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Part I
Trade with Imperfect Competition and
Heterogeneous Firms
1

Chapter 1
The “Almost Static” Melitz (2003)
Trade Model with Fixed Export Costs
In a series of influential papers, Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999,2004),
Bernard, Eaton, Jenson, and Kortum (2003), Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004), among others,
substantiate the existence of large and persistent productivity differences between firms in narrowly
defined industries. They show, inter alia, that even in net export sectors, the fraction of exporting
firms is small, and that the propensity of a firm to export is largely driven by its productivity level.1
While exporting does not feed back to exporters’ productivity, a more pronounced exposure to
trade reallocates resources towards the more productive firms and forces the least productive ones
to exit. Recent theoretical advances by Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), Melitz
and Ottaviano (2005), Yeaple (2005), and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), have confronted
this evidence by explicitly modeling costly trade in environments where firms have heterogeneous
marginal costs and face market entry costs. With a focus on reallocation and firm-selection, this “new
new trade” theory takes technologies as given, and analyzes trade liberalization in settings with zero
steady-state productivity growth. If productivity growth is positive and endogenous, trade-induced
increases in productivity may come at the expense of profit-driven product innovation (Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud, 2007). In knowledge-driven growth models, the aggregate effect on welfare
then depends on the strength of knowledge spillovers in R&D (Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2007).
Similarly, Atkeson and Burstein (2007) show that the exposure to trade fosters process innovation if
1See Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) for a compendium on firms in international trade.
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only a subset of firms exports, but comes at the expense of a large decline in product innovation.2
We contribute to this literature by generalizing the “almost static” Melitz (2003) trade model to
include semi-endogenous variety growth, production using physical capital, and capital accumulation.
To begin with, we introduce the Melitz (2003) model.
1.1 The Melitz (2003) Model
Melitz (2003) has become the workhorse model in international trade theory with productivity dif-
ferences at the firm level.3 Five years after being published in Econometrica, Google Scholar reports
almost 1,000 citations for “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Indus-
try Productivity”.4 In a nutshell, Melitz (2003) adds firm heterogeneity and fixed costs of exporting to
Krugman’s (1980) model of intra-industry trade under monopolistic competition and variable trading
costs. Adjusted to imperfect competition and embedded in a general equilibrium framework, Melitz’
model employs the Hopenhayn (1992) mechanism of firm development based on productivity differ-
ences to explain the markedly heterogeneous impact of international trade on individual firms and
its potential to shift market shares from small and less productive firms to big and more productive
firms within narrowly defined industries. The beauty of Melitz’s (2003) model is that, while remain-
ing analytically tractable, it takes several of the stylized facts about firms in international trade into
account, for which there is no scope within the framework of the new trade theory.5 In particular, the
model provides for pronounced intra-industry productivity differences across firms, small fractions of
2Atkeson and Burstein (2007) conclude from their quantitative results that excluding process innovation generates
very similar dynamic welfare gains, even if process innovation reacts very elastically to trade liberalization.
3Other important contributions in international trade with heterogeneous firms include Bernard, Eaton, and Kortum
(2003), who study heterogeneous firms under Bertrand competition and no fixed costs, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004), who include the possibility of FDI, Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), who dispense with the constant elasticity of
substitution assumption between horizontally differentiated goods, and Yeaple (2005), who explains the heterogeneity
of a priori identical firms by different technology choices and workers with heterogenous skills. See Bernard, Jensen,
Redding, and Schott (2007) for a survey.
4According to the same source, Krugman’s (1980) paper “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern
of Trade” received about 1330 citations in the past 28 years.
5The neoclassical (or “traditional”) trade theory prior to Krugman (1979a,b) employs aggregate production functions
and constant returns to scale technologies, which leave the firm size indeterminate and thus also has no scope for the
impact of trade at the firm level.
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exporting firms in all industries, substantially higher productivity among exporting firms, high fixed
costs of exporting, and no productivity gains from learning by exporting.
The main results of Melitz (2003) are that trade liberalization i) forces the least productive firms to
shut down, ii) shifts resources from less productive firms to more productive firms, iii) allows some
firms to start exporting, and iv) increases profits only for the most productive exporters. Opening to
trade therefore generates substantial turmoil among firms. Melitz (2003) predicts, however, that the
firm selection and resource reallocation induced by the exposure to international trade unambiguously
increases aggregate productivity and welfare.
By accounting for intra-industry firm heterogeneity and an extensive margin of trade liberalization,
the model considerably extends the canonical Helpman-Krugman framework and has proven extremely
fruitful for research into firms in international trade (cf. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007,
for a survey of this strand of literature).
We next introduce the Melitz (2003) model. In deriving the main results on trade liberalization, we
pay special attention to the mechanism at work. To conclude, we specify the fairly general distribution
function for firms’ productivity levels in Melitz (2003) and improve our understanding by deriving a
closed form solution in Section 2.
1.2 Autarky
Following Melitz (2003), we start by describing the model environment in autarky.
1.2.1 Model Setup
The model is described by preferences, firm-specific production technologies, and assumptions about
the production structure in the economy. We consider each in turn. The model is dynamic in nature,
but the analysis is confined to “almost static” stationary equilibria so that there is no need for a time
index. The notion of this “stationary equilibrium” was introduced by Hopenhayn (1992) and will be
explained in more detail below.
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Demand
The model is populated by households whose actions can be summarized in the behavior of a repre-
sentative agent.6 Her preferences exhibit love of variety and are given by
U =
[∫
j∈J
x (j)α dj
]1/α
, 0 < α < 1, (1.1)
where J is the set of available products and x (j) denotes the quantity consumed of good j ∈ J .
All available goods are equally valuable substitutes with a constant elasticity of substitution between
any two goods equal to ε ≡ 1/ (1− α) ∈ (1,∞). If more products become available, e.g. because of
an increasing number of domestic producers or due to international trade, the newly available goods
similarly substitute imperfectly for previously available goods.
Let the aggregate consumption expenditures of the representative consumer be equal to E,∫
j∈J
p (j)x (j) dj = E. (1.2)
Utility is then maximized by choosing consumption bundles so that the marginal rate of substitution
between any pair of goods equals the relative price of the two goods,
∂U/∂x (j)
∂U/∂x (j′)
=
p (j)
p (j′)
, (1.3)
and the marginal utility per unit of expenditures satisfies
∂U/∂x (j)
p (j)
= λ, ∀j ∈ J, (1.4)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in (1.2). From (1.1) we have
∂U
∂x (j)
= U
1
α
−1x (j)α−1 , ∀j ∈ J. (1.5)
As an aside, note that, from (1.5), the marginal utility on the left hand side of (1.4) can be expressed
as U
1
α
−1x (j)α−1 = λp (j), which implies that
x (j) p (j)ε = U
1
αλ−ε (1.6)
6Instead of working with a representative consumer, we could equivalently assume a mass of identical consumers. In
this case, the individual demand functions derived from (1.1) for each consumer can be aggregated across all consumers
and yield demand functions identical to the ones above, with E then referring to the aggregate consumption expenditures
of all consumers. For an introduction on the existence of a representative agent see, e.g., Huang and Litzenberger (1988),
Chapter 5.
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is equal across all j’s. Using (1.5) in (1.3), optimality requires[
x (j)
x (j′)
]α−1
=
p (j)
p (j′)
, ∀j, j′ ∈ J,
or, after solving for x (j),
x (j) =
[
p (j′)
p (j)
]ε
x
(
j′
)
.
Substituting for x (j) in the budget constraint in (1.2) with this expression yields
E =
∫
j∈J
p (j)x (j) dj =
∫
j∈J
p (j)1−ε x
(
j′
)
p
(
j′
)ε
dj. (1.7)
We can pull x (j′) p (j′)ε out of the integral in (1.7) and get (∀j ∈ J)
E = x (j) p (j)ε
∫
j∈J
p (j)1−ε dj. (1.8)
Solving for x (j) yields the optimal demand for each available good:
x (j) =
Ep (j)−ε∫
j∈J p (j)
1−ε dj
, ∀j ∈ J.
The denominator thereby inversely reflects the aggregate price level (ε > 1). Defining the aggregate
price index as
P ≡
[∫
j∈J
p (j)1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
, (1.9)
the demand functions for available products are given by
x (j) =
P ε−1E
p (j)ε
=
[
P
p (j)
]ε E
P
, ∀j ∈ J. (1.10)
A direct consequence of the love of variety embodied in (1.1) is that the demand for each good is
positive as long as its price is finite. The quantity demanded of each good is c.p. decreasing in its
own price and increasing in the expenditure level and the price index (ε > 1) since the other available
goods are competing substitutes.7 The demands in (1.10) are iso-elastic and the price elasticity of
demand is the same for all available goods,
−∂x (j)
∂p (j)
p (j)
x (j)
= εx (j) p (j)−1
p (j)
x (j)
= ε. (1.11)
7An increase in the price index comes both with an income and a substitution effect for the quantity demanded of
each product. First, high overall prices lower the quantity demanded of all goods (the P in the denominator in (1.10)).
Second, the quantity demanded from relatively cheap products is larger (the P in the nominator in (1.10)). The latter
effect dominates as ε > 1.
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A 1% increase in in the total amount spent on consumption c.p. raises the quantity demanded of each
available variety by 1%,
∂x (j)
∂E
E
x (j)
= 1,
i.e., demands are homothetic. Using (1.10), the spending on each product equals
e (j) ≡ p (j)x (j) =
[
P
p (j)
]ε−1
E, ∀j ∈ J. (1.12)
The consumer spends more on a given variety the cheaper this product is relative to the aggregate
price index. If prices scatter over a wide range, there is lots of variation in the equilibrium expenditure
and demand profile across different products if the consumer heavily substitutes relatively expensive
goods against cheaper goods, i.e. if ε → ∞. Evidently, there is only little variation in expenditures
and demands even if prices scatter widely if ε is close to 1.
Production
The economy is endowed with a single non-durable and inelastically supplied primary factor, “labor”,
that serves as the nume´raire. Firms operate under monopolistic competition and produce one product
variety each (j thus indexes both the firm and its product). Entry into the industry is costly (all costs
are wage payments for hiring the required quantity of labor). Upon paying a uniform sunk cost fe,
i.e. “building a firm”, the entrants have access to a constant marginal costs technology. In addition
to the variable costs, the production of output also incurs (quasi-) fixed ”overhead” costs f , so that
production occurs under increasing returns to scale. The production structure is therefore closely akin
to Krugman (1980) with the only difference that fe > 0. Crucially, however, Melitz (2003) adds two
further ingredients. First, firms are heterogeneous with respect to the marginal productivity of their
technologies.8 Second, firms do not know their productivity before entering the market. Newcomers
thus face uncertainty about their market value before entry. Immediately after paying the entry costs,
each firm learns its technology, which is given by the costs c (j, x) of producing x units of good j,
c(j, x) =
x
ϕ (j)
+ f, (1.13)
where ϕ (j) denotes the firm specific marginal productivity of labor. Formally, each ϕ (j) is randomly
drawn from a common and commonly known distribution G (ϕ) defined over R+, G′ (ϕ) ≡ g (ϕ) > 0
and
∫
R+ ϕ
ε−1dG (ϕ) < ∞.9 Firms with a high marginal productivity of labor, i.e. a high ϕ, are able
8A firm’s productivity can equivalently be interpreted as the quality of its product.
9The latter regularity condition ensures that, in equilibrium, the average productivity level is finite.
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to produce a given amount of output at a lower wage cost than less productive firms. The overhead
costs f arise in each period and are identical across all producers.
Firm Entry and Exit
When a firm has learned about its production technology, it decides whether to shut down or to
start production using the realized productivity level. If the firm starts production, it engages in
monopolistic competition with other producers until it is hit by a deadly productivity shock which
then forces instantaneous exit. This idiosyncratic death shock originates from a memoryless stochastic
(Poisson) process that exogenously hits any producer with a common probability 0 < δ < 1 in each
period. Hence, a fraction δ of all producers is forced to exit in every period. Following Melitz (2003),
our attention is confined to stationary equilibria where there is continuous entry and exit of firms, but
the aggregate productivity distribution of producers remains constant over time. In these equilibria,
aggregate output, the number of producers, and each producer’s profit is constant over time (until the
firm exits). While the unconditional exogenous exit of firms is not particularly realistic, it is an easy
way to enable the transition between different stationary distributions of productivity levels after an
exogenous change in the environment. It also implies that the distribution of productivity levels in the
stationary equilibrium is determined by the distribution of productivity levels of new entrants (which
evidently must be stationary itself).10
For simplicity, the interest rate is set to zero so that there is no discounting other than forming
expectations over a producers’ lifetime (we show in Appendix 5.A how a Poisson shock with arrival
rate δ translates into the usual discounting with discount factor e−δt).
A Remark on the Capital Market
Every new firm must raise the entry costs fe. From the point of view of the households, this investment
is uncertain in two dimensions. First, with probability 1 − G (ϕ∗) it yields a positive return pi (ϕ)
where ϕ ≥ ϕ∗. The expected value of this return is uncertain as well. An increase in the cutoff
productivity raises the expected return conditional on an investment that pays at all, but lowers
the fraction of investments that do so. With probability G (ϕ∗), the financed firm fails to draw a
productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ and the return accruing to the investors is zero. The aggregate income must
10In Hopenhayn’s (1992) article, firms’ death rates differ so that the distribution of entrants’ productivities does not
coincide with the stationary equilibrium distribution of producers’ productivity levels.
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thus not be equal to the aggregate wage payments at all times. Note, however, that this will be
the case in the stationary equilibrium. To see this, recall that Melitz (2003) simplifies his model by
assuming zero time discounting (the only discounting is with respect to firm’s market values due to
the productivity death shock, cf. Appendix 5.A). In the stationary equilibrium, therefore, the sum
of dividend payments is equal to the sum of wage payments to the entry workers, i.e. the aggregate
investment in new firms. Accordingly, there is no net income from investing in new firms, the income
of entry workers and payments of investors cancel (cf. Section 1.2.2, Footnote 17, and Section 1.2.3
below). The present value of these income flows would be different, however, if there was positive
time discounting. As noted by Melitz (2003, Footnote 16), the absence of a positive net investment
income is not directly related to the aggregation of heterogenous firms but rather due to the stationary
equilibrium assumption (and zero discounting). A final remark: While Melitz (2003) explicitly chooses
to ignore intertemporal assessments, the assumption of zero time discounting requires Melitz (2003)
to assume an instantaneous utility function equal to the Dixit-Stiglitz index. Households are thus
risk-neutral. We show in a dynamic model of growth and trade in Chapter 3 that risk aversion dues
not alter Melitz’ (2003) results.
Optimal Firm Behavior
A firm’s decision to start production is based on the prospects of its future profits. Since the chance
of dying is the only source of uncertainty once ϕ (j) is revealed, each firm can simply calculate
the expected return from production using its profit maximizing sequence of output quantities and
compare the resulting returns to the necessary fixed costs.
Profit maximization.
Denote by pi (j, x) the period profit of a firm that produces x units of output,
pi (j, x) = p (x (j))x (j)− c(j, x)
where p (x (j)) is the inverse demand for good j implied by (1.10). Given the consumers’ demand curve,
each producer chooses the profit maximizing output quantity, i.e. chooses its output so as to equate
marginal revenues to (the firm specific) marginal costs. From (1.10) and (1.13), optimality requires
∂p (j)
∂x (j)
x (j) + p (j) =
1
ϕ (j)
.
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Using p (x (j)) as implied by (1.10), we get the optimal price as a function of the constant price
elasticity of demand and the marginal productivity of labor employed in firm j,11
1− 1
p (j)ϕ (j)
= − 1
∂x(j)
∂p(j)
p(j)
x(j)
=
1
ε
.
Solving for p (j), the profit maximizing price given the iso-elastic demand (cf. (1.11)) is the usual
markup 1/α, but over firm specific marginal costs 1/ϕ (j) :
p (j) =
1
αϕ (j)
. (1.14)
Firms with a higher marginal productivity of labor charge lower prices and, from (1.11), sell higher
quantities and thus have larger market shares. We derive the firm’s equilibrium output as a function
of the total consumption expenditures E ≡ ∫j∈J e (j) dj. Substituting for p (j) in (1.10) with (1.14),
the quantity supplied by firm j is
x (j) = [αϕ (j)]ε P ε−1E. (1.15)
Given that all firms with identical productivity levels charge the same price and vice versa, p (j) =
p (j′)⇔ ϕ = ϕ′ see (1.14), we can state the equilibrium prices and quantities in (1.10) as functions of
the firm’s productivity levels,
p (ϕ) ≡ 1
αϕ
, (1.16)
x (ϕ, P,E) ≡ (αϕ)ε P ε−1E. (1.17)
Using these functions, the indirect/maximized revenue and profit functions for a firm with productivity
ϕ are given by
r (ϕ, P,E) ≡ p (ϕ)x (ϕ, P,E) =
[
p (ϕ)
P
]1−ε
E = (αϕP )ε−1E, (1.18)
pi (ϕ, P,E) = r (ϕ)− r (ϕ)
p (ϕ)ϕ
− f = (1− α) r (ϕ)− f = (αϕP )
ε−1E
ε
− f. (1.19)
Profits are the usual fraction 1 − α of revenues minus the fixed overhead costs. Note that revenues
and profits vary across firms with different levels of productivity. Profits are strictly increasing in ϕ,
linear in ϕε−1, and pi (0, P, E) = −f < 0.
To summarize, more productive firms (with a higher marginal productivity of labor ϕ) c.p. produce
more output, charge lower prices, and earn higher revenues and profits than less productive firms.
11 ∂p(j)
∂x(j)
= 1∂x(j)
∂p(j)
since p (x) is the (differentiable) inverse of x (p) in (1.10).
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Evidently, more productive firms are larger, i.e. have higher market shares and employ more labor in
equilibrium.
Profitable production.
When a firm has learned its productivity, it decides whether it can produce profitably given the realized
technology. Since the entry cost fe is sunk, the decision to start production boils down to wether or
not a firm is able to cover its fixed overhead costs. The firm thus makes a simple forward looking
decision: if the present value of operating profits exceeds the present value of fixed cost of production,
it will start to produce. Otherwise, it will immediately shut down and exit the market. In a stationary
equilibrium, where the distribution of productivity levels and also P and E are constant, the present
value of profits of a firm with productivity ϕ at time t = 0 equals12
v (ϕ, P,E) = max
{
0,
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)t pi (ϕ, P,E)
}
= max
{
0, pi (ϕ, P,E)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)t
}
=
= max
{
0,
pi (ϕ, P,E)
δ
}
. (1.20)
Each firm treats the aggregates P and E as given. We indicate the firm’s view using a semicolon and
write pi (ϕ;P,E). Since the equilibrium profits are c.p. strictly increasing in ϕ and pi (0, P, E) < 0 (cf.
1.19), (1.20) implies that there is a strictly positive unique cutoff productivity level ϕ∗, below which
firms decide to exit immediately:13
ϕ∗ ≡ inf {ϕ : pi (ϕ;P,E) > 0} (> 0) . (1.21)
12The last equation in (1.20) follows from an infinite geometric series. For 0 < δ¯ ≡ 1− δ < 1,
∞X
t=0
δ¯
t
= 1 + δ¯ + δ¯
2
+ ... ,
δ¯
∞X
t=0
δ¯
t
= δ¯ + δ¯
2
+ ... .
Subtracting the second equation from the first gives
`
1− δ¯´ ∞X
t=0
δ¯
t
= 1,
so that, using the definition of δ¯,
∞X
t=0
(1− δ)t = 1
δ
.
13The infimum is used as firms with productivity ϕ∗ earn zero profits (and thus are indifferent between production
and exit), so that the cutoff ϕ∗ is not part of the set of ϕ′s that permit pi (ϕ) > 0.
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Only firms with productivity larger than ϕ∗ are able to operate profitably and thus start production
in the first place. Accordingly, the distribution of active firms’ productivity levels µ is the distribution
of the population of productivity levels, G (ϕ), conditional on a sufficiently high productivity level
that permits profitable entry, i.e. ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ (there are no producers with productivity ϕ < ϕ∗ and the
probability for entry into manufacturing is 1−G (ϕ∗) > 0):
µ (ϕ,ϕ∗) ≡

G(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗) for ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
0 else
. (1.22)
The equilibrium distribution is endogenously determined from the exogenous distribution via the upper
bound of its support. Evidently, the underlying distribution thus determines the characteristics of the
equilibrium distribution. A notable special case is the Pareto distribution, which, if truncated, again
yields a Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter (cf. Chapter 2).
While the overall equilibrium distribution of ϕ′s remains exogenous, its support [ϕ∗,∞) and thereby
its first moment are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
1.2.2 The Autarky Equilibrium
Following Melitz (2003), we solve the model for a stationary equilibrium where the distribution of
productivities µ (ϕ) is stationary, the number of firms is constant and, as usual, prices and quantities
maximize firms’ profits and households’ utility and all markets clear.
The cutoff productivity is determined together with the average profit of producers by the endogenous
entry and exit decisions of the firms. In particular, we pin down the threshold productivity ϕ∗ by two
equations that naturally emerge from (i) free entry into production and (ii) the minimum productivity
requirement necessary for profitable production (cf. (1.21)).
Free Entry
On the one hand, there is potentially unbounded entry of firms if outsiders expect positive profits in
the market. On the other hand, no firm is willing to enter if it expects negative profits from production
in equilibrium so that the firm deaths would lead to a continuous decline in the mass of producers.
Free entry therefore requires that firms expect zero profits from entering the market, i.e. the ex ante
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expected value of a firm must match the entry costs,14∫
ϕ∈R+
v (ϕ, P,E) dG (ϕ) = fe.
Since v (ϕ) = 0 for all ϕ < ϕ∗ from (1.20) and (1.21), we can equivalently express this equilibrium
condition as ∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pi (ϕ, P,E)
δ
g (ϕ) dϕ = fe.
Inserting the density g (ϕ) of equilibrium productivity levels from (1.22),
g (ϕ) = [1−G (ϕ∗)]µ′ (ϕ) , (1.23)
we then have ∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pi (ϕ) [1−G (ϕ∗)]µ′ (ϕ) dϕ = δfe.
Dividing by 1 − G (ϕ∗), we find that free entry equates the expected per period profit of a producer
(for whom the productivity distribution is given by µ (ϕ)) to the “annuity payment” of the expected
entry costs (on average, it takes 1/ [1−G (ϕ∗)] draws for a sufficiently productive technology with
ϕ ≥ ϕ∗): ∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pi (ϕ) dµ (ϕ) =
δfe
1−G (ϕ∗) . (1.24)
Hence, with free entry, the average profit of a producer, i.e. the average profit of a firm conditional on
starting production after market entry, 15
p¯i ≡
∫ ∞
0
pi (ϕ, P,E) dµ (ϕ) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pi (ϕ, P,E) dµ (ϕ) , (1.25)
depends on the cutoff productivity, P , and E, p¯i = p¯i (ϕ∗, P, E) . Taken together, (1.24) and the
definition in (1.25) yield a first relation between the average profits of a producer and the cutoff
productivity, namely ∫
ϕ∈R+
v (ϕ) dG (ϕ)− fe ≤ 0 ⇔ p¯i = δfe1−G (ϕ∗) . (FEa)
We refer to this equation as free entry condition, FE for short, and use the subscript ’a’ to indicate
autarky. Put differently, given E, the cutoff must be such that P and E drop out from the profit
14We show below that v (ϕ, P,E) is decreasing in the number of producers (like v (j) in Krugman, 1980), so that the
above argument for zero expected profits in fact holds. Note, however, that off the stationary equilibrium considered
in the main text, the expected value of entry may well be strictly negative for some time during the transition to the
stationary equilibrium.
15Since there are no producers with productivities below the cutoff, µ (ϕ) = µ′ (ϕ) = 0 for ϕ < ϕ∗, cf. (1.22).
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function in (1.19) in a way that (FEa) holds. The FE curve is upward sloping in (ϕ∗, p¯i)-space as
g(ϕ) ≥ 0 (see (FEa)).
With (FEa), we have derived a first equation in p¯i and ϕ∗. A second equation in the same variables is
readily obtained from the determination of the cutoff itself.
The Zero Cutoff Profit Condition
Using (1.19), the cutoff in (1.21) defines a relation between the profits of firms operating with pro-
ductivity ϕ∗ and the cutoff productivity level itself. Evidently, pi (ϕ∗) is zero (cf. (1.19), (1.20), and
(1.21)):16
pi (ϕ∗, P, E) = (1− α) r (ϕ∗, P, E)− f = 0. (1.26)
In view of (FEa), all we have to do to obtain a system of two equations in the same variables is to
express the left hand side of (1.26) in terms of the average profits of producers, p¯i. In a stationary
equilibrium, this “translation” is easily achieved since the cutoff is a “sufficient statistic” in that it
contains all relevant information about the equilibrium distribution of productivity types, see (1.22).
Focussing on the stationary equilibrium, we achieve the transition from pi (ϕ∗) to p¯i in two steps. First,
we explicitly derive the productivity level associated with p¯i, i.e. an average productivity. Second, we
employ this average productivity to relate p¯i to pi (ϕ∗), using the functional form in (1.19) for the
average and the cutoff productivity level.
The average productivity level. Together with (1.25), the profit function in (1.19) defines an
average productivity level ϕ˜ by p¯i ≡ pi (ϕ˜, P, E), i.e. ϕ˜ is the productivity of a firm whose profit equals
p¯i. Substituting for pi (ϕ, P,E) with (1.19) in (1.25) and yields
pi (ϕ˜, P, E) =
∫ ∞
0
[
(1− α) (αϕP )ε−1E − f
]
dµ (ϕ) = (1− α) (αP )ε−1E
∫ ∞
0
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)− f.
The second equality follows because the price index can be pulled out of the integral (from (1.6) and
(1.8), P 1−ε = λεEU−1/α is the same for all ϕ) and
∫∞
0 dµ (ϕ) = 1 − µ (0) = 1. Solving for ϕ˜ using
16Since pi (ϕ∗) = 0, equation (1.19) implies that ϕ∗ is a decreasing function of the price index and the aggregate
expenditures,
ϕ∗ =
(εf)
1
ε−1
αE
1
ε−1 P
=
(εf)
1
ε−1
α
`
E
P
´ 1ε−1
P
1
α
.
Intuitively, a decline in real consumption requires a higher efficiency at the firm level. Note, however, that we yet have
to solve for P since given the number of producers, the price index also reflects an average productivity, cf. (1.9) and
(1.16).
16 CHAPTER 1. AN “ALMOST STATIC” MODEL WITH FIXED EXPORT COSTS
(1.19) yields the average productivity:
ϕ˜ =
[∫ ∞
0
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)
] 1
ε−1
. (1.27)
Evidently, as G (ϕ) is exogenous and the support of µ is determined by the cutoff, the average pro-
ductivity depends only on ϕ∗. To get an explicit expression for ϕ˜ as a function of the cutoff, we can
substitute for dµ (ϕ) = µ′ (ϕ) dϕ using (1.22):
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) =
[∫ ∞
0
ϕε−1µ′ (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
ε−1
=
[∫ ϕ∗
0
ϕε−1µ′ (ϕ) dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1µ′ (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
ε−1
=
=
[
1
1−G (ϕ∗)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dG (ϕ)
] 1
ε−1
. (1.28)
Hence, we are now in the position to relate p¯i = pi (ϕ˜, P, E) to pi (ϕ∗, P, E), so that (1.26) and (FEa)
can be solved for the two unknowns p¯i and ϕ∗.
The cutoff productivity level and the average profits. To substitute for pi (ϕ∗, P, E) in (1.26),
note that all producers’ relative revenues depend only on their relative productivities. Dividing (1.18)
for productivity levels ϕ and ϕ′ verifies
r (ϕ, P,E)
r (ϕ′, P, E)
=
(
ϕ
ϕ′
)ε−1
∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗. (1.29)
In particular, using the average and the cutoff productivity, this yields
r (ϕ˜, P, E)
r (ϕ∗, P, E)
=
(
ϕ˜
ϕ∗
)ε−1
∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗. (1.30)
From (1.19), r (ϕ, P,E) = ε [pi (ϕ, P,E) + f ] so that the average profits relate to pi (ϕ∗, P, E) (= 0) by
pi (ϕ˜, P, E) + f =
(
ϕ˜
ϕ∗
)ε−1
[pi (ϕ∗, P, E) + f ] .
Solving for pi (ϕ˜, P, E) = p¯i and noting (1.28), we arrive at
pi (ϕ∗, P, E) = 0 ⇔ p¯i =
{[
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
]ε−1
− 1
}
f, (ZCPa)
where ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) is explicitly given in (1.28). Melitz (2003) coins this equation the zero cutoff profit
condition (ZCP for short), since it simply rephrases that firms with productivity levels below ϕ∗
would incur losses while firms with ϕ > ϕ∗ earn positive profits and pi (ϕ∗) = 0.
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Figure 1.1: Determination of the Autarky Cutoff (Adopted from Melitz, 2003, p. 1704)
Characterization of the Autarky Equilibrium
Equations (FEa) and (ZCPa) can now be solved for the equilibrium values of p¯i and ϕ∗. Given these
values, we can then characterize the entire equilibrium outcome and its welfare properties. Note that
the cutoff productivity level and the average profits are determined by fixed production and entry
costs independently of the endogenous variables P and E (and also do not depend on the country
size). Graphically, Figure 1.1 depicts the FE and the ZCP curves in the (ϕ∗, p¯i)-space. From (FEa),
p¯i is increasing in ϕ∗ (g (ϕ) > 0 for all ϕ so G′ (ϕ∗) > 0) from p¯i (0) = δfe (ϕ ∈ R+ thus G (0) = 0)
to limϕ∗→∞ p¯i (ϕ∗) = ∞. The average profits increase in the cutoff productivity because the average
productivity is increasing in the cutoff and profits are strictly increasing in productivity. In Appendix
1.B, we present Melitz’ (2003) proof that the ZCP cuts the FE curve exactly once (viz., from above),
so that the solution to (FEa) and (ZCPa) in fact exists and is unique.
Given the equilibrium values for p¯i and ϕ∗, we can solve for the number of producers/available varieties.
From (1.19), the average profit of producers equals
p¯i = (1− α) (αϕ˜P )ε−1E − f.
Let M denote the (constant) number of producers in equilibrium. Since µ (ϕ) = 0 for ϕ < ϕ∗, P 1−ε
can be rewritten as (see the detailed derivation in Appendix 1.A)
P 1−ε =
∫ M
0
p (j)1−ε dj =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
(αϕ)ε−1Mµ′ (ϕ) dϕ = αε−1M
∫ ∞
0
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ) =M (αϕ˜)ε−1 . (1.31)
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As an aside, note that the aggregate price index simply is the price index with homogenous firms and
a common marginal productivity of ϕ˜, P = M1/(1−ε)/ (αϕ˜) = p (ϕ˜)M1/(1−ε), cf. (1.16). From (1.31),
(αϕ˜P )ε−1 = 1/M so that with 1− α = 1/ε
p¯i =
E
εM
− f. (1.32)
We are thus left to find a second equation to determineM and E. Melitz’ (2003) model is closed by the
assumption of market clearing. With full employment, total consumption expenditures equal L. To see
this explicitly, start with L = Le+Lp where Le and Lp is labor employed in entry and in production,
respectively, and L is the total stock of labor available. If we denote by Me the mass of firms that
incur the entry costs in each period and resort to a law of large numbers, the resulting mass of new
producers is Me [1−G (ϕ∗)]. In the stationary equilibrium, the mass of entering producers must equal
the mass of dying firms, δM . Hence, the labor market clearing condition becomes
L =Mefe + Lp =
δfe
1−G (ϕ∗)M + LP .
Recognizing that δfe/ [1−G (ϕ∗)] = p¯i from free entry into production, see (1.24), we verify that total
income (i.e. profit plus labor income) equals the total consumption expenditures,
L = p¯iM + LP = E. (1.33)
The entry worker’s income cancels since it equals the investment in new firms that cannot be used for
consumption.17 Returning to the determination of M , we can simply plug E = L in (1.32) and find
the equilibrium number of firms
M =
L
ε (p¯i + f)
. (1.34)
From (FEa) and (ZCPa), the average profit is independent of L. The number of firms is thus higher
in countries with a large labor endowment relative to countries with little labor resources (“large”
countries have a more diversified product portfolio than “small” countries). Equation (1.34) shows
nicely the tension between the number of available products and the productivity with which they are
produced. From (1.19), (FEa), and (1.28), an increase in the cutoff translates into a higher average
productivity and higher average profits, drives down the number of producers and decreases utility
due to the fact that households value variety.
Note, that the increase in the aggregate level of productivity decreases the mass of firms (and hence
the mass of available products) only if the average profit in fact reacts to changes in ϕ∗. If, however,
17p¯i + wL = E + (wL− wLP ).
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the average profit remains constant for all possible cutoff levels, then the number of firms is constant
and there is no trade-off between product diversity and productivity (we explore this feature further
in Chapter 2 below).
Given that a tradeoff between product variety and productivity exists, we are interested to see in
equilibrium whether the decrease in utility due to a reduced number of available products is overcom-
pensated by the impact of lower prices due to more productive producers. To answer this question,
following Melitz (2003), we calculate the period utility of the representative individual (i.e., aggregate
welfare) in the stationary equilibrium. Substituting for the firm index j in the utility function with
productivities ϕ, utility can be rewritten as (cf. Appendix 1.A)18
U =
[∫
j∈J
x (j)α dj
] 1
α
=
[∫ ∞
ϕ∗
x (ϕ, P,E)αMdµ (ϕ)
] 1
α
.
Inserting x (ϕ, P,E) from (1.17) and using E = L from (1.33), U equivalently reads
U = αεM
1
αP ε−1L
[∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕεαdµ (ϕ)
] 1
α
.
Replacing P ε−1 = (αϕ˜)1−ε /M as implied by (1.31) and noting that αε = ε− 1, we have
U = αM
1−α
α Lϕ˜1−ε
[∫ ∞
0
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)
]1/α
.
Since the term in squared brackets equals ϕ˜(ε−1)/α from the definition of ϕ˜ in (1.27), 1−ε+(ε− 1) /α =
1, and (1− α) /α = 1/ (ε− 1), the (per period) welfare in the stationary equilibrium equals
U = αM1/(ε−1)Lϕ˜ (ϕ∗) , (1.35)
where ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) is given in (1.28). Both an increase in the cutoff/average productivity (evidently ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)′ >
0, cf. (1.28)) and an increase in the mass of available products raise utility. To arrive at a conclusive
result, substitute for M using (1.34):
U = α
[
Lε
ε (p¯i + f)
] 1
ε−1
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) .
An increase in the cutoff unambiguously raises utility if p¯i is independent of ϕ∗. In the general case,
we know from (ZCPa) that p¯i + f = (ϕ˜/ϕ∗)ε−1 f, whereby
U = α
(
Lε
εf
) 1
ε−1
ϕ∗. (1.36)
18Melitz (2003) measures welfare W as utility per worker in the steady state equilibrium and simply assigns each
worker one unit of labor. Hence, W = U/L. Cf. the notes on steady state welfare measures and left-out transitional
dynamics in the open economy case in Footnote 24 and Footnote 4 in Chapter 2 below.
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We thus find that an increase in the cutoff productivity level unambiguously increases aggregate
welfare, even if it comes at the cost of a lower mass of available products.
Let us briefly recapitulate the determination and properties of the equilibrium cutoff, mass of firms,
average profits, and welfare. We solved the model for an equilibrium where the distribution of produc-
tivity level remains stationary. The cutoff productivity is a sufficient statistic for this distribution. To
determine the cutoff, we proceeded as follows. The endogenous exit of newcomers with low levels of
realized productivity implies a zero cutoff profit condition, which relates the average profits earned in
the market to the cutoff productivity level. Free entry implies a second equation in the same variables
and imposes that the average profit p¯i depends only on ϕ∗. Hence, we can solve for the equilibrium ϕ∗
and p¯i independently of other endogenous variables. Labor market clearing closes the model. It implies
that the aggregate spending on consumption equals the total of wages earned (E = L).
In the autarky equilibrium, the cutoff productivity ϕ∗ and hence, from (1.28) and (ZCPa), the dis-
tribution of productivity levels and the average profits are independent of the size of the country as
measured by L. The number of producers M is proportional to L and typically decreases with the
average productivity of producers (we provide a counter-example in Section 2). Aggregate welfare,
however, is unambiguously increasing in the average productivity, which is itself increasing in the cut-
off. Welfare is also increasing in L because of the larger mass of available varieties implied by abundant
labor resources/consumption expenditures. To summarize, the equilibrium with firm heterogeneity in
Melitz (2003) can be expressed in terms of a representative firm and as such resembles the autarky
equilibrium in Krugman (1980). Put differently, if the distribution of productivity levels in Melitz
(2003) is “degenerate” with all probability mass at one productivity level, the equilibrium outcome
boils down to that in Krugman (1980).
1.2.3 Who Pays for Entry?
Baldwin (2005) points out that producers in this environment are “luck rentiers”: they earn pure
profits for being lucky enough to draw high productivity levels. Of course, these earnings are necessary
to allow for investments in new firms to break even on average across all productivity types. In
fact, in the stationary equilibrium, the positive profits of incumbent producers exactly cover the
fixed entry investment in each period. To see this, recall that the mass of firms that exits equals
the mass of entrants in the stationary equilibrium. If we denote by M e the mass of entrants, the
mass of producers equals the sum of surviving firms from “the previous period”, (1− δ)M , and the
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mass of new producers (i.e., assuming a law of large numbers, a fraction 1 − G (ϕ∗) of entrants):
M = (1− δ)M + [1−G (ϕ∗)]M e. Solving for the mass of entrants yields
M e =
δM
1−G (ϕ∗) .
Now, multiplying (FEa) by M and using the definition of p¯i in (1.25), we get
fe
δM
1−G (ϕ∗) =M
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pi (ϕ) dµ (ϕ) =
∫ M
0
pi (j) dj.
The investment in new firms is profitable if firms want to enter and the dividends from the incumbent
producers in the stationary equilibrium exactly match the financing needs of the entrants. Accordingly,
the aggregate dividend payments are completely used to cover the entry costs of unlucky entrepreneurs
(with productivity draws ϕ < ϕ∗). However, we assent to Baldwin’s (2005) view that the pure profits
in equilibrium deserve closer attention.
1.3 Open Economy
Consider a world economy where international trade costlessly increases the product market for domes-
tic firms. Suppose furthermore that trade costs do not alter the elasticity of demand and competition
from foreign exporters does not affect the markup charged by domestic firms. Then, all domestic
producers export and the average productivity level is the same as in autarky (as an example, see
Krugman, 1980). Put differently, the usual “replication argument” according to which the multi-
country economy behaves exactly identically to the hypothetical integrated economy that occurs in
the absence of national borders applies in the case without trade costs. Crucially, therefore, Melitz
(2003) adds to this environment fixed costs of exporting to prevent the least productive firms from
exporting – an obstacle strongly supported by empirical evidence. The addition of fixed export costs
leads to substantial new insights on the intra-industry reallocation of resources and the productivity
effects of trade liberalization typically found in firm level trade data. We study these effects after
presenting the open economy model in the next section.
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1.3.1 Additional Assumptions
The world now consists of n+ 1 identical countries of the type described in the autarky section.19 In
particular, each country is inhabited by L individuals. Hence, the wage rate equalizes in all countries.20
International trade is a simple mutual exchange of consumption goods (j). Two trade frictions hamper
the international flow of goods. First, there are variable per-unit iceberg costs, so that τ ≥ 1 units
must be shipped for one unit to arrive. Second, and crucially for Melitz’ (2003) advancements, there
are initial fixed costs fX of exporting, again denominated in units of labor (with exporting, the fixed
production costs accrue only in the local market; see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004, for a similar
model with FDI). Firms decide whether or not to start exporting and incur the fixed cost of exporting
after their productivity level ϕ (j) is realized. This timing structure generates an endogenous selection
of only the most productive firms into exporting, once the fixed costs of exporting prevent some firms
from exporting (recall that profits are c.p. strictly increasing in the firm’s productivity, so that only
sufficiently productive firms can afford to enter into the export market). To simplify the exposition, we
stick to the symmetric case where trade frictions are uniform across all foreign destinations. For the
model to match the stylized fact that only a fraction of all producers exports, we impose the following
parameter restriction (for reasons that will become clear below):
f < τ ε−1δfX . (PA)
Intuitively, this condition ensures that it is more costly to sell a good to a market for a foreign company
than it is for a local company (even if τ = 1).
1.3.2 Equilibrium
The firms’ profit maximization problem is separable in the different destinations of output. In partic-
ular, the optimal price for domestically sold units is not affected by the possibility of exporting. We
19Melitz (2003) briefly considers the case of asymmetric labor endowments (in which free trade of a homogenous good
ensures factor price equalization). He finds that the average productivity, steady state welfare, and wages are higher
in large countries. Falvey, Greenaway, and Yu (2006) additionally include asymmetries in production technologies. In
the case of costly intra-industry trade between a technologically leading country and a laggard country, they find that
reallocation of resources towards the most productive firms is more pronounced in the leading country. If the technological
lead is sufficiently strong, or if a country is sufficiently larger than its trading partner, the superior country will run a
trade surplus in the differentiated goods sector and induce the inferior country to stop production in this sector.
20Note that this does not restrict the size of a country relative to the rest of the world.
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only add to (1.16) a subscript d to indicate domestic sales (exports will be labeled with subscript x),
pd (ϕ) =
1
αϕ
. (1.37)
Accordingly, the revenue and profit functions can be adopted from (1.18) and (1.19). For ϕ > ϕ∗,
rd (ϕ, P,E) = (αϕP )
ε−1E, (1.38)
pid (ϕ, P,E) =
rd
ε
− f. (1.39)
Turning to the exports, iceberg costs increase the marginal costs for exported units without affecting
the elasticity of demand, and fixed exporting costs do not affect the output decision. We can thus
simply treat the production of exported units as if it occurred with productivity ϕ (j) /τ at the firm
level. Hence, exporters charge a constant markup over the effective marginal production costs (variable
production plus trading costs) for each unit sold abroad, cf. the derivation of (1.16):
px (ϕ) =
τ
αϕ
= τpd (ϕ) . (1.40)
Similarly, the resulting equilibrium revenues are readily inferred from (1.38), accounting for the reduced
productivity ϕ (j) /τ for foreign sales:
rx (ϕ, Pi, Ei) =
(
α
ϕ
τ
Pi
)ε−1
Ei = τ1−ε (αϕPi)ε−1Ei = τ1−εrd (ϕ, P,E) . (1.41)
The subindex i refers to the target country 1 ≤ i ≤ n, but since all countries are inhabited by the
same number of people, the aggregate price indices and consumption expenditures are also the same
in all destinations (Pi = P and Ei = E). Exporting firms earn additional revenues rx and incur the
one time entry cost fX in each foreign market. Including the periodized amortization payment fx, the
period profit from exporting to a single country amounts to21
pix (ϕ, P,E) =
rd (ϕ, P,E)
τ ε−1ε
− fx. (1.42)
Both exporting costs reduce the profits from foreign sales. In contrast to the Krugman (1980) model,
however, the fixed export costs imply that not all domestic firms export. From (1.38) and (1.41), it
follows that pix < 0 for firms with a sufficiently low productivity (in particular, pix (0, P, E) < 0).
These firms will not engage in exporting and not sink fX in the first place. If a firm decides to export,
21In the stationary equilibrium with an interest rate equal to zero and no uncertainty other than the death shock,
exporters can borrow the upfront entry payment fX from competitive bankers and pay it back in equal amounts of
fx ≡ δfX per period (so that the lenders make zero profits on average).
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however, it exports in all periods throughout its lifetime and, due to symmetric exporting costs across
all destinations, to all foreign countries. Accordingly, the total profits of a firm with productivity level
ϕ are
pi (ϕ, P,E) = max〈0, pid (ϕ, P,E) + nmax {0, pix (ϕ, P,E)}〉. (1.43)
In the stationary equilibrium, the value of each firm is again given by
v (ϕ, P,E) = max
{
0,
pi (ϕ, P,E)
δ
}
. (1.44)
Just as in autarky, a firm only starts to produce at all if its productivity level exceeds the domestic
cutoff productivity ϕ∗, which is again given by
ϕ∗ = inf {ϕ : pid (ϕ∗) > 0} . (1.45)
Following the same logic, there is now an additional cutoff productivity level for exporting conditional
on producing:
ϕ∗x = inf {ϕ : ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ and pix (ϕ) > 0} . (1.46)
Exporting naturally requires production (i.e., ϕ ≥ ϕ∗) and ϕ∗x defines the lowest productivity level
that allows a firm to export profitably (profits are strictly increasing in productivity and pix(ϕ∗x) = 0).
Empirically, ϕ∗x is binding for the majority of producers. Bernard et al. (2003) find that in 1992, only
21% of U.S. plants report to export at all (and among exporters, only a third sells more than 10% of
its output abroad).22 The parameter assumption in (PA) accounts for this finding by imposing that
ϕ∗x > ϕ∗ holds in equilibrium, so that only a fraction of firms, made up of the most productive firms,
exports (and all exporters also sell domestically).23 Accordingly, there are three types of firms: first,
firms with productivity levels below ϕ∗, which exit immediately upon recognizing their productivity;
second, firms with ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗, which sell only locally; third, the most productive firms with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗,
which sell both locally and export to all countries in the world.
Note that (1.41) allows us to relate the two cutoff productivity levels independently of endogenous
variables. From pix (ϕ∗x) = 0, we have
rd (ϕ∗x, P, E)
ετ ε−1
= fx,
22We are not aware of similar carefully crafted studies with more recent data/other countries. In particular, it would
be interesting to see if similar characteristics hold in Germany, the largest exporter in the world, as well (see, e.g., The
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Viewswire, 2008).
23We prove this implication of the parameter assumption in (PA) below.
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which, from (1.38), implies
(αϕ∗xP )
ε−1E = ετ ε−1fx. (1.47)
Equivalently, pid (ϕ∗) = 0 implies
rd (ϕ∗, P, E)
ε
= f,
which, again using (1.38), can be expressed as
(αϕ∗P )ε−1E = f. (1.48)
Dividing (1.47) by (1.48), P and E drop out due to symmetry and we find
ϕ∗x = τ
(
fx
f
) 1
ε−1
ϕ∗. (1.49)
The threshold productivity for exporting is distorted away from the domestic cutoff by both kinds
of trading costs. Under (PA), τf1/(ε−1)x /f1/(ε−1) > 1. This proves that, in equilibrium, only the most
productive firms export (i.e., ϕ∗x > ϕ∗). The decision to produce is based on the same reasoning as in
autarky, so the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels for all producers is again given by
µ (ϕ) = G (ϕ) / [1−G (ϕ∗)] . (1.50)
The domestic cutoff is a “sufficient” statistic for the impact of trade on the equilibrium distribution
of productivity levels.
The ex ante probability of producing at the time of entry, i.e. before incurring the entry costs fe,
equals
Λ (ϕ∗) ≡ 1−G (ϕ∗) . (1.51)
The ex ante probability of exporting in turn is 1 − G (ϕ∗x). Conditional on starting production (i.e.
conditional on ϕ ≥ ϕ∗), a producer becomes an exporter with probability [1−G (ϕ∗x)] /Λ (ϕ∗). In view
of (1.49), ϕ∗x = ϕ∗x (ϕ∗) so that the conditional probability of exporting is given by
Λx (ϕ∗) ≡ 1−G (ϕ
∗
x (ϕ
∗))
1−G (ϕ∗) < 1. (1.52)
The inequality follows directly from the assumption that only a fraction of firms exports (ϕ∗x ≥ ϕ∗
implies G (ϕ∗x) > G (ϕ∗) , cf. (PA) and (1.49)). To solve for the equilibrium level of the domestic cutoff
ϕ∗, we follow the same steps as before and derive the open economy analogue to the free entry and
zero cutoff profit conditions. Starting with free entry, the expected operating profit must again be
26 CHAPTER 1. AN “ALMOST STATIC” MODEL WITH FIXED EXPORT COSTS
equal to the entry cost fe. By definition of v and pi, both variables are zero for productivity levels that
imply losses so the free entry condition remains unchanged:∫ ∞
0
v (ϕ) dG (ϕ) = fe.
Ex ante, firms anticipate that they either exit immediately (if ϕ < ϕ∗), or earn positive profits from
domestic sales (ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗x), or from both domestic sales and exports (ϕ∗x ≤ ϕ). Hence, (1.43) and
(1.44) allow us to rewrite the free entry condition as∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pid (ϕ, P,E)
δ
dG (ϕ) + n
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pix (ϕ, P,E)
δ
dG (ϕ) = fe.
After multiplying by δ and inserting pid from (1.39) and pix from (1.42), we find∫ ∞
ϕ∗
[rd
ε
− f
]
dG (ϕ) + n
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
[
rd (ϕ;P,E)
τ ε−1ε
− fx
]
dG (ϕ) = δfe.
Dividing by 1 − G (ϕ∗), inserting ϕ∗x = ϕ∗x (ϕ∗) from (1.49), and recognizing dG (ϕ) =
[1−G (ϕ∗)] dµ (ϕ) from (1.50),∫ ∞
ϕ∗
[rd
ε
− f
]
dµ (ϕ) + n
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
[
rd (ϕ;P,E)
τ ε−1ε
− fx
]
dµ (ϕ) =
δfe
1−G (ϕ∗) (1.53)
where ϕ∗x (ϕ∗) is explicitly given in (1.49). Analogously to the closed economy, the left hand side is
the average/expected profit earned by a producer, which now includes profits from domestic sales and
also, potentially, additional exporting profits. We can again use the free entry condition to define an
average productivity of producers and label the associated profits, i.e. the left hand side of (1.53), p¯i.
With this definition, the free entry condition is formally identical to the FE condition in autarky:
p¯i =
δfe
1−G (ϕ∗) . (FE)
We continue to use the free entry condition to derive the average productivity of domestic producers,
which then can be used to state the zero cutoff profit condition in the open economy in terms of p¯i and
ϕ∗. The average productivity is again a function of the local market cutoff productivity only. After
drawing f and fx out of the integrals in (1.53), using (1.51), and rearranging we have∫ ∞
ϕ∗
rd
ε
dµ (ϕ) + n
[
τ1−ε
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
rd (ϕ;P,E)
ε
dµ (ϕ)
]
=
δfe
Λ (ϕ∗)
+ f + nfxΛx (ϕ∗) . (1.54)
Finally, using the specific form for revenues from (1.38) and noting (FE),
(αP )ε−1E
ε
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)+Λx (ϕ∗)n
[
τ1−ε
(αP )ε−1E
ε
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
ϕε−1
Λx (ϕ∗)
dµ (ϕ)
]
= p¯i+f +nfxΛx (ϕ∗) .
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In view of (1.38), we can define the average productivity of all domestic producers in the home market,
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) ≡
[∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)
] 1
ε−1
=
[
1
1−G (ϕ∗)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dG (ϕ)
] 1
ε−1
, (1.55)
as well as the average productivity of exporting producers excluding the variable trading costs,
ϕ˜x (ϕ
∗) ≡
[∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
ϕε−1
Λx (ϕ∗)
dµ (ϕ)
] 1
ε−1
=
[
1
1−G (ϕ∗x)
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
ϕε−1dG (ϕ)
] 1
ε−1
. (1.56)
These definitions allow us to state the average profit of a producer as
p¯i = pid (ϕ˜, P, E) + Λx (ϕ∗)npix (ϕ˜x, P, E) . (1.57)
This formulation makes explicit that ϕ˜ is the average productivity of domestic producers as measured
only in the domestic market. Evidently, the average productivity of domestic firms is even higher if
take account of the fact that only the most productive firms export and thereby gain further market
shares relative to the less productive producers who only sell locally. Observe also that the trading
costs τ , which are modeled as iceberg costs that do not generate any income, are not accounted for in
ϕ˜x. Accordingly, we assess aggregate productivity with ϕ˜ and ϕ˜x.
Returning to the derivation of the ZCP, the next step is to relate pid (ϕ˜, P, E) and pix (ϕ˜x, P, E) to ϕ∗.
This is easily achieved in analogy to the autarky case and separately for the domestic and the foreign
market as follows. Using (1.39), pid (ϕ˜, P, E) explicitly reads
pid (ϕ˜d, P, E) =
rd (ϕ˜d)
ε
− f = (αϕ˜dP )
ε−1E
ε
− f.
Expressing the relative domestic revenues of producers with productivity levels ϕ˜ and ϕ∗ in terms of
their profits, respectively, yields
rd (ϕ˜d)
rd (ϕ∗)
=
pid (ϕ˜d) + f
pid (ϕ∗) + f
.
Hence, as pid (ϕ∗) = 0,
pid (ϕ˜d) = f
[(
ϕ˜d (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
)ε−1
− 1
]
. (1.58)
Similarly, from (1.42) and (1.49), we have
pix (ϕ˜x, P, E) =
rd (ϕ˜x;P,E)
τ ε−1ε
− fx = τ1−ε
[
rd (ϕ˜x;P,E)
ε
− f
]
+ τ1−εf − fx.
The relative revenues from exporting for firms with productivity levels ϕ˜x and ϕ∗x, respectively, thus
can be expressed as
rx (ϕ˜x)
rx (ϕ∗x)
=
pix (ϕ˜x) + fx
pi (ϕ∗x) + fx
,
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where, using pi (ϕ∗x, P, E) = 0 and (1.41),
pix (ϕ˜x, P, E) =
[(
rx (ϕ˜x)
rx (ϕ∗x)
)
− 1
]
fx =
[(
ϕ˜x (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗x
)ε−1
− 1
]
fx. (1.59)
Finally, inserting (1.58) and (1.59) in (1.57), we arrive at the zero cutoff profit condition in the open
economy:
p¯i = f
[(
ϕ˜d (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
)ε−1
− 1
]
+ Λx (ϕ∗)nfx
[(
ϕ˜x (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗x
)ε−1
− 1
]
. (ZCP )
Recall that the closed economy ZCP is given by a similar expression without the second summand
(ϕ˜d with trade corresponds to ϕ˜ in autarky). With (ZCP ) and (FE), we again have two equations in
two unknowns which can be solved for the average profits p¯i and the local cutoff productivity level ϕ∗.
Inserting the domestic cutoff in (1.49) then directly gives the cutoff productivity level for profitable
exporting. In Appendix (1.B), we present Melitz’ (2003) proof for (ZCP ) to cut the FE curve once
from above, so that a unique equilibrium exists in the open economy as well.
We are left to determine the mass of local producers, M, and the mass of exporters, Mx. The as-
sumption of identical countries simplifies this solution. In particular, balanced trade requires that the
spending on imported varieties of local consumers equals the (gross i.e. before accounting for the ice-
berg costs) revenues of domestic exporters in the foreign countries, so that the revenues of all domestic
firms equal the consumption expenditures of local consumers on all available products. Denoting the
average revenues of domestic producers from local and export sales E/M by r¯ (expenditures on im-
ported goods equal the aggregate revenues of domestic producers from exports), and using E = L
from (1.33), which is equally valid in the open economy, this gives
Mr¯ = E = L. (1.60)
We can thereby directly infer the average revenue
r¯ =
∫ ∞
0
r (ϕ) dµ (ϕ) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
rd (ϕ) dµ (ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
rx (ϕ) dµ (ϕ)
from the average profits in (1.54) using (FE):
r¯ = ε [p¯i + f + nΛx (ϕ∗) fx] . (1.61)
After substituting for r¯ in (1.60), the equilibrium number of local producers is
M =
L
ε [p¯i + f + nΛx (ϕ∗) fx]
. (1.62)
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Resorting to a law of large numbers, the mass of exporters is Mx = Λx (ϕ∗)M (< M). Since the
equilibrium distributions of productivity levels are identical throughout the world, the mass of im-
ported products is nMx = nΛx (ϕ∗)M . Hence, the mass of available varieties in the domestic market
is Mt ≡M + nMx = [1 + nΛx (ϕ∗)]M. Alternatively, using rd (ϕ˜t, P, E) = L/Mt (Mt firms with aver-
age productivity ϕ˜t receive a total spending of E = L and revenues can be described by (1.38)) and
rd (ϕ∗, P, E) = εf together with (1.38) for ϕ = ϕ∗ and ϕ = ϕ˜t, we have
L
εfMt
=
rd(ϕ˜t,P,E)
rd(ϕ∗,P,E)
=
(
ϕ˜t
ϕ∗
)ε−1
,
and hence
Mt =
(
ϕ∗
ϕ˜t
)ε−1 L
εf
. (1.63)
We can also solve for the price index which now additionally includes the prices of imported products:
P 1−ε ≡
∫
j∈J
p (j)1−ε dj =
∫ M
0
pd (j)
1−ε dj +
∫ nMx
0
px (j)
1−ε dj,
where we use in the second summand that the firm index is a number and that firms can always
be rearranged along the real line so that j in [0, nMx] indicates the imported products from the
n countries. Analogously to the derivation of (1.31), the j′s can be substituted against ϕ′s using
integration by substitution (cf. Appendix 1.A):
P 1−ε =
∫ M
0
pd (j)
1−ε dj+
∫ nMx
0
px (j)
1−ε dj =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
pd (ϕ)
1−εMµ′ (ϕ) dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
px (ϕ)
1−ε nMxµ′ (ϕ) dϕ.
As for the last term, we used the fact that the domestic markets’ cut-off productivity level is the
same in all countries, so that µ is the distribution of productivity levels in each country. Inserting the
equilibrium pricing rules from (1.37) and (1.40), we obtain
P 1−ε =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
(αϕ)ε−1Mdµ (ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
(αϕτ)ε−1 nMxdµ (ϕ)
= αε−1
[
M
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ) + τ ε−1nMx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)
]
.
Using the definitions of ϕ˜d and ϕ˜x, (1.55) and (1.56), the price index further becomes
P 1−ε = αε−1
[
M
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ) + τ ε−1nMx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)
]
.
If we finally define the average productivity level of all producers competing in a country as
ϕ˜t (ϕ
∗) ≡
{
1
Mt
[
M
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ) + τ1−εnMx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ)
]} 1
ε−1
, (1.64)
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the price index boils down to
P =
1
αϕ˜tM

−1
t
, (1.65)
which is analogous to the autarky case. In contrast to the definitions of ϕ˜ or ϕ˜x, that refer to the
actual productivity of firms, ϕ˜t also takes into account that productive exporters gain additional total
market shares due to the fact that some, less productive producers only sell locally and the decline in
aggregate output due to the ”melting” of shipped units.
Finally, consider aggregate welfare in the stationary equilibrium.24 Households derive utility from
consuming domestically produced and imported products. Substituting for firms j with productivity
levels ϕ (cf. Appendix 1.A) and recognizing (1.49) gives
U =
[∫
j∈J
x (j)α dj
] 1
α
=
[
M
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
xd (ϕ, P,E)
α dµ (ϕ) + nMx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
xx (ϕ, P,E)
α dµ (ϕ)
] 1
α
.
Inserting xd (ϕ, P,E) = rd (ϕ, P,E) /pd (ϕ) = (αϕ)
ε P ε−1E, xx (ϕ, P,E) = rx (ϕ, P,E) /px (ϕ) =
(αϕ)ε τ−εP ε−1E, and E = L from (1.37), (1.38), (1.40), (1.41), and (1.33), U can be rewritten as
(note that εα = ε− 1)
U = αεP ε−1L
[
M
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ) + τ1−εnMx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x(ϕ∗)
ϕε−1dµ (ϕ) dµ (ϕ)
] 1
α
.
Now, inserting P = (αϕ˜t)
1−ε /Mt and replacing the expression in squared brackets with ϕ˜ε−1t Mt, see
(1.64), we find
U = αLM1/(ε−1)t ϕ˜t (ϕ
∗) , (1.66)
similar as in autarky, but with the average productivity and the number of firms referring to the total
of domestic products and imports. To derive aggregate welfare as a function of the domestic cutoff
productivity ϕ∗, substitute for M1/(ε−1)t in U with Mt from (1.63):
U = α
(
Lε
εf
) 1
ε−1
ϕ∗. (1.67)
Note that this expression is identical to (1.36) under autarky. The impact of trade on aggregate welfare
thus becomes apparent from the impact of trade on the domestic cutoff.
24Melitz (2003) assesses the impact of trade on aggregate welfare by a comparison of welfare levels in the steady state
equilibria of different trade regimes, thus ignoring welfare along the transitional path. Alessandria and Choi (2007) take
the transitional dynamics into account and find that, if calibrated to U.S. data, the stationary comparison is ill-suited
for the purpose of measuring welfare gains of trade policies, cf. footnote 4 in Chapter 2 below.
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1.3.3 The Impact of Trade
In this model, producers self-select into the domestic and the export market according to their level
of productivity by the assumption on exporting costs in (PA). The main message from Melitz’ (2003)
model is thus not the partitioning of producers into exporters and non-exporters. Its explanatory
power rather lies in the ability to generate resource reallocations along two margins. First, opening up
to trade allows some firms to start exporting and forces the least productive firms to exit the market.
Second, international trade reallocates resources among surviving producers and shifts market shares
from less productive domestic firms and exporters to the most productive exporters.
To assess these effects, we compare the open economy equilibrium to the equilibrium in autarky
and first analyze how the opening up to trade affects the domestic productivity cutoff, the average
producers’ profits, the mass of available products, and aggregate welfare. Subsequently, we study how
the exposure to trade has the potential to reallocate resources within industries.
The market share shifting and exit of the least productive producers equivalently occurs if open
economies decrease barriers to trade further (see Melitz, 2003, Appendix E for a proof). Instead of
studying the effects of a larger number of trading partners and smooth declines in the iceberg and
export market entry costs in the general model, we consider, as an example, a specified distribution of
productivity levels in Chapter 2. This allows us to derive a closed form solution and provide an easier
understanding of the mechanisms at play.
The Firm Distribution, Aggregate Productivity, and Welfare
To begin with, we compare the domestic cutoff productivity level under autarky to the respective
figure in the open economy. Under both regimes, ϕ∗ is determined together with p¯i independently of
other endogenous variables by the FE and the ZCP condition. We re-state the open economy variants
of both conditions for convenience:
p¯i =
δfe
1−G
(
ϕ∗(a)
) (FE)
p¯i = f

 ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗(a)
)
ϕ∗(a)
ε−1 − 1
+ Λx (ϕ∗)nfx
{[
ϕ˜x (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗x (ϕ∗)
]ε−1
− 1
}
(ZCP)
The FE curve is identical under both regimes. Relative to the ZCP curve in autarky, the ZCP curve in
the open economy has an additional summand (which is positive whenever there is some trade so that
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Λx (ϕ) > 0 since ϕ˜x (ϕ∗) ≥ ϕ∗x (ϕ∗)). That is, the ZCP curve in the open economy is the ZCP curve
in autarky shifted upwards. It follows that the cutoff productivity level ϕ∗ in the domestic market
is increasing. Evidently, the increasing minimum productivity raises the average productivity based
on domestic market shares ϕ˜, cf. (1.55). This productivity increase is accompanied by an increase in
the average profit from domestic sales and added export sales, p¯i. That is, while the possibility for
international trade allows firms with productivity levels ϕ ≥ ϕ∗x to serve the export markets, at the
same time, it forces the least productive firms to cease production.
The opening to trade thereby leads to a decline in the mass of domestic producers: as p¯i increases and
nΛxfx > 0, (1.62) implies thatM is unambiguously lower than under autarky. Typically, however, the
total mass of available products increases, since the mass of different imported products exceeds the
mass of firms that exit due to the exposure to trade. Interestingly, however, Mt (= (1 + nΛxfx)M)
may also be smaller than the mass of available products under autarky (nΛxfx > 0 but M decreases).
In this case, we infer from (1.35) and (1.66) that ϕ∗/ϕ˜ in autarky is strictly greater than ϕ∗/ϕ˜t in
the open economy with international trade. Since the domestic cutoff unambiguously increases if the
economy opens up to international trade, it has to be that ϕ˜t strictly exceeds ϕ˜ in autarky (this
property need not hold in general since ϕ˜t includes the decline in output due to iceberg costs).25
No matter whether both the mass of available products and aggregate productivity increase or only
aggregate productivity increases, trade liberalization unambiguously increases aggregate welfare since
the gain in aggregate productivity outweighs the loss of variety. Trade exposure increases ϕ∗ which,
from (1.67), unambiguously increases welfare.
Intra-Industry Resource Reallocation
To begin with, opening up to international trade allows sufficiently productive firms to start exporting.
At the same time, the least productive firms are driven out of the market. This observation suggests
that trade liberalization benefits the most productive and harms the least productive producers. In
fact, the surviving, non-exporting firms become smaller and earn lower revenues than in autarky. To
see this, denote autarky variables by a subscript ’a’ and consider (1.29) noting that r (ϕ∗, P, L) = εf
25In general, ϕ˜t must thus not exceed the average productivity as defined by ϕ˜ under autarky. Melitz (2003, Appendix
D.3), however, shows that any revenue weighted average productivity, measured “at the factory gate” (Melitz, 2003, p.
1721), i.e. before the iceberg costs occur, must unambiguously increase with trade openness.
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both in the open economy and in autarky. This gives
ra (ϕ, Pa, L) =
(
ϕ
ϕ∗a
)ε−1
εf, (1.68)
rd (ϕ, P, L) =
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
)ε−1
εf, (1.69)
so that ra (ϕ, Pa, L) > rd (ϕ, P, L) since ϕ∗ > ϕ∗a. Melitz (2003, Appendices D.2 and E.2), however,
shows that producers who export earn higher combined revenues from domestic sales and exports
than in autarky, ra (ϕ, Pa, L) < rd (ϕ, P, L)+nrx (ϕ, P, L). Including the export market entry costs, it
can be shown that only the most productive exporters gain from trade liberalization, i.e. that there
is a threshold productivity level that separates the most productive exporters who gain from trade
from the remainder of producers.26 Evidently, the exposure to trade thus raises the inequality in profit
levels across all producers.
The model thus accounts for two major empirical facts. First, it is consistent with the findings by
Bernard and Jensen (1999), Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000), and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998),
that opening up to trade drives the least productive firms out of the market. Second, as surviving
non-exporters shrink while exporters grow, the equilibrium characteristics are in line with the evidence
uncovered by Pavcnik (2002) and Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), namely that trade induces a
large scale reallocation of resources from the less productive, surviving firms to the most productive,
exporting firms.
The bottom line of the preceding analysis is that trade liberalization unambiguously increases aggre-
gate productivity (which drives the increase in welfare). We now take a closer look at the mechanism
behind the productivity gain.
Deciphering the Productivity Effects from Wages and Competition
In principle, two forces can account for the exit of the least productive firms. First, following trade
liberalization, domestic producers compete with an increased number of imports produced by the
most productive foreign manufacturers. Second, relative to autarky, the most productive firms aim
at earning additional profits from exports and thus increase their labor demand to conduct export
26The proof for the last two statements in the general case with an unspecified utility function involves somewhat
more cumbersome comparative statics of the combined revenues of exporters with respect to τ , so that we do not
reproduce them and refer to Melitz (2003, Appendices D.2 and E.2). Instead, we demonstrate these claims in the case
of Pareto-distributed productivities below (cf. Chapter 2).
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entry and expanded production. In addition, the increase in the average profits induces more firms to
enter, again increasing the aggregate demand for labor for the conduct of entry and the subsequent
production. Since the total stock of labor is fixed, the corresponding increase in the real wage lowers
profits and thereby forces the least productive firms to exit. Melitz (2003) asserts that the monopo-
listic competition model with CES preferences restrictively shuts down the “increasing competition”
channel, since the price elasticity of demand is independent of the number of competitors and their
productivity. Note, however, that the “increasing competition” effect works through two forces. On
the one hand, the average productivity of competitors increases because only the most productive
firms export. This increase in competition indeed does not affect the profits of incumbent producers
due to the CES assumption and monopolistic competition. On the other hand, however, the mere fact
that imports increase the number of different products available in the domestic market drives down
the (Dixit-Stiglitz) market share of each domestic incumbent. The constant elasticity of substitution
implies that the decline in revenues is proportional across all varieties, but the increased horizontal
competition also has the potential to force the least productive firms to exit. Solving for the tran-
sitional dynamics following trade liberalization, Chaney (2005) proves that immediately after trade
liberalization occurs, the least productive domestic producers exit because of the market entry of
foreign firms. Subsequently, resources reallocate towards the most productive firms and the aggregate
productivity gain is due to both an increase in the real wage and horizontal competition.
Accounting for the Extensive Margin of Trade Liberalization
Note that the addition of fixed costs for exporting together with heterogeneous firms substantially
extends earlier findings on the effects of trade liberalization as e.g. obtained from Krugman’s (1980)
model. In Melitz (2003), there is an endogenous self-selection of firms into the export markets implies
an extensive margin of trade. That is, while a lowering in (variable) trading costs in Krugman (1980)
simply induces all firms to export more, lowering both fixed and variable export costs not only increase
the trading quantity of all previously active exporters, but also induces some firms to export which
did not export before trade liberalization occurred. In Krugman (1980) all firms export to begin with
and trade liberalization only has an intensive margin. Hence there is no possibility for some firms to
lose from trade.
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1.3.4 Measured Productivity
In this model, firm-level productivity is defined as the marginal productivity of labor in a firm, ϕ.
When looking at the data, however, productivity at the firm level is often measured as output per
worker, i.e. by the average productivity of labor in each firm. In the model, such a measure is ill suited
if it excludes fixed costs. In fact, if we exclude fixed costs and output is measured by revenues, “output
per worker” is the same for all firms: from (1.16), we have
r (j)
x (j) /ϕ (j)
= ϕ (j) p (j) =
1
α
,
where we substituted for j with ϕ in the output, price, and revenue functions to define x (j), p (j), and
r (j) (we do the same for the domestic and export variants below without further remark). Consider,
however, a similar productivity measure including the fixed overhead costs (using (1.17) and (1.18)):
P(j)≡ r (j)
x(j)
ϕ(j) + f
=
[αϕ (j)P ]ε−1
αε [ϕ (j)P ]ε−1 + f
=
1
α+ f
[αϕ(j)P ]ε−1
.
P(j) is c.p. strictly increasing in ϕ(j). Analogously, a theoretical counterpart of the “measured pro-
ductivity” of an exporting firm and a non-exporting firm are
Px(j) ≡ rd (j) + nrx (j)
xd(j)
ϕ(j) + n
τxx(j)
ϕ(j) + f + nfx
and Pd(j) ≡ rd (j)
xd(j)
ϕ(j) + f
,
respectively. xx (ϕ) in the denominator of Px is thereby the quantity sold in the export market for
which τxx units must be shipped (and hence produced) for xx units to arrive. Px can be simplified
by substituting for rx = τ1−εrd from (1.41) and xx = rx/px = τ1−εrd/ (τpd) = τ−εxd from (1.40) and
(1.41):
Px ≡
(
1 + nτ1−ε
)
rd (j)
(1 + nτ1−ε) xd(j)ϕ(j) + f + nfx
= Pd
(
1 + nτ1−ε
) [xd(j)
ϕ(j) + f
]
(1 + nτ1−ε) xd(j)ϕ(j) + f + nfx
= Pd
xd(j)
ϕ(j) + f
xd(j)
ϕ(j) +
f+nfx
1+nτ1−ε
.
Hence, Px > Pd if and only if
f >
f + nfx
1 + nτ1−ε
⇔ f > τ ε−1fx = τ ε−1δfX ,
i.e. under the previous parameter assumption (PA). Hence, the model is in fact in line with the evidence
on heterogeneity in measured productivity if fixed costs are included, with exporters outperforming
the non-exporters.
As an aside, note that the logic of the Melitz model imposes a clear direction of causality for the
positive correlation between the measured productivity and a firm’s export status: firms export because
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they are more productive than their non-exporting competitors, and not because they anticipate a
technological improvement by exporting.27
1.4 A Remark on the ZCP Condition
Melitz (2003) proves that the ZCP curve cuts the FE curve exactly once (viz., from above). The slope
of the ZCP curve is thus not essential for the result that opening up to trade, i.e. an upward shift
of the ZCP curve, increases the domestic cutoff. Given that the ZCP pins down the average profit of
producers, however, we should be aware of the fact that the slope of the ZCP curve is determined by
the assumptions on G (ϕ) , which exogenously fix ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) /ϕ∗. In general, p¯i can be upward or downward
sloping in (p¯i, ϕ∗)-space depending on whether ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) /ϕ∗ is in- or decreasing in ϕ∗. Melitz states that
a sufficient condition for the ZCP to decrease monotonically from infinity to zero is that Γ (ϕ) is
increasing to infinity where
Γ (ϕ) ≡ ϕg (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ)
To see this, note first that limϕ∗→0 p¯i (ϕ∗) = ∞ (if the ZCP curve depends on ϕ∗, i.e. ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) is not
linear in ϕ∗). The ZCP is decreasing to zero in the limit as ϕ∗ →∞ if
ω (ϕ) ≡
[
ϕ˜ (ϕ)
ϕ
]ε−1
− 1
is strictly monotonically decreasing in ϕ since ω (ϕ) > 0 (ϕ˜ (ϕ) > ϕ follows from the definition in
(1.28) for any non-degenerated distribution). In Appendix 1.B, Equation (A.2) we derive
ω′ (ϕ) =
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ)ω (ϕ)−
(ε− 1) [ω (ϕ) + 1]
ϕ
.
Hence, ω′ (ϕ) < 0 if and only if
Γ (ϕ) < (ε− 1)
[
1 +
1
ω (ϕ)
]
,
which holds if Γ (ϕ) is increasing to infinity. This property holds for most common distributions
(restricted to a positive support). Note, however, that ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) /ϕ∗ may also be independent of the
cutoff productivity, namely if ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) is linear in ϕ∗ (a case not considered in Melitz, 2003). The ZCP
27Also, “productivity” in the model is the only determinant of a firm’s profit and hence for the decision to export.
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is horizontal in (p¯i, ϕ∗)-space if ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) is linear in ϕ∗ so that ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) /ϕ∗ is independent of ϕ∗.28 In this
case, the average profit is independent of the cutoff. To grasp this feature, consider again the ZCP
condition (repeated here for convenience):
p¯i =
{[
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
]ε−1
− 1
}
f.
p¯i is increasing in ϕ∗ if ϕ∗ϕ˜′ (ϕ∗)− ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) > 0 or, equivalently,
∂ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
∂ϕ∗
ϕ∗
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
≡ εϕ˜,ϕ∗ > 1.
Similarly, an increase in the cutoff implies a decrease in p¯i if εϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1. If ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) is linear in ϕ∗, εϕ˜,ϕ∗ = 1
and p¯i = const.×f . We can readily assess the economic effects behind εϕ˜,ϕ∗ . We derived (ZCPa) using
(1.30), whereby [
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
]ε−1
=
r (ϕ˜, P, E)
r (ϕ∗, P, E)
=
r (ϕ˜, P, E)
f
.
We just showed that this term is increasing if εϕ˜,ϕ∗ > 1, decreasing if εϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1, and constant if
εϕ˜,ϕ∗ = 1. From (1.18) and E = L we hence know that ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)P is increasing in ϕ∗ if εϕ˜,ϕ∗ > 1,
decreasing if εϕ˜,ϕ∗ < 1, and constant if εϕ˜,ϕ∗ = 1. That is, εϕ˜,ϕ∗ captures two opposing effects on
r (ϕ˜) : on the one hand, the increase in ϕ∗ raises ϕ˜ and hence directly the average profits, cf.(1.19)
for a given P . On the other hand, the average profit is decreasing in the aggregate productivity of
producers, which shows up as a low aggregate price level. In equilibrium, from (1.31), ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)P equals
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)P = M1/(ε−1)/α. Hence, the direct and indirect effects of ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) and P on p¯i determine the
reaction of the number of available products as ϕ∗ changes. In particular,
εϕ˜,ϕ∗ R 1⇒ ∂M
∂ϕ∗
R 0.
This implies that comparative statics of aggregates that are indirectly influenced by ϕ∗ via p¯i with
respect to ϕ∗ crucially depend on our choice of G (ϕ) . This is particularly important in the theoretical
28Evidently, ϕ˜ increases with ϕ∗ (as long as the underlying distribution is not a degenerated one-point distribution).
The marginal change in the average productivity is given by
ϕ˜′ (ϕ∗) =
[1−G (ϕ∗)] ϕ˜a
(ε− 1) R∞
ϕ∗ ϕ
ε−1dG (ϕ)

g (ϕ∗)
[1−G (ϕ∗)]2
Z ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dG (ϕ)− g (ϕ
∗)
1−G (ϕ∗) (ϕ
∗)ε−1
ff
=
g (ϕ∗) ϕ˜
(ε− 1) R∞
ϕ∗ ϕ
ε−1dG (ϕ)
»
1
1−G (ϕ∗)
Z ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dG (ϕ)− (ϕ∗)ε−1
–
=
g (ϕ∗) (ϕ˜)2−ε
(ε− 1) [1−G (ϕ∗)]
h
(ϕ˜)ε−1 − (ϕ∗)ε−1
i
> 0.
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literature, which often resorts to the Pareto distribution when a closed form solution is needed (see,
amongst others, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008, and Gustafson and Segerstrom, 2007). We will see
in Chapter 2 that the ZCP curve is flat in the (p¯i, ϕ∗)-space under Pareto-distributed productivities
since εϕ˜,ϕ∗a = 1. In this case the direct effect via ϕ˜ (ϕ
∗) and the indirect effect via P on p¯i exactly
offset each other, so that p¯i is independent of ϕ∗ which implies that the number of producers is also
independent of the cutoff.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the rule for integrating by substitution which is used throughout the previous
sections to substitute for firms with index j by productivity levels ϕ and Melitz’ (2003) proof for the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in his seminal model.
Appendix 1.A Substituting for Firms with Productivity Levels
Consider the previously defined price index
P 1−ε ≡
∫
j∈J
p (j)1−ε dj =
∫ M
0
p (j)1−ε dj
and the equilibrium price
p (j) =
1
αϕ
.
We aim at integrating over ϕ’s instead of j’s in the price index, since the price of all goods is a function
of their productivity levels, p (j) = p (j (ϕ)). We thus apply the substitution rule from integral calculus.
Intuitively speaking (under some condition, which are pointed out below), we may apply a substitution
rule to the integrand and the inverse of the substitution rule to the limits of integration and integrate
over ϕ instead of integrating over j. In the price index example, we thus need to find a substitution
rule s for j, namely s : [ϕ∗,∞] → [0,M ]. Since the firm index is just a number which can always be
rearranged so that it indicates increasing levels of productivity, we define
s (ϕ) ≡Mµ (ϕ) .
s (ϕ) is increasing in ϕ, with s (ϕ∗) = Mµ (ϕ∗) = 0 and limϕ→∞ s (ϕ) = limϕ→∞Mµ (ϕ) = M .
To perform the substitution, we replace j by s (ϕ) and adjust the limits of integration by applying
s−1. Since each firm’s price depends only on the firm’s productivity level, substituting for j in the
integrand simply means that we regard p (j (ϕ))1−ε as p (ϕ)1−ε . From the definition of s, dj = ds (ϕ) =
Mµ′ (ϕ) dϕ. The new limits of integration are also readily given: from s (ϕ∗) = 0 we have s−1 (0) = ϕ∗
and limϕ→∞ s (ϕ) =M gives limM→∞ s−1 (M) =∞. Taken together, we have
P 1−ε =
∫ M
0
p (j)1−ε dj =
∫ s−1(M)
s−1(0)
p (ϕ)1−εMµ′ (ϕ) dϕ =M
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
p (ϕ)1−ε dµ (ϕ) .
In what follows, we state the substitution rule somewhat more precisely and provide a short proof.
Here is the rule for integration by substitution of the variable x ≡ s (t) for a definite integral:
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If I is a real valued integral I ⊆ R, s : [γ1, γ2]→ I is a continuous, differentiable function,
and f : I → R is a continuous function, then∫ s(γ2)
s(γ1)
f (x) dx =
∫ γ2
γ1
f (s (t)) s′ (t) dt. (A.1)
A short proof is given as follows. Suppose we are given functions f, s, and s′ that satisfy the required
assumptions on continuity and differentiability. Continuity implies that F ′ ≡ f exists so that F (s (t))
is defined. Taking the derivative with respect to t, we have
F (s (t))′ (t) = F ′ (s (t)) s′ (t) = f (s (t)) s′ (t)
over the domain t ∈ [γ1, γ2] . Integrating this expression yields the desired result, i.e. equation (A.1):∫ γ2
γ1
f (s (t)) s′ (t) dt = F (s (γ2))− F (s (γ1)) =
∫ s(γ2)
s(γ1)
f (x) dx.
In our case, I corresponds to the interval [0,M ], s is s (ϕ) from above, γ1 and γ2 are given by ϕ∗ and
∞, respectively, whereby limϕ→∞ s (ϕ) = M and s (ϕ∗) = 0, and f (x) is given by p (j)1−ε . To verify
our result from above, we simply plug these expressions into (A.1), recognizing that f (s (t)) is simply
p1−ε (j (ϕ)) = p1−ε (ϕ), ds (ϕ) =Mµ′ (ϕ) , and dt = dϕ:∫ M
0
p (j)1−ε dj =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
p (ϕ)1−εMµ′ (ϕ) dϕ.
Appendix 1.B Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
In this appendix we reproduce Melitz’ (2003) proof for the ZCP to cut the FE curve once from above
in (ϕ, p¯i) space so that a unique equilibrium exists. We start with the autarky case and subsequently
consider the equilibrium with international trade.
1.B.1 Existence and Uniqueness of the Autarky Equilibrium
If a solution exists, from (FEa) and (ZCPa), it satisfies
f
{[
ϕ˜ (ϕ)
ϕ
]ε−1
− 1
}
=
δfe
1−G (ϕ) ⇔
δfe
f
= Φ(ϕ) ≡ ω (ϕ) [1−G (ϕ)] .
ϕ˜ (ϕ) is given in (1.28) (with ϕ∗ replaced by ϕ, so that the index of integration must be changed to
some other variable to avoid confusion), so that ω (ϕ) > 0 as long as the distribution is non-degenerate.
Thus, if Φ (ϕ) is strictly monotonically decreasing from ∞ to 0 on (0,∞), a unique intersection with
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δfe/f exists so that there is a unique solution to p¯i and ϕ∗ in from (FEa) and (ZCPa); the same is true
if Φ (ϕ) were strictly monotonically increasing from 0 to∞, but we directly see that limϕ∗→0Φ (ϕ) =∞
as limϕ∗→0 ω (ϕ) =∞. Hence, we are left to show that dΦ (ϕ) /dϕ < 0 and that Φ (ϕ) decreases to (at
least) zero. To see this, recall from footnote 28 that
ϕ˜′ (ϕ∗) =
g (ϕ∗) (ϕ˜)2−ε
(ε− 1) [1−G (ϕ∗)]
[
(ϕ˜)ε−1 − (ϕ∗)ε−1
]
> 0.
Accordingly,
ω′ (ϕ) = (ε− 1)
{
ϕ˜ε−2g (ϕ) ϕ˜2−ε
ϕε−1 (ε− 1) [1−G (ϕ)]
[
ϕ˜ε−1 − ϕε−1]− ϕ˜ε−1
ϕε
}
= (A.2)
= (ε− 1)
[
g (ϕ)
(ε− 1) [1−G (ϕ)]
(
ϕ˜
ϕ
)ε−1
− g (ϕ)
(ε− 1) [1−G (ϕ)] −
1
ϕ
(
ϕ˜
ϕ
)ε−1]
=
=
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ)ω (ϕ)−
(ε− 1) [ω (ϕ) + 1]
ϕ
. (A.3)
Therefore, Φ′ (ϕ) is easily calculated:
Φ′ (ϕ) = ω′ (ϕ) [1−G (ϕ)]− ω (ϕ) g (ϕ) = −(ε− 1) [ω (ϕ) + 1] [1−G (ϕ)]
ϕ
< 0.
Moreover, the elasticity of Φ (ϕ) is strictly negative as ω (ϕ) > 0,
∂Φ (ϕ)
∂ϕ
ϕ
Φ
= − (ε− 1)
[
1 +
1
ω (ϕ)
]
< − (ε− 1) < 0
so that Φ (ϕ) is decreasing to zero in the limit as ϕ → ∞ (Φ′ (ϕ) < 0 and Φ > 0 from the last
inequality), which completes the proof.
1.B.2 Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium with International Trade
The equilibrium in the open economy is determined by the FE condition and the open economy
adjusted ZCP condition. The solution satisfies (FE) and (ZCP )
f
{[
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
]ε−1
− 1
}
+ Λx (ϕ∗)nfx
{[
ϕ˜x (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗x (ϕ∗)
]ε−1
− 1
}
=
δfe
1−G (ϕ∗) ,
or, equivalently using the definitions of ω (ϕ), Φ (ϕ) , and Λx (ϕ∗) , and recognizing (1.49),
fω (ϕ∗) + Λx (ϕ∗)nω (ϕ∗x) fx =
δfe
1−G (ϕ∗) ⇔ fΦ (ϕ
∗) + fΦ (ϕ∗x (ϕ
∗)) = δfe.
Φ (ϕ) was shown above to decrease from infinity to zero on (0,∞). Since the left hand side is a
non-negative linear combination of Φ′s while the right hand side is horizontal, a unique intersection
exists.
42 CHAPTER 1. AN “ALMOST STATIC” MODEL WITH FIXED EXPORT COSTS
Chapter 2
Melitz (2003) with Pareto-Distributed
Productivities
To improve our understanding of the equilibrium characteristics, we consider a particular specification
for G (ϕ) and assume that productivity levels are drawn from a Pareto distribution:
G˜ (ϕ) ≡
 1−
(
ϕ
0
ϕ
)k
if ϕ ≥ ϕ0 > 0
0 else
, (2.1)
where k > ε− 1. The corresponding density is
g˜ (ϕ) ≡ G˜′ (ϕ) =
 kϕk0ϕ−(k+1) if ϕ ≥ ϕ0 > 00 else .
This assumption was made e.g. by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2007), Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) and others. Figure 2.1 illustrates G˜(ϕ), g˜(ϕ) together with
the resulting distribution of active firm’s productivities µ(ϕ) and µ′(ϕ) for an arbitrary cutoff. We
again start by deriving the equilibrium in autarky.
2.1 Autarky
2.1.1 Equilibrium Conditions
Under the Pareto assumption, the average productivity ϕ˜ is linear in the cutoff so that ϕ∗ drops out
from (ZCPa). The ZCP curve is therefore horizontal in the (p¯i, ϕ∗)-space so that the average profits
are exogenously determined (by k, , and f).
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Figure 2.1: The Pareto Specification: Illustration of the Underlying and Equilibrium Productivity
Distributions
To begin with, using G˜ (ϕ) in (1.22), the distribution of productivity levels of producers is given by
µ (ϕ,ϕ∗) =

1−
“ϕ
0
ϕ
”k
“ϕ
0
ϕ∗
”k for ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
0 else
.
Hence, the density is
µ′ (ϕ,ϕ∗) =
 k (ϕ∗)
k ϕ−(k+1) if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
0 else
. (2.2)
Substituting for µ′ (ϕ) in (1.27) with (2.2), using ε− 1− k < 0 and β ≡ k/(k− ε+1) > 1, the average
productivity level of a producer in equilibrium equals
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) =
[∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1µ′ (ϕ) dϕ
] 1
ε−1
=
[
(ϕ∗)k k
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−k−2dϕ
] 1
ε−1
=
{
(ϕ∗)k
k
ε− 1− k
[
ϕε−1−k
]∞
ϕ∗
} 1
ε−1
= β
1
ε−1ϕ∗. (2.3)
Note, that the average productivity is linear in the cutoff productivity level. This proves the earlier
remark on the slope of the ZCP condition, namely that a Pareto distribution implies
εϕ˜,ϕ∗ =
∂ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
∂ϕ∗
ϕ∗
ϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
= β
1
ε−1
ϕ∗
β
1
ε−1ϕ∗
= 1.
A one percent increase in the equilibrium cutoff raises the average productivity by exactly one percent.
Using (2.3) in (ZCPa), we find the ZCP curve to be horizontal,
p¯i = (β − 1) f. (Z˜CP a)
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Using G˜ (ϕ) in (FEa) directly, the FE condition reads
p¯i = δfe
(
ϕ∗
ϕ
0
)k
. (F˜Ea)
The fact that the ZCP curve is flat and strictly positive in (p¯i, ϕ∗)-space while the FE curve starts at
the origin and increases monotonically to infinity proves that a unique steady state exists.
2.1.2 The Autarky Equilibrium under the Pareto Distribution
From (Z˜CP a) and (F˜Ea), the equilibrium cutoff productivity equals
ϕ∗ =
[
(β − 1) f
δfe
] 1
k
ϕ
0
. (2.4)
The minimum productivity requirement is increasing in the overhead costs, but decreasing in the
market entry costs. The equilibrium average profit is directly given in (Z˜CP a). Under the Pareto
assumption, it depends only on the overhead costs. Since the average profit is independent of ϕ∗ under
Pareto-distributed productivities, the number of producers M = ε/r¯ (r¯ = p¯i + f) is also independent
of ϕ∗ (in particular, it is independent of the upfront costs fe) and, using (Z˜CP a) in (1.34), equals
M =
L
εβf
. (2.5)
The mass of producers is increasing in the size of the country and decreasing in the overhead costs.
Aggregate profits, however are independent of f , Mp¯i = (1− 1/β)L/ε. Note, however, that f affects
the average productivity positively and thereby generates a trade-off between the mass of available
products and the productivity in production:1
ϕ˜ = β
1
ε−1
[
(β − 1) f
δfe
] 1
k
ϕ0. (2.6)
Interestingly, low entry costs imply a high average productivity. Since decreasing fe increases the av-
erage productivity without altering the average profits, entry costs do not affect the mass of producers
either. Since M is independent of the entry costs, the mass of workers hired for market entry in the
stationary equilibrium must be independent of fe, too. Using (2.4) and (2.5) verifies
feM
e =
δM(
ϕ0
ϕ∗
)k = δL (β − 1)εβδ .
1This is given the distribution of productivities. One way of capturing technological progress is an outward shift of
the support of G (ϕ). Another one is to endogenize the availability of new products, cf. Chapter 3.
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Evidently, this is a direct implication of the ZCP curve being horizontal under the Pareto distribution.
As a caveat, suppose that we had actual discounting in addition to δ. The interest rate would then
simply add to δ in the denominator in (2.4), suggesting a co-movement of interest rates and average
productivity. In Section 3, we explicitly include physical capital as a factor in production in a variant
of the Melitz (2003) model with positive growth and show that in this environment, ϕ∗ and hence ϕ˜
are not affected by the interest rate.
Finally, using ϕ∗ from (2.4) in (1.36), (instantaneous) aggregate welfare amounts to
U = α
(
Lε
εf
) 1
ε−1
[
(β − 1) f
δfe
] 1
k
ϕ0
or, after collecting parameters,
U =
ε− 1
f(
1
ε−1− 1k )
(
L
ε
) 1
α
(
β − 1
δfe
) 1
k
ϕ0.
Welfare is increasing in L (and ε) and decreasing in δ, f, and fe. From (2.5), larger countries, i.e.
economies with abundant labor supply, generate a high product diversity, which per se is valuable
to the consumer, see (1.35). With respect to welfare, the productivity-raising impact of increasing
overhead costs is dominated by the accompanied decrease in product variety. Similarly, barriers to
entry, as measured by fe, unambiguously lower welfare – even with M and feM e unaffected by fe.
Since P = M1/(1−ε)/(αϕ˜) as implied by (1.31) and ϕ˜ is independent of L (due to the independence
of ϕ∗ from L, see (2.4)), the high product diversity in labor abundant economies also implies a lower
aggregate price level. We can explicitly solve for the price index using (2.3) and (2.5):
P =
[
M
1
ε−1αϕ˜ (ϕ∗)
]−1
=
(
L
εβf
) 1
1−ε
αβ
1
ε−1ϕ∗
=
(
εf
L
) 1
ε−1
α
[
(β−1)f
δfe
] 1
k
ϕ
0
=
( ε
L
) 1
ε−1
(
δf
1
β−1 fe
β − 1
) 1
k
(αϕ
0
)−1.
The aggregate price index is decreasing in L and increasing in δ, f, and fe. It reflects the scarcity of
labor as indicated by the real wage 1/P .
2.1.3 On the Impact of Fixed Production and Entry Costs on the Cutoff
The preceding analysis revealed that the cutoff is increasing in the overhead costs f and decreasing in
the entry costs fe (see (2.4)). Here we take a closer look at the effects exerted by fixed production and
entry costs and how they affect the average productivity. Our point of departure is the price index
from above, where we substitute for ϕ˜ from (2.6):
αϕ˜ (ϕ∗) = αβ
1
ε−1ϕ∗ =
1
P
M
1
ε−1
. (2.7)
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C.p., there are two channels through which the overhead costs affect the average productivity level:
the real wage (1/P )-channel and the M -channel. The channels have countervailing effects. First, if we
hold M constant, potential entrants compete for scarce labor and the most productive firms “win”
since they can afford to pay high wages. Therefore, holding the mass of producers constant, the
average productivity of entrants exceeds the average productivity of incumbent producers, leading to
a rise in ϕ˜. Second, however, if we fix the real wage, entrants must have a lower average productivity
than incumbents, since less productive firms demand less labor in equilibrium. Thereby labor demand
remains at a level compatible with the fixed real wage 1/P . C.p. this decreases the average productivity.
A decline in both f and fe raises the real wage. In the case of fe under G˜ (ϕ) , where the ZCP is
horizontal in (ϕ∗, p¯i)-space, M remains unaffected, so that the decline in entry costs raises the average
productivity. In fact, the increase in the average productivity is true in any case, i.e. even if a decline
in fe induces additional entry. We can infer from Figure 1.1 that the impact via the 1/P channel
dominates the impact via the M channel (since ϕ∗ goes up): if the ZCP is downward sloping, lowering
fe implies a decline in p¯i and hence an increase in the number of producers. The decline in M absorbs
the increase in the minimum productivity due to the increase in the real wage only to some extent. If
the ZCP curve is upward sloping, this means that a decrease in fe goes together with an increase in p¯i
and hence a decreasing number of producers. In this case, the decline inM reinforces the exit pressure
on the least productive firms exerted by the increase in the real wage. Note that utility is increasing
both in productivity and in product variety. Given this tension, a closer closer look at the strength of
the gains from specialization implicitly determined in the consumers’ preferences is an interesting task
for future work (cf. footnote 7).2 in this direction. Interestingly, with Pareto-distributed productivities,
there is no effect on M as ϕ∗/ϕ˜ (ϕ∗) changes due to fe. A decline in fe then only affects utility via its
positive impact on aggregate productivity.
The overhead costs affect productivity through both channels. In the case of f , however, the decline
in the cutoff due to a larger mass of available products outweighs the productivity gains from rising
wages (otherwise, the cutoff would actually increase with ϕ˜, see (2.4) or, equivalently, from the sta-
tionary condition δM =M e [1−G (ϕ∗)] with M fixed, an increase in M e must be accompanied by an
increase in ϕ∗). Accordingly, a decline in f induces less productive firms to enter and their products
2The framework with specialized capital goods in Section 3 further provides the point of departure for disentangling
the degree of substitutability from the degree of market power along the lines of Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005).
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overcompensate the consumer for her utility loss from higher prices.
Dying producers at first relax the resource constraint (so that labor becomes less scarce and 1/P falls
as δ increases). Likewise, an increase in δ therefore lowers the real wage and allows less productive
firms to start production: ϕ∗ falls.
To summarize, we have seen that the impact of fixed costs works through the labor market. The over-
head costs and the market entry costs thereby work through two channels, one emphasizing product
variety, the other emphasizing low prices/high productivity. Overhead costs thereby have a stronger
impact via their effect on product variety relative to productivity. In the case of entry costs, this
relation is reversed and the productivity channel dominates. These observations also hold when we
dispense with the Pareto assumption. We have seen, however, that the Pareto assumption implies
εϕ˜,ϕ∗ = 1, i.e. a flat ZCP curve. The only effect of fe is then on productivity as M remains unaffected
by entry costs. In general, falling entry costs raise the cutoff by more, the higher the slope of the ZCP
curve. In case of the Pareto distribution, it is zero.
We next turn to the open economy.
2.2 Open Economy
2.2.1 Equilibrium Conditions
The cutoff productivity is again determined by the FE and the ZCP conditions. Given the definition of
p¯i, international trade does not affect the FE curve, see (FE), hence (F˜Ea) holds in the open economy
also:
p¯i = δfe
(
ϕ∗
ϕ0
)k
. (F˜E)
The first summand of the ZCP condition (repeated here for convenience),
p¯i = f
{[
ϕ˜d (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
]ε−1
− 1
}
+ Λx (ϕ∗)nfx
{[
ϕ˜x (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗x
]ε−1
− 1
}
,
is the same as in autarky,
f
{[
ϕ˜d (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗
]ε−1
− 1
}
= f (β − 1) .
We are thus left to calculate the second term. From (2.3), ϕ˜x/ϕ∗x equals ϕ˜/ϕ∗ = β
1/(ε−1). Due to the
fact that the average productivity is linear in the cutoff under the Pareto distribution, the cutoff drops
out from this ratio. Applying the Pareto specification to (1.51) and (1.52), the probability of starting
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production is
Λ (ϕ∗) = 1− G˜ (ϕ∗) =
(
ϕ0
ϕ∗
)k
so that, from (1.49), the probability of exporting equals
Λx (ϕ∗) =
(
ϕ0
ϕ∗x
)k
Λ (ϕ∗)
=
(
ϕ0
ϕ∗x
)k
(
ϕ0
ϕ∗
)k = (ϕ∗ϕ∗x
)k
=
(
f
τ ε−1fx
) β
β−1
, (2.8)
where we used k/(ε − 1) = β/ (β − 1). Substituting for Λx (ϕ∗) and ϕ˜x/ϕ∗x from above, the expected
additional profits from exporting, i.e. the additional term in the open economy ZCP condition is
Λx (ϕ∗)nfx
{[
ϕ˜x (ϕ∗)
ϕ∗x
]ε−1
− 1
}
=
 f
τ ε−1f
1
β
x

β
β−1
n (β − 1) .
Define further
0 < σ ≡ τ−k
(
f
fx
) 1
β−1
<
fx
f
.
The second inequality thereby follows from (PA).3 Taken together, the ZCP condition is given by
p¯i = (β − 1) f + n (β − 1)
 f
τ ε−1f
1
β
x

β
β−1
= (β − 1) f (1 + nσ) . (Z˜CP )
This verifies the earlier assessment that (Z˜CP ) is the ZCP curve from autarky shifted upwards,
accounting for the additional profit opportunities in the export markets for producers with productivity
levels above ϕ∗x. Given the definition of p¯i based on ϕ˜ and ϕ˜x, the average profit is independent of the
cutoff productivity. Including the possibility of exporting raises p¯i above the average profit in autarky
as long as there is some trade, i.e. as long as τ and fx are finite.
2.2.2 Equilibrium with International Trade
Substituting for p¯i in (Z˜CP ) with (F˜E), the cutoff associated with profitable production equals
ϕ∗ =
[
(β − 1) f
δfe
(1 + nσ)
] 1
k
ϕ0. (2.9)
3The parameter assumption that guarantees partitioning into exporters and non-exporters can be rewritten as
fx
f
τε−1 > 1 ⇔
„
f
fx
« β
β−1
τ−k < 1
so that
0 < τ−k
„
f
fx
« 1
β−1
<
fx
f
.
Inserting the definition of σ yields the expression above.
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Relative to the autarky cutoff, the only difference is the additional summand in the squared brackets,
i.e. ϕ∗ = (1 + nσ)1/k ϕ∗. Using the definition of σ in (1.49), we have
ϕ˜ = σ−
1
k
(
f
fx
)− 1
k
ϕ∗. (2.10)
Substituting for ϕ∗ with (2.9), the cutoff productivity level for exporting is given by
ϕ∗x = σ
− 1
k
(
f
fx
)− 1
k
[
(β − 1) f
δfe
(1 + nσ)
] 1
k
ϕ0 =
[
(β − 1)nfx
δfe
(
1 +
1
nσ
)] 1
k
ϕ0.
Switching from autarky to some limited level of trade openness discretely raises the domestic cutoff ϕ∗
and forces the least productive firms to shut down. The intuition for this is, contrary to the claim in
Melitz (2003), twofold. First, as argued by Melitz, the additional production of the exporting firms bids
up the wage rate, thereby leading to a decline in all firms’ domestic revenues and shifting market shares
from non-exporters to exporters. Second, all local producers’ market shares shrink proportionally as
foreign products become available (cf. the discussion in Section 1.3.3 above).
By inspection of (2.9), the domestic cutoff productivity level is monotonic in n, fx, and τ and converges
to the autarky cutoff as barriers to trade become prohibitive (τ →∞ and/or fx →∞ so that σ → 0)
or n → 0. Hence, a smooth change in the exposure to trade has a similar impact as the switch from
autarky to some limited level of trade openness. In particular, taking the derivative of ϕ∗ with respect
to n, τ , and fx shows that the least productive firms exit as the barriers to trade, τ or fx, fall. At the
same time, a reduction in either τ or fx allows some non-exporting producers to start exporting (ϕ∗x is
decreasing as τ or fx fall). An increase in the number of trading partners induces the least productive
exporters to cease exporting (ϕ∗x rises with n).
From (2.10) and the definition of σ, Λx = (ϕ∗/ϕ∗x)
k = σf/fx. Using the average profit p¯i from (Z˜CP )
and substituting for Λxfx = σf , the average revenue as derived in (1.61) reads
r¯ = ε [p¯i + f + nΛxfx] = ε [(β − 1) f (1 + nσ) + f (1 + nσ)] = εβf (1 + nσ) .
Therefore, the mass of domestic producers is given by
M =
L
r¯
=
1
ε (1 + nσ)
(
L
βf
)
<
L
βf
,
which is lower than in autarky, see (2.5). Corresponding to our assessment above, everything that
raises revenues from exports, like a decline in τ or fx so that σ increases, or an increase in the number
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of trading partners, reduces the mass of domestic producers. A reduction in the barriers to trade
(σ increases) similarly allows more producers to become exporters, increasing the number of trading
partners again reduces the mass of exporters (Mx is increasing in σ and falls in n):
Mx =MΛx (ϕ∗) =
σ ffx
ε (1 + nσ)
(
L
βf
)
=
σ
ε (1 + nσ)
(
L
βfx
)
.
Accordingly, there are
Mt = [1 + nΛx (ϕ∗)]M =
1 + nσ ffx
ε (1 + nσ)
(
L
βf
)
goods available in each economy, so that, under G˜ (ϕ), the consumer has more goods available with
trade if and only if f ≥ fx (recall that M was L/ (βf) in autarky). Under (PA), τ ε−1fx > f so that
both f > fx and f < fx is possible if τ > 1.
To calculate the average productivity of all producers, ϕ˜t, note that from the definition of ϕ˜ and ϕ˜x
and their expressions under the Pareto assumption above∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dG˜ (ϕ) =
[
1− G˜ (ϕ∗)
] ∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ ⇔
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕε−1dµ = β (ϕ∗)ε−1 ,∫ ∞
ϕ∗x
ϕε−1dµ = β (ϕ∗x)
ε−1 = βτ ε−1
(
fx
f
)
(ϕ∗)ε−1 .
Substituting for these expressions in ϕ˜t from (1.64) gives
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mβ (ϕ∗)ε−1 + τ1−εnMxβτ ε−1
fx
f
(ϕ∗)ε−1
]} 1
ε−1
= β
1
ε−1ϕ∗
(
M
Mt
+
Mx
Mt
n
fx
f
) 1
ε−1
.
Inserting the shares of domestically produced and exported goods,
M
Mt
=
1
1 + nσ ffx
,
and nMx/Mt = 1−M/Mt, we find
ϕ˜t =
(
1 + nσ
1 + nσ ffx
) 1
ε−1
β
1
ε−1ϕ∗.
Recall that β1/(ε−1)ϕ∗ was the average productivity in autarky. The average productivity, not measured
”at the factory gate” but via ϕ˜t, i.e. including the output shrinkage from iceberg costs, may be larger
or smaller than under autarky, depending on the relative size of f and fx. If the fixed exports costs
are sufficiently high so that fx > f , the term in brackets is less than 1 so that the increase in ϕ∗ due to
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international trade may not be sufficient for ϕ˜t to exceed ϕ˜ from autarky. In the opposite case where
f ≥ fx, ϕ˜t, the average productivity in the open economy exceeds the average productivity in autarky.
In what follows, we show that even if φ˜t falls, aggregate welfare will increase with trade openness in
the stationary equilibrium.
We firstly calculate the equilibrium price index by inserting Mt and ϕ˜t in (1.65):
P =
M
1
1−ε
t
αϕ˜t
=
(
1+nσ f
fx
ε(1+nσ)
) 1
1−ε (
L
βf
) 1
1−ε
α
(
1+nσ
1+nσ f
fx
) 1
ε−1
β
1
ε−1
[
(β−1)f
δfe
(1 + nσ)
] 1
k
ϕ0
=
(
L
εf
) 1
1−ε
α
[
(β−1)f
δfe
(1 + nσ)
] 1
k
ϕ0
.
For comparison, the price index under autarky was
Pa =
(
L
εf
) 1
1−ε
α
[
(β−1)f
δfe
] 1
k
ϕ
0
.
International trade triggers an expansion of the production of the most productive firms, which trans-
lates into an increase in labor demand and therefore an increase in the real wage (the inverse of the
price index).
Using the expression for P , the instantaneous utility flow in the stationary equilibrium equals
U = αϕ˜tM
1/(ε−1)
t L =
L
P
= α
(
Lε
εf
) 1
ε−1
[
(β − 1) f
δfe
(1 + nσ)
] 1
k
ϕ0.
Again for comparison, the corresponding figure under autarky is
Ua = α
(
Lε
εf
) 1
ε−1
[
(β − 1) f
δfe
] 1
k
ϕ0.
In this environment, international trade unambiguously raises the level of welfare in the stationary
equilibrium (U > Ua whenever there is some international trade, i.e., if σ is bounded away from zero).
Note, however, that we do not evaluate the welfare effects along the transition path from the stationary
distribution under autarky to the new stationary distribution.4
4Calibrating a variant of the Melitz (2003) model to match the U.S. employment size distribution of manufacturing
establishments, Alessandria and Choi (2007) find that steady state consumption is a notoriously bad measure of welfare
(especially in the presence of sunk costs to exporting). They find that, in models with fixed costs of exporting, comparing
steady state consumption levels after trade liberalization understates welfare gains and overstates welfare gains in models
without fixed costs. Cf. Chaney (2005) on the transitional dynamics of trade reforms in a Melitz-type model.
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2.2.3 Who Wins from Trade Liberalization?
Finally, we use our example to demonstrate the reallocation effects among surviving producers exerted
by international trade (evidently, producers that are forced to shut down lose).5 We already know from
the discussion in Section 1.3.3, that non-exporters unambiguously lose from trade, since their domestic
revenues decline: rd,a (ϕ, Pa, L) < rd (ϕ, P, L). Since exporting comes with fixed costs and domestic
revenues also decline for exporters, there exists a productivity level ϕ¯ > ϕ∗x such that all producers
with ϕ < ϕ¯ lose from trade and producers with ϕ ≥ ϕ¯ gain from trade. The threshold is implicitly
defined by
pia (ϕ¯, Pa, L) ≡ pid (ϕ¯, P, L) + npix (ϕ¯, P, L) . (2.11)
Solving for ϕ¯, we find6
ϕ∗x < ϕ¯ =
[
nfxf
(1 + nτ1−ε)− (1 + nσ)β−1β
] 1
ε−1
ϕ∗ =
 (nσ)
β−1
β
(
nfxf
) 1
β
(1 + nτ1−ε)− (1 + nσ)β−1β

1
ε−1
ϕ∗x.
5This subsection presents the discussion in Melitz (2003) for a Pareto-specified distribution of productivity levels.
6Inserting the expressions for profits, (2.11) becomes
ra (ϕ¯, Pa, L)
ε
− f = `1 + nτ1−ε´ rd (ϕ¯, P, L)
ε
− f − nfx.
Using (1.68) and (1.69) to replace
ra (ϕ¯, Pa, L)
ε
=
„
ϕ¯
ϕ∗a
«ε−1
f and
rd (ϕ¯, P, L)
ε
=
„
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
«ε−1
f,
and rearranging terms yields
ϕ¯ε−1
h`
1 + nτ1−ε
´
(ϕ∗)1−ε − (ϕ∗a)1−ε
i
= n
fx
f
.
Inserting ϕ∗/ (1 + nσ)1/k = ϕ∗a we find
„
ϕ¯
ϕ∗
«ε−1 h`
1 + nτ1−ε
´− (1 + nσ) β−1β i = nfx
f
.
Solving for φ¯ yields the first expression above, substituting for ϕ∗ using (2.9) gives the second expression.
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Formally, the inequality sign follows from σ > 0, β > 1, and n ≥ 2.7 The impact of trade on the
industry equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.2. As argued above, opening up to trade raises the
cutoff productivity from its autarky level ϕ∗a to ϕ∗. This increase comes with a decline in revenues for
surviving firms that do not find it profitable to engage in exporting. Another increase in the exposure
to trade raises the domestic cutoff further and lowers the cutoff for exporting profitably. The formally
least productive exporters loose profits. Sufficiently productive firms, those with ϕ ≥ ϕ¯, gain additional
profits.
7This is easily verified as follows. For ϕ¯ > φ∗x to hold, it has to be that
(nσ)
β−1
β
„
n
fx
f
« 1
β
>
`
1 + nτ1−ε
´− (1 + nσ) β−1β .
Inserting the definition of σ on the left hand side, collecting terms, and rearranging, it equivalently has to hold that
(1 + nσ)
β−1
β > 1.
σ > 0, β > 1, and n ≥ 2 imply that this is true.
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Figure 2.2: Reallocation of Market Shares and Profits (Adopted from Melitz, 2003, p. 1715)
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Appendix 2.A The Distribution of Input Coefficients
In Chapter 3 below we work with the distribution of input coefficients b ≡ 1/ϕ instead of productivity
levels. We can simply infer their density h (b) from G (ϕ) :8
h (b) = g
(
1
b
)
·
∣∣∣∣( 1ϕ
)′∣∣∣∣
ϕ=b
.
In particular, using a Pareto distribution for G (ϕ), i.e. the specification of G˜ in (2.1), we find
h (b) = g˜
(
1
b
)
·
∣∣∣∣( 1ϕ
)′∣∣∣∣
ϕ=b
= kϕk0b
k+1 · ∣∣−b−2∣∣ = kϕk0bk−1.
Hence, after integrating, the distribution function of input coefficients that implies Pareto-distributed
productivity levels is
H (b) =
(
b
b0
)k
, b ∈ (0, b0]
where b0 ≡ 1/ϕ0.
8The expression for h (b) above follows from the definition of b ≡ 1/ϕ as a monotonically decreasing and differentiable
function for all ϕ > 0. More generally, if f (x) is the (value of the) density of a continuous random variable x (at “x”),
then, if y = u (x) with u a continuous and monotonic function over all x for which f (x) 6= 0 (so that the inverse of u
exists) the density of y is h (y) = f
`
u−1 (y)
´ · | `u−1´′ (y) | given that u′ (x) 6= 0 (elsewhere, g (y) = 0)˙. See e.g. Freund
and Walpole (1980).
Chapter 3
A Dynamic Trade Model with
Heterogeneous Firms and
Semi-Endogenous Growth1
3.1 Abstract
We investigate the impact of incremental trade liberalization in a dynamic model of endogenous growth
with heterogeneous firms and costly trade. Growth originates from horizontal specialization and the
steady state productivity growth rate is positive. Innovations require costly R&D and are conducted
by profit-seeking researchers. Including physical capital as a factor of production, we find that after
appropriate adjustments in the production structure, previous results on the reallocation of resources
and the selection of firms following trade liberalization continue to hold. We show, however, that unlike
in the Melitz (2003) model, the reallocation effect does not work through increases in the factor price
in production.
3.2 Introduction
The relation between trade and growth remains unfinished business. On the one hand, recent em-
pirical research convincingly argues that commonly used measures of “trade openness” are either
poor measures of barriers to trade or otherwise are highly correlated with important determinants
1This section is a slightly modified version of Bauer (2008a).
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of growth (cf. Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). Theoretical investigations, on the other hand, highlight
various specific mechanisms by which trade liberalization may affect growth and/or productivity, but
this literature suffers from clear-cut results and hardly produces testable predictions. For example,
trade liberalization lowers the real gross domestic product in a typical Heckscher-Ohlin model, but
increases the real gross domestic product in models of monopolistic competition. Unfortunately, the
key variables in competing models often correspond to different empirical measures of real income
or are not observable in the data, thus making it hard to substantiate the findings. Moreover, most
recent theoretical papers abstract from consumer durables and capital goods, which account for 32%
and 30% of non-energy imports and 16% and 45% of non-energy exports in the U.S., respectively
(Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust, 2008).
In this section, we lay out a specific environment to study how trade affects endogenous R&D in
a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and costly trade. In particular, we set up a model in
which growth originates from horizontal specialization and the steady state productivity growth rate
is positive. Innovations require costly R&D and are conducted by profit-seeking researchers. This
feature is the main difference from the canonical Melitz (2003) model.
Our model accounts for typical characteristics of both growth and trade. First, growth is semi-
endogenous and thus does not display a strong scale effect. That is, the steady state productivity
growth rate is exogenous, but policy makers may well exert level effects and influence the growth rate
along a transition path to the steady state. Second, we account for various firm-level facts uncovered
by the empirical trade literature. Most importantly, the distribution of firms’ productivities is highly
skewed and only the most productive firms export in equilibrium (cf. Aw, Chung, and Roberts, 2000,
Bernard and Jensen, 1999, Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998, Pavcnik, 2002, and Tybout, 2003, for a
survey). Trade liberalization implies a reallocation of resources towards the more productive firms (cf.
Melitz, 2003). Further, there is no feedback effect from exporting to a firm’s productivity (Bernard
and Jensen, 1999, and Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006). The environment laid out below, is suited
to allow for both trade in final goods and trade in durables. In this chapter, however, we focus on trade
in intermediate goods which are produced from durable physical capital. The production of output
uses specialized capital inputs and labor. Traded goods are used to produce both consumption and
investment goods. Intermediate firms face endogenous fixed costs for R&D and discover production
technologies with heterogenous productivities. When successful, firms enter the local product market
at a cost and decide wether or not to export their goods to a foreign market. Technical barriers to
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trade imply that only the the most productive firms export. International trade is hampered by both
variable trade costs and fixed market entry costs. Accounting for the different natures of both types of
barriers to trade, we model transportation costs as capital costs and fixed trade costs as labor costs.
The reduced form of the autarky economy resembles the Jones (1995) model. Crucially, however, the
productivity in R&D is not exogenous in the absence of knowledge spillovers. In this model with firm
heterogeneity and market entry costs, the productivity in R&D is endogenously determined by the
amount of labor necessary for market entry and the average R&D cost in the face of a minimum
productivity requirement for firms.
In the open economy, we show that including trade in intermediate goods as well as production using
physical capital does not alter previous findings on the reallocation of resources and the selection
of firms. Similarly, modeling labor intensive technical barriers and capital intensive marginal trading
costs is not essential in the baseline specification. In search of the specific mechanisms implied by
the monopolistic competition heterogeneous firms models, including physical capital is an informative
exercise. In Melitz (2003), trade offers additional profit opportunities only for the most productive
firms. With a constant returns to scale technology, the implied market expansion effect increases the
scarcity of labor, which is the only factor in production. The increase in the wage rate drives the least
productive firms out of the market. In our model, the factor price for intermediate goods producing
firms is independent of the exposure to trade. Furthermore, including a factor that can be accumulated
potentially allows for a more pronounced impact of trade openness. The model builds on two strands
of the literature, namely research on costly trade with heterogeneous firms and non-scale variety
growth. We essentially include firms with heterogeneous marginal productivities and costly trade in
Jones’ (1995) non-scale variety growth model to account for the firm selection effect of trade openness
(Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2003, Melitz 2003). Compared to the seminal contribution of
Melitz (2003), we model endogenous entry cost and positive long-run productivity growth. Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007) study these two extensions in a fully endogenous growth framework (with scale
effects) and with labor as the only factor in production. They find that depending on the specification
of the engine of growth, trade is likely to depress the rate of growth because with endogenous R&D,
the average R&D costs are likely to increase with the necessary productivity for firms to produce
profitably. Using a non-scale R&D technology, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) challenge this view
because of the strong knowledge spillovers implicitly assumed in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud’s (2007)
analysis. Using a semi-endogenous growth model, they argue that trade only has level effects. In
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contrast to the Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) model, more trade makes consumers better off as
long as the knowledge spillovers in R&D are not too strong. Both Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007)
and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) focus on the effect of trade liberalization on productivity and
firm selection, and thus use one factor models and perishable output. A common shortcoming is the
lack of a thorough welfare analysis which is due to the complexity of the models’ dynamics.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We first present the closed economy model. After
discussing its production structure, we characterize the autarky equilibrium. Section 3.4 introduces
international trade. Some qualitative effects of trade liberalization are discussed in Section 3.5. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.3 Model
Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), the world consists of two identical economies. International
trade occurs only in the form of exchanges of intermediate goods. The production structure in each
economy is adapted from Jones (1995), where we include heterogeneous firms and market entry costs
in the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992a,b) and Melitz (2003).
3.3.1 Overview
Production structure. We explicitly distinguish between three sectors in each economy. The R&D
sector invents blueprints for intermediate goods and conducts their market launch. Two manufacturing
sectors produce intermediate goods and aggregate output, respectively.2 Output includes consumption
and investment goods.3 There are three factors in production: labor, raw capital, and knowledge. Raw
capital is the investment good, measured in terms of forgone output. The R&D technology requires
labor as the only private input, and the existing stock of knowledge can have an external effect on
its productivity. Aggregate output is produced from labor and a variety of imperfectly substitutable
intermediate goods with additive-separable effects on output. The production of every intermediate
good takes a blueprint and raw capital and is conducted by a single intermediate firm.4 Each blueprint
2In what follows, we use the terms “output” and “final good” interchangeably.
3We ignore government purchases and there will be no international trade in the final good in the open economy.
4We simply take firms to produce exactly one variety and equate firms with their products (i.e. good j is produced by
firm j and vice versa). The boundary of intermediate firms is only essential in that we require each firm to have measure
zero so that each firm takes the price index of intermediate goods as given.
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implies a specific level of productivity that remains constant over time.
Market entry costs. When entering the market, intermediate firms must bear a uniform entry or
“beachhead” cost. Market entry is conducted using labor only, hence the entry costs take the form of
a wage payment. Newly born firms make a forward looking entry decision based on their productivity.
Firms which are sufficiently productive earn sufficiently high profits to cover the fixed entry cost.
They therefore actually launch production in the first place and become profitable producers. Less
productive firms, however, perceive that the sunk costs exceed their discounted future profits and exit
right upon recognizing their productivity.
Costly trade. Each variety faces a positive demand in every country, but international trade is costly.
It involves marginal trading costs as well as fixed export costs. The fixed export costs capture the
additional costs a foreign company faces when selling to the local market. Importantly, country specific
regulations, standards, and similar “technical” obstacles make it more costly for foreign firms to enter
the home market then it is for local firms.5 The key implication of the existence of technical barriers
to trade (TBTs for short) is that only the most productive firms self-select into the foreign market
and earn additional profits from exporting.
Endogenous growth. Upon investing the entry costs, intermediate firms operate under monopolistic
competition and earn positive profits. The prospect of these rents stimulates researchers to invent
specialized inputs for the production of output.6 Introducing new intermediate goods continuously
increases the total factor productivity (TFP) and causes growth.
Before we describe the model in greater detail, we briefly contrast the present environment with the
Jones (1995) model with homogenous firms, discuss its production structure in the open economy
with variable trade costs, and explain how firms with heterogeneous productivities arise from newly
discovered blueprints.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous Firms, Trade, and the Jones (1995) Model
Homogeneous firms, durable intermediates. The production structure of the Jones (1995) model is
taken from Romer (1990). In Romer (1990), the capital stock comprises a continuum of durable
capital goods, which imperfectly substitute in the production of output, with additively separable
5See Baldwin (2001) for an illustrative introduction to technical barriers to trade.
6Monopolistic competition was introduced to growth theory by Romer (1987).
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effects.7 The capital goods are assembled by intermediate firms. Using k(j) units of the investment
good, firm j assembles x(j) = k(j) units of the specialized capital good j. The investment good, “raw
capital”, is produced from labor and existing durable goods. It is convenient and common practice
to assume identical production technologies for the consumption good and the investment good so
that the output from both sectors can be summarized as aggregate output which can either be used
for investment or for consumption. Romer (1990) already noted that the one-to-one production of
intermediate goods from raw capital is merely assumed to keep the model simple. Similarly, uniform
production technologies across intermediate firms are typically used only for analytical convenience.
Heterogenous firms. In this research, intermediate firms are heterogeneous with respect to their pro-
ductivity. We thereby incrementally extend two workhorse models. First, relative to the Jones (1995)
model, the average “efficiency” of intermediate firms contributes as a second, “vertical” dimension of
productivity to the level of TFP.8 The range, and along with it the average of firms’ productivities in
production, is endogenously determined by the degree of trade openness as measured by trade costs. In
contrast to growth models with both horizontal and vertical innovations, only the number of varieties
increases continuously over time (R&D with heterogeneous firms is addressed in detail in the next but
one paragraph). Second, relative to the existing literature on growth and trade with heterogeneous
firms, intermediate goods are not only used for consumption, but also for investment. This extension
opens up the possibility of a more pronounced impact of trade. Accounting for the accumulation of
physical capital, we further add a second factor in production.
Marginal trade costs and the allocation of capital. The presence of marginal trade costs requires a
careful modeling of the spatial allocation of physical capital. The production structure of the Jones
(1995) model in principle allows two equitable interpretations. The first, classical interpretation (used
by Romer, 1990 and Jones, 1995) is that intermediate goods are durable inputs in the production
of output. Intermediate good producing firms assemble the durables from raw capital and pass the
processed capital on to output producing firms. In this case, capital accumulates at the location of the
final good production. In the second interpretation, raw capital is a durable good in the production
7Breaking up the capital stock in a continuum of imperfectly substitutable goods allows for positive market rents,
which are necessary to cover the innovation costs when production technologies are not strictly convex (see, among
others, Romer, 1990).
8Li (2000), Young (1998), and Kornprobst (2008, Ch. 9) present models with two R&D sectors and both horizontal
and vertical innovations. Sorger (2007) considers quality improving horizontal innovations in a one-sector R&D model,
where researchers can influence the quality of their innovations at the cost of a reduced quantity of innovations.
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of intermediate goods. Intermediate firms accumulate physical capital to produce perishable inputs
for the production of aggregate output. In this case, the capital stock is located at the origin of the
intermediate good production.
No trade in durable commodities. In the closed economy, both interpretations are equivalent. As long
as there are no variable transportation cost both interpretations are equivalent in the open economy as
well. To simplify matters, in what follows, we focus on perishable inputs in the production of durable
investment and consumption goods (we stick to the second interpretation above). Since we also rule
out trade in aggregate output, there is no accumulation of physical capital by imports.9 From an
empirical point of view, neglecting trade in durable/capital goods appears as a severe shortcut. Erceg,
Guerrieri, and Gust (2008) find for the U.S. that consumer durables and capital goods amount to 32%
and 30% of non-energy imports, and 16% and 45% of non-energy exports, respectively. In their data,
consumer non-durables represent about one-fourth of non-energy imports and exports. The remainder
is non-energy industrial supplies used in the production of durables.
Variety expanding R&D and heterogeneous firms. The discovery of blueprints for new intermediate
goods is at the heart of our model of growth and trade. A crucial question is how labor and knowl-
edge are transformed into blueprints with heterogeneous productivities. We adapt the modeling in
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), but use a non-scale technology like Gustafsson and Segerstrom
(2007). Following Melitz (2003), the productivity types of blueprints are drawn from a given station-
ary distribution. The resources necessary to produce a sufficiently valuable blueprint, however, are
endogenously determined.
Stochastic productivity draws. While researchers can be certain about finding a new blueprint, its
inherent productivity is random. Every research attempt is a costly draw. Due to the entry costs,
only blueprints with a sufficiently high productivity (and hence a sufficiently high market value) sell
at a positive price. For the sake of clarity, we formally treat R&D and manufacturing as performed
in separate sectors. As regards content, we may equivalently combine the two activities for a given
variety in “the firm”. With a slight abuse of terms, we then also call costly developed blueprints which
do not make it into the product market “firms”. This gives us a theoretical counterpart to those very
low productivity type firms for which the empirical trade literature has identified a high death rate.
In the model, these “firms” exit immediately upon recognizing their productivity.
Costly aggregate productivity gains. One of the contributions of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) is
9The “trade in intermediate goods only” approach follows Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
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to incorporate the idea that increasing the productivity of innovations is costly, in the sense that R&D
(c.p. and on average) requires more resources if its outcome is to be more productive. In modeling this
notion, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) look at R&D from an aggregate point of view and consider
the average costs associated with the discovery of a marketable blueprint. A potential drawback of
this “aggregate R&D” approach is the lack of intentional investments in more productive capital
goods. In fact, individual researchers cannot influence the productivities of their innovations. From
the individual researcher’s perspective, conditional on being usable, high productivity type blueprints
are “lucky draws” and as such, they come for free: every draw is equally costly. As will be discussed
in more detail in Section 3.3.5, free entry into R&D does not remove the windfall gains associated
with high productivities because researchers must break even across usable and unusable innovations
in expectations.
A productivity frontier in R&D. As a final remark, note that there is a close analogy between the
“aggregate R&D” approach and a productivity-quantity frontier in R&D. That is, an increase in
the quality of products will c.p. come at the cost of fewer innovations.10 Increasing the minimum
productivity requirement (again c.p.) forces researchers to move along the technologically given
productivity-quantity frontier towards more productive blueprints and fewer innovations. Trade lib-
eralization, as measured by a decrease in the foreign market entry costs, actually raises the minimum
productivity requirement, thereby increasing the average productivity of intermediate firms. This
productivity gain however is not “manna from heaven” but takes costly resources and implies that the
set of intermediate goods at least temporarily expands at a lower rate. Via this channel, the exposure
to trade has the potential to slow down productivity gains from specialization. Hence, trade liber-
alization may at least temporarily depress growth and at the same time have ambiguous effects on TFP.
To begin with, we show how endogenous horizontal innovation and TFP is affected by a minimum
productivity requirement in autarky. We then turn to the open economy with international trade in
Section 3.4.
10Sorger (2007) explicitly includes such a frontier in R&D in a closed economy, free entry model of variety growth.
In his model, researchers choose the quality of their innovations optimally, recognizing that higher qualities imply fewer
R&D output (cf. footnote 8).
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3.3.3 Autarky
The economy is characterized by preferences, endowments, technologies, and a specific institutional
environment. As in Romer (1990), Jones (1995), or Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), the specific
environment laid out below allows a concise exposition and is only one example of an environment
that supports the decentralization. The model is set in continuous time and final output is used as the
nume´raire. We omit the time argument, t, wherever it is not confusing, and occasionally abbreviate
variables in the argument of functions by a centered dot (“ · ”).
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass one of identical households. Every household
consists of L homogenous members, who inelastically supply one unit of labor each (there is no
disutility from work). The population grows at an exogenously given, constant rate L˙/L ≡ n ≥ 0,
and L(0) > 0.11 The households are infinitely-lived Barrovian (1974) dynasties, where each generation
cares about the well-being of all its future offsprings. Every household member consumes an equal
amount c of aggregate output Y . The consumption behavior is therefore appropriately summarized
by the optimal decision of one household. Preferences are given by a standard intertemporal utility
function with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption equal to 1/σ (≥ 0):12
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c(t))dt, u(c(t)) =
c(t)1−σ − 1
1− σ .
ρ (> 0) is the subjective discount rate.
Every household earns income from working and returns on assets and purchases consumption goods
and assets. The flow budget constraint is ζ˙ = wL+ rζ − cL, where wL and cL denote the household’s
labor income and consumption, respectively, and rζ is the return on asset holdings ζ at interest
rate r. Assets comprise ownership claims on physical and financial capital (loans and debts between
households cancel in the representative households’ budget constraint). Subsequent assumptions on
the observability of firm types and the capital market ensure that physical capital and all types of
equity are perfect substitutes as vehicles of savings. They all pay a common rate of return r.
11Arnold (1998) replaces population growth with human capital accumulation in a Grossman-Helpman (1991, Ch. 3)
framework (without physical capital) and thereby shows explicitly that L can be interpreted more broadly as the effective
labor force.
12The elasticity of marginal utility is also constant and equals −σ.
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Ponzi-games, where some households borrow infinitely to “repay” consumption loans (and in fact
never actually repay their credit), are ruled out by a borrowing constraint imposed in the capital
market. Bankers will not lend out more than the present value of a household’s income. Hence the
present value of consumption expenditures is bounded above by the present value of income. As
usual, the appropriate condition is that the present value of assets is asymptotically non-negative,
limt→∞
{
ζ(t) exp
[
− ∫ t0 r(s)ds+ nt]} ≥ 0.13
Technology in Manufacturing
Output. Aggregate output Y is produced using a set of measure A of vertically differentiated interme-
diate goods j in quantities x(j) and labor LY :
Y = L1−αY
∫ A
0
x(j)αdj, 0 < α < 1. (3.1)
Output is manufactured by a large number of identical firms (the number of firms is indeterminate
because of constant returns to scale for a given level of A).14 Labor and intermediate goods are
complements (∂2Y/(∂x∂LY ) > 0). The elasticity of substitution between any pair of intermediates is
(1 <)  ≡ 1/(1− α) (<∞). Given the parameter restriction implicit in (3.1), the intermediate goods
have an additively separable effect on output (∂2Y/[∂x(j)∂x(j′)] = 0).15 As usual, the parameter α
jointly determines the returns to horizontal specialization in the production of output, the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods (which indicates the degree of market power of intermediate
producers), the price elasticity of demand, and also pins down constant shares of factor incomes in
equilibrium.16
Intermediates. Every intermediate good is produced from raw capital by an intermediate firm that ex-
clusively owns its blueprint. Each blueprint implies a constant level of productivity in production which
13Non-negativity constraints on consumption can be ignored as the instantaneous utility function u(c) satisfies u′(c)→
∞ as c→ 0.
14The production function in (3.1) of course displays increasing returns in LY , all x(j), and A jointly.
15Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005) introduce a more general production function Y = AγXβL1−βY , X =
A
h
1
A
R A
0
x(j)αdj
i 1
α
where intermediates can be substitutes (α > β) or complements (α < β). We implicitly impose
γ = 1− β and α = β for simplicity.
16 It is possible to disentangle the elasticity of output with respect to (horizontal) specialization and the substitutability
of capital goods, see Benassy (1998). Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005) also disentangle the degree of substitutability from
the capital share, see footnote 15.
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carries over to its producer. The firm-level differences in productivities are captured by heterogenous
per unit input coefficients b(j):
x(j) =
k(j)
b(j)
, b(j) ∈ (0, b0]. (3.2)
More productive firms, i.e. firms with low b(j), require less raw capital k(j) to produce one unit of their
intermediate good. Unlike in the original Romer model (1990), we treat raw capital as a durable good
in the production of perishable intermediate goods. The production and export of the intermediates
implies a permanent flow of production and transport costs and simplifies the solution of the open
economy model in Section 3.4 below.
Technology in R&D
The presence of entry costs implies that forward looking, profit-driven firms only launch production
with blueprints that yield a positive operating profit. Firms’ profits are obviously increasing in
productivity, which implies that the lowest productivity-type blueprints will be discarded due to the
entry costs. If this minimum productivity requirement is binding, the number of intermediate goods
(A) is lower than the total number of discovered blueprints (B). In Romer (1990) and Jones (1995),
there are no barriers to entry and every discovered blueprint is used to produce a new variety (A = B).
To tackle this issue, we may think of the R&D technology conceptually as involving two parts.
“Research” comprises the process of discovering a previously unknown blueprint. “Development”
involves the productivity in production inherent in each blueprint. We consider both parts in turn.
Discovery of blueprints. Researchers deterministically invent new blueprints B˙ using Jones’ (1995)
R&D technology:
B˙ =
LBA
1−χ
FB
, χ > 0, FB > 0. (3.3)
LB is the number of people searching for new blueprints, and FB inversely measures their productivity.
Following the common practice in endogenous growth theory, innovation displays constant returns
to scale in its only private input, labor. Previous research efforts can have external effects on the
magnitude of labor required for innovation, and we follow Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) in
choosing the existing number of intermediate goods (A) to represent the relevant knowledge stock.17
The exponent 1 − χ accounts for the strength and the sign of the knowledge spillovers. Researchers
17Without intentional investments in qualities, B seems equally appropriate as A to represent past innovation efforts.
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may either “stand on the shoulders of giants” and benefit from past innovations (χ < 1) or face the
“fishing out” of ideas (χ > 1). If χ = 1, there are no spillovers. In this case,
B˙
B
=
LB
BFB
so that the growth rate of B declines if B increases and LB is held constant. It then takes positive
growth of the labor input to maintain positive long-run growth (which balances the growth of B in
the denominator). At t = 0, the economy is endowed with a mass B(0) = B0 of blueprints with
distribution G(b).
Jones’ (1995) R&D technology is intended to eliminate the strong scale effect, i.e. the dependence of
the productivity growth rate on the level of labor engaged in R&D in the long run. In doing so, his
specification “exogenizes” long-run growth. Suppose A = B and L˙B/LB = n (as is the case along
a balanced growth path in Jones’ model). Then, a constant growth rate of the number of blueprints
requires n − χB˙/B = 0, or B˙/B = n/χ.18 Thus, growth is semi-endogenous (in that the long run
growth rate cannot be influenced by policy) and trade liberalization can “only” exert level effects.
Having described the discovery process, we now turn to the productivity in production that comes
along with each blueprint.
Stochastic assignment of productivities. The level of productivity is given by variety-specific input
coefficients, which are randomly assigned to each blueprint and revealed after the R&D investment is
made (i.e. at the time a blueprint is discovered).19 The input coefficients are drawn from a distribution
which has many low productivity types, fewer intermediate productivity types, and only a few types
of very high productivity. To be specific, the input coefficients are drawn from the “mirrored” Pareto
distribution
G(b) = (b/b0)θ, b ∈ [0, b0], (3.4)
where the parameters b0 (> 0) and θ > max{− 1, 1} govern the width of the support and the shape
of the cumulative distribution function, respectively.20 Figure 3.1 depicts the cumulative distribution
function and the density g(b) of input coefficients for θ = 2 (red) and θ = 8 (blue) with b0 = 1.
18In the aforementioned Sorger (2007) model with intentional investment in quality, growth also does not display a
strong scale effect. In his model, however, policy makers can affect the growth rate if they are able to design quality
contingent subsidies (see also Howitt, 1998).
19This is analogous to the costly (“black box”) draw of productivities in Melitz (2003).
20We explicitly deduced this distribution from Pareto-distributed productivity levels in Appendix 2.A.
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Figure 3.1: Pareto-Distributed Input Coefficients
Imposing a lower bound on θ serves two purposes. First, as will become clear below, θ >  − 1 en-
sures that the input coefficient of the least productive firm is strictly positive (so that there is a
non-degenerated distribution of firms). Second, it preserves the intended skewness towards low pro-
ductivity types in case of α < 0.5 (in this case, θ >  − 1 does not imply θ > 1).21 θ measures the
steepness or “dispersion” of the distribution and can therefore be interpreted as the inherent likeli-
hood (or “difficulty”) of inventing high productivity types. Increasing θ gives first-order stochastically
dominated distributions, i.e. distributions that are more skewed towards high input coefficients (θ = 0
is the uniform distribution and θ →∞ yields a degenerate distribution at b0, in which case G(b)→ 0
for all b < b0).22
From blueprints to firms. The distribution underlying the productivity types of newly discovered
blueprints directly translates into the productivity distribution of firms. This is because the Pareto
distribution has the property of scale invariance: truncating a Pareto distribution yields another Pareto
distribution with the same shape parameter.23 As an example, suppose that the cumulative distribution
function G(b) is truncated at some minimum productivity 1/btrunc. The resulting distribution of input
coefficients is
G(b|b ≤ btrunc) = G(b)
G(btrunc)
=
(
b
b0
)θ
(
btrunc
b0
)θ = ( bbtrunc
)θ
21Both Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) do not impose the second parameter
restriction which, however, is only important for the interpretation.
22The expected value and variance are E(b) =
R b0
0
bdG(b) =
R b0
0
θ
bθ0
bθdb = θ
bθ0
h
bθ+1
1+θ
ib0
0
= θ
1+θ
b0 (increasing in θ) and
Var(b) = E(b2)− [E(b)]2 = R b0
0
b2dG(b)−
“
θ
θ+2
b0
”2
= θ
(2+θ)(1+θ)2
b20 (decreasing in θ).
23More generally, the Pareto distribution belongs to the class of power law distributions, which are characterized by
the scale invariance property (θ is then consistently called the scaling parameter).
70 CHAPTER 3. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF GROWTH AND TRADE
for b ∈ [0, btrunc]. Thus, if some blueprints are not used due to the minimum productivity requirement,
the distribution of firms productivities will still remain Pareto, and θ will equivalently reflect the
dispersion in the truncated distribution (the support simply shrinks from [0, b0] to [0, btrunc]). Given
the shape of the underlying productivity distribution, the distribution of firms’ productivities matches
the empirical regularity that the fraction of less productive firms is large.
Justifying the Pareto distribution. Like Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) and Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2007), we specify a functional form to obtain a closed form solution. The Pareto dis-
tribution is attractive for two reasons. Firstly, it receives strong empirical support when it comes to
matching the observable distribution of productivities, see e.g. Cabral and Mata (2003) and Corcos,
Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2007). Secondly, as pointed out above, it allows a simple analytical
exposition of the distribution of firm types because truncating a Pareto distribution yields another
Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter (it is scale invariant).
Markets
The markets for labor, the final good, and financial capital are all perfectly competitive. Producers
of capital goods hold infinitely-lived, fully enforced patents. All markets clear. Ownership claims on
physical capital and financial wealth are perfect substitutes and pay the same rate of return, r.
Fundamental evaluation. Once a firm’s input coefficient is revealed (upon discovery of its blueprint),
it immediately becomes common knowledge. We denote by pi(j) the instantaneous profits of firm j
and let
v(j) ≡
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯(s−t)pi(j)ds, (3.5)
where r¯ ≡ ∫ st r(ς)dς is the cumulative interest rate up to time s ≥ t. In the absence of bubbles, and due
to the sunk nature of both innovation and entry costs, v(j) is the market value of firm j (with input
coefficient b(j)). Differentiating (3.5) with respect to time t reveals that, given the definition of v(j)
as fundamental value, the returns from investing in any productivity-type of firm, i.e. the dividend
payments plus capital gains, have to equal the common return on either asset:
pi(j) + v˙(j) = rv(j) ∀j ∈ [0, A] . (3.6)
Market clearing. Labor market clearing requires that the sum of labor in innovation, market entry,
and production is equal to the labor force,
L = LB + LE + LY . (3.7)
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We further denote by LA ≡ LB +LE the total labor force engaged in the process of R&D and market
entry, which we henceforth refer to as R&E (a mnemonic for R&D plus entry).
The stock of raw capital is
K ≡
∫ A
0
k(j)dj. (3.8)
Capital does not depreciate. In Jones (1995), where b(j) = b = 1, the sum of intermediate goods
equals the amount of accumulated forgone consumption, i.e., the stock of raw capital. Here, with
heterogeneously productive firms, the sum of intermediate outputs is proportional to the stock of raw
capital and the factor of proportionality equals the output weighted average input coefficient.24 From
(3.2) and (3.8)
K =
∫ A
0
b(j)x(j)dj. (3.9)
If intermediate firms become more productive on average, an increased amount of intermediate goods
can be obtained from forgoing a given amount of consumption.25
Finally, the resource constraint defined over economy-wide aggregates is
Y = cL+ K˙. (3.10)
Market Entry
Launching the production of a newly discovered intermediate good is equally costly to all entrants.
To keep the analytical exposition simple, we follow Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) and assume
identical production functions (and thereby “factor intensities”) in R&D and the conduct of entry.
The productivity in the entry process thereby indicates the markets’ “openness”. Strictly speaking, the
entrant is required to hire Aχ−1FL workers and pay the associated wage bill wAχ−1FL. FL measures
the strength of the barriers to entry.26 To ensure that the input coefficient of the least productive firm
24Given mark-up pricing in the intermediate good sector, the output weighted average productivity is closely related to
the CES price index. In his one-factor zero-growth model, Melitz (2003, footnote 9) uses such a output-weighted average
to measure overall productivity.
25As pointed out in the model introduction, assuming that capital can be accumulated as forgone output implies that
raw capital is produced with the same technology as the final good. “Forgone consumption” in the above interpretation
is thus not actually produced in the first place, but the respective resources are used to produce, i.e. accumulate, raw
capital instead.
26In Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007), the interpretation of the innovation
and entry process is that researchers have to accumulate FB units of knowledge for inventing a new blueprint and FL
units of knowledge to cope with market entry. Note that this is the Melitz (2003) setting. The one-time initial entry
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in equilibrium is strictly smaller than the upper bound of the underlying distribution, b0 (i.e. that the
minimum productivity requirement introduced by the entry cost is binding in equilibrium), we impose
a lower bound on FL:
FB < (φ− 1)bθ0FL. (PA1)
At any point in time, the economy-wide amount of labor devoted to preparing entry is
LE = A˙Aχ−1FL. (3.11)
Since all productivities are immediately revealed and become common knowledge when the blueprint
is discovered, the entry decision involves no uncertainty.27
Justifying the entry specification. Four remarks on the specification of entry costs are in order. First,
the scaling of entry costs by Aχ−1 enables a balanced growth equilibrium with a constant ratio of entry
costs and the market value of a new capital good (which, by construction, lies between zero and one).
Without resorting to (completely) arbitrary scaling factors, we could alternatively employ FLK/A
or FLY/A (and include the use of resources in the respective market clearing/resource condition).
Second, identical production functions in R&D and entry turn out to be particularly convenient
because they allow a manageable analytical treatment of the free entry into R&D condition. Third,
exploiting the block-recursive structure of the Jones (1995) model, identical “factor intensities” in
R&D and entry allow simple aggregations of both processes. Fourth, in the open economy, trade is
restricted by marginal costs and TBTs. Modeling variable trade costs as iceberg costs implies that
they are capital costs. With respect to the nature of TBTs, we assume that overcoming technical
obstacles is more labor intensive, and take the extreme standpoint that fixed barriers to trade imply
only labor costs.
Having described the environment, we now derive optimality conditions, define the equilibrium, and
aggregate over the different types of firms. The subsequent section then characterizes the equilibrium
costs and the periodically occurring fixed overhead costs (summarized in present value terms), correspond to the R&D
outlays and the entry costs, respectively. The present interpretation with entry costs, however, simplifies the exposition
in the presence of growing firm values.
27This timing structure emphasizes the importance of entry cost. If researchers individually knew the productivity of
their future innovations, the sunk innovation cost would obviously be sufficient to prevent low productivity types from
being invented in the first place.
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balanced growth path.
3.3.4 Optimality Conditions
Households and firms maximize their utility and profits, respectively. We consider their decisions in
turn.
Households
Optimal behavior of households boils down to choosing a path for consumption. Given a measure
B ≥ B0 of firms, households are able to pool the risk of investing firms whose type is a priori unknown.
Hence, optimal consumption is not affected by the actually prevailing productivity distribution of
firms in a household’s portfolio or in the economy. Maximizing intertemporal utility subject to the
flow budget constraint and the no Ponzi game condition (or, equivalently, to an intertemporal budget
constraint that limits the present value of consumption spending to the present value of total income)
yields the well-known Euler equation28
c˙
c
=
r − ρ− n
σ
(3.12)
28 If households maximize utility in per capita terms, the present value Hamiltonian is
H = e−ρtu (c) + λ (wL+ rζ − cL) ,
where λ denotes the shadow price of wealth. H is concave in c and ζ, so that the following first-order conditions are
sufficient for optimality:
∂H
∂c
= e−ρtc−σ − λL != 0,
∂H
∂ζ
= rλ
!
= −λ˙,
lim
t→∞
ζλ = 0.
Inserting λ = e−ρtc−σ/L from the first condition and its time derivative,
λ˙ =
L
`−ρe−ρtc−σ − σe−ρtc−σ−1c˙´− e−ρtc−σL˙
L2
=
e−ρtc−σ
L
„
−ρ− n− σ c˙
c
«
,
in the second optimality condition yields (3.12). Substituting λ = e−ρtc−σ/L and u′ (c) = c−σ in the third optimality
condition, the transversality condition requires that households must not get any utility out assets as t→∞,
lim
t→∞
ζe−ρtc−σ
L
=
e−ρtu′ (c)
L
= 0.
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and a transversality condition. As usual, the Euler equation gives the rate of consumption growth that
optimally relates the subjective discount rate (including household growth) and the market interest
rate.
Firms
Profit maximization and competition in the output producing sector imply that the aggregate demand
for production workers LY and intermediate goods x(j), j ∈ [0, A], satisfy
LY =
(1− α)Y
w
, (3.13)
x(j) =
[
α
p(j)
]
LY . (3.14)
As mentioned earlier, the price elasticity of demand is
∂x (j) p (j)
∂p (j)x (j)
= −.
Given the demand function in (3.14), every intermediate goods producer producing firm maximizes
its profit pi(j) by charging a price equal to a constant mark-up over the firm-specific marginal cost
(irrespective of the time of invention):
p(j) =
rb(j)
α
, ∀j ∈ [0, A]. (3.15)
Using (3.15) in (3.14), the equilibrium demand and revenues R (j) ≡ p (j)x (j) of firm j with input
coefficient b(j) are
x(j) = α2 [rb(j)]− LY , (3.16)
R(j) = α2−1 [rb(j)]1− LY , ∀j ∈ [0, A]. (3.17)
From (3.15), profits amount to
pi(j) = (1− α)R(j), ∀j ∈ [0, A]. (3.18)
Obviously, profits are increasing in productivity 1/b. From (3.18),
∂pi (b, ·)
∂
(
1
b
) = (1− α)α2−1 (− 1)(1
b
)−2(1
r
)−1
LY ,
which implies that profits are convex (concave) in productivity if  > 2 ( < 2), i.e. α > (<) 1/2.
3.3. MODEL 75
Gains from increasing degrees of specialization with imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods
limits a complete allocation of resources towards the most productive firms. In particular, the market
entry costs are the necessary ingredient to prevent the least productive firms from operating: There
is always a positive demand for any variety as long as any output is produced (LY > 0), and mark-
up pricing guarantees positive operating profits for firms of all productivity types. In the absence of
barriers to entry (FL = 0), all firms launch production, b∗L = b0, so that A = B.
No durable goods monopoly problem. Note that our interpretation of the production structure with
durable goods in the intermediate rather than the final good sector naturally avoids the usual “durable
goods monopoly problem”. When monopolists actually sell durable goods, tomorrow’s demand is a
close substitute to today’s demand, and firms with market power account for the fact that today’s
sales come at the expense of tomorrow’s sales. Tirole (1988, Section 1.5) shows that monopolists then
have an incentive to increase today’s quantities at the expense of tomorrow’s demand and do so in the
absence of commitment to output quantities. Romer (1990) points out that in his model environment,
selling durable goods to the final good sector potentially results in a more complicated pricing problem
than the “static” program stated above. To avoid this complication, Romer (1990, in a closed economy)
and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991, in an open economy) formally assume that the durable goods are
rented. In our interpretation, the problem is resolved since there is no monopolistic supplier of the
investment good.
From goods to productivities. In this environment, the intermediate firms’ prices, quantities, profits,
and firm values differ only due to heterogeneous productivities. As of this point, it is thus reasonable
to drop the firm index j and phrase the equilibrium expressions in terms of productivity types b, i.e.
from (3.15) and (3.16),
p(b, ·) = rb
α
, x(b, ·) = α2(rb)−LY , (3.19)
and from (3.18) and the definition of the firm value in (3.5),
pi(b, ·) = (1− α)α2−1(rb)1−LY , v(b, ·) =
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯(s−t)pi(b, ·)ds. (3.20)
Similarly, the time derivatives of the firm values in (3.6) simplify to
rv(b, ·) = pi(b, ·) + v˙(b, ·). (3.21)
Understanding firm heterogeneity. To improve our understanding of firm heterogeneity in this produc-
tion environment, consider a firm with input coefficient b that is more efficient than another firm with
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input coefficient b′ ≥ b. From (3.19), we find that relative output is
x(b, ·)
x(b′, ·) =
(
b
b′
)−
=
(
b′
b
)
(≥ 1).
Similarly, the relative input requirement in production is
bx(b, ·)
b′x(b′, ·) =
(
b
b′
)1−
=
(
b′
b
)−1
(≥ 1).
The relative output and input quantities are thus independent of endogenous variables, and the only
parameter that has an impact at all is α. Finally,
v(b, ·)
v(b′, ·) =
pi(b, ·)
pi(b′, ·) =
R(b, ·)
R(b′, ·) =
(
b
b′
)1−
=
(
b′
b
)−1
(≥ 1).
The second equality holds because of our assumptions on the fundamental evaluation at the capital
market above. Since the input coefficients are constant over time, the profits of firms of all productivity
types and hence their market values grow at equal rates (b cancels from the last term because it can
be pulled out of the integral):
v˙ (b, ·)
v(b, ·) = r −
pi(b, ·)
v(b, ·) = r −
pi(b, ·)∫∞
t e
−r¯(s−t)pi(b, ·)ds, (3.22)
Hence, vˆ (b, ·) = vˆ (j) = vˆ so that the dividend ratio is identical across firms of all productivity types.
In equilibrium, firms with a higher productivity sell higher quantities, demand more raw capital (as
the lower input coefficient is offset by the rise in total demand), receive higher profits, and have a
higher market value. An increase in α amplifies the differences. Figure 3.2 depicts a firm’s profit and
its market value as a function of its productivity for  < 2.29 We summarize these findings in
Result 3.1 (Productivity and firm size). In equilibrium, more efficient firms are larger: they
produce more output and use more raw capital than less efficient firms. Profits and firm values are
increasing and concave (convex) in the firm’s productivity if  < (>)2.
Obviously, higher input prices (an increase in r), and less demand from the final good sector (a decline
in LY ) c.p. imply smaller profits. Clearly also, the profits of more efficient firms react stronger to such
changes in absolute terms (here exemplarily for r):
∂pi(j)/∂r
∂pi(j′)/∂r
=
(
b′(j)
b(j)
)−1
(> 1).
29Differentiating equilibrium profits with respect to b yields ∂pi(b,·)
∂b
= (− 1)pi(b,·)
b2
> 0. This immediately gives a firm
value function that is of the same shape, since the dividend ratio is the same for all productivity type firms which implies
that the ratio of the slopes of v and pi is identical across productivity types.
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Figure 3.2: The Firm’s Profit and Market Value as a Function of Productivity ( < 2)
Profits and α. The relation between firms’ profits and the parameter α deserves a short comment.
As pointed out above, changing α has multiple implications, and it also captures opposing effects
on intermediate firms’ profits. On the one hand, like in the canonical trade models with love of
variety preferences, a low degree of substitutability between the differentiated final good inputs (a
low α) allows the monopolists to charge a high mark-up 1/α, and (as demand is inelastic) earn
high revenues and high profits. On the other hand, α also measures the capital share in the produc-
tion of final output. Hence, a small α also presumes less demand for capital goods from producers
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of output goods. Using standard parameters, the latter effect prevails and profits are increasing in α.30
Entry
Let us return to the entry decision of the firm. The imposed upper bound on FB restricts the analysis
to the case where FL (or b0) is sufficiently “large” so that the entry costs exceed the market value
of the least productive firms (i.e. v(b0, ·) < wA1−χFL holds in equilibrium by assumption). Thus,
only sufficiently productive firms are willing to bear the entry cost. Given market prices, the cutoff
productivity associated with profitable entry, 1/bL, is determined by
v(bL, ·) ≡ wAχ−1FL. (3.23)
Equation (3.23), the zero cutoff profit condition, is illustrated in Figure 3.3.31 Firms with a productiv-
ity below 1/bL will not incur the entry costs and “die” instantaneously. More productive firms incur
30In fact, the sign of the net effect actually depends on the size of the input coefficient. From (3.20),
lnpi (b, ·) = ln (1− α) + (2− 1) lnα+ (1− ) ln (rb) + lnLY ,
and hence
∂ lnpi (b, ·)
∂α
=
1
α− 1 +
2− 1
α
+ 2
∂
∂α
lnα− ∂
∂α
ln (rb) .
After collecting terms and inserting ∂/∂α = 2,
∂ lnpi (b, ·)
∂α
=

α
+ 2 [2 lnα− ln (rb)] .
Hence, profits are increasing in α if
ln
α2
rb
> − 1
α
,
or, using −α = −α/ (α− 1) ,
α2
rb
> e−
1−α
α .
Increasing α raises profits if b < b¯, and lowers profits if b > b¯, where
b¯ =
α2e
1−α
α
r
.
For more productive firms (with b < b¯), profits increase in α, since for them the positive effect of a high final good demand
outweighs the negative effect due to a low mark-up. For less productive firms (those with input coefficient b > b¯), the
increase in demand is not sufficiently strong to outweigh the profit decreasing effect of a lower mark up. Since α captures
opposing effects, comparative statics with respect to α are not unambiguous.
31In Melitz (2003), w = 1 and χ = 1. We verify below that wˆ + (χ − 1)Aˆ = vˆ in the equilibrium along the balanced
growth path so that the snapshot above in fact illustrates a stationary cutoff.
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Figure 3.3: The Cutoff Productivity in Autarky
the costs and launch production. Due to the scale invariant nature of the Pareto distribution, whereby
truncating the distribution maintains both the type of the distribution and its shape parameter, all
information about the equilibrium distribution of firms’ productivities is contained in the cutoff pro-
ductivity (for example, bL easily translates into the output weighted average productivity). We explore
this convenient feature further in the next section.
A law of motion for A. A binding cutoff (bL < b0) implies that researchers can only sell sufficiently pro-
ductive blueprints to profit-seeking manufacturers. Given a continuum of newly discovered blueprints
at any point in time, we rely on a law of large numbers and conclude that the fraction of profitable
blueprints is G(bL). Hence, the evolution of A given that b˙L = 0 is governed by
A˙ = G(bL)B˙. (3.24)
Since only a fraction G(bL) < 1 of newly discovered blueprint will actually go into production (and
increase the specialization in the production of aggregate output), an increase in the minimum
productivity requirement c.p. depresses the dynamic gains from horizontal specialization.
Labor allocation in R&E. In view of (3.24), let us clarify the allocation of labor between R&D and
market entry. By construction, the ratio of labor in R&D to labor in entry is fixed for a given cutoff.
From (3.3), (3.11), and (3.24),
LB
LE
=
FB
G(bL)FL
. (3.25)
Every newly invented intermediate good requires FL (times Aχ−1) workers to realize its market entry
and, on average, it takes FB/G(bL) (times Aχ−1) workers to discover a producible blueprint. Labor
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Figure 3.4: Labor Shares in R&D and Entry Against the Labor Share in Production for a Given Cutoff
market clearing requires that the labor shares in entry, R&D, and production sum up to unity. Using
this relation to replace LB, and solving for the share of labor in the conduct of entry yields
LE
L
=
1
1 + FBG(bL)FL
(
1− LY
L
)
. (3.26)
Figure 3.4 shows the labor shares in R&E as a function of the labor share in the production of output
for a given cutoff productivity 1/bL. The upper line depicts the labor market clearing condition as a
function of the share of labor in production,
LA
L
= 1− LY
L
.
The lower line corresponds to the allocation of labor between entry and R&D, i.e. to equation (3.26).
Of course, the horizontal distance between the two lines is the share of labor in R&D, LB/L, since the
labor market clearing line has slope −1. Suppose that the share of labor in production is not affected
by the productivity distribution of intermediate firms (which we shall prove later on in Corollary 3.8).
Then, for a given cutoff, LE/L(LY /L) simply centers around LY /L = 1 as FL changes. We will return
to this property after having characterized the equilibrium cutoff.
Free entry into R&D. In an equilibrium with free entry into R&D, the expected operating value net
of market entry costs must at most outweigh the innovation cost. If A˙ > 0, we thus have∫ bL
0
[
v(b, ·)− wAχ−1FL
]
dG(b) = wAχ−1FB. (3.27)
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If the expected net return to R&D (the left hand side), i.e. the market value of a capital good net
of the entry cost (the term in squared brackets on the left hand side), exceeds the R&D cost (the
right hand side), more researchers enter and discover a higher number of blueprints, thereby driving
down the value of innovations. Similarly, if the expected net returns to R&D are not sufficient to
cover the R&D cost, researchers leave and become production workers, thereby reducing the number
of innovations and increasing the market value of innovations. Hence, the expected return to R&D
must equal the total innovation costs; from (3.27),
∫ bL
0
v (b, ·) dG (b) = wAχ−1 [FB +G (bL)FL] . (3.28)
In the absence of knowledge spillovers (χ = 0), this free entry condition is again identical to Melitz
(2003). Finally, we define an equilibrium in this economy.
Definition 3.1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a path of quantities
c, LA, LE , LY , Y,K,A,B, {x(j), k(j)}j∈[0,A], prices r, w, {p(j), pi(j), v(j)}j∈[0,A], and the cutoff
productivity bL that satisfies technologies (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.11), and (3.24), the entry conditions
(3.23) and (3.27), the optimality conditions (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15), the resource constraints
(3.7) and (3.10), as well as the definitions of pi, v, and K.32
3.3.5 Aggregation for a Given Cutoff
We derive the equilibrium outcome in aggregate terms in two steps. First, we aggregate over all
productivity type firms for a given level of the cutoff productivity. In a second step, we solve for the
cutoff and characterize the equilibrium.
Suppose for the time being that the cutoff productivity 1/bL is initially given and constant. Since
all entrants are required to pay the entry costs, the productivity distribution in the product market,
32As usual in general equilibrium theory, the households’ budget constraint is another, but dependent, equation in the
same variables.
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denoted by µ(b; bL), is the productivity distribution of blueprints, G(b), conditional on entry:33
µ(b; bL) ≡ G(b)
G(bL)
=
(
b
bL
)θ
, b ∈ [0, bL]. (3.29)
Using µ(b), it is an easy task to aggregate over all active firm types.34 Intuitively speaking, the
probability density function µ′ (b) gives the mass of firms for each level of productivity, relative to the
total mass of active firms, A. The “number” of firms with the same level of productivity hence equals
Aµ′ (b) for each productivity level b. Taking into account that only firms with productivities above
the cutoff productivity incur the entry cost, integrating over all active productivity levels b ≤ bL then
gives the aggregate intermediate outcome. To begin with, consider the capital stock in (3.9). Instead
of aggregating over the raw capital inputs k (j) = b (j)x (j) of all firms j ∈ [0, A], we equivalently
aggregate over all active productivity types b ∈ [0, bL], taking into account that there is a mass Aµ′ (b)
of firms per level of productivity:
K =
∫ A
0
b(j)x(j)dj =
∫ bL
0
bx (b, ·)Aµ′ (b) db.
Now, using the conventional notation dµ(b) = µ′ (b) db and the equilibrium quantities from (3.16),
K = A
∫ bL
0
bα2(rb)−LY dµ(b).
After inserting
dµ(b) =
θbθ−1
bθL
db (3.30)
33In a setup with a random positive death rate for active firms and a large pool of potential entrants, Melitz (2003)
shows that the long-run equilibrium distribution of active firms is G˜(b)/G˜(bL) if the universe of productivities is described
by a more general class of probability distributions G˜(b). The random death of firms of all productivity types is needed
for the distribution of active productivity types to converge back to G˜(b)/G˜(bL) after a shock to bL. In our environment,
where A grows at a positive rate, the transition between two distributions of active firms’ productivity types with different
cutoffs is naturally achieved as the share of those productivities that are no longer introduced goes to zero in finite time.
This is equivalent to randomized firm death, which steadily brings the productivity distribution of active firms back
to the productivity distribution of newcomers whenever this distribution remains constant over time. To simplify the
exposition, we drop the dependency of the active firms’ productivity distribution’s support on the cutoff whenever doing
so does not lead to confusion.
34When aggregating over all firm types, we choose to express the outcome of the aggregation by equilibrium quantities
of the cutoff productivity type firm. Following Melitz (2003), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), and Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2007) we could alternatively apply an output-weighted average productivity type firm. Our choice, which
of course is as good as any other productivity type, is motivated by the fact that the aggregate outcome in terms of the
cutoff productivity makes the basic mechanism of the model visible quite well.
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from (3.29) and integrating, the capital stock equals
K =
Aα2r−LY θ
bθL
∫ bL
0
bθ−db =
Aα2r−LY θ
bθL
[
bθ−+1
θ − + 1
]bL
0
= Aα2r−LY φb1−L (3.31)
where φ ≡ θ/(θ − + 1) (> 1).35 To ease the exposition, use (3.16) again:
K = φAbLx(bL, ·). (3.32)
The average productivity. The average output weighted productivity b¯ is defined by
K = b¯
∫ A
0
x(j)dj = b¯A
∫ bL
0
x(b, ·)dµ(b).
Applying (3.30), inserting x(b, ·) from (3.19), and integrating we have
K =
b¯Aα2θr−
bθL
∫ bL
0
bθ−1−db =
b¯θAα2(rbL)−LY
θ −  .
Accordingly, using (3.19) and (3.32),
K =
θAb¯x(bL, ·)
θ −  =
θAbLx(bL, ·)
θ − + 1 , (3.33)
so that
b¯ =
bL
1 + 1θ−
. (3.34)
For a given amount of accumulated savings, the output of intermediate firms is obviously larger, the
more efficiently resources are transformed into intermediate goods, i.e. the smaller b¯. Of course, with a
Pareto distribution, the output-weighted average input coefficient increases with the input coefficient
of the least productive firm. Comparing the output-weighted average, b¯ = (θ− )/(θ+1− )bL, to the
unweighted average which corresponds to symmetric varieties,∫ bL
0
bdµ =
θ
∫ bL
0 b
θdb
bθL
=
bL
1 + 1θ
,
confirms the intuition that the difference in firms’ output is more pronounced, the lower the degree
of substitutability between intermediate goods (i.e. as  is increasing). That is, competition in the
product market (measured by the degree of substitutability between intermediate goods) works
against the variance reducing effect of fixed cost.36
35φ = θ
θ−(−1) > 1 since θ > − 1 by (PA1) and  > 1.
36Note that this conclusion is again ambiguous due to the fact that α also measures the share of capital income and
the gains from specialization.
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Aggregate profits and firm values. Turning to firm’s market values, we first derive the aggregate inter-
mediate producers’ profits. Using (3.15) and (3.31),∫ A
0
pi (j) dj = (1− α)
∫ A
0
p (j)x (j) dj =
(1− α) r
α
∫ A
0
b (j)x (j) dj = (1− α)α2−1φA (rbL)1− LY .
From (3.17), we have ∫ A
0
pi(j)dj = (1− α)AφR(bL, ·) = Aφpi(bL, ·). (3.35)
The average profit is thus φ times the profit of firms operating with the cutoff productivity, φpi(bL) =∫ A
0 pi(j)dj/A. Using (3.6), the same is true for the cutoff productivity type firm value. From pi(j) =
v(j)(r − vˆ) and (3.35), we find ∫ A
0
v(j)dj = Aφv(bL, ·). (3.36)
The difference in the market value of firms with the cutoff productivity and the average productivity
is larger, the larger φ. φ accounts for the characteristics of the underlying distribution of productivities
(as summarized by θ and b0) and includes α as an indicator of the value of productivity.37 Consistent
with the previous observation on relative profits, the value of average productivity type firms is low
relative to the value of firms operating with the cutoff productivity if α is small (φ is larger, the larger
α). A large α implies a high level of all firms’ values38, and more unevenly distributed profits. Put
differently, the dispersion in the values of firms with different productivity levels depends positively
on α (α→ 0 implies φ→ 1 and v(b, ·)→ v(bL, ·)).39
Next, aggregating over the intermediate firm’s outputs in (3.1) using the equilibrium quantities from
(3.19) and dµ (b) from (3.30), the production function for aggregate output can be rewritten as
Y = L1−αY
∫ A
0
x(j)αdj = L1−αY Aα
2αr1−LαY
∫ bL
0
b1−dµ(b) = L1−αY φA[α
2(rbL)−LY ]α,
or, using (3.16) again,
Y = AL1−αY φx(bL, ·)α. (3.37)
37Of course, a higher average productivity implies a higher distance of the average to the cutoff, so φ increases with
the breadth and dispersion of the underlying distribution, b0 and θ.
38This is because profits are higher the larger α, see the paragraph below equation (3.17).
39The latter observation is easily verified by looking at relative firm values. For b < bL,
d
h
v(b,·)
v(bL,·)
i
dα
=
d
h
pi(b,·)
pi(bL,·)
i
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=
d
“
bL
b
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1−α
dα
=
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1
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α
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Replacing x(bL) using (3.32) we find
Y = (φALY )1−α
(
K
bL
)α
= φ(ALY )1−α
(
K
φbL
)α
. (3.38)
This expression demonstrates quite clearly the close analogy to a representative firm model, where Y =
(ALY )1−αKα. In the present environment with heterogeneous firms, the (endogenously increasing)
degree of specialization is complemented by the (static) average input coefficient that describes how
efficient capital goods can be manufactured to produce output. A degenerate one point distribution
at b = bL (θ →∞) implies φ→ 1.40
The output-capital ratio. We already know from the household’s optimal consumption decision, that
the savings behavior is not affected by the productivity distribution of intermediate firms. Hence, the
output-capital ratio should be independent of the distribution of firm productivities. From (3.38),
Y
K
=
(φALY )1−αKα−1
bαL
,
and using (3.31),
Kα−1 = Aα−1α2(α−1)r−(α−1)Lα−1Y φ
α−1b(1−)(α−1)L .
By definition,  (α− 1) = −1 and (1− ) (α− 1) = α so that
Y
K
=
r
α2
. (3.39)
We thus note:
Result 3.2 (Output-capital ratio). The output-capital ratio depends positively on the interest rate.
Unless entry costs have an impact on the interest rate, the output-capital ratio is independent of
barriers to entry.
The evolution of A for a given cutoff. Given bL, a compact law of motion for A is readily obtained by
combining (3.24), (3.3), and (3.11). From the first two equations,
A˙ =
LBA
1−χG(bL)
FB
=
(LA − LE)A1−χG(bL)
FB
.
Inserting LE from (3.11) yields
A˙ =
(LA − A˙Aχ−1FL)A1−χG(bL)
FB
.
40For θ →∞, µ(bL) = 0 for all b < bL and µ(bL) = 1 for b = bL. At the same time, limθ→∞ 1
1− −1
θ
= 1.
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Solving for A˙, the R&E process is described by a standard Jones (1995) R&D technology:
A˙ =
LAA
1−χ
F a(bL)
, F a(bL) ≡ FL + FB
G(bL)
. (3.40)
Compared to Jones (1995), the innovation technology is augmented in two aspects. Firstly, without
entry costs, all research attempts are successful. Here, the R&E productivity (1/F a(bL)) decreases
endogenously with bL because some innovations must be discarded. F a(bL) = FL+FB/G(bL) captures
the effect of entry costs and the implied minimum productivity requirement on the R&D productivity
in terms of output quantities. Given A, discovering and launching production for a new intermediate
good is obviously less labor intensive if the minimum productivity requirement is low, or easy to
meet (because θ is high so that G(bL) is high), and if few workers are necessary to conduct market
entry (i.e. if FL is low). Note that without entry cost (more precisely, with FL violating (PA1)), there
is no need to dispense with low productivity types. Here, in contrast, it takes 1/G(bL) times more
resources on average to discover a usable blueprint. Secondly, entry is modeled in such a way that
it takes workers away from R&D. This further increases the labor requirement necessary for usable
blueprints.
Free entry in R&D for a given cutoff. Diving the free entry into innovation condition in (3.28) by
G(bL) gives ∫ bL
0
v(b, ·)dG (b)
G (bL)
= wAχ−1F a (bL) .
After recognizing
dG(b)
G(bL)
=
G′ (b) db
G(bL)
= µ′ (b) db = dµ (b) ,
and substituting
v (b, ·) = pi(b, ·)[
r − v˙(b,·)v(b,·)
] (3.41)
from (3.6) in terms of input coefficients (see (3.20)) we get
∫ bL
0
 pi(b, ·)
r − v˙(b,·)v(b,·)
 dµ (b) = wAχ−1F a (bL) .
As shown before, vˆ(b, ·) = vˆ, hence r − vˆ is independent of b and can be pulled out of the integral.
Moreover, since ∫ bL
0
pi(b, ·)dµ(b) =
∫ A
0 pi(j)dj
A
,
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we can replace the remaining integral term, the average profits, with the expression implied by (3.35),
i.e. φpi(bL, ·). Finally, using (3.41), the free entry into R&D condition becomes
φv(bL, ·) = wAχ−1F a(bL). (3.42)
The right hand side equals the average development costs of an actually producible durable good:
a newly discovered blueprint requires FL times Aχ−1 workers to conduct its market entry and it
takes FB/G(bL) times Aχ−1 workers on average to discover a producible blueprint in the first place
(researchers on average must “draw” 1/G(bL) times to find a sufficiently productive type). In endoge-
nenous growth models with free entry into innovation and costless entry into the product market, the
R&D costs of every undertaken research project must equal its costs in an equilibrium with positive
growth. In the present environment, however, researchers face uncertainty about the productivity and
thus the market value of their innovations. In particular, blueprints with a productivity below the
cut-off will not earn their R&D costs. Hence, in equilibrium, sucessful innovations must earn excess
rents. Inserting the definition of F a from (3.40) in (3.42) and solving for the R&D costs of a single
discovery shows this most clearly:
wAχ−1FB = G(bL)
[
φv (bL, ·)− wAχ−1FL
]
< φv (bL, ·)− wAχ−1FL.
Given that the cutoff is binding, i.e. G(bL) < 1, the average net value of entry (the right hand
side of the inequality) exceeds the actual R&D costs of a single innovation to ensures that research
investments break even across all undertaken projects. More generally, if there is a positive probability
that research projects fail, the ex post return on sucessful projects must exceed one, to ensure free
entry ex ante. Since this feature is the main difference between the heterogeneous firms and entry
costs models and the canonical growth models, we explicitly state it in
Result 3.3 (Excess rents for innovators). The average net value of entry exceeds the innovation
cost.
Return on investment in R&D. To avoid confusion, we explicitly state that ex ante zero profits free
entry in R&D imply that the ratio of the average firm value to the average R&D costs for a producible
blueprint is independent from the entry costs. From (3.42),
φv(bL, ·)
wAχ−1F a(bL)
= 1.
Whenever the R&D costs should increase as a consequence of increasing entry costs, the average
returns to successful R&D would increase by the same factor.
88 CHAPTER 3. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF GROWTH AND TRADE
Recap. Let us recapitulate briefly. Melitz (2003) showed that dealing with firm heterogeneity is easy
when consumers have love of variety preferences a` la Dixit-Stiglitz because these preferences still allow
us to work with a single, representative firm. The same is true if we follow Ethier (1982) and use a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in the production of output. To reveal the basic mechanics of the model, we
choose to express the aggregate firm outcome in terms of the cutoff productivity type firms. Given the
cutoff, R&E is conducted with a standard Jones (1995) R&D technology. In fact, the closed economy
model with heterogeneous firms and entry costs boils down to the Jones (1995) model. The two
additional ingredients, costly entry and firm heterogeneity, are included as follows. In Jones’ model,
the R&D technology is
A˙ =
A1−χLA
a
,
where a is an exogenously given productivity parameter. Including entry costs, we can interpret the
productivity as being endogenous. In our formulation, it incorporates the labor requirement necessary
for market entry and to find a sufficiently productive blueprint (a in Jones’ model can take any value
so we set a ≡ F a(bL)).41
The aggregate equilibrium outcome with firm heterogeneity can conveniently be expressed as
the outcome with a representative firm. Market entry costs introduce a minimum productivity
requirement that increases the average productivity of firms. The net effect of entry costs on the level
of TFP, however, is ambiguous, since an increase in productivity in production comes at the cost of
an increase in the average labor requirement necessary to invent a new variety. If the share of labor
in R&D remains fixed, this increase translates into a lower rate at which new intermediate goods are
introduced to the output sector. Note, however, that we cannot assert that the R&D costs actually
increase until we know more about the effects of the entry costs on the wage rate and the level of A
which governs the spillover effects.
Returning to the derivation of an equilibrium, it remains for us to solve for the lowest productivity
level that allows firms to earn the entry costs (the cutoff productivity).
3.3.6 The Equilibrium Cutoff Productivity
Our choice of expressing the aggregate intermediate firm outcome in terms of the cutoff productivity
type firms shows clearly that solving for the cutoff productivity requires only the free entry into
41LA in our formulation also includes entry workers (which do not exist in Jones’ model).
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R&D condition and the condition for profitable market entry. To see this, recall that the free entry
condition requires that the average productivity type firms’ values net of entry costs are equal to their
R&D costs. The value of firms with the average productivity in turn is closely linked to the cutoff
productivity firms’ values, see (3.36) for a given A. By definition, the cutoff productivity type firms’
net/market value in turn is zero, i.e. their operating value equals the entry costs. The equilibrium
cutoff productivity must therefore imply an average firm value that exactly meets the average R&D
costs of finding a usable blueprint. Combining (3.23) and (3.42) yields
F a(b∗L) = φFL, (3.43)
or from (3.40),
G(b∗L) =
FB
FL(φ− 1) . (3.44)
The wage rate and the scaling factor Aχ−1 drop out because of identical technologies in R&D and
market entry. Hence, free entry into R&D requires the average net value of a profitably usable blueprint
FL(φ−1)wAχ−1 = (φFL − FL)wAχ−1 = φvLwAχ−1−FLwAχ−1 times the fraction of usable blueprints
G(b∗L), to equal the discovery costs FBwA
χ−1. Put differently, researchers may expect a usable blueprint
after 1/G(b∗L) = FL(φ− 1)/FB draws on average. If successful, the return on the research investment
equals FL(φ−1)/FB, so that in expectation, researchers exactly break even on average. Since blueprints
with productivities below the cutoff have zero value, the share of usable discoveries is equal to the
inverse of the return on investment in R&D for any usable blueprint.
From the definition of G(b) in (3.4), b∗L = [G(bL)
∗]
1
θ b0. Inserting (3.44) yields the equilibrium cutoff
input coefficient:
b∗L =
[
FB
FL(φ− 1)
] 1
θ
b0 (> 0). (3.45)
The separation of firms into profitable producers and firms that exit comes solely from the entry costs.
As mentioned earlier, b∗L → ∞ as FL → 0 (i.e. the cutoff is not binding since b0 is finite, b∗L = b0).
The minimum productivity requirement, 1/b∗L, is obviously higher, the higher FL.
42 Interestingly, the
efficiency with which researchers operate to find new blueprints (1/FB) has a negative impact on
42The closed economy model in this chapter merely serves as a starting point for the analysis of marginal changes in
the openness of foreign markets (as indicated by the foreign market entry costs). While the above comparative static is
helpful to understand the model’s mechanics, we do not want to take the productivity-increasing effect of local market
entry costs too serious. This is because sunk entry costs (like, e.g., costly regulation) in general deter the creation of new
firms, a feature broadly supported by the data, see Alesina et al. (2005), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), and Klapper et
al. (forthcoming). Loosely speaking, the average firm in Greece, where entry costs are about US$ 6900, is hardly believed
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Figure 3.5: b∗L as a Function of θ (Upper Left Panel), FL (Upper Right Panel), and α (Lower Panel)
the highest admissible input coefficient: the cutoff input coefficient is smaller, the more efficient the
development of new blueprints occurs (i.e. the smaller FB). In other words, an R&D sector with a
low productivity allows intermediate firms to be less efficient in production (horizontal and vertical
productivity are complements). This is intuitive because a less productive R&D sector implies less
pronounced horizontal competition from new entrants (and higher profits for incumbent firms). Figure
3.5 depicts the cutoff input coefficient as a function of θ (upper left panel), FL (upper right panel),
and α (lower panel). We summarize these findings in
Result 3.4 (Minimum productivity requirement). Entry barriers introduce a minimum produc-
tivity requirement for intermediate goods firms. This requirement is higher when the capital share in
the production of output is large (when α is large) and when researchers are productive in the discovery
to be more productive than the average firm in Canada, where entry cost are much lower (US$ 280 according to Bu¨ttner,
2006).
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of blueprints (when FB is small).43
Note that since the factor prices drop out in the determination of the cutoff, see (3.43), the production
structure is not essential for the determination of the cutoff when the production functions in R&D
and entry are identical.
3.3.7 Properties of the Autarky Equilibrium
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium labor allocation and the evolution of horizontal
specialization.
Irrelevance of entry costs for the allocation of labor in R&E. Starting with the labor allocation,
we find that the relative inputs of labor in R&D and entry are not affected by barriers to entry
as measured by FL. This at first glance astonishing feature is concealed in existing models, where
there is no explicit distinction between entry workers and researchers. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2007) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) take a short cut by assuming that the discovery of new
intermediates takes a certain amount of knowledge and that it takes an additional amount of knowledge
to enter a market subsequently. As a consequence, they directly employ an R&E-knowledge production
function like (3.40). Clearly, we we do not alter the modeling substantially given that we maintain
the mechanical link between entry workers and researchers implied by identical production functions.
Exploring the relation between entry workers and researchers, however, reveals how restrictive this
assumption actually is: in equilibrium, the allocation of labor between market entry and R&D is not
affected by the entry barriers.
To see this, plug
G(b∗L)FL =
FB
φ− 1
from (3.44) into (3.25):
LB
LE
= φ− 1. (3.46)
From LB + LE ≡ LA, LB = (φ− 1)(LA − LB) such that
LB
LA
=
φ− 1
φ
, (3.47)
LE
LA
=
1
φ
. (3.48)
43Given the different meanings of α, the result with respect to the capital share is again ambiguous.
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Hence, the existence of a binding cutoff is sufficient to fix the relative labor shares in R&D and entry,
irrespective of the level of the barriers to entry. At second glance, of course, the increase in the labor
requirement per usable blueprint is only one side of the coin. Turning the minimum productivity
requirement up side down, barriers to entry reduce the share of newly invented, usable blueprints. In
equilibrium, a change in the barriers to entry induces a change in the share of usable blueprints that
exactly offsets the change in the labor requirement for developing a usable blueprint. Formally, from
(3.44), G(b∗L)FL is fixed independent of FL.
More explicitly, lowering FL has two opposing effects. On the one hand, a reduction in the barriers
to entry frees labor from the conduct of entry for a given number of innovations (i.e. LA/LE rotates
counter-clockwise around LY /L = 1 in Figure 3.4). On the other hand, the number of newly invented
intermediate goods increases for a given number of researchers because the reduction in entry costs
relaxes the minimum productivity requirement (and thereby reduces the average labor requirement
necessary to discover a usable blueprint). Hence, there are more usable innovations for which the free
entry workers conduct market entry. If there is a change in the share of researchers as a fraction of
the labor force, it is accompanied by an equally sized change in the share of entry workers.
Result 3.5 (Labor allocation between R&D and entry). In equilibrium, the relative use of labor
in R&E, LE/LB, is independent of the level of the entry costs.
Law of motion for A. Using F a(b∗L) from (3.43) in (3.40) gives the equilibrium evolution of A:
A˙ =
A1−χLA
φFL
. (3.49)
Barriers to entry decrease the rate at which new blueprints are introduced to the production of output,
and their impact is stronger the easier it is for the producers of output to replace inputs of less efficient
firms by (cheaper) inputs of more efficient firms (as φ is increasing in ).
The underlying R&D productivity (1/FB) drops out because the productivity of blueprints used in
active firms is conditional on exceeding the cutoff. On average, the discovery of these blueprints requires
FB/G(b∗L) (times A
χ−1) workers. Since the probability of drawing a productivity of at least 1/b∗L in
equilibrium always takes the same effort (G(b∗L) = FB/[FL(φ − 1)] is linear in FB), conditioning on
b ≤ b∗L removes FB from the law of motion for A.
Result 3.6 (Irrelevance of FB for A˙). In equilibrium, the law of motion for A is pinned down by
the entry costs irrespective of the productivity in R&D.
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Equation (3.40) indicates that the reduced form of our model yields the Jones (1995) model. We will
verify this conjecture explicitly in the following section. For now, note that we are free to choose the
units of measurement in the production of output, so that the production function of output in (3.1)
can equivalently be stated as
Y˜ = δL1−αY
∫ A
0
x(j)αdj, δ > 0, δ˙ = 0. (3.50)
Inserting the equilibrium cutoff from (3.45) in the reduced form production function of output in
(3.38) gives
Y = φ(ALY )1−α
 Kφ [ FBFL(φ−1)] 1θ b0

α
=
[
FL(φ− 1)
FB
]α
θ φ1−α
bα0
(ALY )1−αKα.
Without loss of generality for a given FL let
δ ≡
[
FB
FL(φ− 1)
]α
θ bα0
φ1−α
so that we get a standard Cobb-Douglas production function for output:
Y˜ = (ALY )1−αKα. (3.51)
By definition, more productive firms produce more output out of a given amount of input. Hence,
δ increases as FL decreases since the average productivity depends positively on the monotonically
increasing minimum productivity requirement introduced by entry costs.
3.3.8 Balanced Growth Path
Given that the cutoff is determined by instantaneous optimality conditions, the dynamics of the model
are identical to the dynamics of the Jones (1995) model (which are analyzed in Arnold, 2006). For
the sake of completeness, we adapt the analysis in Arnold (2006) to the present environment where
intermediate firms have heterogeneous input coefficients, but can be summarized by a representative
firm. We then use the laws of motions of key variables to solve for the equilibrium allocation along
a balanced growth path. Following Arnold (2006), define the stationary variables l˜ ≡ L/Aχ, z ≡
Y/K, γ ≡ cL/K , and ν ≡ (1 − α)Y/[∫ A0 v(j)dj] = (1 − α)Y/[Aφv(b∗L). We use l˜ instead of l ≡
L/ [φFLAχ] = l˜/ (φFL) to trace the R&E productivity in the law of motion for A. Of course, we can
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alternatively derive the balanced growth path without these definitions.44 Deriving the entire dynamic
system, however, increases our understanding of the model’s mechanics and gives us an idea of the
interdependencies off the balanced growth path.
Definition 3.2 (Steady state). A steady state is an equilibrium with l, z, γ and ν constant.
Before we consider the dynamic system, we first report the steady state growth rates of all endogenous
variables.
Steady State Growth Rates
By definition of a steady state, all variables grow at constant rates. Imposing a constant growth
rate on consumption requires, via the Euler equation (3.12), that the interest rate is a constant as
well. Accordingly, from (3.15), the prices of the intermediate goods are constant. From labor market
clearing, labor in all sectors must grow at the population growth rate so as to ensure that the labor
shares are constant. Profit maximization in the production of output then implies that the input
quantities of intermediate goods also grow at rate n, see (3.14). As prices and the interest rate are
constant, profits and firm values also grow at rate n, see (3.18) and (3.22). Then, using the results
of the aggregation in (3.32) and (3.51), the capital stock and final output grow at rate n + n/χ.
For the growth rate of blueprints to be a constant, B must grow at rate n/χ.45 As b∗L is a constant
(see (3.45)), (3.24) demands that A is a constant fraction of B. Hence, A grows at the same rate
as B. Finally, the profit maximizing labor demand in the production of output in (3.13) implies
that the wage rate grows at rate n. To summarize, Aˆ = Bˆ = wˆ = cˆ = n/χ, Kˆ = Yˆ = n + n/χ,
LˆY = LˆE = LˆB = xˆ = pˆi = vˆ = n, and rˆ = pˆ = bˆ∗L = 0.
In a steady state, the growth rate of consumption per capita, cˆ = n/χ, and the Euler equation in
(3.12) pin down the interest rate irrespective of the barriers to entry:
r∗ = σ
n
χ
+ n+ ρ. (3.52)
That is, the long-run interest rate is such that it removes the dissaving motives from population
44As an example, consider ν. ν∗ is simply derived from the long-run values of r and vˆ∗. ν = (1−α)Y
Aφv(bL,·) =
φApiL
αφAvL
since
AφpiL = (1−α)αY . From (3.6) in a steady state, r∗− vˆ = pi(j)/v(j) = pi (bL, ·) /v (bL, ·). Using this equation to substitute
for the dividend ratio in the expression for ν∗ delivers ν∗.
45In (3.40), A˙ = A
1−χLA
φFL
, so that
˙ˆ
A = 0 requires Aˆ = n
χ
. Hence, (3.24) and (3.44) yield Bˆ = Aˆ = n
χ
.
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growth, subjective discounting, and growth (which is larger the smaller the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution).46
Result 3.7 (Optimal consumption determines steady state interest rate). In a steady state,
the interest rate, i.e. the factor price for intermediate goods firms, is independent of barriers to entry.
Impact channels of entry costs. While this relation is generally well known for the Jones (1995) model,
it is an important observation with respect to the impact of trade. Intuitively speaking, a reduction
in the barriers to trade exerts an production-expanding effect (via additional entry and production
for foreign markets by exporters) which is expected to bid up the factor price. In fact, in the Melitz
(2003) model, the trade-induced increase in the real wage rate is the only channel through which
trade openness drives the least productive firms out of the domestic market (by increasing the local
market’s minimum productivity requirement). In particular, the constant price elasticity of demand
implied by the Dixit-Stiglitz index severely limits the possible impact of trade on factor price effects.
Changing the number of competitors or their productivity leaves the elasticity of demand unaffected
(see Melitz, 2003, p. 1715). In the present model, Result 3.7 implies that the steady state factor
price is independent of the minimum productivity requirement implied by the entry costs. In looking
for the impact of trade in a monopolistic competition model under CES production, this obser-
vation hints at looking for decreases in the prices for the other production factors, labor and knowledge.
In what follows, we deduce the laws of motions and the steady state values for the transformed
variables. If one is less interested in this rather technical derivation, one can skip this paragraph. The
stationary values of key variables are identical to those in the Jones (1995) model since the minimum
productivity requirement only enters through the productivity in R&E.
Laws of Motions for Key Variables
To economize on notation, let η(b∗L) = ηL, pi(b
∗
L, ·) = piL and v(b∗L, ·) = vL. Log-differentiating the
definition of γ, we have
γ˙ = γ
(
c˙
c
+ n− K˙
K
)
.
46From the point of view of the market for the investment good, the determinants of r equivalently reflect the scarcity
of raw capital.
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To substitute for c˙/c and K˙/K, note from the output-capital ratio in (3.39) that
α2z = r.
Dividing byK, the resource constraint in (3.10) implies K˙/K = z−γ. Using these expressions together
with the Euler equation yields the law of motion for γ:
γ˙ = γ
[(
α2
σ
− 1
)
z + γ +
(
1− 1
σ
)
n− ρ
σ
]
. (3.53)
The aggregate firm value is equal to
∫ A
0 v(j)dj = φAvL (see (3.36)). As vL(r − vˆ) = piL from (3.22)
and (3.20), the denominator of ν = (1− α)Y/(φAvL) is
φAvL =
φApiL
r − vˆ . (3.54)
Aggregate profits from (3.35), rewritten as
φApi(bL) =
∫ A
0
pi(j)dj = (1− α)α2−1
∫ A
0
[rb(j)]1−LY dj = (1− α)αL1−αY
∫ A
0
α2α[rb(j)]1−LαY dj,
can be expressed as a constant fraction of aggregate output. Recognizing −α = 1− and using (3.16),
AφpiL = (1− α)α
∫ A
0
x(j)αdj = α(1− α)Y. (3.55)
Taken together, (3.54) and (3.55) imply r − vˆ = αν. Replacing r = α2z gives the law of motion for
the intermediate firms’ values:
vˆ = α(αz − ν). (3.56)
The equilibrium law of motion for A from (3.49) can be rewritten using the labor market clearing
condition (3.7), the equilibrium labor demand from the aggregate output sector (3.13), and the free
entry condition (3.42), which equals the free entry into the product market condition in equilibrium:
A˙
A
=
A−χLA
φFL
=
L− LY
AχφFL
=
l˜
φFL
− (1− α)Y FL
AχφFLvLA1−χ
=
l˜
φFL
− ν, (3.57)
or simply A˙/A = l − ν.
Now, combining (3.32) and (3.37), we have Y/K = φϕ−α(ALY )1−αKα−1, or
z =
φ
ϕα
(
ALY
K
)1−α
. (3.58)
After substituting for LY using (3.13), (3.58) becomes
z =
φ
ϕα
[
(1− α)AY
wK
]1−α
.
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Solving for z = Y/K yields
z =
φ
1
α
ϕ
[
(1− α)A
w
] 1−α
α
.
We can replace the wage rate in the above expression from the free entry condition (which in equilib-
rium coincides with the entry into the product market condition), w = vLA1−χ/FL, and get
z =
φ
1
α
ϕ
[
(1− α)AχFL
vL
] 1−α
α
. (3.59)
Log-differentiating yields
z˙ = z
1− α
α
(
χ
A˙
A
− v˙
v
)
,
or, replacing A˙/A from (3.57) and v˙/v from (3.56),
z˙ = z
(
1− α
α
)[
χ
φFL
l˜ + (α− χ)ν − α2z
]
. (3.60)
Turning to l˜, ˙˜l = l˜(g − χA˙/A), and inserting A˙/A from (3.49), one obtains
˙˜
l = l˜
[
n− χ
(
l˜
φFL
− ν
)]
. (3.61)
Finally, a differential equation for ν is obtained as follows. Dividing (3.10) by K, we get the law of
motion for the capital stock,
K˙
K
= (z − γ) . (3.62)
Using the definition of z, Y˙ /Y = z˙/z + K˙/K, and after replacing K˙/K from (3.62) and z˙/z from
(3.60),
Y˙
Y
=
(
1− α
α
)[
χ
φFL
l˜ + (α− χ)ν − α2z
]
+ z − γ. (3.63)
Now plugging this expression together with the laws of motion for v(j) and A in (3.56) and (3.57) in
the log-differentiated definition of ν, ν˙ = ν(Yˆ − Aˆ− vˆ),
ν˙
ν
=
(
1− α
α
)[
χ
φFL
l˜ + (α− χ)ν − α2z
]
+ z − γ − l˜
φFL
+ ν − α(αz − ν).
After collecting terms, the law of motion for ν equals
ν˙ = ν
[(
1− α
α
χ− 1
)
l˜
φFL
+
(
2− 1− α
α
χ
)
ν + (1− α)z − γ
]
. (3.64)
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Steady State
In a steady state, where γ˙ = z˙ = ˙˜l = ν˙ = 0, (3.53), (3.60), (3.61), and (3.64) imply[(
α2
σ
− 1
)
z∗ + γ∗
]
+
(
1− 1
σ
)
n =
ρ
σ
(3.65)
χ
φFL
l˜∗ + (α− χ)ν∗ = α2z∗ (3.66)
χ
φFL
l˜∗ = n+ χν∗ (3.67)(
1− α
α
− 1
χ
)
χ
φFL
l˜∗ = γ∗ −
(
2− 1− α
α
χ
)
ν∗ − (1− α)z∗. (3.68)
These four equations are readily solved for a unique steady state. Eliminating χ/(φFL)l˜∗ from (3.66)
and (3.67) and (3.67) and (3.68), respectively gives:
n
α
+ ν∗ = αz∗ (3.69)(
1− α
α
− 1
χ
)
n+ ν∗ = γ∗ − (1− α)z∗. (3.70)
Equation (3.65) can be used to eliminate γ∗ from (3.70):(
1
α
− 1
σ
− 1
χ
)
n+ ν∗ + α
(α
σ
− 1
)
z∗ =
ρ
σ
. (3.71)
Let ∆ = (σ− 1)n/χ+ ρ. Combining (3.69) and (3.71) to derive ν∗ and z∗, and using (3.67) and (3.68)
gives (see the detailed derivation in Appendix 3.A):
ν∗ =
1
α
(
∆+
1
χ
n
)
(3.72)
z∗ =
1
α2
(
∆+
1 + χ
χ
n
)
(3.73)
γ∗ =
1
α2
[
∆+
1 + χ
χ
(1− α2)n
]
(3.74)
l˜∗ =
φFL
α
[
∆+
1 + α
χ
n
]
. (3.75)
Replacing l˜∗ = l∗φFL we also get,
l∗ =
1
α
(
∆+
1 + α
χ
n
)
. (3.76)
The steady state in (3.72)-(3.74) and (3.76) is the steady state in the Jones (1995) model with a ≡ φFL
(where “a” in Jones, 1995, is the inverse of the R&D productivity). The present modeling of firm
heterogeneity and R&D implies that, in the long-run, entry costs and firm heterogeneity exclusively
affect the productivity of R&E, and hence l˜ = L/Aχ.
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Arnold (2006)’s findings on the dynamics of the Jones (1995) model are thus robust to our extensions.
In particular, ∆ > 0 is sufficient to ensure that all stationary variables are positive, utility is bounded
((1 − σ)c˙/c − ρ < 0 since c˙/c = n/χ), and that the transversality condition holds, so that a steady
state exists if and only if ∆ > 0.
Using the steady state values we find that this “independence” result carries over to the allocation of
labor.
Result 3.8 (BGP labor shares). In steady state, the allocation of labor between R&E and production
is independent of FL.
This observation is easily verified by combining the condition for optimal labor in production in (3.16),
the free entry condition in aggregate terms in (3.42), and ν∗:
ν∗ =
(1− α)Y
AφvL
=
wLY
wAχφFL
=
LY
AχφFL
=
LY
L
l∗,
and therefore,47
LY
L
=
ν∗
l∗
=
∆+ nχ
∆+ 1+αχ n
. (3.77)
As α > 0, and ∆ + n/χ > 0, we have 0 < LY /L < 1. From this observation and the labor market
clearing condition (3.7), we directly infer that 0 < LA/L < 1 and LA/L = 1− ν∗l∗ is given irrespective
of the level of FL.48
Similarly, using (3.3), (3.11), (3.24), and G(b∗L) = FB/[(φ− 1)FL], in steady state,(
LB
L
)∗
=
n
χ
Aχ
L
(φ− 1)FL (3.78)(
LE
L
)∗
=
n
χ
Aχ
L
FL. (3.79)
Since the labor shares are independent of the barriers to entry, the total labor income is also indepen-
dent of the entry costs. Due to the Cobb-Douglas production of output we have wLY = (1−α)Y , see
(3.13), and hence
wL
Y
= (1− α) L
LY
= (1− α)ν
∗
l∗
.
No reallocation between factor incomes. Do entry costs affect the aggregate distribution of wage and
capital income in the steady state? Using the definition of z in wLY = (1−α)Y from the last paragraph,
wLY = (1− α)r∗K/α2 and hence
wL
rK
=
(1− α)l∗
α2ν∗
47Substituting for ∆, (3.77) equivalently states LY
L
= σn+χρ
(σ+α)n+χρ
.
48 LA
L
= αn
[(σ+α)n+ρχ
.
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is independent of barriers to entry.
Having characterized the equilibrium in the closed economy, we now turn to the open economy.
3.4 Trade
We include characteristic features of international trade in the simplest possible way. Consider a world
of two economies, each one as described in the previous section. The two economies have identical
preferences, technologies, production structures, and identical capital and labor endowments. Only in-
termediate goods are traded internationally.49 The free flow of intermediates between the two countries
is hampered by marginal trading costs and TBTs.
TBTs. Empirically, TBTs remain important obstacles between developed countries despite various
rounds of free trade negotiations. Importantly, TBTs are pure trading costs, and as such should be
interpreted distinctly from the local market entry costs. TBTs are fixed costs associated with the
entry of firms into the export market and account for country specific product/production stan-
dards/regulations, additional certification procedures, or additional bureaucratic burdens that make
it harder for foreign firms to supply the domestic market than for their local competitors.50 To capture
the relative disadvantage for foreign firms, we follow Melitz (2003) and assume that foreign firms face
higher entry costs when entering the export market than local firms that enter that same market. Due
to symmetry, exporting thus comes at higher fixed costs than producing for the local market from
a domestic firm’s point of view. Hence, there is another cutoff productivity, 1/bE , for exporting. In
the presence of TBTs, bE is lower than bL, so that the equilibrium productivity pattern in the local
and the export market matches the empirical regularity that the bulk of firms sells only locally and
only the most productive firms export. As an aside, the empirical trade literature has also clarified
that there are no feedback effects from exporting to a firm’s productivity (Bernard and Jensen, 1999,
and Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006). The fact that input coefficients remain constant in the model
when a firm starts to export is thus in line with the empirical evidence. Returning to the model, we
account for the different sources of TBTs and iceberg costs by using different “factor intensities” for
the two types of trade barriers. With respect to the fixed export costs, we adapt the modeling in the
literature and assume that fixed export costs are wage costs.
49We abstract from including trade in the final good since this would allow imports of new physical capital.
50Roberts and Tybout (1997) validate empirically that the sunk cost associated with exporting are of substantial
magnitude for exporting firms. See also the evidence in Bernard and Jensen (2004).
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Iceberg costs. The variable trading costs are modeled as Samuelson-type iceberg costs and as such de-
crease the productivity in the production of exported units. Since intermediate goods are manufactured
using physical capital, variable trading costs constitute capital costs to the firms.
In what follows, we describe the additional assumptions for the open economy and then deduce the
adjusted optimality conditions.
3.4.1 Open Economy
Technologies
Output. We distinguish local and export market variables of intermediate firms by a subscript i,
i ∈ {L,E}. To avoid additional complexity, we focus on the case where there is no overlap between
local and foreign varieties at the point in time when trade liberalization occurs.51 That is, if foreign
firms decide to export, local output producers are able to employ a larger number of intermediate
inputs and explore a higher degree of specialization. We denote the worldwide “number” of different
existing intermediate goods by A˜ > AL. Without loss of generality, let the intermediate goods index
be such that j ∈ [0, AL] indicates locally produced intermediate goods, while j ∈ (AL, A˜] refers to
imported varieties. Aggregate output in each economy is given by
Y = L1−αY
∫ A˜
0
xi(j)αdj, (3.80)
where xi (j) = xL (j) for j ≤ AL represents the input quantity of a locally produced good and
xi (j) = xE (j) for j > AL is the input quantity of an imported intermediate good.
Intermediates. When exported, τ ≥ 1 units of an intermediate good must be shipped for every unit
that arrives (exporters get paid for the arriving units). From an exporting firm’s perspective, producing
one actually sellable unit for the foreign market thus ties up τ times more resources than producing
the same unit for the local market:
xi(j) =
ki(j)
τ ib(j)
, (3.81)
where here and in what follows τ i = τ if goods are exported (i = E), and τ i = 1 if goods are
sold locally (i = L). Iceberg costs therefore imply that the productivity of a firm depends on the
destination of the manufactured output. The level of productivity in the production of exports
thereby decreases linearly in the iceberg costs. To simplify the exposition, we treat the marginal trade
51Cf. Tang and Wa¨lde (2001) for a model with initial overlap.
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costs as a technology such that they do not yield any income.52
Markets
Barriers to trade. Launching an export business with a newly discovered intermediate good requires
the entrant to hire Aχ−1L FE “entry workers”, where FE ≥ FL so that T ≡ FE/FL ≥ 1. T (a mnemonic
for TBTs) measures how much harder it is for a foreign firm to enter the local market compared to
a domestic firm. If T > 1, additional profit opportunities from exporting accrue only to the most
productive firms for which it is profitable to sink the foreign market entry costs. Incremental trade
liberalization is modeled as a decrease in either transportation costs, τ , or TBTs, T. In the case of
TBTs, we formally consider the comparative statics with respect to FE (evaluated at FE ≥ FL).
Profitable market entry. Firms base the decision to export on the same forward-looking investment
calculus as the decision to enter the domestic market in autarky. Given its productivity, each firm
knows its future profits in either market and decides to enter a market only if the present value of its
profits in that market exceeds the entry costs to that market. We denote by 1/bL and 1/bE the lowest
productivity levels that allow firms to operate profitably in the local and the export market, respec-
tively. The presence of TBTs (i.e., FE > FL) implies that bE < bL so that only the most productive
firms export. Hence, xE (j) in (3.80) is zero for some j > AL.53 While entering the domestic market is
less involved for local firms, it still takes costly resources and hence there is a minimum productivity
requirement for active firms.54 The least productive firms, which do not meet this minimum produc-
tivity requirement, exit immediately. Firms with input coefficients bL ≥ b > bE sell exclusively in their
home market and the most productive firms with b ≤ bE sell both in the local market and export.
Market entry and research again use the same production technology and we define its productivity
so as to already include the effects of international knowledge spillovers.55 For further reference define
52See Matsuyama (2007) for a theory of factor biased trading costs.
53By the definition of AL as the number of actually active firms, all xL (j) are positive for j ≤ AL.
54The lower bound on FL in (PA1) ensures that bL < b0 in equilibrium so that the minimum productivity requirement
is binding for some firms.
55Consider the Jones (1995) R&D production function from the closed economy, augmented by international knowledge
spillovers:
B˙ =
(AL + σAF )
1−χLA
F˜B
,
where AF is the knowledge stock in the foreign country, σ ≥ 0 measures the intenisty of the across-the-border spillovers,
and F˜B is an exogenous productivity parameter. With symmetric countries it holds that AF = AL and hence AL+σAF =
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the present value of operating profits pii (j) of firm j in market i:
vi(j) ≡
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯(s−t)pii(j)ds. (3.82)
Since firms differ only in terms of their productivities, profit maximization together with (3.82) again
implies that vi(j; b (j)) = vi(j′; b (j′)) if and only if b (j) = b (j′). With a slight abuse of notation, we
can therefore drop the firm index and equivalently state the present value of profits of firm j in market
i as a function of the firm’s input coefficient (and other variables), i.e.
vi (b, ·) ≡
∫ ∞
t
e−r¯(s−t)pii(b, ·)ds, (3.83)
where pii (b, ·) is the operating profit of a firm with input coefficient b in market i. Differentiating (3.83)
with respect to time t, the definition of vi (b, ·) implies
rvi(b, ·) = pii(b, ·) + v˙i(b, ·). (3.84)
Entry into R&D. Including the additional profit opportunities net of entry costs for productivity types
b ≤ bE , free entry into R&D in the open economy requires∫ b0
0
max
[
vL(b, ·)−Aχ−1L wFL, 0
]
dG(b)+
∫ b0
0
max
[
vE(b, ·)−Aχ−1L wFE , 0
]
dG(b) = Aχ−1L wFB (3.85)
whenever B˙L > 0. In equilibrium, the innovation costs have to equal the expected market value of
a newly discovered blueprint, i.e. the sum of expected operating values net of entry costs in both
the local and the foreign market. Expectations are taken with respect to productivity, accounting for
the fact that only sufficiently productive blueprints sell at all and that only blueprints with a high
productivity allow for additional profits in the export market. We already know that market values
decrease strictly monotonically in b so that the cutoffs bL and bE , i.e. the productivities that yield zeros
in the squared brackets in (3.85), are unique.56 In particular, the cutoff associated with exporting, bE ,
is determined via
vE(bE , ·) = wAχ−1L FE , (3.86)
(1 + σ)AL. We let FB ≡ F˜B/(1 + σ)1−χ to maintain
A˙L =
A1−χL LA
FB
as in the closed economy.
56Under our parameter assumptions, both cutoffs also exist within the support of the equilibrium distribution of active
firms’ productivities.
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whereas the minimum productivity requirement for active firms, 1/bL, is implicitly given by
vL(bL, ·) = wAχ−1L FL. (3.87)
In view of (3.86) and (3.87), the free entry condition in (3.85) equivalently reads∫ bL
0
[
vL(b, ·)−Aχ−1L wFL
]
dG(b) +
∫ bE
0
[
vE(b, ·)−Aχ−1L wFE
]
dG(b) = Aχ−1L wFB. (3.88)
No imitation or “footloose” production. Two simplifying assumptions ensure that firms have no means
to avoid the trading costs. First, firms are not able to form multinational companies or issue production
licenses, i.e. there is no “footloose” production. Second, transportation costs are lower than the cost
of patent infringement, so that imitation and limit pricing by foreign firms is not profitable.
3.4.2 Equilibrium
We proceed by deriving the equilibrium for given cutoff productivity levels, then aggregate across
firms, and use the results to determine the cutoffs.
Optimality Conditions
Households and firms. Optimal consumption is not affected by the degree of trade openness in the
model. The demand for intermediates from the final good sector in (3.14) now applies to all j ∈ [0, A˜]
and the profit-maximizing monopoly price in (3.15) refers to the price of selling locally, pL(j) =
rb(j)/α. When exporting, the monopolists charge the profit maximizing price pE(j) = τrb(j)/α =
τpL(j). Using these pricing rules, the demand for variety j in market i obeys
xi(j) = α2 [rτ ib(j)]
− LY . (3.89)
If firm j is active in market i, it receives equilibrium revenues
Ri(j) = α2−1 [rτ ib(j)]1− LY , (3.90)
and earns profits pii(j) = (1 − α)Ri(j) in that market.Using the fact that pi(j) = pi(j′) and xi(j) =
xi(j′) if and only if b(j) = b(j′), we can again rewrite the equilibrium prices and quantities in terms
of productivities:
pi(b, ·) = τ irb
α
, xi(b, ·) = α2 [rτ ib]− LY .
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The same is true for revenue and profits,
Ri(b) = α2−1 [rτ ib]1− LY , pii(b) = (1− α)Ri(b),
which was already used in the definition of the present value of profits in (3.83) above.
A simple relation between the cutoffs. Due to the symmetry assumption, the relation of the two
cutoff productivities is easily derived as follows. Combining the local and the foreign market entry
condition, (3.86) and (3.87), gives vE(bE , ·)/vL(bL, ·) = T . For a given b, vE(b, ·) and vL(b, ·) differ
only because of the marginal trading costs. Since vˆi(b, ·) = vˆ(·) from (3.84), piE(b, ·) = piL(τb, ·)
implies vE(b, ·) = vL(τb, ·). We also know from the closed economy that the ratio of any two firms’
market values only depends on their input coefficients (and , cf. (3.22)). In this setup, the two cutoff
input coefficients are therefore exclusively related by variable and fixed barriers to trade:
bE
bL
= ψ, 0 > ψ ≡ τ−1T− 1−1 ≥ 1. (3.91)
ψ is an inverse measure of the real barriers to trade and measures the economies’ openness. Under
free trade, τ = T = 1 and ψ = 1. The more restricted trade is (i.e. the larger τ and T ), the smaller is
ψ. Autarky corresponds to ψ → 0.
We verify from (3.91) that both marginal trading costs and TBTs drive a wedge between the minimum
productivity requirement for the local and the export market. The impact of TBTs is thereby more
severe if  is large. This is because a high elasticity of substitution in the production of output
depresses prices, profits, and hence market values in the intermediate sector so that firms must be
more productive to cover the entry costs.57
Aggregation
Output. Making use of the convention that goods j ∈ [0, AL] refer to locally produced intermediates
while j ∈ [AL, A˜] indicate imported varieties, aggregate output can be rewritten as
Y = L1−αY
∫ A˜
0
x(j)αdj = LY
[∫ AL
0
xL(j)αdj +
∫ A˜
AL
xE(j)αdj
]
.
Using integration by substitution to switch from goods j to productivities b, the term in squared
brackets becomes AL
∫ bL
0 xL(b)
αdµ(b) + A♦L
∫ ψb♦L
0 xE(b)
αdµ♦(b), where the diamonds indicate foreign
57Recall, however, that α also measures the capital intensity in the final good production and the gains from special-
ization.
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values and b♦E = ψb
♦
L was used (see (3.91)). We again solve the model in terms of the local cutoff
productivity bL. Due to symmetry and identical initial conditions, AL = A♦L, bL = b
♦
L (such that
µ♦(b) = µ(b)) and using (3.89) and (3.91), we obtain
Y = L1−αY
[
ALα
2αr−αLαY
(∫ bL
0
b−αdµ(b) + τ−α
∫ ψbL
0
b−αdµ(b)
)]
.
Applying the Pareto specification and integrating yields
Y = L1−αY
[
ALα
2αr−αLαY θ
bθL
(∫ bL
0
bθ−db+ τ1−
∫ ψbL
0
bθ−db
)]
= L1−αY
[
φALα
2αr−αLαY
(
b1−L + τ
1−ψθ−+1b1−L
)]
.
Using (3.89) again and recognizing −α = 1− , aggregate output can be rewritten as
Y = φALL1−αY x(bL, ·)α
(
1 + τ1−ψθ−+1
)
.
After collecting the parameters in the last term, we get
Y = φΨALL1−αY x(bL, ·)α, (3.92)
where
1 ≤ Ψ ≡ 1 + ψθT ≤ 2, ∂Ψ/∂τ < 0, ∂Ψ/∂T < 0.
For a given cutoff bL, the expression for Y converges to the closed economy counterpart Y =
φALL
1−α
Y x(bL, ·)α as trade costs become prohibitively high (ψ → 0 such that Ψ → 1), (cf. (3.37)).
Under free trade, (where T = τ = ψ = 1) Ψ = 2 and output were twice the amount in the closed
economy if the autarky cutoff were to prevail in the open economy also (the mass of domestic firms
also would remain unchanged).
Capital. The capital stock is analogously derived as follows. From
K =
∫ AL
0
k(j)dj =
∫ AL
0
b(j)x(j)dj,
where b(j) and x(j) refer to the total output of an intermediate firm (i.e. output sold in the local market
and, if applicable, output sold in the export market) and the destination dependent productivity,
respectively. In terms of productivities, the capital stock reads
K = AL
∫ bL
0
bxL(b)dµ(b) +AL
∫ bE
0
bτxE(b)dµ(b).
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After substituting with the output functions xi(b) and integrating over the distribution of firms’
productivity types we get
K = ALα2r−LY
[∫ bL
0
b1−dµ(b) +
∫ bE
0
(τb)1−dµ(b)
]
=
ALα
2r−LY θ
bθL
[∫ bL
0
bθ−db+
∫ ψbL
0
τ1−bθ−db
]
= φALα2(rbL)−LY bL(1 + τ1−ψθ−+1).
The last term is again 1 + τ1−τ −1−θT−
θ
−1+1 = Ψ such that
K = φΨALbLx(bL, ·). (3.93)
After replacing x(bL, ·)α = Kα(φΨALbL)−α, aggregate output in the open economy with costly trade
obeys
Y = (φΨALLY )1−α
(
K
bL
)α
. (3.94)
Given bL, the only difference to the closed economy is again the additional parameter Ψ (cf. (3.38)).
Aggregate revenues, profits, and market values. From (3.80) and (3.90), the total payments for inter-
mediate goods in each economy amount to
∫ A˜
0
R(j)dj =
∫ AL
0
RL(j) +
∫ A˜
AL
RE(j)dj.
Trade balance gives that the revenues of foreign producers (the second term) equal the revenues of
domestic firms from exporting,
∫ A˜
A˜−AL
RE(j)dj =
∫ AL
0
RE(j)dj,
where RE(j) = 0 for all firms with b(j) > bE . Denoting the total revenues accruing to firm j, i.e.
RL(b, ·) for bL ≥ b > bE , and RL(b, ·) +RE(b, ·) for b ≤ bE by R(j), it thus has to hold that
∫ A˜
0
R(j)dj =
∫ AL
0
R(j)dj.
Rewriting this relation in terms of productivity levels we obtain∫ AL
0
R(j)dj = AL
∫ bL
0
pL(b, ·)xL(b, ·)dµ(b) +AL
∫ bE
0
pE(b, ·)xE(b, ·)dµ(b).
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Using the equilibrium pricing rules and demands, the revenues of domestic producers become58∫ AL
0
R(j)dj = ALα2−1r1−LY
[∫ bL
0
b1−dµ(b) +
∫ bE
0
(τb)1−dµ(b)
]
.
Applying the Pareto specification and integrating again, we equivalently have∫ AL
0
R(j)dj = ALα2−1(rbL)1−LY φ
(
1 + τ1−ψθ−+1
)
.
The last term again equals Ψ. Using the equilibrium profits in (3.90), aggregate revenues can be
expressed as ∫ AL
0
R(j)dj = ΨφALRL(bL, ·).
Since profits are a fraction 1− α of revenues, we also have∫ AL
0
pi(j)dj = ΨφALpiL(bL, ·),
so that, along a balanced growth path, (3.84) implies∫ AL
0
v(j)dj = ΨφALvL(bL, ·).
Given the cutoff, accounting for costly international trade simply adds the factor Ψ ≤ 2 here as well.
The average firm value is
∫ AL
0 v(j)dj/AL = ΨφvL(bL, ·). In the absence of trade (so that Ψ = 1) we are
back in the closed economy where φ relates the value of firms with the cutoff productivity to the average
value of firms in the local market. Under free trade, the average firm value equals
∫ AL
0 v(j)dj/AL =
2φvL(bL, ·). The average firm value of producers that are only selling to the local market as a function
of bL was derived in the closed economy and equals AL
∫ bL
0 vL(b, ·)dµ(b) = φvL(bL, ·). The domestic
cutoff in the open economy, however, will differ from the cutoff in autarky.
58We could take the following shortcut here: replacing the term in squared brackets with the expression from the
derivation of aggregate output, the revenues of local producers amount toZ AL
0
R(j)dj = Y Lα−1Y A
−1
L α
−2αrαL−αY ALα
2−1r1−LY = αY.
Since aggregate profits are a fraction 1− α of aggregate revenues, aggregate profits areZ AL
0
pi(j)dj = α(1− α)Y.
In an equilibrium with balanced growth, using (3.84), we haveZ AL
0
v(j)dj = α(1− α)Y/(r − vˆ).
This directly yields the open economy νν = (1− α)Y/ R AL
0
vi(b, ·)dµ(b∗L) = (1− α)Y/[ΨφALvL(b∗L)].
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Entry into R&D for given cutoffs. Equation (3.91) is the key to solve the open economy model in the
same block recursive manner as the autarky model. It again allows us to derive the FE and the ZCP
conditions as a function of the domestic cutoff only. To begin with, we rewrite the FE condition in
(3.88) in terms of productivity levels∫ bL
0
[
vL(b, ·)−Aχ−1L wFL
]
dG(b) +
∫ bE
0
[
vE(b, ·)−Aχ−1L wFE
]
dG(b) = Aχ−1L wFB. (3.95)
Splitting up the integral terms, integrating out the terms without productivity levels, and rearranging,
the FE condition equivalently reads∫ bL
0
vL(b, ·)dG(b) +
∫ bE
0
vE(b, ·)dG(b) = Aχ−1L w [FB +G (bL)FL +G(bE)FE ] .
After dividing by G(bL) and recognizing from the definition of µ (b) in (3.29) that dG (b) /G(bL) =
µ′ (b) db = dµ (b), we obtain∫ bL
0
vL(b, ·)dµ(b) +
∫ bE
0
vE(b, ·)dµ(b) = Aχ−1w
[
FB
G(bL)
+ FL + FE
G(bE)
G(bL)
]
. (3.96)
The term in squared brackets on the right hand side is, like F a(bL) in the closed economy, the quantity
of labor necessary to invent and market a new intermediate good in the absence of knowledge spillovers
(χ = 1). Using (3.91), it can be expressed as a function of the local cutoff only. Substituting for bE
with (3.91) and applying the Pareto specification yields G(bE)/G(bL) = ψθ. Hence,
FB
G(bL)
+ FL + FE
G(bE)
G(bL)
=
FB
G(bL)
+ FL + θ−θF
1− θ
−1
E F
θ
−1
L =
FB
G(bL)
+ FL
[
1 +
(
FE
FL
)1− θ
−1
τ−θ
]
.
To avoid cumbersome expressions, we keep in mind that T is contained in ψ also, but collect parameters
so that the last term on the right hand side becomes
FB
G(bL)
+ FL
[
1 +
(
FE
FL
)1− θ
−1
τ−θ
]
=
FB
G(bL)
+ FL
(
1 + ψθT
)
=
FB
G(bL) + ΨFL
≡ F (bL) . (3.97)
The left hand side of (3.96) can be expressed in similar terms. Using vˆi(b, ·) = vˆ(·), dµ = θbθ−1/bθLdb,
and (3.91), the average value of a usable blueprint becomes
(1− α)α2−1r1−LY θ
(r − vˆ)bθL
(∫ bL
0
bθ−db+ τ1−
∫ ψbL
0
bθ−db
)
.
Integrating and rearranging terms yields
(1− α)α2−1r1−LY θ
(r − vˆ)bθL
[
bθ−+1L
θ − + 1 + τ
1− (ψbL)θ−+1
θ − + 1
]
=
φ(1− α)α2−1(rbL)1−LY
(
1 + τ1−ψθ−+1
)
r − vˆ .
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From (3.89), this equals φvL+ψθ−(−1)φvE . Costly trade thus lowers the value of exporting relative to
local sales (ψ ∈ (0, 1] and θ > − 1). Like in the closed economy, φ relates the average market value of
exclusively locally selling firms to the market value of firms with the local market cutoff productivity.
In order to obtain an aggregation in terms of the local market cutoff, we rewrite the average value of
a usable blueprint as
φvL
(
1 + τ1−ψθ−+1
)
= φvL
[
1 + τ−θT−(
θ
−1−1)
]
= ΨφvL.
Again for expositional convenience, we collect parameters in the last equation to get φvL
(
1 + ψθT
)
.
Inserting this expression together with (3.97) in the free entry condition, we arrive at
ΨφvL = wA
χ−1
L F (bL). (3.98)
Given the cutoff, all we have to take into account when including international trade between identical
countries is that firms now expected present additional profits in the foreign market. Discounted to
the present, these profits amount to ψ times the average value of a domestic producer.
We are now in the position to solve the model for its steady-state equilibrium. Upon deriving the
steady state, we provide further economic intuition and discuss the reallocation and incentive effects
induced by international trade.
Equilibrium
In view of the close and block-recursive relation of bL and bE in (3.91), the definition of an equilibrium
in the closed economy carries over to the open economy (including bE , the additional equation is
(3.91)). The steady state growth rates are the same as in the closed economy, and bˆE = 0 follows from
(3.91). The cutoffs are again instantaneously fixed.
Equilibrium cutoffs. The entry conditions for the local product market and for R&D in (3.87) and
(3.98) again determines the local productivity cutoff b∗L and via (3.91) also b
∗
E . In equilibrium, the
share of sufficiently productive blueprints is
G(b∗L) =
FB
(φ− 1)FLΨ , (3.99)
and the implied cutoffs are
b∗L =
[
FB
(φ− 1)FLΨ
] 1
θ
b0,
b∗E = ψ
[
FB
(φ− 1)FLΨ
] 1
θ
b0 (≥ b∗L).
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Inserting the definition of Ψ, the local market cutoff explicitly reads
b∗L =
[
FB
FL(φ− 1)
] 1
θ b0(
1 + τ−θT 1−
θ
−1
)− 1
θ
. (3.100)
Similarly, the equilibrium cutoff associated with exporting is given by
b∗E =
[
FB
FL(φ− 1)
] 1
θ b0τ
−1T−
1
−1(
1 + τ−θT 1−
θ
−1
) 1
θ
. (3.101)
Using (3.99) together with these expressions, the average labor requirement for a usable blueprints is
found to equal59
Aχ−1F (b∗L) = A
χ−1 FB
G(b∗L)
+ ΨFL = Aχ−1ΨφFL. (3.102)
In the absence of knowledge spillovers, the average labor requirement in R&D is determined by Ψ
and the parameters relating average values to the domestic cutoff values (ψ) alone. In this case, the
increase in the required productivity of intermediates raises the average labor requirement in R&D.
If χ = 1 and there is free trade, the average labor requirement per usable blueprint increases by 100
percent. Barriers to trade relax this necessity by lowering the required minimum productivity.
Dynamic Equilibrium
Laws of motions and steady state. Turning to the dynamic equilibrium, the same transformed variables
as in the closed economy apply. The integral in the denominator of ν now goes from 0 to AL, and
ν = (1−α)Y/ ∫ AL0 vi(b, ·)dµ(b∗L) = (1−α)Y/[ΨφALvL(b∗L)]. Just like in the closed economy, rK/α=αY ,
or r = α2z. Also, using the adjusted definition of ν, K˙/K = z − γ and v˙/v = α(αz − ν) continue to
hold. The innovation costs change from F a(b∗L)wA
χ−1 = φFLwAχ−1 to F (b∗L)wA
χ−1 = ΨφFLwA
χ−1
L ,
and this only affects the law of motion of AL in terms of l˜: A˙L/AL = l˜/(ΨφFL)− ν. Accordingly, the
laws of motion for γ and z are still given by (3.53) and (3.60), where ν in (3.60) refers to the adjusted
definition from above. The law of motion for l˜ then becomes
˙˜
l = l˜
[
n− χ
(
l˜
ΨφFL
− ν
)]
.
59For free entry into R&D to be in line with the local market entry condition, the impact of trade on the average
firm value (relative to the local cutoff productivity type firm value) must be equal to the impact of trade on the average
development costs (relative to the entry costs), i.e. Ψ must drop out in the free entry into R&D condition, compare
(3.98) using (3.102).
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Updating the law of motion for ν with A˙L/AL in the open economy, we obtain
ν˙ = ν
[(
1− α
α
χ− 1
)
l˜
ΨφFL
+
(
2− 1− α
α
χ
)
ν + (1− α)z − γ
]
.
Accordingly, the steady state in the open economy is the steady state in the closed economy in terms
of ν∗, z∗, γ∗, and l∗. Ψ only affects the resources in R&E and
l˜∗ =
ΨφFL
χ
[
∆+
1 + α
χ
n
]
.
3.5 Trade Liberalization
To ease the exposition, suppose without loss of generality in the following analysis that b0 = 1 and
FB = FL(φ− 1). Then, the cutoffs simplify to
b∗L =
1(
1 + τ−θT 1−
θ
−1
) 1
θ
, (3.103)
b∗E =
τ−1T−
1
−1(
1 + τ−θT 1−
θ
−1
) 1
θ
. (3.104)
With free trade, τ = T = 1, and all firms are exporting (bE = bL). In this case, output in both
economies is produced using A˜ = 2AL intermediate goods at any point in time.
We now consider policy induced changes in the barriers to trade and show the presence of a Melitz
(2003)-type reallocation towards the more productive firms.
3.5.1 Cutoffs and Industry Reallocation
Differentiating (3.104) exemplarily with respect to τ yields
∂b∗E
∂τ
=
−
(
1 + τ−θT 1−
θ
−1
) 1
θ
τ−2T−
1
−1 + τ−1T−
1
−1
(
1 + τ−θT 1−
θ
−1
) 1
θ
−1
τ−θ−1T 1−
θ
−1
[.]2
< 0.
The derivative with respect to T has the same sign.60 They are negative, implying that a decrease in
both types of trade costs increases b∗E and hence lower the minimum productivity requirement necessary
60More precisely, to analyze the effect of a decrease in TBTs, we take the derivative with re-
spect to FE and evaluate it at FE ≥ FL. The sign of the derivative with respect to T is
sgn
»
−τ−2T− 1−1 + τ−1T− 1−1
“
1 + τ−θT 1−
θ
−1
”−1
τ−θ−1T−1−
θ
−1
–
= sgn
„
τ−θT1−
θ
−1
1+τ−θT1−
θ
−1
− 1
«
= −1.
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for profitable exporting. A simple inspection of (3.103) shows that a reduction in the barriers to trade
has the opposite effect on the local cutoff:
∂b∗L
∂τ
> 0,
∂b∗L
∂T
> 0.
A decrease in either τ or T raises the minimum productivity requirement for all firms. Taken together,
trade liberalization allows more firms to export profitably (and implies an increase in the intensive
margin), but at the same time requires all newcomers to be more productive.
Result 3.9 (Reallocation). Trade liberalization lowers the productivity requirement for exporting,
but increases the minimum productivity requirement for newcomers.
The implied reallocation of resources from less productive firms towards more productive firms is the
same as in Melitz (without productivity growth) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) (with fully
endogenous steady state growth and scale effects). Including capital in production, factor prices are
irrelevant for the determination of the productivity cutoffs as long as R&D and entry are conducted
with identical production functions. Therefore, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) find exactly the
same cutoffs.
3.5.2 Labor Shares
A direct implication of identical steady state values in autarky and in the open economy is that the
allocation of labor between production and R&E is not affected by the exposure to trade. Moreover,
for the same reasons as argued in Section 3.3.7), the allocation of labor between R&D and entry is
not affected by a reduction of trade costs.
Result 3.10 (No impact on labor shares). The allocation of labor in R&D, market entry, and
production is not affected by the degree of trade exposure.
3.5.3 Trade Liberalization and the Incentives to Innovate
We have seen three channels by which trade openness affects the incentives to innovate. First, trade
liberalization increases the minimum productivity requirement for all firms and thereby raises the
average discovery costs of newly invented varieties. Second, at the same time, the expected value of a
usable blueprint increases because a reduction of TBTs lowers the entry costs for the export market.
Third, this innovation enhancing effect from an increase in the returns to successful R&D is reinforced
by the fact that more blueprints can be used to launch a profitable export business.
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Growth effects under fully endogenous growth. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) study the growth
effects of trade liberalization in a fully endogenous growth framework (with scale effects). They find
that openness to trade is growth enhancing if and only if the expected sunk cost of R&E decrease
(their Result 1, p. 10) as a result of trade liberalization.
The sunk costs of R&E consist of the quantity of workers necessary to conduct R&E for marketable
blueprints, magnified by the impact of spillovers, and the associated wage. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2007) state that the actual labor requirement unambiguously increases if a country opens up to trade
incrementally. The impact on the price for R&E depends on the exact specification of the engine of
growth, but is likely to be positive. In the Grossman-Helpman specification (Grossman and Helpman,
1991b, Ch.3), the net-effect permanently depresses growth.
Incentive effects under semi-endogenous growth. In our formulation with Jones (1995) technology as
the engine of growth, the impact of trade exposure on the labor requirement is similar. The innovation
enhancing reduction in the labor requirement for entry is offset by the increase in the labor requirement
due to a lower local cutoff:61
F (b∗L) = ΨφFL =
φ
φ− 1ΨFB
increases as T and/or τ decrease (which increases Ψ). If trade where free, F (b∗L) = 2φFL.
Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) study how trade affects the level of total productivity (which in their
model coincides with per capita consumption), i.e. variety growth and the productivity in production.
To do so, they compare per capita consumption along the steady-state path of two economies which
exclusively differ in terms of the trade costs. Since the ratio is constant over time, they conclude that
trade increases productivity if and only if the path associated with lower barriers to trade has higher
per capita consumption. This conclusion depends on the strength of knowledge spillovers in R&D.
If spillovers are sufficiently strong, trade liberalization retards productivity growth in the short run
(and makes consumers worse off in the long-run). This assertion is true in our model also because
physical capital in the production of intermediates does not alter the effects of trade on the incentives
to innovate. This is because the assumption of identical technologies in R&D and entry “exogenizes”
the determination of the cutoff.
61The second equality follows by replacing FL with its normalized value in terms of FB .
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3.6 Conclusion
Recap. We described a specific environment to investigate how trade affects endogenous R&D in a
dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and costly trade. Focusing on trade in non-durable interme-
diate goods, we highlighted important features of the production structure when firms use physical
capital and showed that trade in intermediate goods and a careful introduction of capital in produc-
tion does not alter previous findings on the reallocation of resources and the selection of firms. We
further clarified that, albeit convenient, the assumption of identical production technologies in R&D
and entry is restrictive. In particular, the labor shares between innovation and market entry are fixed
independently of the level of barriers to entry. Technically speaking, the cutoff productivity levels
are determined independently of other endogenous variables. This disentangles the cutoffs from the
particular production structure.
Avenues for future research. The present chapter provides a framework for various robustness checks.
In particular, including trade in the final good and trade in durables is a straightforward extension.
More importantly, however, the environment described in this chapter allows us to include physical
capital and/or units of output as an input in the entry process. A second extension concerns the average
R&D costs approach. Recall that inventing a blueprint is costly, but the productivity implied by the
discovered blueprint was a random draw. Hence, there is no intentional investment in productivity, and
high productivity types come “for free”. Exploring the trade-off between high productivities and the
number of usable blueprints at the level of an individual researcher and thereby allowing for purposive
investment in productivity is a promising task. Finally, stripping down the model to its essential
ingredients is an important step in building a model that is both in line with empirical evidence and
also amenable to a thorough welfare analysis. Such a model is necessary to assess the suitability of
trade and welfare measures in empirical work. We leave these important challenges for future work.
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Appendix 3.A Derivation of ν∗, z∗, l∗, and γ∗
Combining (3.69) and (3.71) yields(
1
α
− 1
σ
− 1
χ
− 1
α
)
n+ α
(α
σ
− 1
)
z∗ + αz∗ =
ρ
σ
−
(
1
σ
+
1
χ
)
n+
[
α
(α
σ
− 1
)
+ α
]
z∗ =
ρ
σ
ρ
σ
+
(
1
σ
+
1
χ
)
n = z∗
α2
σ
ρ+
(
1 +
σ
χ
)
= α2z∗,
and hence
z∗ =
1
α2
[
ρ+ n+
σ
χ
n+
(σ − 1)n
χ
− (σ − 1)n
χ
]
=
1
α2
[
∆+
(χ+ σ)n− (σ − 1)n
χ
]
=
1
α2
[
∆+
1 + χ
χ
]
.
Using this expression in (3.69) yields ν∗.
n
α
+ ν∗ =
1
α
[
∆+
1− χ
χ
n
]
ν∗ =
1
α
[
∆+
1 + χ
χ
n− n
]
ν∗ =
1
α
[
∆+
n
χ
]
.
This gives χl˜φFL = n+
χ
α
[
∆+ nχ
]
. Hence,
l˜∗ =
φFL
χ
[
n+
χ∆
α
+
n
α
]
= φFL
[
n
χ
(
1 +
1
α
)
+
∆
α
]
=
φFL
α
[
n
1 + α
χ
+∆
]
.
Finally, from (3.65), [
ρ
σ
−
(
1− 1
σ
n
)]
−
(
α2
σ
− 1
)
1
α2
(
1 + χ
χ
n+∆
)
= γ∗.
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After rearranging and canceling terms, we have
γ∗ =
ρ
σ
− n+ n
σ
−
(
1
σ
− α2
)(
1 + χ
χ
n+
σ − 1
χ
n+ ρ
)
=
ρ
σ
− n+ n
σ
− 1 + χ
χ
n
σ
− σ − 1
χ
n
σ
− ρ
σ
+
1 + χ
χ
α2n+
σ − 1
χ
α2n+ α2ρ
=
1
α2
[
α2
(
ρ
σ
− n+ n
σ
− 1 + χ
χ
n
σ
− σ − 1
χ
n
χ
− ρ
σ
)
+
(
1 + χ
χ
+
σ − 1
χ
)
n+ ρ
]
=
1
α2
[
α2n
(
1
σ
− 1− 1 + χ
χ
1
σ
− σ − 1
χσ
)
+
χ+ σ
χ
n+ ρ
]
=
1
α2
[
α2n
(
χ− χσ − (1 + χ)− σ + 1
χσ
)
+
χ+ σ
χ
n+ ρ
]
=
1
α2
[
−α2n
(
1 + χ
χ
)
+
χ+ σ
χ
n+ ρ
]
=
1
α2
{
n
χ
[−α2(1 + χ) + χ+ σ]+ ρ}
=
1
α2
{
n
χ
[
(1− α2)χ− α2 + σ]+ ρ}
=
1
α2
{
n
χ
σ + n
[
(1− α2)− α
2
χ
]
+ ρ
}
=
1
α2
{
n
χ
σ − n
χ
+ ρ+
n
χ
+ n
[
(1− α2)− α
2
χ
]}
=
1
α2
{
∆+
n
χ
[
1 + χ(1− α2)− α2]}
=
1
α2
[
∆+ (1− α2)n1 + χ
χ
]
.
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Part II
On the Growth and Welfare Effects of
Monopolistic Competition
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Chapter 4
Monopolistic Competition and
Endogenous Growth
4.1 Introduction
In this section, we present the canonical Grossman-Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3) increasing variety en-
dogenous growth model. It was first published as a building block in Grossman and Helpman’s book
“Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy” in 1991. While the book, which according to Google
Scholar received about 4350 citations, was designed to analyze the linkages between innovation, growth,
and trade, the variety growth model in Chapter 3 serves as a useful device to answer various questions
related to profit driven growth. Today, more than 15 years later, the model remains a helpful modeling
tool, mainly because of its marked flexibility and great analytical tractability.
We proceed as follows. Section 4.2 provides a quick overview over the production structure and presents
the model. The equilibrium is derived and characterized in Section 4.3. We then turn to its welfare
properties in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 assesses the effectiveness of R&D policies in the model. Finally,
we recognize that the model has come under criticism for its counterfactual “strong scale” effect
implication and conclude this section with some supportive comments.
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4.2 The Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3) Model
4.2.1 Overview
Consider a closed economy endowed with a single primary factor, labor, in fixed supply. There are two
sectors: In R&D, workers invent blueprints for the production of differentiated consumption goods. In
manufacturing, workers employ the blueprints and produce consumption goods. Households consume
the manufacturing output and value product variety. Holding the total physical amount of inputs
constant, the consumers’ utility is increasing in the number of different products consumed. R&D
is conducted to invent new products and thereby has the potential to raise households’ utility, even
if the amount of resources and the technologies employed in manufacturing remain constant. Indus-
trial innovation, however, is costly. Romer (1990) has clarified that endogenous technological change
necessitates either imperfect product markets or strictly convex production functions to cover the
upfront R&D costs. Following Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3) allow for market
power in manufacturing (and employ constant returns to scale technologies): Researchers sell newly
discovered blueprints exclusively to one manufacturing firm, which remains the monopolistic supplier
forever, and different products substitute only imperfectly in consumption. Manufacturing firms thus
operate under monopolistic competition, and their rents provide the incentive for R&D.1 It is thus
the intentional, profit-driven innovation that leads to an increasing mass of available blueprints, and
hence to an increase in welfare.
Increasing product variety, however, exerts a destructive effect on the incentives for R&D, which hinge
crucially on the profits in manufacturing. As more and more products become available, an increasing
number of firms competes over limited resources, and profits per firm decline. More severe horizontal
competition implies diminishing returns to R&D as forward looking manufacturers lower their bids on
newly discovered blueprints if they expect declining returns from selling the good.
Accordingly, sustainable R&D driven growth requires an opposing force to offset the “profit destruction
effect” in the long-run. This force is found in the non-rival and non-excludable nature of (at least some
forms of technological) knowledge.2 Following Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3)
1In this model, competition has an unambiguously negative impact on growth. See quality upgrading models with
step-by-step innovation for settings where competition spurs growth in imperfectly competitive markets (Aghion, Harris,
Vickers, 1997, and Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers, 2001). See also Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and Funk (2008) for
models with endogenous growth under perfect competition.
2For an empirical assessment on R&D spillovers see Griliches (1992) and Coe and Helpman (1995) for the open
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include publicly available knowledge as an input in the production of blueprints. In conducting R&D,
researchers “stand on the shoulders of giants” and employ technological knowledge uncovered by
previous research. As a consequence of the imperfect appropriability of knowledge, the “knowledge
capital” accumulates as a by-product of innovation. It is freely assessable by current researchers and
increases the marginal productivity of labor in the production of blueprints.3 Accordingly, if many
innovations have been uncovered in the past, less labor is needed to invent a new blueprint so that
the R&D cost per blueprint decreases as the number of products blueprint rises over time.
A long run equilibrium is found when the “knowledge spillover effect” exactly balances the “profit
destruction effect” and the incentive for R&D remains unchanged. The central trade off is then the
allocation of labor between R&D, where it increases the variety of available products, and manufac-
turing, where it increases the output of existing products. Below, the market economy is shown to
provide inefficiently little research and hence too little growth relative to the social optimum.
The model is set in continuous time (as usual, we suppress the time index t whenever this causes
no confusion). It is deterministic and solved for a perfect foresight equilibrium. The model environ-
ment is described by behavioral assumptions about households and firms, technologies, and a specific
institutional structure. Beginning with households, we consider each in turn.
4.2.2 Households
Households supply labor, receive wages and capital income, consume, and save by accumulating finan-
cial wealth. The population is exogenously given and constant over time. For simplicity, all households
are identical (with respect to preferences, productivity, and initial asset holdings), and we use a rep-
resentative consumer to describe their behavior.4 She aims at maximizing the present value of utility
flows,
Ut =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) logD (τ) dτ, (4.1)
economy.
3Evidently, intertemporal knowledge spillovers from past R&D on current innovation may well be negative so that
there is a “fishing out” of ideas. In this case, it takes different sources to sustain growth.
4See Caselli and Ventura (2000) for consumer heterogeneity in one-sector representative consumer growth models.
Inter alia, they show that agents with homothetic preferences and heterogeneous levels of asset holdings save the same
fraction of total wealth independently of the individual level of asset holdings.
124 CHAPTER 4. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH
where ρ denotes the constant subjective discount rate and log D is the instantaneous utility function5
where
D (t) ≡
[∫ n(t)
0
x (j, t)α dj
] 1
α
. (4.2)
The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) index D (t) generates positive demands x (j) for differentiated products j
∈ [0,∞) from which only goods j ∈ [0, n (t)] , n (0) ≡ n0 > 0, are available at time t, (the product space
is assumed to be continuous). As in earlier sections, ε ≡ 1/ (1− α) measures the constant elasticity
of substitution between each pair of available products. As pointed out earlier, consumers with Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) preferences value product diversity.6 Importantly for the analysis of endogenous growth,
(4.2) equivalently implies that the utility derived from a given stock of resources increases with the mass
of available products. To see this, suppose that different goods are consumed in equal amounts so that
x (j) = x. Suppose further that all goods are produced one-to-one from labor. Then, D (t) = n1/α−1nx
or D/ (nx) = n1/(ε−1) is increasing in n even if the resources employed in manufacturing, nx, remain
unchanged. In particular, if n increases by 1%, D goes up by 1/α− 1% > 0%.7
The range of products grows endogenously due to intentional investment in R&D (and never dimin-
ishes). Newly invented products substitute imperfectly for existing products. Ongoing variety growth
increases diversity in consumption and thus accommodates consumers’ demand for variety. An im-
portant characteristic of this type of variety growth is that new products are in no way superior to
5Log-utility is used for convenience and can be replaced by a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES)
utility function. This generalization, however, does not provide additional insights in the present environment and requires
further parameter restrictions for the existence of a steady state and boundedness of the utility integral in (4.1), see
Kornprobst (2008, Chapter 4).
6Following Ethier (1982), D may alternatively be interpreted as a production function for a unique final good, which is
assembled (i.e. without further inputs) from specialized inputs x (j). In this interpretation, an increase in n (t) indicates
a more specialized production process. Both interpretations are identical. There is an important difference with respect
to welfare, however, if D is interpreted as a production function and competitively priced labor is used in the production
of the final good as well. Unlike in the love-of-variety/production-by-assembling variant, this alteration implies that if D
is produced by a mass of competitive firms from specialized inputs and labor, and labor is priced at the competitive wage
rate, there are welfare losses due to monopoly power in manufacturing. This is because mark-ups then differ between the
final good and the intermediate good sector. In the love-of-variety/production-by-assembling variant, all relative prices
are unbiased so that the allocation is Pareto efficient if we exclude knowledge spillovers (cf. Section 4.4). In what follows,
we stick to the somewhat simpler interpretation with love of variety preferences (so that there is no welfare loss from
monopoly, cf. Lerner, 1934, or Samuelson, 1965, pp. 239–240, and the discussion in Section 4.4 below).
7The elasticity of D with respect to product variety is again fixed by the parameter assumption implicit in (4.2), cf.
the reference to Benassy (1996) in footnote 16.
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existing products. This is very different from quality ladder growth models, where technologically supe-
rior goods replace existing products in the same product line so that innovation implies Schumpeter’s
notion of “creative destruction”. Note, however, that there is some creative destruction in terms of
market shares in the increasing variety model. Though there is no product replacement like in quality
upgrading growth models, product innovation increases the horizontal competition between existing
firms and diminishes their market shares proportionally.
Anticipating the welfare properties of the model, we have thus already uncovered three potential
sources of market failure: first, producers have market power; second, newly introduced products in-
crease consumers’ utility by more than is reflected in the earnings of the innovator (the “consumer
surplus” effect); third, by introducing new products, innovators decrease the incumbent firms’ prof-
its (the “profit destruction” effect). These externalities suggests that the market equilibrium is not
efficient. We will see below, however, that the particular production structure in this model implies
that the allocation is Pareto optimal as long as no intertemporal knowledge spillovers occur. We will
also see that knowledge spillovers are the source of sustained growth in this model so that the market
equilibrium with growth is inefficient.
In maximizing (4.1), the representative consumer is subject to the flow budget constraint
˙(V −1) = r
(
V −1
)
+ wL− E, (4.3)
where r, w, and E denote the market interest rate, the wage rate, and consumption expenditures,
respectively, and V −1 are the representative household’s asset holdings (or, equivalently, the stock
market value). A “no-Ponzi game” condition additionally limits “lifetime” consumption to “lifetime”
income:
∫ ∞
t
e−[
R τ
0 r(s)ds−
R t
0 r(s)ds]E (τ) dτ ≤
∫ ∞
t
e−[
R τ
0 r(s)ds−
R t
0 r(s)ds]w (τ)Ldτ + V −1 (t) . (4.4)
Each household supplies labor inelastically (leisure does not enter the utility function), and we suppose
that the aggregate labor supply is constant and equal to L at each point in time.
Formally, households solve a similar program as in Chapter 3, with the slight difference that L is
constant over time (i.e., n = 0), aggregate consumption expenditures are denoted E (instead of Lc),
and σ → 1, i.e. log-utility applies for simplicity (cf. footnote 28 below).
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4.2.3 Producers
There are two types of firms: research labs and manufacturing plants.8 Workers employed in the labs
conduct R&D to discover blueprints for the production of new consumer goods. At the aggregate
level, this process is treated as certain and described by a deterministic production function. The
R&D technology is a ”bottleneck technology” in the sense that only a finite number of innovations are
made at each instant. There is free entry into R&D, but due to this limiting characteristic, no matter
how many researchers pursue the development of new products, the mass of blueprints will never jump
discretely but rather increase smoothly over time. Specifically, n (t) increases proportionally with the
aggregate amount of labor employed in R&D, Ln:
n˙ =
Ln
a
. (4.5)
Innovation has a constant marginal product in the labor input; a is a productivity parameter. We will
see below that growth under (4.5) comes to a halt in finite time. In Section 4.3.2, we add existing
knowledge as a factor in production, which then allows for sustained growth.
Upon discovery, the blueprint for a new good is exclusively sold to one (atomistic) manufacturing firm.
Since the knowledge embodied in the blueprint is essential for production, the buyer becomes the only
producer of the newly invented good. Further down the road, imitation might become possible at a
cost, but we assume that upon imitation, the incumbent and the imitating firm engage in Bertrand
competition with identical marginal costs.9 This leaves the imitating firm with losses so that no costly
imitation will ever occur in a perfect foresight equilibrium (for a model with imitation cf. Chapter
5).10 For simplicity, we also suppose that each firm produces exactly one good/owns one blueprint.
Accordingly, we refer to the firm that owns the blueprint for/produces good j as firm j. In contrast
8R&D can equivalently be conducted either by independent research labs or in-house, i.e. within the prospective
manufacturing firm (see Romer, 1990, p. 82). The distinction matters in the case of quality upgrading growth models
since with external R&D, the quality leader has a larger willingness to pay for new blueprints than outsiders (see
Kornprobst, 2008, p. 83).
9In the so-called North-South growth models, imitation occurs by foreign firms. If the wage rate in the North exceeds
the wage rate in the South and identical manufacturing technologies, the imitating firms captures the entire product
market. The equilibrium is then characterized by product cycle trade patterns. See, e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
Segerstrom (1991), or, more recently, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007) and Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008).
10Alternatively, the bulk of the endogenous growth literature assumes perpetual, fully enforced patents to ensure that
the initial buyer remains a monopolistic supplier forever.
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to Melitz (2003), firms are homogenous in production. All producers use constant returns to scale
technologies with an identical level of productivity. By choice of units, we set the labor input coefficient
equal to 1. The aggregate labor demand in manufacturing therefore amounts to
Lp = nx. (4.6)
The instantaneous profits of firm j ∈ [0, n] , which are paid out as dividends to its shareholders, amount
to
pi (j) = p (j)x (j)− wx (j) , (4.7)
where p (j) and x (j) denote the price charged and the quantity sold by firm j, respectively. Given
the households’ demand schedule, whereby x (j) = x (p (j)), all active firms j ∈ [0, n] engage in
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition in the product market.
4.2.4 Equilibrium Conditions
Households
Households maximize (4.1) subject to (4.3) and the no-Ponzi game condition. Let E (t) denote the
aggregate spending consistent with market clearing on the markets for available consumer goods at
time t,
E (t) ≡
∫ n(t)
0
p (j, t)x (j, t) dj. (4.8)
The problem of solving for the optimal demands x (j), j ∈ [0, n] is the same as in Section 1.2.1.
There, we found that given the aggregate consumption expenditures E and the ideal price index
P =
[∫ n
0 p (j)
1−ε dj
]1/(1−ε)
, D is maximized by choosing
x (j) =
Ep (j)−ε
P 1−ε
. (4.9)
Recall that these demands feature a uniform elasticity of substitution across goods (ε), a constant
price elasticity of demand across all quantities demanded (ε), and a constant expenditure elasticity
(equal to 1).11 Note, in particular, that the price elasticity of demand for any variety is independent
of the mass of available products (i.e. there is “large group” monopolistic competition in the sense
that a single firm has a sufficiently small market share).
11As mentioned earlier, the demand functions x (j) can be derived separately for each consumer. Aggregating over all
consumers then yields the demands given above.
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Since all firms have identical production technologies and the demand functions are the same for all
products, the equilibrium is symmetric with regard to firms:
p (j) = p, x (j) = x, pi (j) = pi.
Accordingly,
D = n
1
αx, P = n−
1
ε−1 p = n−
1−α
α p, E = npx = DP.
Substituting for D = E/P in (4.1), the households’ utility obeys
Ut =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) logE (τ) dτ −
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) logP (τ) dτ .
Hence, ∂U/∂E is independent of P . The intertemporal maximization problem can therefore be split
into two separate steps. First, given E and P, optimality requires that households choose quantities
x (j) such that D is maximized, i.e. according to (4.9). Second, the path of expenditures {E}∞τ=0 can
be chosen given P .12 A similar problem was discussed in Chapter 3. Its solution yields the standard
Euler equation for expenditure growth, E˙/E = (r − ρ) /σ (as well as a transversality condition to pin
down the solution to this differential equation and equality in (4.4)).13 With log-utility (σ → 1), the
optimal expenditure path boils down to E˙/E = r − ρ. The model is most easily solved by choosing
E as the nume´raire. With E (t) ≡ 1, the optimal expenditure path pins down the interest rate. From
E˙ = 0 in the Euler equation,
r (t) = ρ. (4.10)
In anticipation of the dynamic equilibrium, note that E (t) = 1 also implies that wˆ = pˆ = 0 and
pˆi = −xˆ if the sectoral allocation of labor between R&D and manufacturing remains constant (since
then nˆ = −xˆ from Lˆ = 0). Moreover, in this case, Pˆ = −Dˆ = −1/ (ε− 1) nˆ.
Production
Manufacturing. Manufacturing firms maximize the profits (4.7) subject to the consumers’ demands
in (4.9). We solved this problem earlier for the more general case of input coefficients in manufacturing
12This is a special property of the log-utility in (4.1). In the more general CIES case with u (D) = D1−σ/ (1− σ),
u′ (D) = E−σ/P 1−σ, the necessary condition for optimal consumption is that u′ (D) grows at the same rate as the
shadow price of wealth, ρ− r. Accordingly, −σEˆ − (1− σ) Pˆ = ρ− r or
Eˆ =
r − ρ
σ
− 1− σ
σ
Pˆ .
With log-utility (σ → 1), expenditure growth is independent of Pˆ and Eˆ = r − ρ.
13Cf. footnote 28 with n = 0 and Lc = E.
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equal to 1/ϕ, (cf. Chapter 1). We found that firms charge a constant mark-up over marginal cost, so
for ϕ = 1 we have
p =
w
α
. (4.11)
In equilibrium and with expenditures as nume´raire, the quantity demanded of each good is thus
x = 1/(np) or, using (4.11),
x =
α
nw
.
Substituting for w with (4.11) in (4.7) reveals that profits are a fraction 1 − α of revenues, pi =
(1− α) px. Since px = 1/n, the instantaneous profit of each producer equals
pi =
1− α
n
. (4.12)
Hence, the instantaneous aggregate profits or, equivalently, dividend income npi is a constant fraction
1− α of consumption expenditures (E = 1).
Equation (4.12) demonstrates the “profit destruction effect”: product innovations increase horizontal
competition and decrease the profits of incumbent firms. Profits are lower if the elasticity of demand,
ε, is high (so that α is high).
Let v (t) ≡ ∫∞t e−ρ(τ−t)pi (t) dτ denote the present value of a firm’s profits. In the absence of speculative
bubbles and uncertainty, the capital market prices each firm with value v.14 Since manufacturing firms
are willing to pay up to v for each newly discovered blueprint, v is also the equilibrium revenue for
the innovating firms, i.e. the market price for blueprints. Taking the derivative with respect to time t,
v evolves according to
v˙ = ρv − pi. (4.13)
The value of blueprints declines over time if the attainable profits from its use in manufacturing exceed
the annuity equivalent of all future profits/dividend payments. In view of (4.12) and the definition of
v, v˙ < 0 if n increases over time, i.e. if innovation occurs. Since (4.13) equivalently states that bonds
and equity are indeed perfect substitutes (the return on an investment of v in the bond, r = ρ, equals
the equivalently certain return of an investment of v in any firm’s equity, i.e. the sum of capital gains v˙
and dividend payments pi relative to v, (v˙ + pi) /v = ρ), it is often named “capital market equilibrium
condition”. This wording is somewhat misleading since any equity price that equates supply and
demand implements an equilibrium in the capital market.
14With infinitively lived agents, equity prices do not include bubbles, see Grossman and Yanagawa. For a similar result
cf. Blanchard and Fisher (1989, Ch. 5).
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R&D. Free entry into R&D and profit maximization in the research labs imply that labor demand
is unbounded if the (instantaneous) return on newly discovered blueprints exceeds the invention costs,
i.e. if vn˙ dt > wLn dt. Since n˙ blueprints require Ln = n˙a units of labor, see (4.5), we know that
v ≤ wa holds in equilibrium. If v < wa, however, no researcher would rationally incur the R&D cost
and Ln = n˙ = 0. Summarizing, in equilibrium,
wa
 = v if n˙ > 0≥ v if n˙ = 0 . (4.14)
Due to the normalization of expenditures, wages must decline with v as long as ongoing innovation
decreases the return on R&D.
Resource Constraint
Finally, labor market clearing (i.e. the aggregate resource constraint) requires labor in R&D and labor
in production, Lp = nx, to sum up to the aggregate labor endowment, Ln+Lp = L. After substituting
for Ln using (4.5), the resource constraint reads
L = an˙+ Lp. (4.15)
4.2.5 Model Structure
The model involves two state variables, n and v. While n is given by historical innovations (and
the exogenous initial value n(0) = n0) at each instant, v continuously adjusts according to what
agents believe about the future rates of return to R&D. These “beliefs” involve no uncertainty, so
v can be calculated by the agents in the model. Given n and v, we can solve for the equilibrium
labor allocation and prices at each instant, and (4.5) and (4.13) connect the resulting “instantaneous
equilibria” through time.
Note that given our assumptions on technologies, v > 0 provides the only incentive for R&D (the
sufficient condition is that n is sufficiently small).15 That is, in equilibrium, the “if” in (4.14) goes in
both directions: v → 0 implies n˙→ 0.
15Cf. footnote 2 on necessary conditions for innovation-driven growth.
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4.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of quantities {Lp, Ln, x, n}∞t and prices {p, w, r, v, pi}∞t
that satisfies16
• agents’ optimality conditions
– expenditure is chosen optimally, r (t) = ρ
– prices maximize profits, p = w/α
• technologies
– in R&D, n˙ = Ln/a
– in production, nx = Lp
• the absence of bubbles (to rule out divergent paths), ρv = v˙ + pi where profits are given by
pi = (1− α) /n
• bounded labor demand in R&D with free entry: wa ≥ v if n˙ = 0 and wa = v if n˙ > 0
• Market clearing
– at the labor market, L = Lp + Ln.
– at the markets for consumption goods, nxp = 1
We begin to characterize the equilibrium by deriving the necessary prerequisites for profit driven
growth in this environment.
4.3.1 No Endogenous Growth in the Long-Run
The incumbent manufacturers’ profits in (4.12), pi = (1− α) /n, are decreasing in the number of
competitors. This profit destruction effect of R&D hints at where the economy is headed in the long-
run. Given that the present value of future profits provides the incentive for researchers to conduct
R&D, innovation must come to a halt as n→∞ since then pi → 0 and v → 0 along with it.17 In fact,
16As usual, the budget constraint is another, but dependent, equation in the same variables.
17This is the Grossman and Helpman (1989) model.
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we can easily verify that the threshold number of competitors compatible with profit-driven growth
is finite. Let n¯ (t′) denote the number of incumbents/blueprints at the point in time where innovation
stops, i.e. suppose that n (t′ + τ) = n¯ for all τ ≥ 0. From (4.5), this implies that Ln = 0 as of time t′,
and 1 = npx = pLp from (4.15) and (4.11) give L = Lp = 1/p = α/w. In the stationary environment,
the wage rate thus equals
w|Ln=0 =
α
L
. (4.16)
It is increasing in ε (α), reflecting the fact that a high elasticity of substitution/demand implies that
firms charge low prices, sell large quantities, and thus demand much labor.
If the number of producers is constant at n, so are the incumbent firms’ profits. Since r = ρ, the
market value of each firm amounts to v = (1− α) /n ∫∞t e−ρ(τ−t)dτ, or,18
v =
1− α
ρn
. (4.17)
Finally, without ongoing innovation, the free entry into R&D condition in (4.14) is given by v ≤ wa.
Inserting the wage rate from (4.16) and the market value from (4.17) yields αa/L ≥ (1− α) / (ρn).
Solving for n we find that n˙ = 0 occurs if and only if n ≥ n¯, where
n¯ =
(1− α)L
αaρ
. (4.18)
The economy is able to generate profit-driven innovation as long as n < n¯. The threshold value of
producers is increasing in the labor endowment and the productivity in R&D (1/a). A low elasticity
of substitution between the goods as well as a high discount rate are detrimental to n¯.
If n0 ≥ n¯ to begin with, the economy immediately finds itself in a unique stationary equilibrium
(without growth): no innovation occurs (Ln = 0) and n remains constant at n0. Labor market clearing,
L = Lp = α/w, determines the equilibrium wage rate (see (4.16)). Substituting for w in the optimal
output decision of the firms with (4.16), we find that each of the n0 manufacturers produces x =
1/ (n0p) = α/ (n0w) = αL/ (n0α) units of output and charges a price equal to p = 1/L. Letting
n¯ = n0 in (4.17), the value of manufacturers equals v = (1− α) / (ρn0).
“No growth” equivalently obtains if a growing economy reaches the number n¯ of producers. The
intuition for this is simple. As more firms enter the product market with new goods, households
allocate their expenditures across an increasing number of products, market shares and profits per
product diminish and along with it the incentives for R&D. Eventually, profits (and thereby the value
18
R∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)dτ =
[e−ρ(τ−t)]
∞
t
ρ
= 1
ρ
.
4.3. EQUILIBRIUM 133
Figure 4.1: Global Dynamics (Adapted from Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, p. 56)
of blueprints) are so low that no research is conducted and all labor is employed in manufacturing.
This occurs at the point in time when n reaches n¯ or, using (4.18) with equality in (4.17)), if v reaches
v = αa/L.19
Put differently, growth of n is positive if and only if n < n¯ or, equivalently, if and only if
v >
αa
L
≡ v¯. (4.19)
The dynamics of the two-dimensional system are captured by two differential equations in n and v.
First, if (4.19) holds, the mass of innovations at each point in time is
n˙ =
L− 1p
a
=
L
a
− α
aw
=
L
a
− α
v
(> 0) . (4.20)
Second, using (4.12) in (4.13), the market value of blueprints changes by
v˙ = ρv − 1− α
n
. (4.21)
Given n0, the two ordinary differential equations in (4.20) and (4.21) completely describe the dynamic
behavior of the system and are amenable to a simple phase diagram analysis (see Figure 4.1).
From (4.21), v is constant on
ζv (n) ≡
1− α
ρn
,
19Equivalently, if n˙ > 0, free entry into R&D requires v = wa = αap and, since Ln > 0, v/ (αa) = p > 1/L from labor
market clearing. Hence n˙ > 0 requires v > αa/L ≡ v¯.
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and only if we impose non-negativity, v˙ = 0 at v = 0 (otherwise v˙(0) < 0). ζv is downward sloping
from ∞ to zero on (0,∞) in (n, v)-space. v increases above ζv and decreases below. With respect to
n, we have seen above that no innovation occurs if v ≤ v¯, see (4.19). The border of this region,
ζn ≡ v¯,
is horizontal in (n, v)-space so that ζv and ζn uniquely intersect in the first quadrant at (n¯, v¯). If v > v¯,
the rewards to R&D spur innovation.
ζv and ζn separate (the first quadrant of) the (n, v)-space in four regions. In the North-East region
(region I), all trajectories diverge and imply v → ∞, n → ∞. In the South-East region (region II),
all trajectories are vertical and eventually enter region I. Below both ζn and ζv, in the South-West
region (region III) all trajectories are also vertical but point to the South. The dynamics in this region
eventually implies v → 0 at a constant n. Finally, in the North-West region (region IV), trajectories
point to the South-East. Accordingly, a saddle path leading to (n¯, v¯) exists. Trajectories above and
below this path eventually enter region I and region III, respectively. We show below that perfect
foresight allows us to sort out all paths where v →∞ or v → 0, so that we can dismiss regions I and
III and all paths leading to these regions.
If the economy starts with n0 ≥ n¯, we have already seen that prices immediately adjust so that the
equilibrium without growth is reached where n = n0 and v = ζv (n0) forever. If n < n0 and given that
we can rule out explosive paths, we know from the phase diagram analysis that v jumps to its value
on the saddle path, innovation occurs, and the economy converges gradually along the saddle path
towards the steady state (n¯, v¯) where finally n˙ = 0.
The main message of this section is the following. No matter how well endowed the economy is with
labor, in the long-run, diminishing returns to R&D bring profit-driven growth to a halt. In particular,
growth cannot be sustained because the incentives for R&D diminish as innovations decrease the
future profits of manufacturing. With n˙ > 0, pi/v converges towards pi/v¯ = piρ/p¯i (v˙ = −pi > p˙i) and
eventually, as n→ n¯, the rate of return to R&D converges to r = ρ.
4.3.2 Sustainable Growth with Knowledge Spillovers
Up to now, labor was the only input in the production of blueprints. In particular, technical knowledge
was implicitly assumed to be perfectly appropriable: each researcher starts from scratch and sells all the
knowledge he gathers in the form of a blueprint. Romer (1990) argues that R&D not only produces
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this type of excludable knowledge. R&D rather generates lots of techniques and insights that not
only apply to the particular research project at hand. Put differently, R&D involves a lot of existing
knowledge and “standing on the shoulders of giants” (i.e. researchers benefiting from the achievements
of others). Following Romer, Grossman and Helpman assert that R&D uses a substantial amount of
“public knowledge” that is created automatically along with the private, patentable knowledge that
leads to new varieties. Somewhat more accurate, “public knowledge” refers to available knowledge
that did not originate from the given R&D project, but is freely available to the researchers.
In what follows, we include non-excludable knowledge as an input in the production of blueprints
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, Sec. 3.2). The accumulated, non-excludable part of R&D output is
thereby referred to as knowledge capital. Its flows arise steadily as a by-product of purposive R&D. The
stock of available knowledge capital serves as a freely accessible input in the production of blueprints.
Knowledge capital – at first similar to physical capital – increases the marginal productivity of labor.
The crucial difference, however, is the non-rivalry of knowledge (Romer, 1990). If Mr. Smith uses the
particle accelerator to speed up electrons, Mr. Jones will have to wait to smash atoms himself, but
both Smith and Jones may use Newton’s law of motions at the same time.20
Introducing Knowledge Capital in R&D
In their baseline model, Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Sec. 3.2) assume strong positive externali-
ties from past R&D on current product development. Abstracting from dissemination lags and non-
linearities, knowledge capital is simply assumed to be directly proportional to the number of previous
research projects, n. By appropriate choice of units, the factor of proportionality is set to one so that
n equivalently denotes the knowledge available. The knowledge capital enters the blueprint produc-
tion function linearly, so that the labor requirement per blueprint declines exponentially if n grows
20This example, however, immediately points to a severe shortcoming of the pure externality approach to sustained
growth. In the model, knowledge is a freely available input, but in reality it surely takes costly resources to allow
researchers to apply the body of knowledge uncovered by others (cf. Scotchmer, 1991). Moreover, in theory, we can work
with positive knowledge spillover effects as well as with negative “fishing out” effects whereby research into new products
becomes increasingly harder the more innovations have been made in the past (cf. Jones, 1995a, Segerstrom, 1998, and the
empirical evidence in Caballero and Jaffe, 1993, and Kortum, 1993). We can further think of various dissemination effects
that generate all kinds of growth patterns. While some functional forms can be excluded on theoretical grounds, more
detailed empirical research on the production function is required to further open the black box of R&D. In particular,
the literature lacks the micro-foundations of a R&D production function when it comes to the trade-off between the
number and the quality of innovations.
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exponentially. In particular, (4.5) is replaced by21
n˙ =
nLn
a
. (4.22)
This modification of the R&D production function leaves firms’ and households’ decisions unaffected
and only affects the resource constraint and the free entry into R&D condition. Given (4.22), a/n
units of labor are sufficient to produce one blueprint. Accordingly, replacing Ln = an˙ by an˙/n from
(4.22), the labor market clearing condition in (4.15) becomes
L = a
n˙
n
+
1
p
. (4.23)
Correspondingly, the R&D cost per blueprint reduces to wa/n so that free entry into R&D now says
wa
 = vn if n˙ > 0≥ vn if n˙ = 0 . (4.24)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Sec. 3.2), we characterize the equilibrium in terms of
n˙/n ≡ g and the auxiliary variable V ≡ (nv)−1. The definition of V implies that Vˆ = −g − vˆ.
Substituting for vˆ from (4.21) in terms of V , i.e. v˙/v = ρ− pi/v = ρ− (1− α)V, V evolves according
to
V˙
V
= −(g + ρ) + (1− α)V. (4.25)
V = 0 implies V˙ = 0. In analogy to the model without knowledge spillovers, n˙ = ng > 0 requires v to
be sufficiently large (pi and hence v continue to decline as n increases). In terms of V, we have from
(4.24) with n˙ > 0 and (4.11) that
V =
1
wa
=
1
αap
. (4.26)
Again, with ongoing innovation, some resources must be employed in the R&D sector so that Lp =
1/p > L. Inserting p from (4.26) we find that n˙ = gn > 0 if and only if
V <
L
αa
≡ V¯ .
Evidently, not all combinations of g and V are feasible (“growth” and “manufacturing” compete for
scarce labor). Using the R&D technology (4.22), labor market clearing (4.23), the pricing equation
(4.11), and free entry into R&D with n˙ > 0, we can express the resource constraint as
L = Lp + Ln =
1
p
+ a
n˙
n
=
α
w
+ a
n˙
n
= a
α
nv
+ a
n˙
n
.
21Evidently, the restriction n0 > 0 allows for the possibility of growth.
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Figure 4.2: Dynamics if the Parameter Assumption (PA) Holds (Adapted from Grossman and Help-
man, 1991b, p. 60)
This constraint can be rewritten in terms of V and g:
ξ (V ) =
 La − αV if V < V¯0 if V ≥ V¯ . (4.27)
The dynamics of the system is entirely characterized by the evolution of V as described in (4.25). A
feasible steady state is found where V remains constant and (4.27) holds. If V 6= 0 is constant, (4.25)
implies g = −ρ+ (1− α)V . Similarly, if V = 0, V˙ = 0 for all g. Hence, from (4.25), V is constant on
ζV (V ) =
 −ρ+ (1− α)V if V > 00 if V = 0 .
Depending on parameter values, there are two possibilities. Consider first the case where ζV (0) =
ρ/ (1− α) < V¯ = L/ (αa) , i.e.
ρ
1− α <
L
αa
. (PA)
In this case, ζV intersects ξ once from below in the first quadrant so that a unique steady state with
positive growth exists, see Figure 4.2. Note that V is decreasing to the left of ζV and increasing to the
right. If the economy starts not at the intersection of ζV and ξ, it converges along ξ to either V = 0
(if V (0) is less than the intersection value) or V → ∞ (if V (0) exceeds the intersection value). Since
0 < n <∞ (as g → 0 as V → V¯ <∞), we can sort out both trajectories based on the arguments put
forward in Appendix 4.A so that the economy must jump into its steady state initially.
Consider next the case where (PA) does not hold. In this case, ξ lies above ζV for all V < V¯ (cf.
Figure 4.3). If the economy starts out to the left of the intersection of ζV and ξ, the system eventually
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Figure 4.3: Dynamics if (PA) is Violated (Adapted from Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, p. 64)
converges to V = 0. If it starts to the right of the intersection, ξ > ζV and V → ∞. By familiar
arguments (see above), both types of paths can be ruled out. We conclude that the economy directly
jumps into its steady state where g = 0, V = V¯ (that is to say, given n0, v adjusts such that
v = αa/ (n0L)).
Let us briefly summarize. The parameter assumption in (PA) distinguishes two cases. If the resource
base is sufficiently low so that (PA) is violated, then no growth will ever occur and (g = 0, V = V¯ )
instantaneously constitutes the unique (steady state) equilibrium. If, however, (PA) is satisfied, the
economy jumps into a unique steady state with positive growth, and from ζV (L/a+ ρ) = ξ (L/a+ ρ),
the growth rate equals
g = (1− α) L
a
− αρ (> 0) . (4.28)
Growth can be sustained in the long-run since the falling returns to R&D due to ongoing innovation are
accompanied by a continuous decline in the R&D cost per blueprint. In the steady state equilibrium,
the two forces exactly offset each other and the incentives for R&D remain constant. Due to the
normalization of expenditures, wages (and thus prices) are constant and equal w = (L+ aρ)−1. From
g and (4.5), we infer Lp = (1− α)L− αaρ and from (4.15), Ln = αL+ αaρ.
We now turn to the welfare properties of the equilibria with and without knowledge spillovers.
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4.4 Welfare
Recall that we encountered three possible sources of inefficiencies in the model. First, consumers get
extra utility from every newly invented good since they value product variety per se. This ”consumer
surplus effect” of innovations does not accrue to the profit-seeking behavior of firms. Second, newly
entering manufacturers decrease the profits of incumbent firms (the “profit destruction effect”). Third,
producers have market power and set prices above marginal costs. Absent competitive pricing, however,
all mark-ups in the economy are of equal size so that relative prices are unbiased. Hence, as claimed
already by Lerner (1934), no distortions arise from the monopolistic price setting (cf. Samuelson, 1965,
pp. 239-240).
In the model with knowledge spillovers, there is a fourth reason to expect the equilibrium to be
inefficient: current researchers do not account for the positive side effect on future innovations.
To get a grip on the welfare properties of the models with and without knowledge spillovers, we follow
Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3) and break the labor allocation problem down into a static and
a dynamic part. That is, in a first step, we take the sectoral allocation of labor as given and ask how
production labor has to be split up among the different products. In a second step, we then ask how
labor should be allocated efficiently between R&D and manufacturing over time.
This section is organized as follows. We begin by considering R&D without knowledge spillovers (e.g.
perfectly appropriable knowledge). In this environment, the decentral market outcome will be shown
to be optimal. We discuss this somewhat surprising result right after its derivation below. Next, we
include knowledge spillovers and show that, in this case, our earlier intuition is confirmed: with public
knowledge, the private value of innovations falls short of its social return and the equilibrium allocation
generates too little growth compared to the social optimum.
4.4.1 Static Efficiency
Welfare is given by the intertemporal utility Ut. To begin with, note that any allocation that maximizes
utility over time must necessarily achieve efficiency in a static sense. That is, at any point in time labor
must be allocated across all available products so that the quantities produced of all goods maximize
D in (4.2).22 With the marginal gains from x (j) falling and identical production technologies, this
evidently requires symmetry across all products: x (j) = x or, equivalently, x = Lp/n.
22Evidently, the log is a strictly increasing function and attains its highest value if D is maximized.
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The market equilibrium is efficient in this static sense. Both with and without knowledge spillovers,
npx = E = 1 and hence x = p−ε/
(
np1−ε
)
= 1/ (np) = Lp/n. We are thus left to check whether the
allocation of labor between R&D and manufacturing is efficient across time.
4.4.2 Dynamic Allocation with Perfectly Appropriable Knowledge
We next derive the socially optimal paths for the allocation of labor in production and R&D when
R&D uses labor as the only factor in production.
Given static efficiency and one-to-one production from labor, the Dixit-Stiglitz index equals D =
n1/αx = n(1−α)/αLp. Substituting this expression in the households utility functional in (4.1), the
social planners’ objective function is given by
Ut =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)
[
1− α
α
log n+ logLp
]
dτ .
Due to the log preferences, Ut is bounded away from infinity since growth of n is at most exponential
so growth of log n is linear. In the social planner problem, n is the only state variable and Lp is used as
the control. A feasibility constraint was derived in (4.15), taking into account the resource constraint
and technologies. Solving (4.15) for n˙ gives the transition function for n :
n˙ =
L− Lp
a
. (4.29)
The current value Hamiltonian for the planner’s program is23
H = 1− α
α
log n+ logLp + λ
(
L− Lp
a
)
,
where λ denotes the co-state variable. H measures the flow value of consuming Lp units of n different
available products and investing L− LP units of labor in “new firms” in terms of current utility. By
construction, the Hamiltonian also puts a price on the foregone consumption wrapped up in the R&D
investment, namely the incremental change in (future) lifetime utility due to a change in n, λ (recall
from Bellman’s principle that λ is the time derivative of the corresponding value function and that the
flow from the optimal choice, i.e. the maximized Hamiltonian, has a return equal to ρ). λ can thus be
interpreted as the shadow price of n, which, as will become clear below, is closely linked to the firm’s
market value in equilibrium.
23For a primer on optimal control theory see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1991).
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Log-utility implies that H is concave in both its state and control with its state being non-negative.
Accordingly, the following necessary conditions are sufficient for a maximum:
∂H
∂Lp
=
1
Lp
− λ
a
≤ 0, =, if Lp > 0 ⇔ Lp ≥ a
λ
=, if Lp > 0 (4.30)
∂H
∂n
=
1− α
αn
= −λ˙+ ρλ ⇔ λ˙ = ρλ− 1− α
αn
(4.31)
lim
τ→∞λ (τ)n (τ) = 0. (4.32)
The first condition, (4.30), requires the marginal utility loss from foregoing one unit of consumption of
an existing good (i.e. holding n constant, 1/Lp) to equal the marginal utility gain from an additional
unit of labor employed in R&D (reducing output by one unit allows one manufacturing worker to
become a researcher, invent 1/a new blueprints, and thereby raise Ut by λ/a). The second condition,
(4.31), requires the rate of return on n to equal the discount factor:
ρ =
1−α
αn + λ˙
λ
=
∂ logD
∂n + λ˙
λ
. (4.33)
As usual, the rate of return consists of a dividend and a capital gain (in terms of utility): increasing n
directly raises utility (the first term) and the value of doing so, λ, may change over time (the second
term).24 The last condition (4.32) imposes that the present value (in utility terms) of blueprints must
converge to zero in the long run so that households cannot raise utility by inducing labor to reallocate
into manufacturing.
In the decentral equilibrium, one unit of consumption costs p = w/α. Foregoing one unit of consump-
tion thus allows the household to finance the upfront blueprint costs for 1/α firms (p equals 1/α−th
of the value of 1/a blueprints, see (4.14) for n˙ > 0). If v/α were equal to the shadow price of n in the
socially optimal allocation (i.e. equal to λ), the market would provide the socially optimal incentive
for R&D.
In what follows, we prove that this is in fact the case. To do so, we show that a sequence of asset prices
{v ≡ αλ}∞t satisfies the market equilibrium conditions not yet accounted for in the social planner’s
problem (namely, the evolution of asset prices and free entry into R&D), so that the solution to the
social planner’s problem also solves the market equilibrium conditions. Since the market equilibrium
is unique, this proves that the decentral outcome is efficient.
24Including public knowledge as a factor in R&D, we will find that since the transition function (i.e. the R&D technology
in terms of LP ) is no longer independent of n, there will be an additional indirect dividend term from each invented
blueprint, see Section 4.4.3 below.
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First, by definition, λˆ = vˆ so that (using (4.7)), (4.31) coincides with the evolution of asset prices in
(4.13). Second, substituting for λ with v = αλ, (4.30) becomes Lp = (αa) /v. After replacing Lp using
(4.29) we find that (4.30) yields
n˙
n
=
L
a
− Lp
a
=
L
a
− α
v
,
(i.e. equation (4.20)). Accordingly, Lp/a = α/ (wa) = αv or wa = v, which satisfies (4.14).
Finally, let us ask under what conditions the social planner would implement zero growth. A simple
way to answer this question is to impose L = Lp in the first order condition for Lp in the planner’s
solution. Then, λ = a/L and λ˙ = 0 from (4.30) so that (4.31) implies
n =
1− α
αaρ
L = n¯.
The same argument yields that optimally L∗p < L (so that g > 0) if n < n¯. In the market equilibrium,
n ≥ n¯ was shown to imply Ln = g = 0. This, however, is exactly the outcome in the market equilibrium.
The socially optimal allocation is thus an equilibrium and uniqueness implies that the equilibrium path
is socially optimal.
Since the growth rate associated with the share of labor in R&D implies the efficient growth rate,
from the social point of view, we conclude that the tendency to overinvest in innovation (due to the
nonobservance of profit destruction) exactly offsets the tendency to underinvest in innovation (due to
the consumer surplus effect; see Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, Appendix A3.3 for a formal proof).
We next consider the economy with knowledge spillovers in R&D and show that adding this externality
induces the inefficiency of the market outcome.
4.4.3 Dynamic Allocation with Knowledge Externalities
Including knowledge spillovers, we only have to use the modified R&D technology n˙ = Lnn/a and
replace the transition function for n in (4.29) with
n˙ =
(L− Lp)n
a
. (4.34)
The Hamiltonian in this case becomes
H = 1− α
α
log n+ logLp + λ
(
L− Lp
a
)
,
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and the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum are
∂H
∂Lp
=
1
Lp
− λn
a
= 0 ⇔ Lp = a
λn
(4.35)
∂H
∂n
=
1− α
αn
+
λ (L− Lp)
a
= −λ˙+ ρλ ⇔ λ˙ = ρλ− 1− α
αn
− λ (L− Lp)
a
(4.36)
lim
τ→∞ e
−ρτλ (τ)n (τ) = 0. (4.37)
Comparing (4.31) to (4.36), we see that the latter now implies an additional “social dividend” term
for the rate of return on n. In addition to the direct increase in utility (which was the only reward in
the economy without knowledge spillovers), every additional blueprint now increases the productivity
of researchers and c.p. boosts innovation in the future. In utility terms, this additional reward is worth
λn˙.
We assess the properties of the optimal allocation in two steps. First, we show that the optimal path
involves no transitional dynamics so that the economy finds itself directly in a steady state allocation
as of time 0. We then proceed to show that along the optimal path, the share of labor employed in
R&D exceeds the share of labor in R&D in the equilibrium allocation. Hence the equilibrium growth
rate is inefficiently low whenever the optimal allocation implies a positive growth rate. Otherwise, the
equilibrium is efficient, just like in the case without knowledge spillovers above (cf. Section 4.4.2).
With M ≡ nλ and (4.34), (4.36) can be rewritten as
λ˙
λ
+
n˙
n
= ρ− 1− α
αM
= Mˆ ,
or, equivalently, M˙ = ρM−(1− α) /α. Intuitively speaking, since this differential equation is unstable
(ρ > 0) and neither M → 0 nor M → ∞ can be part of a feasible optimal path, M˙ = 0 and Lp is
immediately pinned down at its steady state value by (4.35). To prove this statement, we go ahead
and solve the (linear, first order) differential equation for its general solution:25
M =
1− α
αρ
−
(
γ0 + γ1
1− α
α
)
eρt,
where the γ′s are arbitrary constants. The transversality condition pins down the particular solution:
25Multiplying M˙ − ρM = 1− 1/α with e−ρt and integrating, we haveZ
M˙e−ρt − ρMe−ρtdt =
„
1− 1
α
«Z
e−ρtdt.
Recognizing that the term in the integral on the left hand side equals the time derivative of e−ρtM and solving for M
yields the solution above.
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from (4.37), limτ→∞ e−ρτM = 0 so that the term in brackets is zero and M = (1− α) / (αρ).26
Accordingly, (4.35) imposes that Lp directly jumps to its steady state value,
L∗p =
a
M
=
aαρ
1− α.
The growth rate along the optimal path is obtained from (4.34):
g∗ =
L− L∗p
a
=
L
a
− αρ
1− α =
1
1− α
[
(1− α) L
a
− αρ
]
= εg > g. (4.38)
Observe that labor employed in production is independent of the size of the labor force. Along the
optimal path, economies with L ≤ L∗ allocate all labor to manufacturing. If L > L∗p, L−L∗p resources
are available for the conduct of R&D and growth is positive. In two economies A and B with LA >
LB > L∗p, the “larger” economy A grows faster along the optimal path,
(
gA
)∗
>
(
gB
)∗, but the
manufacturing sectors are of equal size: nAxA = nBxB.
The inefficiency of the laissez-faire outcome in the economy that permits sustainable growth points to
the need of government intervention. We consider two instruments that naturally come to mind: (i) a
sales subsidy and (ii) a subsidy on R&D costs. We conclude the section by deriving the optimal R&D
subsidy (which implements the Pareto efficient allocation).
4.5 R&D Policy
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3.3), we analyze the impact of subsidies in a diagram
that highlights the very basic allocation trade-off between growth and manufacturing. Recall that
the economy with knowledge spillovers jumps into its steady state so that there are no transitional
dynamics to be considered. In (g, Lp)-space, the steady state equilibrium can be exemplified by the
intersection of the resource constraint and a “participation constraint”, i.e. combinations of Lp and g
where the return to manufacturing equals the real interest rate. These conditions are readily derived.
Rearranging (4.23), we redefine the resource constraint (i.e. the economy’s production possibility
frontier) as
ΠL (g) ≡ L− ag. (4.39)
26In some problems, the transversality condition employed above must not be necessary for optimality (limτ→∞H (τ) =
0 is). Since we employ the transversality condition to pick the particular solution for M , let us point out that in the
planning problem at hand, limτ→∞ e−ρτλn = 0 is in fact the appropriate condition since ρ > 0 and Ut converges. See
Benveniste and Scheinkman (1982) for a proof.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of the Equilibrium: Resource and “Participation” Constraint (Adapted from
Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, p. 65)
The negative slope of ΠL says that labor employed in R&D is not available for production, and thus
a high growth rate goes hand in hand with little goods production. A useful feature of our analysis of
growth policies is that this equilibrium condition is independent of all policy interventions.
The second condition is readily derived from (4.13), which says that the rate of return on R&D satis-
fies r = v˙/v + pi/v. In equilibrium (in steady state), v grows at rate −g (since V is constant), r = ρ,
and, using the free entry into R&D condition and the pricing equation, the dividend ratio equals
pi/v = (1− α) / (nv) = (1− a) / (aw) = (1− α) / (αap) . Inserting 1/p = Lp from the normaliza-
tion of expenditures and the manufacturing technology and solving for Lp, we get the “participation
constraint”:
Πg (g) ≡ αaρ1− α +
αa
1− αg.
Given (PA), the upward sloping Πg curve cuts ΠL uniquely from below, see Figure 4.4. We now use
this diagram to examine how a subsidy to R&D affects the equilibrium allocation.
4.5.1 R&D Subsidy
Suppose that the government aims at increasing the incentives for R&D via a subsidy. In particular,
suppose that a fraction φ of the R&D expenses per newly invented blueprint is covered by the subsidy.
While this intervention leaves the “production possibilities frontier” ΠL unaffected, the slope of Πg
and its intersection with the ordinate decline. That is to say, the profit rate in manufacturing must be
higher for any given allocation to offset the increase in real interest rate due to the subsidy. Starting
from the free entry into R&D condition, V −1 = wa (1− φ) , or, using w = αp from the pricing
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equation and L−1p = p from nxp = 1, V −1 = αa (1− φ)L−1p . Solving for the resources employed in
manufacturing Lp yields the modified Πg curve:
Π′g (g) ≡
αa (1− φ) ρ
1− α +
αa (1− φ)
1− α g. (4.40)
Equating Π′g (g) and ΠL generalizes the expression for the equilibrium growth rate to include the
subsidy,27
gφ ≡ (1− α)
L
a − (1− φ)αρ
1− αφ . (4.41)
Evidently, gφ=0 = g in (4.28). Comparing (4.41) to the optimal growth rate in (4.38), we find that the
efficient allocation can be implemented by a subsidy equal to
φ∗ =
L
a − (ε− 1) ρ
L
a − (ε− 1) ρ+ ρ
=
g∗
g∗ + ρ
(< 1) .
Qualitatively, the optimal subsidy is increasing in L and 1/a and decreasing in ε and ρ. Perhaps
surprisingly, φ∗ is increasing in L since, optimally, all resources in excess of aαρ/ (1− α) should be
allocated to R&D. It takes ever stronger subsidization to achieve this target, the larger L (as L→∞,
φ∗ → 1).
4.5.2 Inefficacy of Sales Subsidies
Now suppose that instead of paying a fraction φ of R&D expenses, the government subsidizes the sales
of manufactured goods so as to increase the value of blueprints and thereby spur innovation via the
product market. Following Grossman and Helpman, we show that such a subsidy leaves the sectoral
allocation of labor, and hence the growth rate, unaffected.
A sales subsidy affects the price setting behavior of manufacturing firms. Denoting the subsidy by
φx (> 0), the profit of a manufacturer reads
pi (j) = p (j) (1 + φx)x (j)− wx (j) ,
27Equating (4.39) and (4.40) yields
L− agφ = αa (1− φ)
1− α g
φ +
αa (1− φ)
1− α ρ ⇔
1− α
αa (1− φ)L − ρ = g
φ
»
1 +
1− α
α (1− φ)
–
.
Solving for gφ gives (4.41) above.
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where x (j) = p (j)−ε P ε−1, see (4.9). Quantities are chosen to maximize profits so that
αp (j) (1 + φx) = w. C.p., the subsidy lowers the equilibrium prices and increases the quantity supplied,
p (j) =
w
α¯
, x (j) =
1
np
=
α¯
nw
,
where α¯ ≡ (1 + φx)α > α. The equilibrium profit amounts to
pi =
α¯
α
px− wx =
( p
w
α¯
α
− 1
)
wx =
(
1
α
− 1
)
α¯
n
=
1 + φx − α¯
n
=
(1 + φx) (1− α)
n
.
Note, however, that the wage rate is endogenous. In fact, since wa = V −1, the sales subsidy does
not change the rate of return on R&D (the R&D costs increase with the value of the blueprints). To
prove this statement, insert the equilibrium price in the free entry into R&D condition, V = (wa)−1 =
(α¯ap)−1 = Lp/ (α¯a) (since Lp = p−1 from nxp = 1), and calculate the rate of return to R&D:
r =
pi
v
− g = (1 + φx) (1− α)V − g =
(1 + φx) (1− α)Lp
(1 + φx)αa
− g = (1− α)Lp
αa
− g.
Accordingly, Πg remains unchanged. A sales subsidy does not alter the allocation of labor between R&D
and manufacturing and hence leaves the growth rate unaffected. While the R&D subsidy increases
the rate of return on R&D without affecting the rate of return from manufacturing, the sales subsidy
at the same time increases the return to manufacturing, thereby leaving the relative rate of return
unchanged.28
4.6 Scale Effects in the Grossman-Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3) Model
A major drawback of the Grossman-Helpman model, as well as of other endogenous growth models
of the early 1990s, is that it suffers from the strong scale effect: the long-run growth rate depends
positively on the labor endowment (i.e. the “size”) of the economy.29 Jones (1995a) prominently
argued that this feature is at odds with empirical evidence.30 Using U.S. data from 1950-1990, he
shows that while the number of scientists and engineers grew by factor 5, the growth rates of total
28This result is more general. The crucial assumption is that there is only one factor in manufacturing.
29Jones (2005) distinguishes the strong scale effect, i.e. the dependency of the growth rate on the “scale” of the economy,
and the dependency of the level of GDP on the “scale” of the economy, the weak scale effect.
30Similar concerns are raised by Kremer (1993) and Young (1998) among others. The first “search for the scale effects”
in growth (and trade) seems to be conducted by Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe (1992), who found little empirical evidence
for the strong scale effect, but uncovered that the growth of output per worker in manufacturing is significantly affected
by the scale of manufacturing.
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factor productivity (TFP) continued to stagger around 2%. Growth models marked by the strong scale
effect, however, predict a rise of the growth rate as the number of researchers increases.
The invariability of growth rates further casts doubts on the efficacy of growth policy, and, more
generally, on the influenceability of innovation rates, another central hypothesis of the Grossman-
Helpman model.
To cure these shortcomings, Jones (1995b) and various other authors proposed slight modifications of
the R&D technology among other things. Important contributions in this strand of literature include
Segerstrom (1998), Eicher and Turnovsky (1999), and Arnold (1998). Basically, these models impose
that the labor requirement per newly discovered blueprint increases over time. Sustainable industrial
growth in these environments is then driven by e.g. population growth (Jones, 1995b) or growth of
human capital (Arnold, 1998). At first glance, the modifications in the R&D production functions of
these so-called “second generation” models are rather small. In fact, however, they lead to tremendous
differences in the steady state comparative statics. In particular, the long-run growth rate is no longer
endogenous and thus also invariant to policy interventions.31 Importantly, however, policy interventions
still affect the transitional growth path as the economy converges to its long-run growth path. The level
effects exerted by growth policies or other shocks are of great importance for consumers’ welfare. Their
evaluation, however, more often than not, requires careful calibration. Generally, second generation
growth models are less flexible and generally harder to work with than first generation growth models
(at least, they involve an additional state variable).
Two further arguments support the continued use of first generation growth models like Grossman
and Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3). First, Baldwin and Forslid (1999) warn against taking the Jones critique
as too substantial an argument against the Grossman-Helpman model. Their point is that Jones
measures ”innovation” by the growth rate of TFP which, as previously claimed by Nelson (1996),
is a bad measure of innovation. In particular, Baldwin and Forslid (1999, p. 802) argue that since
TFP figures crucially depend on aggregate prices, the TFP growth rate will constantly underestimate
innovation if the involved price indices are not continuously adapted to the increase in product variety.
In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991b, Ch. 3) growth model, it is precisely the continuous decline in the
ideal price index32 induced by the increasing product variety that drives growth. Baldwin and Forslid
point to an extreme case: if the empirical price index is constructed as consumption expenditures over
31See, however, Howitt (1998).
32P is called the “ideal” price index because it follows with perfect competition from cost minimization in the manu-
facturing sector (which yields unit production costs equal to
ˆR n
0
p (j)1−ε dj
˜ε/(1−ε)
/(p (j)ε for each j).
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average prices, a figure that remains constant in the model, there will be no correlation between labor
employed in R&D and growth of TFP as measured by the empirical price index.
Second, Lingens (2005) calibrates both a version with and without scale effects of Jones’ (1999)
endogenous growth model and finds that the impact of a marginal change in the amount of labor
devoted to R&D leads to similar reactions of the growth rate right after the shock in both models.
That is, the first generation model and the second generation model behave similarly if we look at
the initial impact in the second generation framework. Lingens (2005, p. 5) concludes that “’first
generation’ models, hence, offer a convenient approximation of the transitional behavior of ’second
generation’ models”. He further claims that first generation models even provide a good quantitative
approximation of the transitional effects of R&D policies in second generation models. If this assertion
is robust, we may well exploit the flexibility of the Grossman-Helpman in further policy experiments.
A couple of years after the initial “Jones shock”, some authors put their feet back on the grounds of first
generation models. In doing so, they are very careful in interpreting the results and the mechanisms
at work. Recent publications, like e.g. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), suggest that a careful
assessment is acceptable by the profession. Evidently, however, building on first generation frameworks,
one is inevitably subject to criticism by sceptical readers. The development of sufficiently simple and
flexible frameworks for endogenous growth without scale effects therefore still remains an important
task. Sorger (2007) is a first step in this direction, although his “quantity–quality frontier in R&D”
approach has not yet received adequate attention.
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Appendix 4.A Rational Expectations and Diverging Trajectories
In this appendix, we show that neither nv → ∞ (V → 0) nor nv = 0 (V → ∞) is compatible with
rational expectations so that the divergent paths in both the economy with and without knowledge
spillovers can be sorted out (Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, p. 61).
To begin with, consider the the case nv →∞ (V → 0). The most general argument against this case
follows from the no-Ponzi game condition in (4.4). If the consumption path is chosen optimally, (4.4)
must hold with equality and r = ρ from E (t) ≡ 1. Accordingly, along the optimal consumption path,
(4.4) obeys
1
ρ
=
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)wLdτ + vn.
Recall that wa ≥ vn and wa ≥ v in the economy with and without knowledge spillovers, respec-
tively. Hence, if both n and v grow without bound in the economy without knowledge spillovers, the
consumption path cannot be chosen optimal. The same is true for unbounded growth of nv in the
economy with knowledge spillovers. If the stock market value blows up to infinity, the firm values must
be inconsistent with rational expectations and optimal consumer behavior.
Consider next the case where nv → 0 (V → ∞). In both economies with and without knowledge
spillovers, this case implies n˙ = 0 so that we are actually looking at v → 0. Since the economy is in
a stationary environment with a bounded number of firms and each incumbent earns strictly positive
profits at each moment in time, households cannot rationally expect v → 0. Actually, in the economy
without knowledge spillovers, trajectories that lead to v → 0 imply v < 0 if we do not impose v ≥ 0
exogenously. Evidently, this must violate rational expectations.
Chapter 5
Some Second Thoughts on
Monopolistic Distortions and
Endogenous Growth1
5.1 Abstract
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between
static welfare and long-term growth. This chapter reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding
variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets for “old” innovative products and for
a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which tend to
be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest
positive growth potentially requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge
to a steady state with zero growth, even though another locally saddle-point stable steady state with
positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets is sufficiently high, as this
implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap” may
happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The
policy implications are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation
as well as quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term.
1This chapter is joint work with Lutz Arnold. It presents a slightly modified version of Arnold and Bauer (2008). An
earlier working paper contains detailed derivations of Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 (Bauer, 2006). The model in this chapter
builds on Arnold (1995).
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5.2 Introduction
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition, taught in introductory economics
courses, is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term growth: perfect competition
brings about static efficiency but undermines the incentives to invest in the innovation of new goods,
services, and processes (see, e.g., Blanchard, 2006, p. 256).2 This chapter highlights several important
macroeconomic implications of this basic proposition. To do so, we consider the standard Grossman-
Helpman (1991, Ch. 3) expanding variety endogenous growth model augmented to include erosion
of monopoly power due to (exogenous) imitation and a non-innovative traditional sector. Neither of
these two extensions is novel. Textbook expositions can be found, for instance, in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004, Section 6.2, pp. 305 ff.) and Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Section 5.3, pp. 130 ff.),
respectively.3 However, the implications of the resulting monopolistic distortions for model dynamics
and welfare are not fully worked out. We prove three results on the model’s dynamics and welfare
properties and derive corollaries which characterize second-best competition and patent policies.
The first result is directly concerned with the tradeoff between static welfare and the incentives to
innovate. In the Grossman-Helpman (1991, Ch. 3) model (i.e., without competitive markets), the
equilibrium growth rate is lower than optimal, and no growth cannot be better than some growth. We
show that, in our model, it can be. This is because the static welfare loss due to monopoly pricing in
the innovative sector is non-infinitesimal. So if strict enforcement of IPRs brings about only a modest
growth rate, it is preferable to dispense with growth altogether and implement static efficiency instead.
The second result says that the economy may get stuck in a “no-growth trap” (poverty trap): the
unique perfect-foresight equilibrium possibly entails convergence to a steady state with zero growth,
even though another (locally) saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists. This will
happen if the initial share of competitive markets is sufficiently high.4 In that case, a potential innovator
would compete with many relatively cheap products, so that it does not pay to innovate. This result
2 Hellwig and Irmen (2001) point out that perfect competition per se does not rule out innovation-driven growth:
positive profit and costly innovation are compatible with perfect competition in the presence of diminishing returns to
scale and inframarginal rents (see also the discussion in Romer, 1990, pp. S75-S77).
3For models with exogenous imitation, see also Rustichini and Schmitz (1991), and Pelka (2005, Chapter 7). In
Segerstrom (1991) and Walz (1995), imitation is endogenous. Perez-Sebastian (2000) shows that “growth miracles” can
be explained in a model that interprets the process of imitation as the costly adaption of knowledge created abroad.
4The possibility of a no-growth trap is ignored in the papers with exogenous imitation mentioned in Footnote 2 except
in Pelka (2005, Chapter 7).
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is related to the literature on poverty traps, surveyed by Azariadis and Stachurski (2005).5 As for
economic policy, it implies that quick deregulation, which turns many monopolistic markets (e.g.,
state monopolies) into perfectly competitive markets simultaneously may be very detrimental to long-
term growth, since innovating becomes unattractive as the incumbent competitive producers attract
the major part of the goods demand.
The second result is reminiscent of Tang and Wa¨lde’s (2001) finding that a two-country world economy
may find itself in a no-growth trap if there are sufficiently many competitive markets due to a large
initial overlap of products, invented before trade is opened up between the countries. Our third result
is concerned with the open-economy version of our model and relates our model to Tang and Wa¨lde’s
(2001). Adapting the analysis in Arnold (2007) appropriately, we prove that, under certain conditions,
the world economy made up of several (identical) countries replicates the equilibrium of the hypotheti-
cal integrated economy (that would prevail if national borders did not exist). Together with the second
result, it follows immediately that if the model parameters are such that the no-growth trap occurs in
the integrated economy, then the no-growth trap is also an equilibrium of the world economy if there
are sufficiently many competitive markets due to a large initial overlap of products. From a policy
point of view, it follows that, like quick deregulation in a closed economy, quick trade liberalization
can lead to stagnation in the long term: the opening up of free trade at a point in time when the
overlap exceeds the threshold number of competitive markets, above which the (world) economy is
stuck in a no-growth trap, leads to long-term stagnation.
Several related recent papers investigate the growth and welfare effects of changes in IPRs. These
papers challenge Judd’s (1985) case for infinitely-lived patents. Kwan and Lai (2003) and Iwaisako
and Futagami (2003) analyze imperfect protection of IPRs in expanding variety growth models. Kwan
and Lai (2003) work out the welfare effects of a marginal shock to IPR protection (including transitional
dynamics) and show that there is a finite optimal patent length, which probably exceeds the status
quo for the U.S. Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) draw a similar conclusion from a comparison of steady-
state intertemporal utility levels. Horii and Iwaisako (2007) show, in a quality upgrading model, that
5The result most closely related to our finding of a no-growth trap is due to Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996, Section
7). Allowing final goods producers to substitute labor for a composite good made up of differentiated intermediate goods,
they show that a low initial number of innovative goods may lead to a no-growth trap if the elasticity of substitution
is sufficiently high. The intuition is that a low number of existing innovative goods implies high costs of the composite
input. Together with the possibility to substitute for innovative goods with labor, the resulting demand for innovative
goods is too low to induce innovation and get growth started.
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the growth rate effect of strengthening IPRs is not necessarily positive if competitive sectors are more
innovative than monopolies. Similarly, Furakawa (2007), using an expanding variety model, points out
that tightening IPRs may be detrimental to growth if the ensuing reduction in market size reduces
the scope for productivity gains due to learning by doing. Our chapter’s main contribution to this
strand of the literature is two-fold. For one thing, to investigate the possibility of a no-growth trap,
we analyze our model’s global dynamic behavior. For another, we present results for the open as well
as for the closed economy.
A different strand of the literature calibrates dynamic general equilibrium models in order to challenge
Harberger’s (1954, p. 87) classical presumption that “monopoly does not seem to affect aggregate
welfare very seriously through its effect on resource allocation”, in view of his calculation that the
gains from eliminating the distortions in the manufacturing sector (in the U.S. in the 1920s) are about
one-tenth of a percentage point of GNP. Matheron (2002) shows that in a human capital growth model
these gains are equivalent to a permanent 2.5 percent increase in consumption. The corresponding
figure is 3.6 percent in Jonson’s (2007) model and grows more than three-fold if one takes account of
distortions caused by the tax system. These models lend support to the view that the monopolistic
distortions analyzed in the present chapter are of non-negligible magnitude.
As the above-mentioned papers constitute only a small fraction of the vast literature on growth and
competition, it might be helpful to point out what the present chapter does not do.
First, a huge and growing literature addresses the issue of competition between several firms in given
markets and the relation between the intensity of competition and the pace of equilibrium growth.
For instance, Aghion et al. (2001) demonstrate that more intense competition may spur growth in a
model with innovation by both technological leaders and laggards, as it induces firms to try to escape
fierce competition. Such effects are not present in our model, in which markets are either monopolies
or perfectly competitive. Our motivation is that this is the easiest way of approaching the question of
how distortions which stem from the fact that some markets are less competitive than others affect
model dynamics.
Second, in their influential “Case Against Intellectual Property”, Boldrin and Levine argue that “the
case against monopoly rests less upon the [Harberger] welfare triangle from monopoly pricing than
upon the rent-seeking activity used to get and keep a monopoly” (Boldrin and Levine, 2002, p. 211).
This de-emphasis of monopoly distortions is at least debatable. At any rate, the two effects are
complementary, and including the rent seeking problems emphasized by Boldrin and Levine would
5.2. INTRODUCTION 155
strengthen our conclusions.
Third, O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004, p. 87) argue that, not patent length, but “[T]he patentabil-
ity requirements and patent breadth reflect the two main tasks that confront the patent authorities”
and analyze these dimensions of patent policy in depth. We do not address these issues.
Fourth, the terms deregulation and liberalization can be given different meanings. We call a change
from monopoly to perfect competition deregulation (since our model is an expanding variety model,
the market then remains competitive indefinitely). As an example of a different definition, see Bu¨ttner
(2006). She considers a quality upgrading model in which some goods are publicly provided (without
being upgraded) at monopoly prices and defines deregulation as a decrease in the number of such
monopolies. Deregulation is then unambiguously conducive to growth. In the open economy version
of our model, liberalization means a switch from no international trade at all to unrestricted free
trade. A more general formulation would allow for finite iceberg costs and define trade liberalization
as a decrease in the iceberg costs (see, e.g., Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007, or Gustafsson and
Segerstrom, 2007) or introduce tariffs explicitly (as, e.g., in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999, or
Baldwin and Forslid, 1999, 2000).
Fifth, it is well known that in models with quality upgrading as the source of growth, contrary to
the standard expanding variety models, growth can be too fast and zero growth can be preferable
when equilibrium growth is positive (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, Ch. 4, pp. 103-106).
To highlight that it is the monopolistic distortions which are responsible for our first result, we choose
as our point of departure the Grossman-Helpman (1991, Ch. 3) expanding variety growth model, so
that growth cannot be too fast in the absence of competitive markets.6
Sixth, the Grossman-Helpman (1991, Ch. 3) model is a first-generation R&D model, which displays
scale effects. Time series observations pose a great challenge to such models (see Jones, 1995a) and have
led to the development of non-scale growth models, such as Jones (1995b), Young (1998), or Arnold
(1998).7 A relatively general lesson of these models is that growth rates are much less responsive to
6In standard expanding variety models, one parameter pins down both the elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties of a differentiated good and the magnitude of the gains from specialization. Be´nassy (1998) shows that growth
can be too fast if one disentangles these two variables.
7Young (1998) emphasizes that an increase in the labor force may be absorbed by a sector of the economy that does
not spur long-term growth. Jones (1995b) assumes diminishing returns to knowledge in the creation of new knowledge,
in which case population growth is required to sustain long-term growth. Arnold (1998) replaces population growth with
human capital accumulation.
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changes in the model parameters than models with scale effects indicate.8 Our motivation for using
a first-generation model is that this limits the number of state variables in such a way that we can
carry out the (phase diagram) analysis of the model’s global dynamic behavior which is necessary in
order to identify a no-growth trap. This appears acceptable in view of the fact that the presence of a
no-growth trap is a property of the model’s qualitative dynamic behavior, which should not relate to
the responsiveness of the steady-state growth rate to changes in model parameters.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.3 introduces the model. The growth
equilibrium is derived in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 proves our main results on growth and competition.
Section 5.6 concludes.
5.3 Model
There is a continuum of mass one of identical households. Each household inelastically supplies L units
of labor, the only primary factor of production. Their intertemporal utility is U =
∫∞
0 e
−ρt[σ lnX +
(1 − σ) lnY ]dt, where X and Y are the quantities consumed of two homogeneous goods, x and y
(and ρ > 0, 0 < σ < 1).9 Good x is produced using a set of intermediates, j, according to the
production function X = [
∫ n
0 x(j)
αdj]1/α, where x(j) is the input of intermediate j, n is the “number”
of producible intermediates, and 0 < α < 1. Each producible intermediate, j, is obtained one-to-one
from labor. The “traditional” good y is also obtained one-to-one from labor: Y = LY , where LY is
labor employed in the production of y (one may think of services with less scope for innovation than
in manufacturing). Blueprints for new intermediates are invented in R&D according to n˙ = nLR/a
(with a > 0), where LR is employment in R&D (there are scale effects). As for market structure,
we assume that all markets are perfectly competitive except for the markets for “new” intermediates.
Immediately after the development of a new variety, the innovator is a monopolist (due to either patent
protection or the fact that other agents are not yet able technologically to imitate the intermediate).
Subsequently, in any short time interval dt the innovator loses his monopoly with probability ψ dt
(due to the loss of patent protection or of technological leadership), in which case the market becomes
perfectly competitive. ψ (≥ 0) is called the rate of imitation. Consequently, letting nm and nc denote
the “numbers” of monopolistic and competitive markets for intermediate goods, respectively, we have
n˙c = ψnm, n = nc + nm. (5.1)
8See, however, Howitt (1999).
9The time argument is suppressed here and in what follows whenever this does not cause confusion.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, the presence of competitive markets (for “old” innovative goods
and for the traditional good) is the only difference to Grossman and Helpman (1991b, Ch. 3). Our
main results, explained in the Introduction, go through for ψ = 0. The purpose of including ψ > 0,
at the cost of some additional complexity, is two-fold. First, with ψ = 0, obviously, the number of
competitive innovative goods markets converges to zero, which runs counter our focus on the role
of competitive versus monopolistic markets. Second, by allowing for positive values, we can use ψ
as a measure of the strength of intellectual property rights, which will be convenient in the policy
experiments we consider.
5.4 Equilibrium
Using aggregate expenditure as the nume´raire, utility maximization yields
pXX = σ, pY Y = 1− σ, r = ρ, (5.2)
where pX and pY are the prices of goods x and y, respectively, and r is the interest rate. Cost
minimization in the x-sector yields the input coefficient a(j) = p(j)−[
∫ n
0 p(j
′)1−dj′]/(1−) for good
j, where p(j) is the price of intermediate j and  ≡ 1/(1−α). Consequently, the unit production cost
and, because of perfect competition, the price of good x is pX = [
∫ n
0 p(j)
1−dj]1/(1−). The x-sector’s
demand for intermediate j is x(j) = a(j)X. The price elasticity of demand is  (< ∞). Monopolists
in the intermediate goods sector maximize profit, pi, given these demand functions. Letting pm and pc
denote the prices in monopolistic and competitive intermediate goods markets, respectively, and xm
the output of monopolistically supplied intermediates, we obtain the familiar pricing rules and ensuing
profits:
pm =
w
α
, pc = w, pi = (1− α)pmxm. (5.3)
Substituting the pricing rules into the expression for the input coefficients, a(j), the demands x(j) =
a(j)X can be rewritten as
xm = α
(
nc + α−1nm
)− 1
α X, xc =
(
nc + α−1nm
)− 1
α X, (5.4)
where xc denotes the output of competitively supplied intermediates. Moreover, substituting the pric-
ing rules in (5.3) into pX = [
∫ n
0 p(j)
1−dj]1/(1−) and using the fact that good y is obtained one-to-one
from labor, we get the final goods’ prices:
pX =
(
nc + α−1nm
)− 1
−1 w, pY = w. (5.5)
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Using the fact that, as of time t, a monopolist’s probability of still being a monopolist at τ (≥ t) is
e−ψ(τ−t), the value of a monopoly is
v(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
exp
{
−
∫ τ
t
[r(s) + ψ]ds
}
pi(τ)dτ. (5.6)
Imitation acts like additional discounting.10 Free entry into R&D requires
wa ≥ nv, with equality if n˙ > 0. (5.7)
Finally, the labor market clearing condition reads:
L = a
n˙
n
+ ncxc + nmxm + Y. (5.8)
Equations (5.1)-(5.8) comprise a system of 15 equations in 15 unknowns: nc, nm, n, pX , X, pY , Y ,
r, pm, w, pc, pi, xm, xc, and v.11 A vector of these 15 variables which solves (5.1)-(5.8) for all t is an
equilibrium.
Let θ ≡ nc/n and g = n˙/n denote the proportion of intermediate goods markets which are competitive
and the growth rate of the “number” of intermediates, respectively. Further, let V ≡ 1/(nv).12 Using
Y = LY , (5.2), (5.4), (5.5), (5.7), and these definitions, the labor market clearing condition (5.8) can
be rewritten as
g = max
{
0,
L
a
− σV
[
θ(1− α) + α
θ(1− α−1) + α−1 +
1− σ
σ
]}
. (5.9)
Differentiating the definition of θ and using (5.1) yields
θ˙ = (1− θ)ψ − θg. (5.10)
Imitation tends to increase the proportion of competitive markets, growth tends to reduce it. From
(5.2)-(5.5), we have
pi =
σ(1− α)
[1− θ(1− α1−)]n.
Differentiating the definition of V and (5.6) with respect to time, eliminating v˙, and using (5.2) and
the equation for monopoly profit above, we obtain
V˙
V
=
(1− α)σ
1− θ(1− α1−)V − (ρ+ ψ + g). (5.11)
10See Appendix 5.A below.
11The budget constraint d(nmv)/dt = rnmv+wL−1 represents another equation in the same variables but, as usual in
general equilibrium theory, one of the 16 equations can be obtained from the other 15 so that we have as many equations
as unknowns.
12Note that this is not the inverse of the aggregate firm value.
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Given (5.9), equations (5.10) and (5.11) comprise an autonomous system of ordinary differential equa-
tions in θ and V . In the present section, we analyze this system of equations. The findings will be
used in Section 5.5 to bring forth our main results. As mentioned above, it is possible to focus on the
(easier) case ψ = 0.
From (5.9), g > 0 if, and only if,
V <
L
a
1− θ(1− α1−)
1− θ[1− α1− − (1− α)σ]− (1− α)σ ≡ V˜ (θ) (5.12)
and g = 0 otherwise. V˜ (θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing for θ ∈ [0, 1], with V˜ (0) = (L/a)/[1−
(1− α)σ] and V˜ (1) = L/a.
Figure 5.1: Dynamics in Case 1 (Left Panel: ψ > 0, Right Panel: ψ = 0)
Consider first the g = 0-region. According to (5.11), V is constant for V = 0 and for
V = (ρ+ ψ)
1− θ(1− α1−)
(1− α)σ ≡ V¯0(θ), (5.13)
where V¯0(0) = (ρ + ψ)/[(1 − α)σ], V¯0(1) = (ρ + ψ)/[(1 − α)α−1σ], and V¯ ′0(θ) > 0. V˙ is positive for
V > V¯0(θ) and negative for V < V¯0(θ). For ψ > 0, from (5.10) and g = 0, θ is constant or increases
depending on whether θ = 1 or θ < 1, respectively. ψ = 0, together with g = 0, implies θ˙ = 0.
Here and in what follows, we distinguish three cases:
Case 1:
(1− α)σLa
ρ+ ψ
> α1−. (5.14)
In this case, V¯0(1) < V˜ (1). As V¯ ′0(θ) > 0 > V˜ ′(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1], it follows that V¯0(θ) < V˜ (θ) and,
hence, V˙ /V > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, trajectories in the g = 0-region point to the north-east for
ψ > 0 (see the left panel of Figure 5.1) and to the north for ψ = 0 (see the right panel of Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.2: Dynamics in Case 2 (Left Panel: ψ > 0, Right Panel: ψ = 0)
Case 2:
(1− α)σLa
ρ+ ψ
< 1− (1− α)σ. (5.15)
Here, V¯0(0) > V˜ (0) so that the curve V¯0(θ) is located above the curve V˜ (θ). V rises above and falls
below V¯0(θ). Suppose ψ > 0. Then, the point (θ, V ) = (1, V¯0(1)) is a steady state. As can be seen
from the left panel of Figure 5.4, for each θ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique path converging to this
steady state. For ψ = 0, we have (θ˙, V˙ ) = (0, 0) for all (θ, V¯0(θ)). Hence, for any initial proportion
of competitive markets, θ(0), there is a steady state (θ, V ) = (θ(0), V¯0(θ(0))) (see the right panel of
Figure 5.4).
Case 3:
1− (1− α)σ ≤ (1− α)σ
L
a
ρ+ ψ
≤ α1−. (5.16)
In this, intermediate, case the curves V¯0(θ) and V˜ (θ) intersect for some θ ∈ [0, 1].13 As in case 2, V
rises above V¯0(θ) and falls below the curve (see Figure 5.3).
Next, consider the region with positive growth (i.e., g > 0). From (5.9) and (5.11), V is constant if
V = 0 or if
V =
(
ρ+ ψ +
L
a
)
1− θ(1− α1−)
1− θ[1− α1− − (1− α)σ] ≡ V¯ (θ). (5.17)
V¯ (0) = ρ+ψ+L/a, V¯ (1) = (ρ+ψ+L/a)/[1 + (1−α)α−1σ], and V¯ ′(θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. V rises
13Notice that the terminology is somewhat loose with regard to a common point at one of the boundaries, θ = 0 or
θ = 1 (i.e., when one equality in (5.16) is strict).
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Figure 5.3: Dynamics in Case 3 (Upper Panels: ψ > 0, Lower Panel: ψ = 0)
above the stationary locus and falls below. From (5.10), θ˙ = 0 for
V =
(
L
a
− 1− θ
θ
ψ
)
1− θ(1− α1−)
1− θ [1− α1− − (1− α)σ]− (1− α)σ ≡ Vθ(θ). (5.18)
Using (5.12), we can rewrite Vθ(θ) as
Vθ(θ) = V˜ (θ)− 1− θ
θ
ψ
1− θ(1− α1−)
1− θ [1− α1− − (1− α)σ]− (1− α)σ . (5.19)
For ψ > 0, from (5.18) and (5.19), we have Vθ(θ) = 0 for (0 <) θ = ψ/(ψ + L/a) (< 1) and for
θ = 1/(1 − α1−) (< 0). Moreover, Vθ(θ) → −∞ as θ → 0 from above, Vθ is continuous on θ ∈ (0, 1],
V ′θ(1) = ψ − (L/a)α−1(1 − α)σ, and Vθ(θ) < V˜ (θ) for all θ ∈ (0, 1). For ψ = 0, on the other hand,
Vθ(θ) = V˜ (θ) for all θ and Vθ(1) = V˜ (1) = L/a.
Case 1: Suppose ψ > 0. Then, the case distinction (5.14) implies V¯ (θ) < V˜ (θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]
(since V¯ (0) < V˜ (0) and V¯ (θ) = V˜ (θ) for some θ ∈ (0, 1] contradicts the case distinction). Moreover,
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Vθ(θ) < V˜ (θ) for all θ ∈ (0, 1), and Vθ(1) = V˜ (1) (i.e., Vθ(1) > V¯ (1)). It follows that the stationary loci
V¯ (θ) and Vθ(θ) intersect an odd number of times on (0, 1). The fact that V ′θ(1) < 0 implies that Vθ(θ)
has an interior local maximum on (0, 1]. From (5.17) and (5.18), V¯ (θ) = Vθ(θ) for θ = 1/(1 − α1−)
(< 0) and for those θ’s which satisfy the equality V¯ (θ)/[1 − θ(1 − α1−)] = Vθ(θ)/[1 − θ(1 − α1−)].
This is a quadratic equation, with an even number of real-valued solutions. It follows that V¯ (θ) and
Vθ(θ) intersect exactly once in the interval [0, 1], which proves that a unique steady state exists in the
g > 0-region. As can be seen from the left panel of Figure 5.1, the steady state is a saddle point. For
ψ = 0, we have θ˙/θ = −g < 0. (θ, V ) = (0, V¯ (0)) is the unique steady state in the g > 0-region and is
a saddle point (see the right panel of Figure 5.1). For each θ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique trajectory
converging to the steady state both for ψ > 0 and for ψ = 0. Divergent paths can be ruled out
adapting the arguments put forward by Grossman and Helpman (1991b, p. 61): paths starting above
the saddle path yield V → ∞ and θ → θ′ > 0, where θ′ = 1 if ψ > 0 (see Figure 5.1). However, once
the economy is in the g = 0-region, pin = σ(1− α)/[1− θ(1− α1−)] ≥ σ(1− α)α−1 and, from (5.6),
vn ≥ σ(1− α)α−1/(ρ+ ψ). This contradicts V →∞. Paths starting below the saddle path converge
to (θ, V ) = (ψ/(ψ + L/a), 0) (see Figure 5.1). As pi ≤ σ(1 − α)/n, we have nv ≤ σ(1 − α)/(ρ + ψ),
which contradicts V → 0.
Case 2: In the g = 0-region, V˙ /V < 0 below the curve V¯0(θ). A fortiori, from (5.11), V˙ /V < 0 in
the g > 0-region. As in case 1, if ψ > 0, the θ˙ = 0-locus diverges to −∞ as θ → 0 from above and
satisfies Vθ(1) = V˜ (θ). As can be seen from the left panel in Figure 5.4, all paths except the one
converging to (θ, V ) = (1, V¯0(1)) violate perfect foresight analogously to the divergent paths in case
1. For ψ = 0, given a starting value θ(0), the only trajectory consistent with perfect foresight entails
that the economy jumps to the steady state (θ(0), V0(θ(0))).
Case 3: In this intermediate case, the curves V¯0(θ) and V˜ (θ) intersect for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. From (5.11),
the stationary locus for V is continuous on the border between positive and zero growth, V˜ (θ). When
the first inequality in (5.16) is strict, we have V¯ (0) = V˜ (0). For ψ > 0, by the arguments put forward
in case 2, the number of intersections of V¯ (θ) and Vθ(θ) in the g > 0-region is two (see the upper left
panel of Figure 5.3) or zero (see the upper right panel of Figure 5.3).14 In the former subcase (two
intersections), let θc denote the abscissa value of the south-eastern intersection. Then, for each θ < θc,
the unique trajectory consistent with perfect foresight converges to the north-western steady state, and
14The dynamics are similar in all respects important for our purposes if Vθ(θ) is montonically increasing, rather than
taking on a maximum on θ ∈ (0, 1].
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for each θ > θc, the unique trajectory consistent with perfect foresight converges to (θ, V ) = (1, V¯0(1)).
Similarly, in case of ψ = 0, let θc denote the θ-value at which the V˙ = 0-locus intersects the g = 0-
boundary, V˜ (θ). For θ(0) < θc, the economy converges to (0, V¯ (0)). By contrast, for θ(0) > θc, the
economy jumps to (θ(0), V¯θ(θ(0))) (see the lower panel of Figure 5.3).
5.5 Results
In this section, we use our findings about the model dynamics to prove three propositions about growth
and welfare and derive corollaries addressing the issue of second-best competition policies mentioned
in the Introduction.
The first result states that no growth may be better than some growth. To illustrate this, suppose it
is possible to effectively protect monopolies indefinitely so that ψ = 0. Suppose L is sufficiently large
so that (5.14) or (5.16) holds for ψ = 0, i.e. case 1 or case 3 applies, and there is a steady state with
positive growth. We know from Section 5.4 that if θ(0) = 0, the economy settles down at a steady state
with θ(t) = 0 for all t (see the right panel of Figure 5.1 and the lower panel of Figure 5.3, respectively).
From (5.9) and (5.11) with θ˙ = 0, it follows that
g = (1− α)σL
a
− [1− (1− α)σ]ρ. (5.20)
Let L+ denote the value for L such that g = 0 for L ≤ L+ and g > 0 for L > L+ (L = L+ implies
that the first weak inequality in (5.16) holds with equality):
L+ ≡ aρ
[
1
(1− α)σ − 1
]
.
Proposition 5.1 (“benefits of no growth”). Suppose (5.14) or (5.16) holds for ψ = 0 (i.e., L ≥
L+). Then, there exists Lc (> L+) such that for L ∈ (L+, Lc), intertemporal utility with competitive
prices, full employment, θ(t) = 1, and g(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 is higher than in the equilibrium with
θ(t) = 0 and g(t) > 0 given by (5.20) for all t ≥ 0.15
Proof. Let θ and g be constant. Furthermore, assume prices are set competitively in the y-sector and in
nc intermediate goods markets, while monopoly prices are charged in nm intermediate goods markets.
Then intertemporal utility, U , is
ρU − 1− α
α
σ lnn(0) =
σ
α
ln
[
(ncxc)αθ1−α + (nmxm)α(1− θ)1−α
]
+ (1− σ) lnY + 1− α
α
σ
ρ
g. (5.21)
15In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991b, Ch. 4) quality upgrading model, equilibrium growth is positive although zero
growth would be preferable if ρa/L lies in the interval (log λ, λ− 1), where λ (> 1) is the size of a quality jump.
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Figure 5.4: Comparing Growth and No-Growth Equilibria
The important point to notice is that monopoly pricing in the intermediate goods sector causes the
usual static welfare loss. To see this, notice that an allocation of labor across the intermediates and
good y that maximizes static welfare requires symmetry across the intermediates (i.e., x(j) = x for all
j ∈ [0, n]) and nx/Y = σ/(1 − σ). For θ(t) = 1, as nc(t) = n(t), the symmetry condition is satisfied.
And from zero profit in x- and y-production (i.e., ncxc = σ/w and Y = (1− σ)/w, respectively), the
allocation of labor is efficient. Next, consider the allocation with θ(t) = 0 and g(t) > 0. Equations
(5.2)-(5.5) and θ = 0 imply nx/Y = ασ/(1 − σ). That is, markup pricing leads to too low a level of
x-production relative to y.
Let U0 denote the intertemporal utility level with θ(t) = 1 and g(t) = 0, and U+ the utility level
obtained in the steady-state equilibrium with θ(t) = 0 and g(t) > 0 given by (5.20). Let L → L+
from above. By the definition of L+, the growth rate, g, converges to zero. Given that this implies
that the combined labor input in x- and y-production converges to L, the static welfare loss is of
non-infinitesimal magnitude. Consequently, U0 > U+ as L→ L+ from above.16 The right hand side of
(5.21) is concave in ncxc and in nmxm but linear in g (which is itself linear in L, see (5.20)). So there
is an Lc > L+ such that U+ ≥ U0 for L ≥ Lc (see Figure 5.5).
16It is possible (albeit not necessary) to calculate the difference in welfare levels explicitly. Simple manipulations show
that ρU0 − [(1− α)/α]σ lnn(0) = lnL+ σ lnσ + (1− σ) ln(1− σ) and ρU+ − [(1− α)/α]σ lnn(0) = lnL+ σ lnσ + (1−
σ) ln(1 − σ) + σ lnα − ln[1 − (1 − α)σ] as g goes to zero. So ρ(U0 − U+) = ln[1 − (1 − α)σ] − σ lnα as g goes to zero.
That U0 − U+ is strictly positive follows from the fact that it equals zero for σ = 0 and σ = 1 and is strictly concave.
The fact that U0 − U+ = 0 for σ = 1 highlights that the presence of a traditional sector is essential for our argument.
Monopolistic price setting per se does not cause a static distortion; distortions obtain when different goods have different
markups (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991b, p. 70).
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A direct corollary of Proposition 5.1 is that no patent protection may be preferable to very strict
patent protection. Suppose by giving up patent protection, the policymaker can raise the imitation
rate from ψ = 0 to ψ = ψ¯ (> 0). Consider the extreme case in which imitators learn instantaneously
how to copy new innovations, so that ψ¯ →∞.
Corollary 5.1 (“benefits of preventing growth”). For L slightly greater than L+, θ(0) = 0, and
ψ¯ →∞, intertemporal utility is higher with ψ = ψ¯ than with ψ = 0.
Proof. As explained above, with ψ = 0, the economy settles down at a steady state with positive
growth, θ = 0, and, hence, with intertemporal utility U+ (the first inequality in (5.16) is strict). As ψ
rises sufficiently far, (5.15) becomes valid and case 2 applies. As illustrated by the left panel of Figure
5.4, zero growth prevails, and the economy converges towards (1, V¯0(1)). For ψ¯ →∞, the convergence
process becomes infinitely short, so that θ quickly goes to unity and intertemporal utility is close to
U0. Since, by Proposition 5.1, U0 > U+ for L slightly greater than L+, giving up patent protection
raises welfare.
Numerical results, admittedly, suggest that some growth is better than no growth. However, it is
possible to construct counterexamples with parameter values that should not be deemed unrealistic
a priori. For instance, let ρ = 0.04, α = 5/8 (which gives rise to the standard 60% markup), a = 1,
and n(0) = 1. We let σ = 0.999 or σ = 0.5 and choose L such that without imitation (i.e., if ψ = 0)
g = 0.5%, which implies 0.3% growth in the x-sector’s real output (i.e., L = 0.0801 or L = 0.2,
respectively). For σ = 0.999, we get U0 = −63.3097 < −63.0515 = U+. For σ = 0.5, on the other
hand, U0 = −57.5646 > −57.9446 = U+. So the economy with σ = 0.5 (but not the economy with
σ close to unity) would be willing to give up long-term manufacturing output growth of 0.3% in
exchange for static efficiency. That is, raising the imitation rate from zero to infinity is beneficial to
this economy’s representative consumer.
Our second proposition states that the economy may get stuck in a “no-growth” trap (even though
there exists a steady state with positive growth) due to too much competition initially.
Proposition 5.2 (“no-growth trap”). Suppose (5.16) holds (case 3). Suppose further that either
ψ > 0 and V¯ (θ) and Vθ(θ) intersect twice in the g > 0-region, or else ψ = 0. Then, g(t) > 0 for all
t ≥ 0 if θ(0) < θc, while there is tc ≥ 0 such that g(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tc if θ(0) > θc.
Proof. This simply rephrases the results of the analysis of case 3 in Section 5.4. If ψ > 0, tc (> 0) is
the point in time at which the trajectory converging to (1, V¯0(1)) crosses the g = 0-boundary. tc = 0
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for ψ = 0 (see the upper left and the lower panels of Figure 5.3, respectively).
The intuition for Proposition 5.2 is: the lower its competitors’ prices, the lower the share of aggregate
demand that accrues to a potential innovator. If too many competitors supply at competitive prices, it
does not pay to innovate, even though it would pay if the competitors’ products were more expensive.
As an example, let ρ = 0.02, ψ = 0.01, α = 0.6, a = 1, σ = 1, and L = 0.15. This gives rise to
case 3, and the stationary loci for V and θ intersect twice in the g > 0-region, at θ = 0.4352 and
θ = 0.7404 ≡ θc. The growth rate corresponding to the steady state with θ = 0.4352 is g = 1.30%,
which implies 0.87% growth of the x-sector. So this economy fails to reach a steady state with 0.87%
manufacturing output growth if the initial proportion of competitive markets exceeds 74.04%.
The implication of Proposition 5.2 for competition policy is that quick deregulation of monopolies may
do more harm than good, as it makes it harder for a potential innovator to compete with incumbent
producers. To illustrate this, consider an emerging economy with state monopolies in nm = θmn
intermediate goods markets initially. Assume θm < θc. Without deregulation, θ(0) = 1 − θm, and
the economy converges to the saddle-point stable steady state, in which growth is positive. Suppose,
by contrast, the government deregulates some of the monopolies, in which case they instantaneously
become perfectly competitive. That is, the government determines a starting value θ(0) in the interval
[θm, 1] (3 θc). From Proposition 5.2, we have:
Corollary 5.2 (“perils of quick liberalization”). Let the conditions of Proposition 5.2 be satisfied.
If markets are deregulated such that θ(0) > θc, then there is a tc > 0 such that g(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tc,
while g(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0 without deregulation.
In the example above, if θm = 74%, then deregulating a further 0.1% of the markets means giving up
0.87% long-term manufacturing growth.
Tang and Wa¨lde (2001) show that a no-growth trap is possible in the two-country open economy
version of our model with σ = 1 and ψ = 0. Proposition 5.2 is strongly reminiscent of their finding.
We now turn to the m-country open economy version of our model. We show that under certain
conditions the m-country economy behaves exactly identically to the hypothetical integrated economy
that occurs in the absence of national borders (i.e., the restrictions on labor movements they imply).
To do so, we generalize the analysis in Arnold (2007) (which assumes ψ = 0). The Tang-Wa¨lde
(2001) result is then obtained as a corollary to this replication theorem.17 Consider a world economy
17Our result also generalizes Tang and Wa¨lde (2001), to the cases σ > 0 and m > 2.
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made up of m (≥ 2) countries of the type introduced in Section 5.3 (i.e., with identical parameter
values everywhere). Variables referring to individual countries, i, are distinguished by a superscript
i (= 1, . . . ,m). Variables without the superscript are world aggregates. We assume that knowledge
spillovers in R&D are international in scope, so that the R&D technologies become n˙i = nLiR/a.
An important issue is which products can be produced where. We start with the assumptions least
conducive to the possibility of replication: non-imitated goods have to be produced where they were
invented, and imitation is also “local”, in that in short time intervals, dt, a fraction (Li/L)ψ dt of the
nm goods not yet imitated before becomes producible in country i and is also produced in country
i: n˙ic = (L
i/L)ψnm. We say that replication of the equilibrium of the integrated economy (ignoring
national borders that inhibit movements of labor across borders) is feasible if this allocation is an
equilibrium of the world economy (with national borders) as well.
Proposition 5.3 (“replication”). If
Li − nic(t)xc(t)− nim(t)xm(t) ≥ 0, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, t ≥ 0, (5.22)
then replication is feasible.
Proof. Ignoring national borders, the equilibrium obeys equations (5.1)-(5.8) in Section 5.4 (where
L ≡∑mi=1 Li). We have to show that this set of equations is also satisfied in the world economy with
national borders. Equation (5.1) follows from adding up n˙ic = (L
i/L)ψnm for all i = 1, . . . ,m. The
conditions for utility maximization in (5.2) are unaffected by the presence of national borders. Since
the cost minimization problem is also unchanged, so are the input coefficients, a(j), the zero profit
condition pX = [
∫ n
0 p(j)
1−dj]1/(1−), the demands for intermediates x(j) = a(j)X, and, therefore, the
pricing rules and ensuing profit in (5.3) and the expressions for xm and xc in (5.4) (where X is the
world production of good x, xm is the output of any monopolistically supplied intermediate, and xc
is the output level of any competitively supplied intermediate). Evidently, the equations for pricing
of the final goods, the value of an innovation, and free entry into R&D, (i.e., (5.5)-(5.7), respectively)
hold true in equilibrium. Finally, labor market clearing in country i requires
Li = a
n˙i
n
+ nicxc + n
i
mxm + Y
i. (5.23)
Assumption (5.22) ensures that for each country, i, given nic and n
i
m, there exist n˙
i ≥ 0 and Y i ≥ 0
such that (5.23) is satisfied. Adding up (5.23) for all i = 1, . . . ,m yields (5.8).
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Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 can be jointly used to prove a generalized version of the Tang-Wa¨lde (2001)
theorem on the existence of a no-growth trap due to the opening up of international trade between
several countries. To do so, assume that at time t = 0, m countries with free international flows
of knowledge between them start to engage in trade with each other. Suppose that, while still in
autarky (i.e., before time t = 0), the producers do not take into account the possibility of future trade
liberalization, so that they do not have an incentive to avoid the invention of identical intermediates
in different countries (“duplication”). Let n denote the total “number” of different intermediates
producible somewhere in the world economy and nd the “number” of duplicated intermediates at the
point in time when trade is liberalized. From Propositions 5.2 and 5.3, we obtain:
Corollary 5.3 (generalization of Tang and Wa¨lde, 2001). Let the conditions of Proposition 5.2
be satisfied, and (5.22) holds. Then the no-growth trap described in Proposition 5.2 is an equilibrium
of the world economy if nd/n > θc.
From a policy point of view, this corollary implies that, like quick deregulation in a closed economy,
quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term: if countries decide to liberalize trade
at a point in time when nd/n ≥ θc, growth will come to a halt.18
Under the maintained assumptions, replication may fail due to the fact that a country, i, starts out with
a disproportionately large number of blueprints. If, for instance, nimxm > L
i, then replication is not
feasible, as country i does not have enough resources to manufacture the integrated equilibrium outputs
of the intermediates with a domestic monopolist. On the other hand, as Li−nic(t)xc(t)−nim(t)xm(t) =
LiR + Yi, (5.22) is satisfied with strict equality in a steady state with L
i
R and Yi positive, it follows
that if the world economy is close to its steady state initially, then (5.22) will hold. Moreover, the
problem vanishes altogether under assumptions more conducive to the possibility of replication. To see
this, assume that intermediates invented in one country can be manufactured in a different country,
i, either within multinational firms or via international patent licensing. Assume further that once
imitation is possible in one country, i, it is possible in each country, i = 1, . . . ,m (“simultaneous
imitation”). Then, all production activities are “footloose”. Equation (5.23) is satisfied, for instance,
for n˙i/n˙ = nic/nc = n
i
m/nm = Y
i/Y = Li/L (and for many other allocations of productive activities
across countries as well). This proves:
18To maintain growth, one has to wait for a point in time where nd/n < θc, or one has to choose a non-stationary
path of the imitation rate, ψ, which prevents too much competition. A thorough analysis would require announcement
effects and/or explicitly making ψ non-stationary.
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Corollary 5.4. Let the conditions of Proposition 5.2 be satisfied. Then, with simultaneous imita-
tion and either multinational firms or international patent licensing, the no-growth trap described in
Proposition 5.2 is an equilibrium of the world economy if nd/n > θc.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter is concerned with the question of how competition with “cheap”, i.e., old or traditional,
goods affects the incentives to enter markets with new, innovative products. It shows that no growth
may be better than some growth and that both a closed economy and a world economy made up
of several countries engaged in free trade with each other may get stuck in a no-growth trap. As a
result, growth-enhancing policies may be misguided, and quick deregulation as well as quick trade
liberalization possibly lead to avoidable stagnation in the long term.
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Appendix 5.A Imitation Acts Like Additional Discounting
In this appendix, we show that imitation as defined in the main text acts like additional discounting.19
Albeit intuitive, this is readily proven as follows. Let Ψ(t, τ + ∆) denote the probability that no
imitation occurs in the time span (t, τ +∆). Since the Poisson process lacks memory, Ψ(t, τ +∆) =
Ψ(t, τ)Ψ(τ , τ +∆) holds. If ∆ refers to a short period of time, the latter factor equals 1− ψ∆. Now,
let ∆ go to zero,
lim
∆→0
Ψ(t, τ +∆)−Ψ(t, τ)
∆
=
∂Ψ(t, τ)
∂τ
= −Ψ(t, τ)ψ.
Solving this first order variable coefficient differential equation gives the probability of still being a
monopolist τ periods after t. Since Ψ(t, t) = 1, we have Ψ(t, τ) = exp
[− ∫ τt ψ(ξ)dξ].
19Cf. the Poisson imitation model by Grossman and Helpman (1991a).
Part III
Idiosyncratic Income Risk and the
Labor Market
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Chapter 6
Labor Market Matching with Savings
More often than not, individual’s decisions are subject to risk and uncertainty.1 While some risk is
due to systematic, aggregate shocks, other risk is less systematic or even characteristic of a single
asset or agent. These idiosyncratic risks are diversifiable to a large extent if the underlying shock is
publicly observable. There are then, typically, markets where individuals trade state-contingent claims
to insure against the financial consequences of risks such as credit or liability fraud, accidents, or, in
some cases, disability or health problems, to name just a few. As indicated by the latter example,
however, some, often substantial, idiosyncratic risks lack a market for insurance. This is in particular
true if the shocks are private information. Informational frictions, through moral hazard and adverse
selection, among other frictions may prevent markets from being complete. For example, as love is
private information, there is no market for a spouse to insure against the potential loss of wealth
caused by a divorce due to reported loss of love. Similarly, there is no market for individual workers
to insure against unemployment, since again, key determinants of unemployment like productivity
or effort are often unobservable. In certain cases where no market exists, governments can improve
allocations by enforcing transfers among individuals, effectively avoiding adverse selection through
statutory insurance, or by disentangling the insurance costs from the benefits. Governments may
further be able to collect information that is inaccessible in a market or otherwise extremely costly.2
Evidently, any normative analysis of such policies requires a thorough understanding of how individuals
1The distinction between risk and uncertainty dates back to Knight (1921). Hubbard (2007, p. 46) refers to uncertainty
as the existence of more than one possible outcome and defines risk as a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities
involve a loss for the decision maker.
2Cf. Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008) for a comparison of government-regulated allocations to market allo-
cations.
173
174 CHAPTER 6. LABOR MARKET MATCHING WITH SAVINGS
behave optimally in the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic risks.
In what follows, we employ dynamic partial equilibrium heterogeneous agents models in continuous
time to show how risk averse individuals react optimally to idiosyncratic fluctuations in their labor
incomes. There is no insurance market for this risk, but since we abstract from aggregate shocks,
individuals may use a riskless asset with a deterministic return to smooth their consumption to some
extent.
We start off by briefly reviewing some of the influential work on risk-averse individuals and equilibrium
unemployment with incomplete markets. The following section introduces a dynamic partial equilib-
rium framework that serves as a baseline model for the analysis of labor market search and matching
when individual workers are able to invest in a riskless asset. Upon describing the environment, we
characterize the individual’s optimal behavior and consumption dynamics under CRRA preferences.
The following section is devoted to the individual’s consumption Euler equation under labor income
uncertainty. We proceed by reviewing the recent model by Shimer and Werning (2008), who charac-
terize the optimal unemployment policy in a dynamic search model with CARA preferences. Building
on their analysis, we then show how imposing a borrowing constraint and nonnegative consumption
accounts for history dependence in the decision to accept a job, even under CARA. We characterize
the optimal savings behavior and derive the equilibrium reservation wage as a function of wealth.
Finally, we conclude this part by showing how a change in the attitude towards risk and uncertainty
affects the optimal amount of savings in the standard two period model of optimal consumption under
income uncertainty.
6.1 Introduction
Research into risk averse agents, savings, and labor market search in economies with incomplete
markets has a longstanding tradition. Somewhat roughly, we can subdivide the literature into three
strands.
The first strand is on labor market search and business cycles. It involves a merger of the canonical
Kydland-Prescott (1982) real business cycle (RBC) model with search frictions of the Mortensen-
Pissarides (1994) type of equilibrium unemployment. Seminal contributions include Andolfatto (1996),
Merz (1995), and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). The starting point of this literature is an
unsatisfying propagation of shocks in early RBC models. Including costly job search in a Kydland-
Prescott (1982) RBC model, Andolfatto (1996) reduces the contemporaneous correlation of hours
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worked and productivity relative to the standard RBC model, matches the observed larger fluctuation
in hours worked compared to the fluctuation of wages, and generates output dynamics that no longer
simply replicate the impulse dynamics.3 Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) further increase the
persistence of shocks by endogenizing the process of job destruction. The fluctuations of the job
destruction rate over the cycle, moreover, magnify the output effects of shocks.4 The model matches
well the empirically observed cyclical patterns of job creation and destruction. Typical for this strand
of literature, however, den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) assume income pooling in large families
and thus abstract from idiosyncratic consumption risk due to job separation and unemployment.
In pioneering work, a second strand of literature dispenses with the assumption of income pooling and
takes uninsured income fluctuations into account. Here, substantial contributions are by I˙mrohorog˘lu
(1989), Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (1998, 2003), and Heer (2001).5 I˙mrohorog˘lu (1989)
computes the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations holding fixed the capital stock and the interest
rate. She finds large utility costs of cycles, in the range of 0.3 and 1.5% of aggregate consumption. In a
complete markets model by Lucas (1987), the corresponding figure is substantially lower, about 0.1%
of consumption. Allowing agents to react to income fluctuations by building up precautionary savings
so that asset holdings differ between the benchmark cases with and without income fluctuations,
3In a similar RBC model with search unemployment, Merz (1995) generates dynamic patterns in line with labor market
data: real wages deviate from productivity, productivity is leading unemployment over the cycle, and the contemporary
correlation between vacancies and the unemployment rate is negative.
4In their model, the standard deviation of output is 2.5 times the standard deviation of shocks; in the standard RBC
model, it is less than two.
5Heer and Maußner (2005, Chapters 5 and 6) provide a compendium of the numerical methods necessary to compute
the stationary equilibrium and the evolution of the wealth distribution of heterogeneous agent economies. Cf. R´ıos-Rull
(1995, 1999). Heer and Maußner (2005, Ch. 5.3 and 6.5) also provide various applications and point to further important
research in the field (I˙mrohorog˘lu, 1992, on the welfare cost of inflation; Aiyagari, 1994, on an endogenous borrowing
constraint that ensures repayment with probability one in all possible states; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995, on the
implications of various idiosyncratic shocks for the accumulation of wealth in a life-cycle model; Huggett, 1996, on the
wealth distribution in life-cycle models when the earnings distribution is calibrated to real world data; Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber, 1998, on dynamic general equilibrium models with endogenous heterogeneous human capital accumulation;
Ventura, 1999, on the quantitative consequences of a revenue-neutral flat tax reform for capital accumulation, labor
supply, and the distribution of earnings, income, and wealth; Huggett and Ventura, 2000, on the impact of a social
security reform on the distribution of welfare, consumption, and leisure across households; Caucutt, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and
Kumar, 2003, on the implications of increasing subsidies to higher education for inequality, welfare, and efficiency; Heer
and Trede, 2003, on the quantitative effects of revenue-neutral flat tax and consumption tax reforms).
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Heer (2001) suggests that the welfare costs of cycles obtained by I˙mrohorog˘lu (1989) provide a lower
bound. Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (1998) employ a neoclassical growth model with
heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks to investigate the dynamics of the income distribution over
the cycle. Inter alia, they show that uninsured unemployment spells, not cyclical moving factor shares,
account for much of the dynamics of the income distribution when partitioning the set of households in
five groups according to differences in permanent earnings.6 Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull
(2003) substantiate the outstanding performance of a model with uninsured idiosyncratic efficiency
labor endowment shocks and ex ante identical households. Calibrated to the Lorenz curve of earnings
and wealth from 1992 U.S. consumer survey data, their model matches the observed U.S. earnings
and wealth inequality almost exactly.
More recently, a third strand of literature emerged from an extension of the Mortensen-Pissarides
(1994) equilibrium search model to include incomplete markets in the spirit of Bewley (undated),
Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994). This literature, initiated by Krussel, Mukoyama, and S¸ahin
(2007) and Nakajima (2007), offers new mechanisms to address the ongoing rise of within-group het-
erogeneity. For example, in a model with aggregate certainty and period-per-period wage negotiations,
Krussel, Mukoyama, and S¸ahin (2007) show that financial wealth acts as an outside option in wage ne-
gotiations and raises the worker’s wage. Further, including aggregate shocks, consumption smoothing
permits capital from jumping to its new long-run level and thereby generates transitional dynamics
for the tightness of the labor market (measured by the ratio of vacancies to unemployed). In models
with linear utility, labor market tightness is a jump variable. However, Krussel, Mukoyama, and S¸ahin
(2007) assert that both mechanisms matter little for aggregate dynamics. In most calibrations, there
is also little dispersion of wages due to different levels of wealth.7 While there is some difference in
key variables between linear and concave utility in Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) calibration, risk
aversion does not add anything if the model is calibrated to labor market flows like in Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005). In a related paper, Nakajima (2007) replaces individual wage bargaining by the bar-
gain between a representative firm and a representative worker, who is only constructed for that single
purpose. He finds that risk aversion and the lack of insurance strongly amplify shocks, independently
6The differences in permanent earnings are measured by an index constructed from longitudinal U.S. Panel Study of
Income Dynamics data.
7This may be due to the assumption of exogenous job separation. Using estimates on French panel data, Algan,
Che´ron, Hairault, and Langot (2003) substantiate a significant positive effect of short-term liquid asset holdings on job
quits.
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of including leisure in the utility function or not. Nakajima’s (2007) model, however, generates little
inequality among workers as well. The only heterogeneity is due to different (un)employment histories.
Like Krussel, Mukoyama, and S¸ahin (2007), most research into uninsured idiosyncratic labor income
risk builds on an individual sequential search problem or uses insights from such a model in reduced
form. Recent work by Shimer and Werning (2008, cf. Chapter 7) presents analytical results on the
optimal unemployment insurance in a partial equilibrium job search model with CARA preferences.
In their model, individuals have unlimited access to liquidity and employment is an absorbing state.
In this case, constant unemployment benefits and employment taxes are optimal in that they provide
the unemployed individual with a given level of utility at the lowest possible cost. Using numerical
methods to solve the model under CRRA preferences, they show that the cost of a constant benefit
and tax policy relative to an optimal, time-varying policy is minuscule, so that the optimal policy
obtained for CARA provides a good benchmark for CRRA as well. In what follows, we focus on the
optimal behavior of the individual. Independently of Shimer and Werning’s research, we advanced
and clarified a similar analysis of optimal consumption in a standard Pissarides matching model due
to Sennewald (2007b). In this model, individuals have CRRA preferences, switch back and forth
between employment and unemployment according to a two-state Poisson process, and face interest
rates that generally differ from their subjective discount rates. In the simplest version, we abstract
from heterogenous job offers and thus ignore reservation wages. In an extension, we include job offers
drawn from a distribution and derive the equilibrium reservation wage. The baseline model serves
well as a starting point for the analysis of matching and savings for two reasons. First, it allows us
to derive analytical expressions for the evolution of optimal consumption with CRRA preferences,
where an individual’s degree of risk aversion changes if her level of wealth changes, and account also
for the level effect implied by consumption smoothing in cases where the interest rate differs from the
subjective discount rate. In passing, we derive the law of motion of optimal consumption with CARA
preferences as well, which will be useful in the following applications. Second, exploring individual
consumption Euler equations, it is an easy task to assess the dynamics of consumption and wealth
and to characterize the economic determinants of threshold wealth levels that were first uncovered in
computable general equilibrium models (see, e.g., Heer and Maußner, 2005, Ch. 5).
In what follows, we describe the baseline model environment. It contains as a special case (with zero
job separation, an interest rate equal to the discount rate, and a degenerated one-point distribution
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of wage offers) the unemployed’s problem in Shimer-Werning (2008) under CRRA preferences. After
solving the model, we characterize the dynamics of consumption and wealth. The appendix comprises
several derivations and technical conditions for the model in the main text. It also extends the baseline
model to include wage offers from a distribution and a wealth dependent reservation wage.
A cautionary note is in order. The following section is intended to introduce the basic modeling
tools in continuous time matching with savings models and to present some immediate findings. The
appendices to this chapter go somewhat beyond this goal and present material that is relevant for a
reader interested in working with the models. We briefly repeat essential steps when needed, so that
the main text is sufficient to prepare the grounds for the following applications.
6.2 A Baseline Model of Matching with Savings8
6.2.1 An Individual
Consider an individual who faces idiosyncratic, uninsured income risk from job separation and search
frictions at the labor market. As in standard matching models in continuous time (cf. Pissarides,
2000), an individual working on a job loses her position with Poisson separation rate s and, when
unemployed, finds a job with Poisson rate µ (a mnemonic for ’match’). Over the course of her lifetime,
the individual switches back and forth between working on a job and being unemployed. The only
uncertainty is about the duration of the employment and the unemployment spells. The wage rate
is given by some constant w and constant unemployment benefits b ≤ w are paid as long as the
individual is unemployed. Consumption is the nume´raire. In a slight abuse of the word, we refer to
z (t) ∈ {w, b} as an individual’s “labor” income irrespective of the actual employment state. We further
economize on notation and denote by z (t) equivalently an individual’s employment state, i.e. z (t) = w
for ’employment’ and z (t) = b for ’unemployment’.
While there is no insurance against the labor income shocks, individuals can borrow and save in a
riskless asset. Let a denote the stock of an individual’s asset holdings. The individual’s dynamic (or
flow) budget constraint reads9
da (t) = {ra (t) + z (t)− c (t)} dt. (6.1)
8Sections 6.2 and 6.4 are joint work with Klaus Wa¨lde.
9With CRRA preferences, nonnegative consumption implies what Aiyagari (1994) calls the natural debt limit. That
is, even if consumption was zero, the individual would not be able to repay more than a certain level of debt with
probability one. The asset space is thus bounded below, cf. Section 6.3.
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Per unit of time dt, financial wealth a (t) increases (or decreases) if capital income ra (t) plus labor
income z (t) is larger (or smaller) than consumption c (t) . Labor income z (t) is given by w when
employed and b when unemployed. All variables with a time argument can change over time, all others,
like the interest rate r, are constant. Dividing the budget constraint by dt and using a˙ (t) ≡ da (t) /dt
would yield a more standard expression, a˙ (t) = ra (t) + z (t)− c (t) . As a (t) is not differentiable with
respect to time at moments where an individual jumps between employment and unemployment or
vice versa, we prefer the above representation. The latter is also more consistent with the subsequent
stochastic differential equations.
The dynamics of z (t), the individual’s employment status and labor income, can be described by a
stochastic differential equation,
dz (t) = ∆dqµ −∆dqs, ∆ ≡ w − b. (6.2)
The Poisson process qs counts how often the individual moves from employment into unemployment.
Its arrival rate is given by s (z (t)). The Poisson process related to finding a job is denoted by qµ with
arrival rate µ (z (t)). It counts an individual’s transitions out of unemployment, i.e. how often she
finds a job.10 As an individual cannot loose her job when she is unemployed and as searching for a job
makes no sense for someone who has a job since all jobs are equally valuable, both arrival rates are
state dependent (see table 6.2.1). If an individual is employed, for example, µ (w) = 0, whereas when
she is unemployed, s (b) = 0.
z (t) w b
µ (z (t)) 0 µ
s (z (t)) s 0
Table State dependent arrival rates.
Suppose the individual is employed: z (t) = w. The equation for the employment status then simplifies
to dz = − (w − b) dqs. Whenever the process qs jumps, i.e. when the individual loses her job and
dqs = 1, the change in labor income is given by −w + b and, given that the individual earns w before
10Alternatively, we could use a single process that jumps back and forth between two values indicating ’employment’
and ’unemployment’, respectively (cf. Bayer, 2007) instead of two alternating Poisson processes. Both formulations are
equivalent in the present environment.
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losing the job, earns w − w + b = b afterwards. Similarly, when unemployed, the employment status
follows dz = (w − b) dqµ and finding a job, i.e. dqµ = 1, means that labor income raises from b to
w. The description of the dynamics of the job status in (6.2) formalizes by the tool of a stochastic
differential equation what has been used for a long time in many discrete-time models with two-state
Markov processes.
The individual maximizes a standard expected intertemporal (present value) utility function,
U (t) = Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ[τ−t]u (c (τ)) dτ.
Expectations need to be formed due to the uncertainty of labor income which in turn makes consump-
tion c (τ) uncertain. The planning horizon starts in t (as today) and is infinite. The time preference
rate is ρ > 0 and instantaneous utility is of the CRRA type,
u (c (τ)) =
c (τ)1−σ − 1
1− σ , σ > 0. (6.3)
We now ask how individuals behave optimally in such a framework.
6.2.2 Optimal Behavior
The Solution to the Maximization Problem
The individual maximizes her objective function by choosing a path {c (τ)} of consumption subject
to the budget constraint (6.1) and the stochastic evolution of her employment status (6.2). We ap-
proach this problem by continuous-time stochastic dynamic programming. While this approach has
a longstanding tradition in almost all fields of economics (see, e.g., Obstfeld, 1994, Turnovsky, 1997,
Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998, , Wa¨lde, 1999, Stein, 2006, among many others), a rigorous proof
for its applicability to standard economic problems was only recently provided by Sennewald (2007a).
At least, this is true for the subset of problems where the instantaneous objective function is un-
bounded like in our case (see (6.3)).11 Sennewald (2007a) proves that dynamic programming in fact
yields the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum with this type of instantaneous objective
function. To the best of our knowledge, however, there exists no rigorous proof of the differentiability
of value functions in continuous-time stochastic dynamic programming when uncertainty stems from
11More precisely, Sennewald (2007a) proves that the stochastic dynamic programming approach can be used as a
necessary criterion for optimality if the utility function and the coefficients are linearly bounded. He further proves
sufficiency without any boundedness requirements.
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Poisson processes.12 Sennewald (2007a, p. 1126) notes this shortcoming: “Nevertheless, we required
(...) the value function to be once continuously differentiable with bounded first derivatives. Relaxing
these issues is left for further research.” This lack of rigorous foundation is hardly believable given
the long lasting and widespread use of continuous-time stochastic dynamic programming. Evidently,
the issue is naturally resolved ex post in the case of problems that allow closed-form solutions (see,
e.g., Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998, or Wa¨lde, 1999). As noted by Wa¨lde (2008, p. 226), however,
many standard models do not permit a closed form solution. Our general model shares this property.
In what follows, we thus pursue a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, we take as given that the value
function is twice continuously differentiable in the level of wealth whenever the employment state
does not jump and proceed analytically. This approach offers important insights into the dynamics of
optimal consumption and wealth that are in line with economic reasoning on consumption smoothing
and precautionary savings. In view of closed-form solutions in special cases and rigorous proofs for
analogous problems in discrete time, we conjecture that differentiability holds more generally as well.13
On the other hand, we adopt a numerical solution and show qualitatively how the solution looks like.
This strategy of course cannot replace a rigorous analytical treatment. Like our predecessors, we leave
this important work for future research.
Returning to the model, an individual’s state is described by her current labor income z (t) and her
current wealth a (t). We thus define the value function as V (a (t) , z (t)) = max{c(τ)} U (t) such that it
solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation (for the math on stochastic differential equations
see Øksendahl, 2003; for the derivation of the HJB equation in the present setup cf. Sennewald,
2007a,b, Sennewald and Wa¨lde, 2006, and the compendium in Wa¨lde, 2008)
ρV (z (t) , a (t)) = max
c(t)
{
u (c (τ)) +
1
dt
EtdV (z (t) , a (t))
}
. (6.4)
12See Stockey and Lucas (with Prescott) (1989) for a rigorous treatment in discrete time. In continuous-time under
certainty (and also in discrete time under certainty), Beneviste and Scheinkmann (1979) prove the differentiability of the
value function.
13It will become clear below, however, that the issue is not easily dismissable. For example, we find that consumption
jumps at points in time where the individual changes her employment state, so that the instantaneous utility functional
is not continuously differentiable in t. Note, however, that we only require differentiability of the value function with
respect to the endogenous state variable at points in time where the Poisson process does not jump. Seierstad and
Sydsæter (1987) provide theorems for the Maximum principle and sufficient conditions in problems where the optimizing
decision involves jumps in the state variable (similar to the problem of an unemployed with endogenous reservation wage
in Appendix 6.C below).
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To compute the differential dV (a (t) , z (t)) we need the rule for differentiating functions of stochastic
processes governed by Poisson processes, the Change of Variable Formula (CVF, see Wa¨lde, 2008,
Lemma 5). Let F (t, Q) be a function of a stochastic process Q that evolves according to dQ(t) =
γ1 (·) dt+ γ2 (·) dq (t), where γ1 (·) and γ2 (·) stand for the deterministic part and the stochastic part
of the stochastic differential equation, respectively, and dq (t) denotes the increment of the Poisson
process (i.e., 1 with probability λqdt and 0 with probability 1−λqdt where λq is the arrival rate of q).
The CVF then says that the differential of F is given by the sum of the “deterministic derivatives”
and heuristic terms that indicate the jumps of F due to jumps of the Poisson process q:
dF (t, Q) = Ftdt+ FQγ1 (·) dt+ [F (t, Q+ γ2 (·))− F (t, Q)] dq.
Ft and FQ thereby denote the partial derivative of F with respect to t and Q, respectively.
Applying the CVF to V (z, a), the differential dV (z, a) is
dV (z, a) = Va(z, a)da+ [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] dqµ(z) + [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] dqs(z),
where the change in the employment status is state dependent with dqµ(z) = 0 in case of employment
and dqµ(z) = dqµ when the worker is unemployed. Similarly, dqs(z) = 0 in case of unemployment and
dqs(z) = dqs if the worker has a job.
Forming expectations, noting that Et(qλ(τ)−qλ(t)) = λ(τ−t) for both Poisson arrival rates λ ∈ {s, µ},
yields
EtdV (z, a) = Va(z, a)da+ µ(z) [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] + s(z) [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] ,
where again s(z) = 0 if z = u and µ(z) = 0 if z = e (and s and µ otherwise, respectively).
After replacing the evolution of assets from (6.1) in EtdV (z, a), and inserting the resulting expression
in (8.5), the HJB equation becomes
ρV (z, a) = max
c
{u (c) + [ra+ z − c]Va (z, a)
+s (z) [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] + µ (z) [V (w, a)− V (b, a)]} , (6.5)
where Va (z, a) denotes the partial derivative of V with respect to a. We suppressed the time arguments
as this should not lead to confusion as of this point. Note that this Bellman equation holds in both
employment states as the arrival rates are state dependent.
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The first order condition for optimal consumption defines c = c (z, a). It requires marginal utility of
consumption to equal the shadow price of wealth,
u′ (c (z, a)) = Va (z, a) . (6.6)
We know from the budget constraint (6.1) that one unit of consumption costs one unit of wealth.
Hence, in the optimum, the instantaneous increase in utility due to consuming marginally more is
identical to the present value increase in overall utility due to an additional unit of wealth.
Consumption is a Normal Good
Normality of consumption is implied by the strict concavity of the value function of the unemployed
(see, e.g. Sennewald, 2007b, Appendix A.3 to Chapter 3, or in a related setting with Brownian motion
Chang, 2004, Section 4.3.1). To see this, differentiate the first order condition for consumption (6.6)
with respect to wealth. Since the utility function (6.3) is strictly concave, we find that
∂c(z, a)
∂a
=
Vaa(z, a)
u′′ (c(z, a))
> 0
if and only if V (z, a) is strictly concave in a (Vaa(z, a) thereby denotes the partial derivative of Va(z, a)
with respect to a).14 We are thus left to prove that V (z, a) is in fact strictly concave in a, i.e. that
V (z, aλ) > λV (z, a1)+(1− λ)V (z, a2), where aλ ≡ λa1+(1− λ) a2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. To this end, denote
by c1 (z, a1) and c2 (z, a2) the optimal consumption levels associated with a1 and a2, respectively, and
let cλ ≡ λc1+(1− λ) c2. While not changing her employment status, the wealth levels evolve according
to (6.1), i.e. da1/dt = a˙1 = ra1+z− c1 and da2/dt = a˙2 = ra2+ z− c2, respectively. The consumption
levels are thereby the optimal choices given a1 and a2. Note that the evolution of aλ follows in fact
from consumption level cλ: daλ/dt = a˙λ = λa˙1+(1− λ) a˙2 = λ [ra1 + z − c1]+(1− λ) [ra1 + z − c1] =
raλ + z − cλ.
Inserting the definition of the value function in the inequality above, consumption is normal if and
only if
V (z, aλ) > λV (z, a1) + (1− λ)V (z, a2) =
Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)λu (c (z, a1)) dτ + Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) (1− λ)u (c (z, a2)) dτ .
14See Stockey and Lucas (with Prescott) (1989) Theorem 9.8 for the concavity of the value function in the time-discrete
case.
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Since u′′ (c) < 0, we know that λu (c1) + (1− λ)u (c2) < u (cλ). Accordingly, we actually have
λV (z, a1) + (1− λ)V (z, a2) =
= Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) [λu (c1) + (1− λ)u (c2) dτ ] < Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)u (cλ) dτ ≤ V (z, aλ) .
Since cλ is affordable and something else is better, we have shown
Corollary 6.1 (“normality”, Sennewald, 2007b). The consumption good is normal. The con-
sumption function is strictly increasing in wealth, ∂c(z,a)∂a > 0.
The Reduced Form
Let us collect the equations we need in order to be able to determine optimal behavior. We can insert
the first order condition (6.6), keeping (6.3) in mind, into the Bellman equation (6.5) and take the
state dependence into account. This gives (see Appendix 6.A)
ρV (w, a) =
σ
1− σ
[
(Va (w, a))
(σ−1)/σ − 1
σ
]
+ [ra+ w]Va (w, a) + s [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] , (6.7)
ρV (b, a) =
σ
1− σ
[
(Va (b, a))
(σ−1)/σ − 1
σ
]
+ [ra+ b]Va (b, a) + µ [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] , (6.8)
i.e. the maximized Bellman equation for employed workers in (A.20) and for unemployed workers in
(A.21). These two equations, formally speaking, are implicit differential equations (as one can not
solve explicitly for the derivative Va (w, a) given the utility term σ/(1− σ)Va (b, a)(σ−1)/σ and form a
differential algebraic system. They are also non-autonomous due to the ra + w and ra + b terms. In
principle, the two differential equations can be solved for value functions V (b, a) and V (w, a) which
are sufficient for an optimum.
From the solutions to the value functions we can then, given the first order condition (6.6), compute
consumption levels as a function of the state variables. This in turn allows us to compute the evolution
of wealth of unemployed and employed workers using the budget constraint (6.1).
In Appendix 6.D.1 we show analytically that there is a simple solution for the special case where
w = b = 0 (so that there is only one implicit differential equation and no zVa(z, a) term). It is
given by V (w, a) = V (b, a) = κa1−σ with κ some constant. We also prove that this solution is
the boundary condition for the two differential equations in the general case with w > b ≥ 0, i.e.
lima→∞ V (w, a) = lima→∞ V (b, a) = κa1−σ (see Appendix 6.D.1). Accordingly, from (6.6) and (6.3),
consumption becomes approximately linear in wealth if wealth grows sufficiently large (cf. Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2004, Ch. 17.13).
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As analytical solutions to the above system have not been found so far (the structure is related to
the so-called Clairaut equation), we employ a numerical approximation to graphically demonstrate
the ensuing policy functions below. In what follows, we obtain further insights from the evolution
of optimal consumption over the (un)employment spell. Before continuing with the analysis of the
optimal consumption behavior, we thus derive the consumption Euler equations in the two employment
states.15
6.3 The Euler Equation in Continuous-Time Matching and Saving
Problems
The first step towards the consumption Euler equation is to deduce the evolution of the costate variable
(cf. Sennewald and Wa¨lde, 2006, and Sennewald, 2007a and 2007b, Ch. 3 Appendix 2). The evolution
of marginal utility then follows from the first order condition. Finally, we translate the evolution of
marginal utility into the consumption Euler equation.
6.3.1 Deriving the Evolution of the Costate Variable
Differentiating the maximized HJB,
ρV (z, a) = u(c(z, a)) + Va(z, a) [ra+ z − c(z, a)] +
+µ(z) [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] + s(z) [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] ,
with respect to a yields
ρVa (z, a) = u′(c(z, a))ca (z, a) + Vaa(z, a) [ra+ z − c(z, a)] + [r − ca (z, a)]Va(z, a) +
+µ(z) [Va(w, a)− Va(b, a)] + s(z) [Va (b, a)− Va(w, a)] .
where ca (z, a) denotes the partial derivative of c (z, a) with respect to a and Vaa (z, a) stands for the
partial derivative of Va (z, a) with respect to a. Using the first order condition (6.6), the change in
consumption cancels (the “envelope theorem”):
ρVa (z, a) = rVa(z, a) + [ra+ z − c(z, a)]Vaa(z, a) +
+µ(z) [Va(w, a)− Va(b, a)] + s(z) [Va (b, a)− Va(w, a)] . (6.9)
15Section 6.3 follows the derivation of the evolution of marginal utility and optimal consumption under CRRA in
Sennewald (2007b).
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An expression for Vaa(z, a) is readily derived by applying the CVF to Va(z, a):
dVa(z, a) = Vaa(z, a)da+ [Va(w, a)− Va(b, a)] dqµ(z) + [Va (b, a)− Va(w, a)] dqs(z).
Replacing the evolution of assets gives
dVa(z, a) = [ra+ z − c(z, a)]Vaa(z, a)dt+
+ [Va(w, a)− Va(b, a)] dqµ(z) + [Va (b, a)− Va(w, a)] dqs(z). (6.10)
Using equation (6.10) to substitute for [ra+ z − cz(a)]V z′′(a) in (6.9), we find that V z′(a) evolves
according to
dVa(z, a) = {(ρ− r)Va(z, a)− µ(z)(Va(w, a)− Va(b, a))− s(z)(Va(b, a)− Va(w, a))} dt+
+ [Va(w, a)− Va(b, a)] dqµ(z) + [Va (b, a)− Va(w, a)] dqs(z).
Note that we did not use the functional form of the utility function yet. To obtain the evolution of
optimal consumption under fairly general preferences, we substitute dVa(z, a) = du′(c(z, a)) from the
first order condition (without using the CRRA specification). This gives the evolution of marginal
utility:
du′(c(z, a))
u′(c(z, a))
=
{
ρ− r − [µ(z)− s(z)] u
′(c(w, a))− u′(c(b, a))
u′(c(z, a))
}
dt+
+
u′(c(w, a))− u′(c(b, a))
u′(c(z, a))
dqµ(z) +
u′(c(b, a))− u′(c(w, a))
u′(c(z, a))
dqs(z) (6.11)
6.3.2 Deriving the General Consumption Euler Equation
We can use the first order condition to translate the evolution of marginal utility into the evolution
of consumption and derive a consumption Euler equation. To do so, define f(·) ≡ (u′(c))−1 (such that
f(u′(c)) = c). Applying the CVF to f , we get
df((u′(c)) = f ′(u′(c))du′(c(z, a))dt+
+
[
f(u′(c (b, a))− u′(c (w, a))] dqµ(z) + [f(u′(c (w, a))− u′(c (b, a))] dqs(z),
where du′(c(z, a)) is given in (6.11). By construction, df = dc and
f ′(·) = df
du′(c(z, a))
u′(c(z, a)) =
1
u′′(c(z, a)
.
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Hence (6.11) becomes
dc(z, a) =
{
(ρ− r) u
′(c(z, a))
u′′(c(z, a))
− µ(z)(u
′(c(w, a))− u′(c(b, a))
u′′(c(z, a))
− s(z)u
′(c(b, a))− u′(c(w, a))
u′′(c(z, a))
}
dt+
+(c(w, a)− c(b, a))dqµ(z) + (c(b, a)− c(w, a))dqs(z).
Rearranging and taking the state-dependency into account, we finally find
−dc(b, a)u
′′(c(b, a))
u′(c(b, a))
=
{
r − ρ− µ
[
1− u
′(c(w, a))
u′(c(b, a))
]}
dt− u
′′(c(b, a))
u′(c(b, a))
[c(w, a)− c(b, a)] dqµ, (6.12)
−dc(w, a)u
′′(c(w, a))
u′(c(w, a))
=
{
r − ρ+ s
[
u′(c(b, a))
u′(c(w, a))
− 1
]}
dt− u
′′(c(w, a))
u′(c(w, a))
[c(b, a)− c(w, a)] dqs. (6.13)
As usual, the change of consumption is decreasing in the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion
−u′′ (c) /u′ (c).
The Consumption Euler Equation under CRRA Utility
From (6.3), u′′(c)/u′(c) = −σ/c and u′(cu)/u′(ce) = (ce/cu)σ . Using these expressions, and letting
cu = c (b, a) and ce = c (w, a), we get
dcu
cu
=
{
r − ρ
σ
− µ
σ
[
1−
(
cu
ce
)σ]}
dt+
[
cu
ce
− 1
]
dqµ,
dce
ce
=
{
r − ρ
σ
+
s
σ
[(
ce
cu
)σ
− 1
]}
dt−
[
1− c
e
cu
]
dqs. (6.14)
If we concentrate on the effects of income uncertainty and let r = ρ, consumption decreases (increases)
deterministically for the unemployed (employed), and jumps to its new level whenever the employment
status changes:
dcu
cu
= −µ
σ
[
1−
(
cu
ce
)σ]
dt+
[
cu
ce
− 1
]
dqµ,
dce
ce
=
s
σ
[(
ce
cu
)σ
− 1
]
dt−
[
1− c
e
cu
]
dqs.
Note that, with CRRA preferences, cu = 0 and ce = 0 implies dcu = 0 and dce = 0, respectively.
The Consumption Euler Equation under CARA Utility
Alternatively, suppose that preferences are of the CARA type,
u (c) = −e−γc. (6.15)
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In this case, u′′(c)/u′(c) = −γ is independent of c and u′(cu)/u′(ce) = e−γ(cu−ce). Accordingly, from
(6.12) and (6.13),
dcu =
{
r − ρ
γ
− µ
γ
[
1− e−γ(ce−cu)
]}
dt+ (ce − cu)dqµ,
dce =
{
r − ρ
γ
+
s
γ
[
e−γ(c
u−ce) − 1
]}
dt− (ce − cu)dqs.
Letting again r = ρ, optimal consumption follows
dcu = −µ
γ
[
1− e−γ(ce−cu)
]
dt+ (ce − cu)dqµ,
dce =
s
γ
[
e−γ(c
u−ce) − 1
]
dt− (ce − cu)dqs.
We now return to the analysis of the optimal consumption in our baseline matching with savings
model.
6.4 Consumption and Wealth Dynamics under CRRA
The last section provided the consumption Euler equation in the case of CRRA in the present environ-
ment where the labor income is uncertain due to matching frictions. We found that the consumption
of an employed individual obeys
dc(w, a)
c
=
{
r − ρ
σ
+
s
σ
{[
c(w, a)
c(b, a)
]σ
− 1
}}
dt−
[
1− c(b, a)
c(w, a)
]
dqs, (6.16)
while her wealth evolves according to (6.1) with z = w, i.e. da = [ra + w − c(w, a)]dt. Analogously,
the evolution of the optimal consumption of an unemployed individual is given by
dc(b, a)
c
=
{
r − ρ
σ
− µ
σ
{
1−
[
c(b, a)
c(w, a)
]σ}}
dt+
[
c(w, a)
c(b, a)
− 1
]
dqµ, (6.17)
and her wealth follows da = [ra+ b− c(b, a)]dt.
Without uncertainty about future labor income, i.e. with s = µ = dqs = dqm = 0, the above consump-
tion Euler equations reduce to the classical consumption rule in deterministic models, c˙/c = (r−ρ)/σ.
The additional s{·} term in (6.16) suggests that, when exposed to the risk of losing her job, an em-
ployed individual will c.p. want to sacrifice more consumption today and accumulate additional wealth
to “insure” herself against sudden drops in labor income.16 Accumulating wealth allows her to smooth
16It is known from the partial equilibrium analysis in Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) that utility functions with
convex marginal utility generate a positive precautionary demand for savings. The CRRA specification in (6.3) satisfies
u′′′(c) > 0. Cf. Kimball (1990) and Chapter 9.
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consumption over the unemployment spell to some extent. Due to these precautionary savings, the risk
of unemployment potentially increases the relative change in consumption of employed individuals.
In the case of unemployment, as indicated by the s{·} term in (6.17), the possibility to find a new
job induces unemployed individuals to expand their current consumption. Relative to a situation in
which unemployment is an absorbing state (i.e., in the absence of job separation so that s = 0), the
prospect of a higher labor income in the future reduces the individual’s willingness to give up today’s
consumption. Precautionary savings are less important if the unemployed can expect to return to a
higher labor income after having found a job. Relaxing the anxiety of having to rely on a low unem-
ployment benefit thus allows a more optimistic spending and has the potential to reduce consumption
growth for unemployed individuals.
The last terms in (6.16) and (6.17) (tautologically) represent the discrete jumps in the level of con-
sumption whenever the employment status changes.
We are now in a position to explore the individuals savings decisions when her income is to some
extent uncertain due to matching at the labor market.
6.4.1 Consumption and Wealth
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between consumption and wealth of an employed and of an unem-
ployed worker. This figure was obtained by numerically solving for the value functions V (b, a) and
V (w, a) and then computing the optimal consumption levels c (w, a) and c (b, a) from the first order
condition (6.6).17 The following parameter values were used to generate Figure 6.1:
ρ s µ r σ w b
.05 .01 .09 .05 1.5 .5 w/2
The parameter values were chosen without a particular calibration goal. The separation and matching
rate imply an unemployment rate equal to s/ (µ+ s) = 10%.
Financial wealth a is plotted on the horizontal, consumption levels c (w, a) and c (b, a) on the vertical
axis. Not surprisingly, an employed worker consumes strictly more for a given wealth level than an
17We thank Burkhard Heer for numerically approximating the value functions and providing the following figures via
Klaus Wa¨lde. Some figures were modified to include threshold values for financial wealth and to indicate the dynamics
of consumption and wealth, see below.
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Figure 6.1: A Qualitative Example of the Consumption Function
unemployed worker,18
c (w, a) > c (b, a) , ∀a. (6.18)
Intuitively, consumption of the unemployed is lower at any given level of wealth since a currently
employed worker expects a strictly higher lifetime income than a currently unemployed individual.
One can also find (although hardly visible) that the relative consumption of employed to unemployed
workers decreases in the level of wealth and approaches unity (see Appendix 6.D.1, equation (A.19)
for a proof of the latter result),
d
da
c (w, a)
c (b, a)
< 0, lim
a→∞
c (w, a)
c (b, a)
= 1. (6.19)
18Lentz and Tranæs (2005) provide a rigorous proof of this property for the time-discrete case. Let f(z, a) ≡ ra +
z − c(z, a). In the case where f(w, a) ≤ f(b, a), w > b directly implies c(w, a) > c(b, a). In the opposite case, Lentz and
Tranæs (2005) use the contraction mapping property of the mapping defined by the system of maximized value functions
for the two employment states to prove the existence of a fixed point (V (w, a), V (b, a)). It is then shown that this fixed
point lies in the set of continuous functions that satisfy the analogue of Va(w, a) < Va(b, a), so that, from the first-order
condition, c(w, a) > c(b, a) also in the case where f(w, a) > f(b, a) (cf. Lentz and Tranæs, 2005, Lemma 3).
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6.4.2 Dynamics
Let us understand the evolution of consumption in both employment states. As it turns out, saving and
wealth dynamics crucially depend on the level of the interest rate relative to the subjective discount
rate and the Poisson arrival rates. We therefore subdivide our discussion into three parts.
Very High Interest Rates (r ≥ ρ+ µ)
To begin with, consider an employed worker and her consumption Euler equation (6.16). Suppose she
does not lose her job while we analyze her consumption behavior. Then, optimal consumption is given
by
σ
c˙ (w, a)
c (w, a)
= r − ρ+ s
{[
c(w, a)
c(b, a)
]σ
− 1
}
. (6.20)
From (6.18), c (b, a) /c (w, a) < 1 so that the term in curly brackets is positive. This gives us part (i)
in the following
Proposition 6.1. If r > ρ+ µ (sufficient condition),
(i) consumption of employed workers always increases through time.
(ii) consumption of unemployed workers also always increases through time.
For both groups, wealth rises as well.
When we look at an unemployed worker who does not find a job, her consumption follows
σ
c˙ (b, a)
c (b, a)
= r − ρ− µ
{
1−
[
c(b, a)
c(w, a)
]σ}
. (6.21)
In a situation with a high interest rate, i.e. for r > ρ + µ, the right hand side is always positive and
consumption always rises. Normality requires wealth to rise as well. This gives us the second part of
Proposition 6.1.
We illustrate this proposition in Figure 6.2. Rising consumption levels are indicated by arrows on the
consumption curves. With very high interest rates, an individual continuously increases her wealth
and consumption over her lifetime. Consumption jumps at points in time when she changes her job
situation: when finding a job, consumption jumps up, when losing a job, consumption jumps down.
The opportunity costs of consumption and the desire to save for unemployment spells work in the same
directions. During unemployment spells, the high interest rate boosts consumption growth by reducing
the incentives to borrow against a higher expected future labor income. Since da = ra+z−c (z, a) > 0,
we have that c (z, a) < ra+ z at all times.
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Figure 6.2: Consumption Dynamics in the Case of High Interest Rates (Qualitative Example)
Intermediate Level Interest Rates (ρ < r < ρ+ µ)
Consider again an employed worker who keeps her job. As the right hand side of her deterministic
consumption rule in (6.20) is positive, her consumption still increases unambiguously. She accumulates
wealth at a positive rate (i.e., she consumes less than her contemporary income ra + w) as long as
she keeps her job and is only forced to decrease her consumption level discretely when she becomes
unemployed.
Let us now turn to an unemployed individual and suppose that she does not find a new job. For her,
there typically exists a critical wealth level a∗b implicitly defined by
c(b, a∗b)
c(w, a∗b)
≡
[
1− r − ρ
µ
] 1
σ
, (6.22)
above which consumption and wealth increase (see Appendix 6.B for a proof of the existence of a∗b
given the existence of an optimal control). In this case, c (b, a) < ra+ b. If endowed with lower wealth,
i.e. a < a∗b , returns on assets and the unemployment benefit add up to an income level for which a
continuously growing consumption is not optimal. Instead, she will eat up her savings by consuming
more than her contemporary income and decrease her consumption over time. To see this formally,
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Figure 6.3: Consumption Dynamics in the Case of Intermediate Interest Rates (Qualitative Example)
consider the deterministic consumption rule for the unemployed in (6.21). The right hand side is
positive if and only if r − ρ > µ[1 − [c(b, a)/c(w, a)σ] or, using the definition of a∗b in (6.22), if and
only if a ≥ a∗b . Accordingly, sufficiently large levels of wealth (a ≥ a∗b) ensure a continuously increasing
level of consumption as well as wealth. We qualitatively describe the resulting dynamics by arrows in
Figure 6.3.
Next, consider an employed worker who has accumulated wealth a < a∗b . If she loses her job, the level of
consumption jumps downward and continues to decrease continuously along c(b, a). Only finding a new
job can reverse the decrease in consumption and wealth. Suppose she actually finds a job (so that her
consumption jumps upward) and that she is lucky enough to stay employed long enough to accumulate
wealth a ≥ a∗b . The next employment shock will again reduce her level of consumption discretely
(c(w, a) drops to c(b, a)), but this time unemployment will not reverse the growth of consumption and
wealth: she will continue to accumulate assets, increase consumption, and finally reach the level of
consumption she had before becoming unemployed. Put differently, all individuals with wealth a ≥ a∗b
optimally choose consumption levels above c(b, a∗b). More poorly endowed unemployed individuals are
forced to optimally decrease their consumption and run down their assets further, potentially incurring
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debt. We show below that consumption and wealth decline and consumption converges towards zero,
implying an endogenous lower bound on wealth. We have thus established
Proposition 6.2. If ρ < r < ρ+ µ (sufficient condition),
(i) consumption and wealth of employed workers always increases.
(ii) consumption and wealth of unemployed workers increases if a ≥ a∗b where a∗b is defined in (6.22)
and decreases otherwise.
Low Level of the Interest Rate (r ≤ ρ)
Finally, consider low levels of the interest rate where r ≤ ρ. In deterministic settings, such an interest
rate typically leads to a decrease in the level of consumption as the individual does not receive a
sufficiently high compensation for her impatience. This classical result must hold true for unemployed
workers in this model as well since the “optimistic spending” effect further exaggerates the usual
dissaving incentives of a low interest rate (compare the previous paragraph). Consumption exceeds
the contemporary income. Formally, inspection of the right hand side of (6.21) shows that unemployed
workers indeed always reduce wealth and consumption if r ≤ ρ.
For employed workers, the “precautionary savings” motive counteracts the dissaving incentives from
the low interest rate (i.e., consumption smoothing).19 Since the threat of sudden drops in consump-
tion becomes less severe the higher the agents’ wealth, only employed workers with a low level of
accumulated savings will continue to save and build up assets. Reducing “today’s” level of consump-
tion then implies positive consumption growth if “tomorrow’s” consumption is not decreased by more
than current consumption. Since the “precautionary savings” motive becomes weaker as wealth in-
creases, “tomorrow’s” decrease is lower than “today’s” decrease as long as there are positive savings.
Accordingly, consumption and wealth go up for less endowed working individuals, see Figure 6.4.
A formal argument is readily derived from (6.20). When r ≤ ρ, the right hand side can only be positive
if c(w, a)/c(b, a) is sufficiently large or, more precisely, if and only if a ≤ a∗w where a∗w is implicitly
defined by
c(w, a∗w)
c(b, a∗w)
≡
[
1− r − ρ
s
] 1
σ
. (6.23)
19Cf. Chapter 9.
6.5. CONCLUSION 195
Figure 6.4: Consumption Dynamics in the Case of Low Interest Rates (Qualitative Example)
See Appendix 6.B for a proof of the existence of a∗w given the existence of an optimal control. The
threshold again separates wealth levels that imply positive savings (c(w, a) < ra+w) from those that
imply dissaving (c(w, a) > ra+ w). We summarize the above results in
Proposition 6.3. If r ≤ ρ (sufficient condition),
(i) consumption and wealth of unemployed workers always decrease.
(ii) consumption and wealth of employed workers increase if a ≤ a∗w where a∗w is defined in (6.22) and
decrease otherwise.
6.5 Conclusion
We have studied a baseline model of labor market matching with savings. In the model, individuals
move back and forth between employment and unemployment and thus face idiosyncratic labor income
shocks. Under CRRA preferences, individuals have a desire to build up precautionary savings while
working on a job and like to spend more during the unemployment spell when having the prospect
of finding a job. Consumption smoothing may either work in the same direction or run counter the
precautionary savings motive (we further study this feature in a two period model in Chapter 9).
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Depending on the constellation of employment transition parameters, the interest-, and the discount
rate, we encountered threshold wealth levels in the dynamics of consumption and wealth. If the interest
rate is in an intermediate range, poor unemployed individuals may find it hard to escape wealth levels
below the threshold. If the interest rate is low, consumption of the employed will converge to a
stationary target level. Sufficiently well endowed, employed individuals decrease consumption and eat
up their wealth, while less endowed, employed individuals save and increase their consumption (until
they reach the stationary level of consumption and wealth). Unemployed individuals, however, always
dissave.
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Appendix
The following appendices contain several derivations and technical conditions for the model in the
main text, proves the existence and uniqueness of the threshold levels, and introduces reservation
wages.
Appendix 6.A Derivation of the System of Partial Differential
Equations for V(z, a)
Inserting the first order condition for optimal consumption (6.6) in (6.5) gives the maximized HJB
equation
ρV (z, a) = u (c (z, a))+[ra+ z − c (z, a)]Va (z, a)+s (z) [V (b, a)− V (w, a)]+µ (z) [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] .
After substituting for c (z, a) with Va (z, a)
−1/σ from (6.6) and
u (c (z, a)) =
c (z, a)−σ c (z, a)− 1
1− σ =
Va (z, a)
σ−1
σ − 1
1− σ (A.1)
from (6.6) and the utility functional (6.3) and taking the state dependency into account, we get
ρV (w, a) =
Va (w, a)
σ−1
σ
1− σ −
1
1− σ +
[
ra+ w − Va (w, a)−
1
σ
]
Va (w, a) + s [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] ,
ρV (b, a) =
Va (b, a)
σ−1
σ
1− σ −
1
1− σ +
[
ra+ b− Va (b, a)−
1
σ
]
Va (b, a) + µ [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] .
Rearranging and collecting terms yields the system in the main text. Note that the notation V (z, a)
indicates different value functions since, in general, not only w 6= b but also s 6= µ.
Appendix 6.B Existence and Uniqueness of the Wealth Thresholds
We aim at providing conditions under which the threshold wealth levels a∗b and a
∗
w exist (taking as
given the existence of an optimal control). To begin with, consider the unemployed in the case of
intermediate level interest rates. By definition of c(a∗b , b), we have that c(a
∗
b , b) = ra
∗
b + b as c˙ (a
∗
b) = 0
and hence da∗b = 0 from normality of the consumption good. Using this expression in (6.22) and
rearranging gives
ra∗b + b[
1− r−ρµ
] 1
σ
= c (w, a∗b) .
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The left hand side is zero at a∗b = −r/b and, in the case of intermediate level interest rates, increases
with slope r/
(
1− r−ρµ
) 1
σ
> r. The right hand side is smaller than ra∗b+w as the unemployed individual
chooses da < 0 at all levels of wealth in this intermediate case. It is, however larger than ra∗b + b as
c (w, a) > c (b, a). By normality, c (w, a∗b) is monotonically increasing in a
∗
b . Hence, a
∗
b exists uniquely
without further parameter restrictions.
Consider next the employed individual in the case of low interest rates. For her, by the same argument
as above, we have c(a∗w, w) = ra∗w + w. Inserting this expression in (6.23) and rearranging, we get
ra∗w + w[
1− r−ρs
] 1
σ
= c(b, a∗w).
The left hand is zero at a∗w = −w/r and increases with slope r/
[
1− r−ρs
] 1
σ < r since r < ρ. At the
same time, c (b, a∗w) > ra∗w + b as wealth declines for the unemployed individual. Again, consumption
is normal so c (b, a∗w) increases monotonically in a∗w. Accordingly, a unique intersection exists without
further restrictions.
Appendix 6.C Endogenous Reservation Wages
In this appendix, we show how a distribution of wage offers affects the unemployed individual’s optimal
behavior. An immediate implication of including a wage offer distribution is that the unemployed
individual will only accept wages above some threshold, i.e. a reservation wage exists.20 In what
follows, we derive the HJB equation including a wage offer distribution and an additional equation
that characterizes the optimal reservation wage.
6.C.1 Derivation of the HJB Equation with Reservation Wage
Suppose the wage offers are sampled from a continuous distribution F (w) with finite expectation and
F (w) < 1 for some w > 0. The draw of the wage is assumed to be independent of the stochastic
process that governs the transition between the two employment states. “Search on the job” is ruled
out by assumption (cf. the state dependent arrival rates in Section 6.2.1). The unemployed individual
thus faces a random sequence of independently and identically distributed wage offers. Put differently,
we consider a Poisson differential equation with random amplitudes of the upward jumps of z. Let w¯
20For an introduction to reservation wages, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch. 5) in discrete time or Mortensen
(1986, Ch. 15), see further Chapters 7 and 8.
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denote the individual’s reservation wage, i.e., the lowest wage offer accepted by the individual. Such a
reservation value rule is well-known from the analysis of an optimal stopping rule in sequential search
models with costly wage draws (see, e.g. DeGroot, 2004 ). By definition, the reservation wage satisfies
V (b, a) = V (w¯, a), so that it is potentially a function of wealth, w¯ = w¯ (a) . As will become clear in
Chapter 8 below, the reservation wage need not always depend on an individual’s level of wealth.21
Since the stochastic processes underlying wage offers and employment transitions are independent, the
arrival rate of a job for an unemployed conditional on w ≥ w¯ (a) is given by µ˜ (a) ≡ µ[1− F (w¯ (a))].
Hence, z is now governed by
dz = (w − b)dqµ˜(a) + (b− w)dqs. (A.2)
where dqµ˜(a) is the increment of the Poisson process resulting from µ˜ (a) and z ∈ {b, w}, w ∈ [w¯,∞].
Wealth still evolves according to (6.1), i.e. da = ra+z−c (z, a), where z = w in the case of employment
is now the realization of the wage draw conditional on w ≥ w¯ (a). In addition to the uncertain duration
of the employment spells, an unemployed individual now also faces uncertainty about the future wage
income.
Let V (z, a) again denote the unique solution to this problem’s Bellman equation. In principle, V (z, a)
looks just like the value function in (6.4), except that we need to take account of the fact that
the individual only accepts jobs that make her better off relative to remaining unemployed. After
all, working on a poorly paid job forecloses the possibility of finding a better job. To compute the
differential dV (a (t) , z (t)) , we first calculate the differential for a given wage draw, dV¯ , and then
form expectations over w and the evolution of the employment state to obtain dV . Using the CVF
and taking the constraints (6.1) and (A.2) into account gives
dV¯ (z, a) = Va[ra+ z − c]dt+max[0, V (w, a)− V (z, a)]dqµ + [V (b, a)− V (w, a)]dqs.
Taking as given that V (w¯(a), a) = V (b, a) yields a unique reservation wage w¯ (a) and using that
21We show in Chapter 8 that if preferences are CARA, consumption is allowed to be real-valued, debt is unbounded, and
employment is an absorbing state (i.e. s = 0), the reservation wage is in fact independent of the unemployed individual’s
wealth. Chapter 8 demonstrates that including a borrowing constraint in this environment introduces reservation wages
that are increasing in wealth.
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V (z, a) is increasing in z, we can equivalently write22
dV¯ (z, a) = Va[ra+ z − c]dt+ [V¯ (w˜, a)− V (b, a)]dqµ + [V (b, a)− V (w, a)]dqs,
where V¯ (w, a) stands for V (w, a) if w ≥ w¯ (a) and V (b, a) otherwise. For z = b we have
dV¯ (b, a) = Va[ra+ b− c]dt+ [V¯ (w˜, a)− V (b, a)]dqµ.
The first term on the right hand side contains only the state and prices, which are known in t. Forming
expectations about both wages and states yields∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
dV¯ (b, a)dG(dq)dF (w) =
= Va(ra+ b− c)dt+
∫ ∞
0
[
V¯ (w, a)− V (b, a)] ∫ ∞
0
dqµdG(dqµ)dF (w) =
= Va(ra+ b− c)dt+ µ
∫ ∞
0
[
V¯ (w, a)− V (b, a)] dF (w)dt =
= Va(ra+ b− c)dt+ µ [1− F (w¯ (a))]
[∫ ∞
w¯(a)
V (w, a)
dF (w)
1− F (w¯) − V (b, a)
]
dt. (A.3)
The expected change of V (b, a) has a deterministic and a stochastic component. First, wealth a evolves
deterministically according to (6.1) as long as the unemployed individual does not accept a job. This
change itself is known in t. Second, the labor income jumps upward at the point in time where the
unemployed individual accepts a job. Her expected wage is drawn from the truncated wage distribution
with support [w¯ (a) ,∞), i.e. from the cumulative distribution function F (w)/[1− F (w¯ (a))].
Using dV (b, a) and making explicit the choice between remaining unemployed and accepting a job,
an unemployed’s situation may be expressed via the following partial differential equation, denoting
by w˘ some minimum wage:
ρV (b, a) = max
{
ρV (w, a) ,max
c
〈u (c) + [ra+ b− c]Va (b, a)+
+µ
[∫ ∞
w˘
V (w, a)− V (b, a) dF (w)
]〉}
. (A.4)
If an unemployed accepts a wage offer, her “overall happiness” is given by the value function V (w, a)
where w is the offered wage (the first part of the above Bellman equation). If she rejects the job, she
22Note that the indirect marginal effect of wealth on V via the reservation wage is zero since, by definition of the
reservation wage and the independency of the stochastic processes for employment transition and the wage draw, the
change in [V¯ (w˜, a)− V (b, a)]dqµ due to change of wealth via the reservation wage is zero, since [V (a, w¯)− V (a, b)] = 0,
cf. Chapter 8.
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finds herself in the same situation as if no job had been offered at all (this is the second part of this
Bellman equation). The reservation wage w¯ (a) is the wage offer that makes the individual indifferent
between continuing to search and accepting the job. If w¯ (a) is chosen, the Bellman equation in (A.4)
can simply be written as
ρV (b, a) =
max
c
{
u (c) + [ra+ b− c]Va (b, a) + µ
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[V (w, a)− V (b, a)] dF (w)
}
(A.5)
The first order condition for optimal consumption thus again equates the shadow price of wealth to
the marginal utility of consumption: u′(c(b, a)) = Va(b, a).
Now, insert the first order conditions in both states into the Bellman equations and equate the maxi-
mized Bellman equations in both employment states. This gives an expression for the reservation wage
in terms of optimal consumption:
u (c (a, w¯ (a))) + [ra+ w¯ (a)− c (a, w¯ (a))]Va (w¯ (a) , a) + s [V (b, a)− V (w¯ (a) , a)] =
u (c (a, b)) + [ra+ b− c (a, b)]Va (b, a) + µ
[∫ ∞
w¯(a)
V (w, a)− V (b, a) dF (w)
]
. (A.6)
6.C.2 The Reduced Form
After substituting for u (c (z, a)) with (A.1), we obtain an equation for the reservation wage in terms
of V (z, a) and Va (z, a):
σ
1− σVa (w¯ (a) , a)
(σ−1)/σ + [ra+ w¯ (a)]Va (w¯ (a) , a) + s [V (b, a)− V (w¯ (a) , a)] =
σ
1− σVa (b, a)
(σ−1)/σ + [ra+ b]Va (b, a) + µ [1− F (w¯ (a))]
[∫ ∞
w¯(a)
V (w, a)
dF (w)
1− F (w) − V (b, a)
]
(A.7)
By means of the identity V (w¯ (a) , a) = V (b, a) , we further have
Va(w¯ (a) , a)
[
1 +
∂w¯ (a)
∂a
]
= Va(b, a).
After substituting for Va (b, a) on the left hand side, using V (b, a) = V (w¯ (a) , a), and rearranging,
equation (A.7) simplifies to
σ
σ − 1
[
Va (w¯ (a))
∂w¯ (a)
∂a
]σ−1
σ
+ (ra− b)Va(w¯ (a) , a)∂w¯ (a)
∂a
+ (w¯ (a)− b)Va (w¯ (a) , a) =
µ
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[V (w, a)− V (b, a)] dF (w). (A.8)
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In the example in Chapter 7 below, where the reservation wage is independent of wealth, the reservation
wage is determined by (letting w¯′(a) = 0)
(w¯ − b)Va(w¯, a) = µ
∫ ∞
w¯
[V (w, a)− V (b, a)] dF (w). (A.9)
Equation (A.8) is an additional equation to the system of partial differential equations for V (w, a)
and V (b, a) considered in the main text, augmented to include the expected wage in the case of
employment where w is drawn from the cumulative distribution function F (w)/[1−F (w¯)]. A solution
to the augmented system of three equations in three unknowns provides us with V (z, a), Va (z, a) ,
and w¯ (a) (see Chapter 8 for an example). Using this solution, the policy functions for consumption
follow from the first order conditions above.
Appendix 6.D Technical Appendix
6.D.1 On the Boundary Conditions of the General Model
In this final technical appendix, we derive two boundary conditions for the system of differential
equations in the value functions as the level of wealth grows large.
In the main text, we derived the reduced form of the model from the maximized Bellman equation
using the first order condition to replace consumption with Va(z, a) with the help of the specified
CRRA utility function u(c) = c1−σ/(1− σ)− 1/(1− σ). Including the constant −1/(1− σ) is usually
convenient because it implies that u(c) approaches the log-utility function as σ → 1 (this can easily
be verified using l’Hoˆpital’s rule). It turns out that omitting the term −1/(1− σ) allows us to derive
solutions to the system of partial differential equations for the value functions in special cases. This is
helpful because it allows us to check the validity of numerical solutions for parameter values close to
the special cases. In what follows, we therefore replace (6.3) with
u(c(τ)) =
c(τ)1−σ
1− σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1. (A.10)
Now, instantaneous utility no longer converges to log(c) as σ → 1, but the elasticity of marginal utility
remains u′′(c)c/u′(c) = −σ and the individual’s consumption choice evidently remains unaffected by
this transformation of the utility function since, as usual, we rely on a limited form of cardinal utility
(see Koopmans, 1965).
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With this change, the constant drops out from the system of differential equations: 23
ρV (w, a) =
σ
1− σVa(w, a)
σ−1
σ + (ra+ w)Va(w, a) + s (V (b, a)− V (w, a)) , (A.11)
ρV (b, a) =
σ
1− σVa(b, a)
σ−1
σ + (ra+ b)Va(b, a) + µ (V (w, a)− V (b, a)) . (A.12)
In what follows, we first describe a solution to the special case where w = b = 0 (so that there is no
income uncertainty and no zVa(z, a) term in the remaining differential equation) and then use this
information to derive a boundary condition for large levels of wealth. Intuitively, as an individual
becomes richer and richer, optimal consumption should depend less and less on current labor income.
A Special Case: w = b = 0
Consider an unemployed individual that holds the same level of wealth as another, employed, individ-
ual. If the unemployment benefit and the wage rate are equal (w = b), there is no economic reason for
the maximized value functions of the two individuals to differ. The only difference is due to heteroge-
neous initial employment states, but after all, the labor income is all that matters for the individual’s
lifetime utility and it is the same in both employment states. In this case, the system of equations
(A.11) and (A.12) boils down to a single equation (V (w, a) = V (b, a)),
ρV (w, a) =
σ
1− σVa(w, a)
σ−1
σ + (ra+ w)Va(w, a). (A.13)
If, in addition, the wage rate is zero, we arrive at an implicit, non-autonomous differential equation
that is amenable to an analytical solution:
ρV (0, a) =
σ
1− σVa(0, a)
σ−1
σ + raVa(0, a). (A.14)
A solution to (A.14) is
V (0, a) = a1−σκ, κ =
σσ
(1− σ)(ρ− r(1− σ))σ . (A.15)
Proof. The solution can easily be verified by plugging (A.15) in the right hand side of (A.14). From
the solution in (A.15) we get
V (0, a)
σ−1
σ = a1−σ
(
σ
ρ− r(1− σ)
)σ−1
=
1− σ
σ
a1−σκ (ρ− r(1− σ)) , (A.16)
23From (A.10) and the first order condition (6.6) it holds that u(c) = 1/(1−σ)V (σ−1)/σa and cVa = V (σ−1)/σa . Plugging
these expressions into the Bellman equation (6.5) separately for each state gives the system under modified utility
functional (A.10) .
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and
aVa(0, a) = a1−σ
(
σ
ρ− r(1− σ)
)σ
= a1−σκ (1− σ) . (A.17)
Using both expressions in (A.14) yields a1−σκρ = ρV (0, a).
For κ not to become a complex number, impose ρ > (1− σ)r.
Taking the Limit a→∞
Ultimately, we are interested in the characteristics of the solution if wages exceed positive unemploy-
ment benefits. The special case where w = b = 0, however, has an important implication for the
general case where w ≥ b ≥ 0. This is because the effect of current labor income on the individual’s
consumption choice vanishes if wealth holdings grow sufficiently large. In the limit as a goes to infinity,
the impact of z on the value function vanishes.
These conjectures are validated as follows. Suppose the solution to the special case where w = b = 0,
V (z, a) = a1−σκ, also solves the general system. Using V (z, a) = a1−σκ in equations (A.11) and (A.12)
gives24
ρa1−σκ =
σ
1− σ
(
(1− σ) a−σκ)σ−1σ + (ra+ z) (1− σ) a−σκ,
where z equals w for (A.11) and b for (A.12). Dividing by a gives
ρa−σκ =
σ
1− σ ((1− σ)κ)
σ−1
σ a−σ +
(
r +
z
a
)
(1− σ) a−σκ⇔
ρ−
(
r +
z
a
)
(1− σ) = σ (1− σ)− 1σ κ− 1σ .
As a →∞, there is a constant κ which solves this equation. In fact, it is the same κ as in (A.15). The
true solution runs below or above a1−σκ, depending on wether σ < 1 or σ > 1, respectively. For any
given level of wealth, the difference between the true value function and a1−σκ is smaller, the closer σ
is to unity (from either side) and the smaller the wage rate.
We have thus found two “boundary conditions” for the general system (A.11) and (A.12): V (z, a)
converges to a1−σκ as a grows large. Taking the limit of V (z, a) = a1−σκ as a → ∞, we further find
that
lim
a→∞V (z, a) |σ>1 = 0, lima→∞V (z, a) |σ<1 = +∞, (A.18)
24To calculate the right hand sides, we can directly use the expressions in equations (A.16) and (A.17) for both z = w
and z = b, V (z, a)
σ−1
σ = 1−σ
σ
a1−σκ (ρ− r(1− σ)) and aVa(z, a) = a1−σκ (1− σ). Taken together, the right hand sides
obey a1−σκ(ρ + (1 − σ)z/a), while the left hand sides read a1−σκρ. Dividing both sides by a1−σκ and taking the limit
a→∞ verifies that the solution to the general system converges to a1−σκ as a becomes “large” (σ 6= 1).
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i.e. the value functions approach zero or plus infinity, depending on the size of σ. We also obtain
lima→∞ Va(z, a) = 0. Using the first order condition (6.6) to relate Va(z, a) to optimal consumption,
this proves equation (6.19) in the main text, namely that
lim
a→∞
c(w, a)
c(b, a)
= 1. (A.19)
6.D.2 No “Typical” Closed-Form Solution in the Baseline Model
A solution to the individual’s optimal consumption problem is a set of value functions V (z, a) that
satisfy the reduced system, (A.11) and (A.12), the first order conditions, and the boundary conditions.
The following guess and verify approach shows the difficulty of the problem at hand. Suppose the
solution is of the “typical” form: cg(w, a) = γ0a + γ1, Vg(w, a) (a) = γ2u(cg(w, a)), and cg(b, a) =
δ0a+ δ1, Vg (b, a) = δ2u(cg(b, a)) where all γi, δi, i ∈ {0, 1} are constants. If these guesses are correct,
they must solve the system of differential equations (re-stated here for convenience),
ρV (w, a) (a) =
σ
1− σ
[
Va(w, a) (a)
σ−1
σ − 1
σ
]
+ [ra+ w]Va(w, a) (a) + s [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] , (A.20)
ρV (b, a) =
σ
1− σ
[
Va(b, a)
σ−1
σ − 1
σ
]
+ [ra+ b]Va(b, a) (a) + µ [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] . (A.21)
Applying CRRA utility, the guesses become
V eg (a) = γ2
(γ0a+ γ1)1−σ
1− σ , V
u
g (a) = δ2
(δ0a+ δ1)1−σ
1− σ .
Accordingly, V e′g (a) = γ0γ2(γ0a + γ1)−σ, V u′g (a) = δ0δ2(γ0a + γ1)−σ and u′(ceg) = (γ0a + γ1)−σ as
well as u′(cug ) = (δ0a + δ1)−σ. Note that this derivation explicitly uses dγi/da = dδi/da = 0. For the
guess to solve the individual’s problem, it also has to solve the f.o.c.’s , namely equate marginal utility
to the shadow price of wealth. After substituting the linear guesses, we thus have (γ0a + γ1)−σ =
γ0γ2(γ0a+γ1)−σ and (δ0a+ δ1)−σ = δ0δ2(δ0a+ δ1)−σ, so that γ0γ2 = δ0δ2 = 1. Inserting this finding
and the above expressions for V eg (a) , V
u
g (a) , V
e′
g (a) , and V
u′
g (a) into the system of differential
equations above, we get
ρ
(γ0a+ γ1)1−σ
(1− σ)γ0
=
1
σ − 1 +
σ
1− σ (γ0a+ γ1)
1−σ + [ra+ w] (γ0a+ γ1)
−σ +
+ s
[
(δ0a+ δ1)1−σ
(1− σ)δ0 −
(γ0a+ γ1)1−σ
(1− σ)γ0
]
,
ρ
(δ0a+ δ1)1−σ
(1− σ)δ0 =
1
σ − 1 +
σ
1− σ (δ0a+ δ1)
1−σ + [ra+ b] (δ0a+ δ1)−σ +
+ α
[
(γ0a+ γ1)1−σ
(1− σ)γ0
− (δ0a+ δ1)
1−σ
(1− σ)δ0
]
.
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Now, we cannot make any reasonable assumption about the constants to get rid of a. We will see
below that γ0 = δ0 = r is a solution to a similar system with CARA preferences and s = 0. Here in
contrast, we are always left with two equations that depend on the level of wealth, a contradiction. If
one is interested in the implications of a closed form solution, a possible way out is to assume that
wages in equilibrium depend on assets and equal w = γeaσ and b = γuaσ (or, w = γea and b = γua),
but that the individual does not anticipate these relations when making her consumption decision. In
general, however, it seems a good idea to think about numerical solutions.
6.D.3 Matching with Savings under CARA: A Boundary Condition
Finally, we briefly consider the same model with CARA preferences and provide a boundary condition
for a numerical solution. After substituting for CRRA utility with CARA utility and performing
analogous steps as in the main text, we obtain the two dimensional system of value functions describing
the optimal behavior.
rV (w, a) = Va(w, a)
[
ra+ w − 1
γ
(1 + log γ) +
1
γ
log Va(w, a)
]
+ s [V (b, a)− V (w, a)] , (A.22)
rV (b, a) = Va(b, a)
[
ra+ b− 1
γ
(1 + log γ) +
1
γ
log Va(b, a)
]
+ α [V (w, a)− V (b, a)] . (A.23)
Upon solving for V z and differentiating with respect to a, the first order condition for optimal con-
sumption yields ce(a) and cu(a).
Lemma 6.1. The value function
V (w, a) = V (b, a) ≡ V (a) = −e
−γra
r
solves the system (A.22)-(A.23) as a→∞.
Proof. Inserting V (a) and its derivative V ′ (a) = γe−γra into the general system yields
−e−γra = γe−γra
[
ra+ w − 1
γ
(1 + log γ) +
1
γ
log
[
γe−γra
]]
,
−e−γra = γe−γra
[
ra+ b− 1
γ
(1 + log γ) +
1
γ
log
[
γe−γra
]]
,
which is equivalent to
−1
γ
= ra+ w − 1
γ
(1 + log γ) +
1
γ
log γ − ra,
−1
γ
= ra+ b− 1
γ
(1 + log γ) +
1
γ
log γ − ra,
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and to ra = ra + w and ra = ra + b. Dividing by a yields r = r + w/a and r = r + b/a which holds
for a→∞.
This lemma implies that for large a, the solution of the general system must approach the solution
V (a). In other words, V (a) provides a boundary condition for the system of differential equations. As
wealth approaches infinity, consumption converges to cu = ce = ra.
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Chapter 7
Optimal Unemployment Policy with
Savings: Shimer and Werning (2008)
7.1 Introduction
After 30 years of intensive research, there is still a lively debate about the optimal design of unem-
ployment insurance.1 The main challenge tackled in this literature is to provide income insurance for
risk-averse individuals with the incentive scheme most conducive to efficient outcomes (unemployment
benefits offer insurance but at the same time induce individuals to reduce their search effort, increase
their reservation wages, and exert less effort at work). On the normative side, the optimal timing of the
unemployment benefits is of prominent interest. In seminal work on optimal unemployment insurance,
Shavell and Weiss (1979) show that in the absence of asset holdings and moral hazard, the optimal
benefit sequence is constant over time. Allowing for the incentives to search for a job to vary with
unemployment benefits, they demonstrate that the inherent moral hazard problem requires benefits
to decline over the unemployment spell. Including a constant but potentially history dependent wage
tax/subsidy, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) show that the declining benefits remain characteristic
of an optimal unemployment policy (the wage tax should increase over the unemployment spell to
further increase the cost of unemployment and spur job search).2 While Shavell and Weiss (1979)
1See Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and Holmlund (1998) for surveys of the “classical” literature on unemployment
insurance.
2This finding is the prevalent justification underlying many countries’ unemployment policies in the EU where, similar
to the U.S., unemployment benefits are typically paid for about one year (usually followed by lower welfare payments).
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account for wealth holdings at the beginning of the unemployment spell in some cases, Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997) explicitly rule out savings throughout their analysis.3 Allowing workers to save
but taking the probability of finding a job as exogenous to the unemployed (i.e. abstracting from
reservation wages), Shavell and Weiss (1979) find that benefits should initially be zero and then jump
to a constant positive level over the unemployment spell.4
In their forthcoming AER article, Shimer and Werning (2008) employ an optimal contracting model
in the spirit of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) to address some of the previously unanswered questions
on optimal unemployment benefits when workers have access to liquidity (i.e., can borrow and save
in a riskless asset). Inter alia, they show that if individuals have constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) preferences, constant net benefits (equal to unemployment benefits net of employment taxes)
are optimal. Using numerical simulations, they demonstrate that the optimal policy under constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences involves “nearly constant” benefits and taxes so that the
CARA case provides a good benchmark for CRRA preferences also. Consequently, Shimer and Werning
(2008) advocate simple constant unemployment schemes. Accounting for individual savings, their
paper presents a simple, analytically tractable model that allows a distinction between the insurance
against the uncertain duration of unemployment spells on the one hand and consumption smoothing
by means of liquidity on the other hand, a feature typically found in calibrated models on optimal
unemployment insurance.56 Put differently, the timing of consumption can be distinguished from the
A noticeable exception is Belgium, where unemployment benefits are paid for the entire duration of unemployment.
3In both papers, employment is an absorbing state; the job separation rate is zero.
4Shavell and Weiss (1979) demonstrate in a two period model that if the probability of finding a job can be influenced
by the worker, optimal benefits may be hump-shaped. They were not able to derive a solution to the general model,
however.
5The seminal contribution in the class of calibrated models is by Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992), who analyze the
optimal level of unemployment benefits in an environment with a interest rate on savings equal to zero and without
borrowing. Optimal unemployment policies in numerical models include Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu, and S¸ahin (2002) and
Wang and Williamson (2002), who account for saving but rule out borrowing, and find that the optimal benefit sequence
is u-shaped. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Shimer and Werning (2008, p. 4), it is hard to identify the source of the
conflicting outcomes in the calibrated models. For a model with exogenous duration of unemployment and both saving
and borrowing up to an exogenous constraint see Heer and Maußner (2005, Ch. 5).
6See Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) for an empirical validation of the consumption smoothing effect of unemployment
benefits. Lentz (2008) estimates optimal unemployment insurance in a job search model with savings using Danish micro
data.
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timing of benefits.
In what follows, we review the model with CARA preferences of Shimer and Werning (2008). Section
7.2 briefly introduces the model (the model is a special case of the general environment introduced
in Section 6, with s = 0, r = ρ, and including a wage offer distribution). Section 7.3 considers the
optimal behavior of the agents and establishes the optimality of a constant policy scheme if individuals
have access to liquidity. In the main text, we concentrate on central arguments and relegate more
cumbersome derivations to the appendix.
After presenting the model, we argue that the closed form solution obtained by Shimer and Werning
(2008) relies on a government that, with positive probability, provides more debt to an unemployed
than she can ever pay back, even if she commits to zero consumption forever after accepting a job.
That is, a Aiyagari (1994)-type natural debt limit is violated with positive probability (cf. Aiyagari,
1994).7 This equivalently implies negative consumption levels in finite time with positive probability.
In the next section, we propose an alternative solution that accounts for a natural borrowing limit.
7.2 The Shimer and Werning (2008) Model
Consider a partial equilibrium sequential job search model with risk-averse individuals (McCall, 1970).
Each unemployed individual exogenously receives job offers with a constant Poisson arrival rate α > 0.
Jobs pay a constant wage w and each offer is an independent draw from a known wage distribution
F (w) where F (w) < 1 for some w > 0. If the individual accepts a job, she keeps it forever; there is no
“on the job” search and the separation rate is zero (in the limit as t goes to infinity, the unemployment
rate goes to zero).8 The individual receives benefits b (t) when unemployed and pays an employment tax
τ (t) when working on a job. Utility is derived from a single consumption good. Crucially, individuals
have no means to pool their incomes so that they cannot insure against the uncertain duration of
7A debt limit is usually called “natural debt limit” if it emerges from the requirement of risk-free government bonds,
i.e. if repayment must occur almost surely under optimal taxation. A more stringent debt limit is called an ad hoc limit
(see Aiyagari, 1994, or Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004, p. 577; cf. Chamberlain and Wilson, 2000). Aiyagari (1994) calls
the debt limit “natural” that emerges from solving the dynamic budget constraint and imposing c ≥ 0 and repayment
with probability one. Following Aiyagari (1994), we take seriously the assumption that the interest rate is risk-free.
8Following the tradition in the optimal unemployment insurance literature, employment is an absorbing state. Chapter
6 provided a more general environment which includes temporary unemployment spells so that income shocks are
transitory.
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unemployment.
An unemployment agency aims at providing each individual with a given level of intertemporal utility
at the lowest possible cost. In doing so, the agency observes only the individual’s employment status,
but not the realized wage once the individual accepts a job. Restricting the agency’s information
to the employment status forecloses the possibility of taxing every worker’s income by 100% and
redistributing the proceeds lump-sum whereby the first best attainable outcome would be feasible.
Shimer and Werning (2008) consider two policies. The first involves constant unemployment benefits
and employment taxes and allows individuals to borrow and lend at the risk-free market interest
rate r (UIP I). The second policy is the benchmark case of optimal unemployment insurance where
the unemployment agency dictates the consumption path for individuals (UIP II). Under this policy
scenario, the agency again cannot observe the wage offers, and the unemployed cannot borrow or save,
i.e. they live from (the agency’s) hand to mouth. In Appendix A of their paper, Shimer and Werning
use the revelation principle to prove that UIP II is the best available deterministic mechanism under
non-increasing risk aversion preferences given that the agency cannot observe the wage offers (which
is used to prevent the first best) in that it provides a given amount of utility at the lowest possible
cost.9
Throughout the paper, the interest rate r is equal to the subjective discount rate ρ. Following Shimer
and Werning (2008) we proceed to show that the cost of providing a certain level of utility is the same
under both policies, so that UIP I is in fact optimal (since UIP II yields the information-constrained
efficient allocation).
7.3 Optimal Behavior
7.3.1 Optimal Behavior under UIP I
Under UIP I, the unemployment agency sets constant unemployment benefits b¯ and employment taxes
τ¯ . Workers have access to liquidity in terms of a riskless asset and choose optimal consumption given
b¯ and τ¯ .
9The main insight from this proof is that neither reports on the received wage offers nor the possibility to vary taxes
over the employment spell reduce the costs of providing a given level of utility relative to what can be achieved using a
policy that only accounts for the duration of unemployment.
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The Agency’s Program
The unemployment agency aims at maximizing the utility of each unemployed worker subject to
its budget and the initial wealth level a0. That is, the agency pays unemployment benefits when
the individual is unemployed and continuously receives the tax proceeds as of the time she starts
working on a job. Shimer and Werning (2008) solve this program via its dual, i.e. by minimizing
the expected cost of the unemployment benefits and initial assets net of employment taxes given a
certain expected level of intertemporal utility v0 (expectations need to be formed about the duration
of the unemployment spell). With E0 denoting the expectations operator and z (t) ∈
{
b¯,−τ¯}, the
total expected costs obey
E0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtz (t) dt+ a0.
We show in Appendix 7.A that this objective can be rewritten as∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯∗(s))))ds
(
b¯− α (1− F (w¯∗ (t))) τ¯
r
)
dt+ a0,
where w¯∗ (t) ≡ w¯(a(t), b¯, τ¯) denotes the reservation wage implied by the optimal behavior of an
unemployed individual.
Denote by V u
(
a0, b¯, τ¯
)
the maximized Bellman equation of the unemployed, i.e. her equilibrium life-
time utility given initial assets a0 and the sequence of constant unemployment benefits and taxes
{b¯, τ¯}. Taken together, the dual problem is
Cc (v0, a0) = min
b¯,τ¯
∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯∗(s))))ds
(
b¯− α (1− F (w¯∗ (t))) τ¯
r
)
dt+ a0 (7.1)
subject to v0 = V u
(
a0, b¯, τ¯
)
. (7.2)
Evidently, the constraint in (7.2) ensures that the policy endows the individual with utility v0 in equi-
librium, where the unemployed chooses her optimal consumption path and reservation wage optimally
given {b¯, τ¯}.
Note that in this environment with r = ρ, rational individuals are indifferent between taxes tomorrow
distributed as lump-sum income today so that any initial income transfer x/r given the agency’s
budget leaves the unemployed’s utility unaffected, V u
(
a; b¯, τ¯
)
= V u
(
a+ x/r; b¯− x, τ¯ + x); Ricardian
equivalence applies. Suppose
{
b¯, τ¯
}∗ is optimal. Since the {b¯, τ¯}∗ and {b¯− x, τ¯ + x} give rise to the
same allocations (the individual is indifferent between both policies), the optimal policy leaves a0
indeterminate. Following Shimer and Werning (2008), we thus suppress a0 and simplify the notation
by letting Cc(v0, a0) = Cc(v0).
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We proceed to derive the closed-form solution for optimal consumption obtained by Shimer and
Werning (2008). Under their solution, the optimal consumption path implies a constant reservation
wage w¯ that leaves the individual indifferent between accepting a job and remaining unemployed.
The fact that this reservation wage is independent of the level of wealth is a direct implication of the
optimal consumption rule being linear in the level of assets (see Chapter 8 for a nonlinear solution).
Workers
The worker’s state is described completely by her employment status and current level of wealth. In
the program considered by Shimer and Werning (2008), the asset space is unbounded so that the
individual state space is given by the set {e, u} × (−∞,∞).10
As long as an unemployed individual does not find a job, her assets evolve according to a˙ (t) =
ra (t)+ b¯− cu (t) . After accepting a job, the worker’s assets follow a˙ (t) = ra (t)+w− τ¯ − ce (t) where
w ≥ w¯.
An unemployed individual chooses consumption cu to maximize her intertemporal utility,
rV u (a) = max
cu
{
u (cu) + V u′ (a)
[
ra+ b¯− cu]}+
+α
∫ ∞
0
max [V e (w, a)− V u (a) , 0] dF (w) .
We solve this program for cu (a), w¯, and the maximized value function by going through a “verification
theorem” in Section 8 (cf. Merton, 1969 and 1971).11 For CARA preferences, where u (c) = −e−γc,
the Shimer-Werning (2008) solution obeys the following linear consumption rule (see the proof of
Proposition 8.3 in Chapter 8):
cu (a) = ra+ w¯. (7.3)
The reservation wage w¯ is implicitly given by
(w¯ − b) γ = α
r
∫ ∞
w¯
[1 + u (w − w¯)] dF (w) , (7.4)
10In Chapter 8, we restrict the asset space to [amin,∞) where amin is a limit on borrowing.
11The only constraint on this maximization problem is a no-Ponzi game condition of the form limt→∞ e−rta (t) ≥ 0.
Consumption is allowed to become negative as c ∈ R. For a numerical solution of a general equilibrium model with
an exogenous lower bound on wealth and CRRA preferences see Heer and Maußner, 2005, Ch. 5. Cf. the discussion in
Chapter 8 below.
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and the maximized value function satisfies
V u =
u (ra+ w¯)
r
. (7.5)
The existence and uniqueness of w¯ is easily verified. Rearranging (7.4) gives
γr (w¯ − b)
α
=
∫ ∞
w¯
[1 + u (w − w¯)] dF (w) .
The left hand side is equal to −γrb/α < 0 if w¯ = 0 and linearly increasing in w¯. The right hand side
is positive at w¯ = 0 (since eγ(w−w¯) ≥ 1 for w ≥ w¯) and strictly decreasing in w¯.12 Hence, a unique w¯
exists.
When working on a job, the individual lives in a stationary world, and r = ρ ensures that a˙ = 0.
Hence,
ce (w, a) = ra+ w − τ¯ and V e = u (c
e)
r
. (7.6)
In both employment states, optimal consumption is linear in the asset level. In the case of unemploy-
ment, this implies that the reservation wage is independent of the level of an individual’s wealth, see
(7.4) (which does not involve a). If unemployed, the individual consumes an amount ra+ w¯ > b and
runs down her assets (a˙ (t) = b¯ − w¯ < 0, cf. the discussion in Chapter 8). If she accepts a job, a˙ = 0
and consumption equals the constant net income.
7.3.2 Optimal Behavior under UIP II
In the second scenario, UIP II, the unemployment agency sets time-dependent benefits b(t) and em-
ployment taxes τ (t), and individuals have no means to borrow or save. The insurance agency thus
dictates the level of consumption during the unemployment spell and workers consume their after-
tax income. If unemployed, however, the individual can decide which job offer to accept. The agency
therefore accounts for the unemployed’s optimal reservation wage decision, but cannot control the
reservation wage w¯ (t) directly.
The objective of the unemployment agency is to provide the individual with a given amount of utility
v0 at the lowest possible cost. Since now the individuals can neither borrow nor save, the unemployed’s
reservation wage under UIP II is found by simple backward induction. At the second stage, the unem-
ployed individual decides about her reservation wage given the unemployment policy {b (t) , τ (t)}. At
12 ∂
R∞
w¯ [1+u(w−w¯)]dF (w)
∂w¯
= γ
R∞
w¯
[u (w − w¯)] dF (w) < 0.
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the first stage, the agency sets the sequence of benefits and taxes, taking into account the unemployed’s
optimizing behavior. The agency thereby indirectly pins down the sequence of reservation wages.
To state the ensuing program, denote by U (t′, {w (t) , b (t) , τ (t)}) an unemployed individual’s expected
lifetime utility as of time t′. The agency then solves
min
{b(t),τ(t),w¯(t)}
∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds
(
b (t)− α (1− F (w¯ (t))) τ (t)
r
)
dt (7.7)
such that the recommended sequence of reservation wages {w¯′ (t)} (i) provides the worker with utility
v0,
v0 = U (0, {w¯ (t) , b (t) , τ (t)}) , (7.8)
and (ii), given {b (t) , τ (t)}, {w¯ (t)} is at least as good as any other sequence of reservation wages
{w¯′ (t)},
U (0, {w¯ (t) , b (t) , τ (t)}) ≥ U (0, {w¯′ (t) , b (t) , τ (t)}) . (7.9)
The unemployed’s utility mirrors the costs of the unemployment agency. Its derivation is therefore
analogous to the derivation of the operand in (7.1) deduced in Appendix 7.A. We thus simply adjust
(7.7) to yield the present value utility of an unemployed individual. As long as she is looking for a
job, the unemployed worker must consume whatever benefit the agency provides. While the agency
pays out b (t), the unemployed individual receives instantaneous utility u (b (t)). Once the individual
accepts a job, she consumes her after-tax income. The worker then receives utility u (w − τ (t)) where
w ≥ w¯ (t), while the agency earns the proceeds from the employment tax (cf. (7.7)).
The distribution of the acceptable wages is the underlying distribution of wages conditional on w ≥
w¯ (t), i.e. F (w) / [1− F (w¯)] . Accordingly, an unemployed’s expected lifetime utility as of the time
she accepts a job obeys
u˜ (w¯ (t)) =
∫ ∞
w¯
u (w − τ (t))
r
dF (w)
1− F (w¯ (t)) .
Sufficiently well paying jobs are offered with Poisson arrival rate α (1− F (w¯ (t))). Hence, replacing
b (t) by u (b (t)), −τ (t) /r by u˜ (w¯ (t)), and adjusting the limits of integration in the objective in (7.7),
the present value utility of an unemployed individual as of time t′ equals
U
(
t′, w¯, {b (t) , τ (t)}) = ∫ ∞
t′
e−
R t
t′ (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds
(
u (b (t)) + α
∫ ∞
w¯
u (w − τ (t))
r
dF (w)
)
dt.
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Recursive Formulation
The agency’s program in (7.7), (7.8), and (7.9) can be expressed recursively, whereby utility v (t′) =
U (t′, w¯, {b (t) , τ (t)}) serves as the only state variable (Werning, 2002). Taking the derivative of
U (t′, w¯, {b (t) , τ (t)}) in (7.10) with respect to time and substituting for the definition of v (t) yields
the evolution of utility given the reservation wage (see Appendix 7.B for the derivation):
v˙ (t) = rv (t)− u (b (t))− α
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
[
u (w − τ (t))
r
− v (t)
]
dF (w) . (7.10)
For the recommended reservation wage to be compatible with the unemployed’s optimal choice, it
must maximize the unemployed’s intertemporal utility, see (7.9). Hence, w¯ (t) must maximize v (t) at
any point in time, and Appendix 7.C shows that the constraint in (7.9) can equivalently be stated as
v (t) =
u (w¯ (t)− τ (t))
r
. (7.11)
If C∗ (v0) is the minimum attainable cost implied by the solution of the agency’s problem, C∗ (v0)
must solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
rC∗ (v) = min
w¯,b,τ
(
b+ (C∗)′ (v)
[
rv (t)− u (b (t))− α
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
u (w − τ (t))
r
− v (t) dF (w)
]
−α (1− F (w¯))
(τ
r
+ C∗ (v)
))
(7.12)
subject to (7.11). The sequence {w¯ (t) , b (t) , τ (t)} then follows from the first order conditions of (7.12).
7.4 Characterization of the Equilibrium under UIP I
Under UIP I, the equilibrium unemployment policy is given by the solution of (7.1) subject to (7.2) and
the unemployed individual’s optimality conditions (7.3)–(7.6), which enter via the agency’s objective
utility level v0. In what follows, we substitute for v0 and τ¯ in the agency’s program, so that the
equilibrium under UIP I is fully characterized by the reservation wage.
7.4.1 Exploring the Linear Solution
Two properties of the optimal behavior of the unemployed are used: first, the constancy of the reserva-
tion wage (see (7.4)) and, second, the closed form solution to the value function (see (7.5)). Inserting
τ¯ and the “net benefit” B¯ ≡ τ¯ + b¯ as a function of w¯ from the unemployed individual’s optimality
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conditions for utility level v0 and the unemployed’s value function, we show in Appendix 7.D that the
agency’s objective can be rewritten as
Cc (v0) = max
w¯
Φ (w¯)
where
Φ (w¯) =
∫∞
w¯ 1 + γw¯ + u (w − w¯) dF (w)
r + α (1− F (w¯)) . (7.13)
It follows that the optimal reservation wage w¯∗ is given by
w¯∗ ∈ argmax
w¯
Φ (w¯) .
As demonstrated in Appendix 7.D, the implied insurance costs under UIP I with CARA preferences
and a linear consumption rule amount to
Cc (v0) =
u−1 (rv0)
r
− αΦ (w¯
∗)
γr
. (7.14)
7.5 Characterization of the Equilibrium under UIP II
The optimal unemployment policy under UIP II follows from the policy functions of the HJB equa-
tion in (7.12). The optimal behavior of the unemployed enters through the incentive compatibility
constraint, which was expressed in recursive terms in (7.9).
The policy outcome is again characterized by the minimum expected cost associated with utility level
v. Let us directly look at the solution:
C∗ (v) =
u−1 (rv)
r
− αΦ (w¯
∗)
γr
. (7.15)
where Φ is defined in (7.13). Accordingly, for v = v0, the optimal policy under UIP II implies the
same cost as the constant benefits and taxes under UIP I (cf. (7.14)). This is Shimer and Werning’s
main result: constant benefits and taxes exert constrained optimal incentives given that the worker
has CARA preferences and is free to borrow and save in a riskless asset.
We are left to prove the validity of the cost function in (7.15). In doing so, we make a point of studying
how the optimal decision of the unemployed affects the minimum costs. Following Shimer and Werning
(2008), the proof is organized in two steps. The first step is to show that the minimum cost function
for any initial level of promised utility v must be of the following form:
C∗ (v) =
u−1 (rv)
r
+ C0, (7.16)
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where C0 is a constant. To see this, we make use of the following helpful fact (see Appendix 7.E for a
detailed proof): CARA preferences imply that a simultaneous shift in the non–capital income in both
employment states does not alter the reservation wage and affects intertemporal utility linearly,
U
(
t′, {w¯ (t) , b (t) , τ (t)}) = −u (x)U (t′, {w¯ (t) , b (t) + x, τ (t)− x})
for all x. Therefore, if a policy {w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ , τ (t)∗} is optimal for utility v0, then the alternative policy
{w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ + x, τ (t)∗ − x} is also accepted by the unemployed, and thus feasible. This alternative
policy delivers utility −u (x) v0. Since a lump-sum income transfer, i.e. a transfer that does not alter
the decision to accept a job offer, gives the highest possible utility, it is also the agency’s optimal
choice to deliver utility −u (x) v0. This is our argument for optimality. Shimer and Werning (2008)
“establish” optimality of {w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ + x, τ (t)∗ − x} for utility −u (x) v0 by arguing that since
{w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ , τ (t)∗} is revealed as good as any other feasible policy to deliver v0, and {w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗+
x, τ (t)∗ − x} is feasible, {w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ + x, τ (t)∗ − x} is optimal to deliver −u (x) v0 by a “standard
revealed preference argument”.
Suppose that the agency wants to ensure zero consumption forever and thus deliver utility v0 =
u (0) /r = −1/r. Given the optimal sequence {w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ , τ (t)∗}, denote by C0 ≡ C∗ (u (0) /r) the
associated expected minimum attainable cost. Then, the alternative optimal policy {w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ +
x, τ (t)∗ − x}, which implies utility −u (x) v0 = u (x) /r, yields costs C0 + x/r since the agency now
pays out an additional amount x at any point in time.
Taken together, we can solve for the income shift x that yields a given initial utility v and the associated
costs C∗ (v) = C0 + x/r. From v = u (x) /r, we have x = u−1 (rv) so that the minimum attainable
cost to deliver v is C0 + u−1 (rv) /r, i.e. equation (7.16).
We are left with the second step, which is to determine the constant C0. Here is where the optimal
decision of the unemployed enters.
By definition, C0 is the cost of delivering utility level v = u (0) /r. Since we know that the minimum
costs C∗ (v) must satisfy the HJB equation (7.12), its first order conditions, and the incentive constraint
(7.11), we can simply insert all these formulas in the HJB equation in (7.12) and solve for C0. We
again re-state the HJB equation from above for convenience:
rC∗ (v) = min
w¯,b,τ
(
b+ (C∗)′ (v)
[
rv (t)− u (b (t))− α
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
u (w − τ (t))
r
− v (t) dF (w)
]
−α (1− F (w¯))
(τ
r
+ C∗ (v)
))
.
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To begin with, note that u−1 (rv) = 0 and C∗ (v) = C0 if v = u (0) /r . The first order condition with
respect to b is
1− C∗ (v)′ u′ (b) = 0. (7.17)
Since
C∗ (v)′ =
[
u−1 (rv)
]′
r
=
r
ru′ [u−1 (rv)]
=
1
u′ [u−1 (rv)]
from (7.16), v = u (0) /r implies
C∗ (v)′ =
1
u′ (0)
=
1
γ
.
Substituting for C∗ (v) in (7.17), optimality requires
1− u
′ (b)
u′ (0)
= 0,
or equivalently b = 0. Moreover, evaluated at v = u (0) /r, the incentive constraint in (7.11) implies
w¯ − τ = 0, or w¯ = τ . Taken together, if v = u (0) /r = −1/r, C∗ (v) = C0, C∗ (v)′ = 1/γ, rv = u (0) ,
τ = w¯, and b = 0, the HJB boils down to
rC0 = min
w¯
−α
γ
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
u (w − τ (t)) + 1
r
dF (w)− α (1− F (w¯))
( w¯
r
+ C0
)
.
After collecting terms using 1− F (w¯) = ∫∞w¯ dF (w) , the HJB equivalently reads
rC0 = min
w¯
− α
γr
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
[u (w − τ (t)) + 1 + γw¯] dF (w)− α (1− F (w¯))C0,
or, solving for C0 and using the definition of Φ (w¯) in (7.13),
C0 = min
w¯
− αγr
∫∞
w¯(t) [u (w − τ (t)) + 1 + γw¯] dF (w)
r + α (1− F (w¯)) = −
α
γr
max
w¯
Φ (w¯) .
After inserting this constant in (7.16), we arrive at (7.15), which establishes optimality of the constant
unemployment policy under CARA, if there is no separation, r = ρ, and consumption is allowed to
take any (i.e. possibly negative) real number.
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Appendix
The following appendices contain several detailed derivations of formulas used in the main text.
Appendix 7.A Derivation of the Expected Insurance Costs
In this appendix, we show that the expected net payment to an individual who is unemployed at t = 0
plus initial assets, E0
∫∞
0 e
−rtz(t)dt+a0 with z(t) ∈ {b¯,−τ¯}, can be rewritten as the operand in (7.1):∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯∗(s))))ds
(
b¯− α (1− F (w¯∗ (t))) τ¯
r
)
dt+ a0.
To see this, consider
C0 = E0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtz(t)dt+ a0.
Expectations are formed only about the duration of unemployment, or, more precisely, about the
future employment state, given that the individual is unemployed at t = 0. Exploring the Markovian
evolution of the employment status and the fact that there is no separation after the individual has
found a job, the conditional probability of being unemployed at t ≥ 0 is simply given by
puu(t) = e−
R t
0 α(1−F (w∗(s)))ds = e−α¯(t)t,
where α¯ (t) ≡ 1/t ∫ t0 (α (1− F (w∗ (s)))) ds. Correspondingly, the probability of working on a job at
t ≥ 0, given unemployment at t = 0 is
1− puu(t) = 1− e−α¯(t)t.
Taken together, the present value of the total expected resource costs amounts to
C0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−
R t
0 α(1−F (w¯∗(s)))dsb¯− e−rt
(
1− e−α¯(t)t
)
τ¯ dt+ a0.
Since r = ρ, the interest rate is constant so that −rt = − ∫ t0 rds. We thus have
C0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 r+α(1−F (w¯∗(s)))dsb¯dt−
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
1− e−α¯(t)t
)
τ¯ dt+ a0.
In order to arrive at the operand in (7.1), we need to show that∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
1− e−α¯(t)t
)
dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds
α¯ (t)
r
dt.
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To do so, let f(t) ≡ 1− e−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds and g (t) ≡ −e−rt/r. Using these definitions and g′ (t) = e−rt, the
left hand side equals ∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
1− e−α¯(t)t
)
dt =
∫ ∞
0
g′ (t) f (t) dt.
After integrating by parts, whereby∫ ∞
0
g′ (t) f (t) dt = [f (t) g (t)]∞0 −
∫ ∞
0
f ′ (t) g (t) dt,
we get, upon recognizing f ′ (t) = α¯ (t) e−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds,∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
1− e−α¯(t)t
)
dt =
[(
1− e−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds
)(
−e
−rt
r
)]∞
0
+
+
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds
α¯ (t)
r
dt
We are left to show that the term in squared brackets is zero. The first factor, 1− e−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds, is again
the conditional probability of being employed at t ≥ 0. As t → ∞, this probability goes to unity.
Evaluated at t → ∞, however, the second factor, −e−rt/r, goes to zero, so that the product of the
two factors goes to zero as t → ∞. If t = 0, the second factor, −e−rt/r, equals −1/r. Evaluated at
t = 0, 1−e−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds = 0 and again the product of both expressions is zero. Hence, the term in squared
brackets is actually zero so that
E0
∫ T
0
e−rtz(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯∗(s))))dsb¯− e−rte−
R t
0 α¯(s)ds
α¯ (t)
r
τ¯dt.
After replacing α¯ (s) and rt =
∫ t
0 rds, we arrive at
C0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯∗(s))))ds
(
b¯− α
(
1− F (w¯∗ (t)) τ¯
r
))
+ a0.
Appendix 7.B Derivation of the Evolution of Utility
Equation (7.10) describes the lifetime utility of an unemployed as of time t′ (repeated here for conve-
nience):
U
(
t′, w¯, {b (t) , τ (t)}) = ∫ ∞
t′
e−
R t
t′ (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds
(
u (b(t)) + α
∫ ∞
w¯
u (w − τ (t))
r
dF (w)
)
dt.
Taking the derivative with respect to t′, we get
∂U (·)
∂t′
= −u (b (t′))− α ∫ ∞
w¯(t′)
u (w − τ (t′))
r
dF (w) +
+
∫ ∞
t′
e−
R t
t′ (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds
[
r + α
(
1− F (w¯ (t′)))]×(
u (b(t)) + α
∫ ∞
w¯
u (w − τ (t))
r
dF (w)
)
dt.
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Using v (t′) = U (t′, w¯, {b (t) , τ (t)}) and changing the time argument from t′ to t,
v˙ (t) = [r + α (1− F (w¯ (t)))] v (t)− u (b (t))− α
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
u (w − τ (t))
r
dF (w) .
Recognizing 1 − F (w¯ (t′)) = ∫∞−∞ dF (w) − ∫ w¯(t′)−∞ dF (w) = ∫∞w¯ dF (w), we arrive at the evolution of
utility in equation (7.10):
v˙ (t) = rv (t)− u (b (t))− α
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
[
u (w − τ (t))
r
− v (t)
]
dF (w) .
Appendix 7.C Recursive Formulation of the Participation Con-
straint
The worker only uses the agency’s recommended reservation wage sequence if it is at least as good
as any other reservation wage sequence. In recursive terms, this is to say that w¯ (t) must maximize
v (t). Finding the respective necessary condition is most easily achieved by using (7.10) to define the
implicit function
Γ (v (t) , w¯ (t)) ≡ v˙ (t)− rv (t) + u (b (t)) + α
∫ ∞
w¯(t)
[
u (w − τ (t))
r
− v (t)
]
dF (w) = 0. (A.1)
From the implicit function theorem,
∂v (t)
∂w¯ (t)
= −∂Γ (v (t) , w¯ (t)) /∂w¯ (t)
∂Γ (v (t) , w¯ (t)) /∂v (t)
,
where we remember that v (t′) = U (t′, {w¯, b (t) , τ (t)}). For w¯ (t) to maximize v (t) , we require
∂Γ (v (t) , w¯ (t))
∂w¯ (t)
= −u (w¯ (t)− τ (t))
r
+ v (t) = 0.
Rearranging gives U (0, w¯, {b (t) , τ (t)}) ≥ U (0, {w¯′ (t) , b (t) , τ (t)}) equivalently as
v (t) =
u (w¯ (t)− τ (t))
r
.
Appendix 7.D Derivation of the Insurance Costs under UIP I and
CARA
The unemployment agency’s objective was given in (7.1), and is repeated here for convenience:
min
b¯,τ¯
∫ ∞
0
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds
(
b¯− α (1− F (w¯ (t))) τ¯
r
)
dt+ a0.
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Given that w¯ is constant (see (7.4)),
e−
R t
0 (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds = e−(r+α(1−F (w¯)))t,
and b¯− α (1− F (w¯ (t))) τ¯ /r = b¯− α (1− F (w¯)) τ¯ /r can be pulled out of the integral:
min
b¯,τ¯
(
b¯− α (1− F (w¯)) τ¯
r
)∫ ∞
0
e
−(r+α(1−F (w¯)))t
dt+ a0.
After integrating, we have
min
b¯,τ¯
b¯− α (1− F (w¯ (t))) τ¯r
r + α (1− F (w¯)) + a0,
or, substituting b¯+ τ¯ ≡ B¯,
min
b¯,τ¯
B¯ − τ − α (1− F (w¯ (t))) τ¯r
r + α (1− F (w¯)) + a0.
Now, after collecting terms,
min
b¯,τ¯
B¯
r + α (1− F (w¯)) − τ¯
r+α(1−F (w¯(t)))
r
r + α (1− F (w¯)) + a0,
and canceling r + α (1− F (w¯)) ,
min
b¯,τ¯
B¯
r + α (1− F (w¯)) −
τ¯
r
+ a0. (A.2)
The next step is to substitute for τ¯ using the unemployed’s optimal consumption decision (7.3), her
value function (7.5), and the objective utility, v0 ≡ V u
(
a0; b¯, τ¯
)
. After inserting the value function V u
from (7.5), we get
v0 =
u (cu)
r
,
where cu = ra− τ¯ + w¯ is the optimal consumption rule when unemployed. To solve this equation for
τ¯ , multiply by r, apply u−1 on both sides, and insert cu at t = 0 to obtain u−1 (rv0) = ra0 − τ + w¯.
Accordingly,
τ = ra0 + w¯ − u−1 (rv0) (A.3)
so that (A.2) becomes
min
B¯,w¯
B¯
r + α (1− F (w¯)) −
ra0 + w¯ − u−1 (rv0)
r
+ a0.
The initial asset level a0 drops out:
min
B¯,w¯
B¯
r + α (1− F (w¯)) +
u−1 (rv0)− w¯
r
, (A.4)
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and the term u−1 (rv0) /r is a constant in the cost minimization. We are left to substitute for B¯. To
do so, we solve the unemployed’s optimality condition that determines the reservation wage (again
repeated for convenience),
γ
(
w¯ − B¯) = α
r
∫ ∞
w¯
[1 + u (w − w¯)] dF (w) ,
for B¯ and get
B¯ = w¯ − α
γr
∫ ∞
w¯
[1 + u (w − w¯)] dF (w) . (A.5)
After substituting for B¯ and dropping the constant u−1 (rv0) /r, (A.4) becomes
min
B¯,w¯
w¯ − αγr
∫∞
w¯ 1 + u (w − w¯) dF (w)
r + α (1− F (w¯)) −
w¯
r
.
Collecting the reservation wage terms, we have
min
B¯,w¯
w¯
(
1− r+α(1−F (w¯))r
)
r + α (1− F (w¯)) −
α
γr
∫∞
w¯ [1 + u (w − w¯)] dF (w)
r + α (1− F (w¯))
so that, after canceling r from the numerator of the first term, we get
min
B¯,w¯
−
α
r w¯ (1− F (w¯))
r + α (1− F (w¯)) −
α
γr
∫∞
w¯ [1 + u (w − w¯)] dF (w)
r + α (1− F (w¯)) .
Dropping the common factor α/r from both terms, and recognizing 1 − F (w¯) = ∫∞w¯ dF (w), we can
combine the two terms to yield
min
B¯,w¯
−
1
γ
∫∞
w¯ [1 + γw¯ + u (w − w¯)] dF (w)
r + α (1− F (w¯)) .
Finally, let
Φ (w¯) =
∫∞
w¯ [1 + γw¯ + u (w − w¯)] dF (w)
r + α (1− F (w¯))
and drop −1/γ to arrive at
Cc (v0) = max
w¯
Φ (w¯) .
Hence, the reservation wage w¯∗ is given by
w¯∗ ∈ argmax
w¯
Φ (w¯) .
The unemployment policy
(
b¯∗, τ¯∗
)
follows from (A.3) and (A.5) using the definition of B¯. Adding
again the dropped factor α/(γr) and the summand u−1 (rv0) /r, the insurance costs are
Cc (v0) =
u−1 (rv0)
r
− αΦ (w¯)
γr
.
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Appendix 7.E A Useful Property of CARA
We show in this appendix that a simultaneous shift in the “labor” income in both states does not
affect the reservation wage under CARA preferences. Level effects in income simply affect intertemporal
utility linearly:
U
(
t′, {w¯ (t) , b (t) , τ (t)}) = −u (x)U (t′, {w¯ (t) , b (t) + x, τ (t)− x}) (A.6)
for all x. Moreover, if a sequence {w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ , τ (t)∗} is optimal to implement utility u (0) /r, then
{w¯ (t)∗ , b (t)∗ + u−1 (rv) , τ (t)∗ − u−1 (rv)} is optimal for utility level v0 (cf. the discussion in Section
7.5 and Lemma 1 in Shimer and Werning, 2008). An unemployed’s utility as of time t′ was derived in
(7.10), and is repeated here for convenience:
U
(
t′, w¯, {b (t) , τ (t)}) ≡ ∫ ∞
t′
e−
R t
t′ (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds
(
u (b (t)) + α
∫ ∞
w¯
u (w − τ (t))
r
dF (w)
)
dt.
Raising the “labor” income in both states by x, utility becomes
U
(
t′, w¯, {b (t) + x, τ (t)− x}) = ∫ ∞
t′
e−
R t
t′ (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds (u (b(t) + x)+
+ α
∫ ∞
w¯
u (w − τ (t) + x)
r
dF (w)
)
dt.
Since
u (c+ x) = −e−γ(c+x) = − (−e)−γc (−e−γx) = −u (c)u (x) ,
we have
U
(
t′, w¯, {b (t) + x, τ (t)− x}) = −u (x)∫ ∞
t′
e−
R t
t′ (r+α(1−F (w¯(s))))ds (u (b(t))+
α
∫ ∞
w¯
u (w − τ (t))
r
dF (w)
)
dt,
i.e. equation (A.6). Hence, utility is simply multiplied by −u (x) , and this carries over to the evolution
of utility. Accordingly, changing the level of income by the same amount in both states leaves Γ
in (A.1) unaffected and hence does not alter the sequence of reservation wages that maximizes the
unemployed’s intertemporal utility.
Chapter 8
Job Search with Borrowing Constraint
under CARA
8.1 Introduction
In a standard job search model with employment as an absorbing state and without consumption
smoothing motives from the interest rate, Shimer and Werning (2008, cf. Chapter 7) have shown
that consumption is linear in wealth and reservation wages are independent of wealth if individuals
have CARA preferences. These results rest on the assumption that borrowing is unlimited and only a
no-Ponzi game condition needs to be taken into account.
Shimer and Werning (2008) characterize the optimal unemployment policy in a sequential search
environment where agents can borrow and save in a riskless asset. A closed form solution for con-
sumption allows an analytical treatment of the optimal contract, and unlimited access to liquidity is a
pragmatic way to obtain a closed-form solution. Intuitively speaking, unbounded debt allows a linear
consumption function to solve the necessary conditions for optimality.1
In this section, we introduce a borrowing constraint in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994) into the optimal
savings problem considered by Shimer and Werning (2008) under CARA preferences.2 Our motivation
is twofold. First, accounting for a borrowing constraint that ensures repayment with probability one
1A direct implication is that the optimal decision to accept a job is independent of the unemployed’s history because
(i) the probability of finding a job is constant and (ii) unlimited borrowing guarantees that consumption smoothing is
equally feasible at all levels of wealth.
2This chapter originates from joint work with Klaus Wa¨lde. It presents a modified version of Bauer (2008b).
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and nonnegative consumption is intrinsically reasonable.3 Ruling out the possibility of default takes
serious the fact that the bond interest rate is risk-free.
Second, empirical research has identified a significant positive impact of wealth on the reservation
wage (Algan, Che`ron, Hairault, and Langot, 2003, Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001, Stancanelli 1999,
among others)4 on the one hand, and strict borrowing limits for a large fraction of the unemployed on
the other hand (cf. Browning and Crossley, 2001, Chetty, 2005, Sullivian, 2002 and 2008, and Rendon,
2006). Imposing repayment with probability one naturally generates wealth dependent reservation
wages in line with the data even under CARA preferences. We contribute to the understanding of the
empirical findings by differentiating between the effects of liquidity, insurance, and risk aversion5.
Introducing what Aiyagari (1994) calls a “natural borrowing limit”, i.e. imposing nonnegative con-
sumption and repayment with probability one, we show that the optimal consumption of the unem-
ployed is no longer linear in wealth. The intuition is that the borrowing constraint rules out debt levels
of unemployed workers which are implied by a linear solution while leaving consumption of wealthy
individuals unaffected. We prove that a linear solution requires an unemployed worker to borrow more
(with a strictly positive probability) than the present value of her lifetime income, even if she commits
to a zero consumption level after having found a job. We present a solution where the intertemporal
budget constraint (IBC for short) is satisfied at each point and clarify the role of borrowing constraints
for the duration dependence of hazard rates. The solution implies that unlike in the case of unlim-
ited borrowing, the distribution of wages below the reservation wage affects the individual’s optimal
behavior.
The cost of restricting consumption to nonnegative levels is that no closed-form solution as in Shimer
3Under CRRA preferences, nonnegativity of consumption naturally implies a lower bound on debt that allows repay-
ment with probability one. As shown in a discrete time model by Aiyagari (1994), nonnegative consumption together
with the no-Ponzi game condition limt→∞ a (t) e−rt ≥ 0 is equivalent to a constraint on debt that allows repayment with
probability one.
4Addison, Centeno, and Portugal (2008) find little evidence for declining reservation wages across the employment
spell. It is not evident from their study, however, if individual asset holdings are taken into account.
5Allowing for negative consumption, the reservation wage in an environment with constant net benefits is independent
of an individual’s wealth under CARA, see Shimer and Werning (2007 and 2008). In the numerical solution to the CRRA
case with optimal unemployment insurance in Shimer and Werning (2008), the reservation wage is nearly constant,
reflecting a balance of decreasing reservation wages as a response to increasing risk aversion as the unemployed becomes
poorer and an increase in the moral hazard from raising unemployment benefits, which is a feature of the optimal
unemployment policy scheme.
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and Werning (2008) can be found. In deriving our results, however, we characterize the optimal
behavior by exploring analytically an expression for the optimal evolution of consumption in a simple
phase diagram.
The idea that limited asset endowments mitigate the moral hazard problem of prolonging unemploy-
ment spells has a long tradition. It dates back at least to Danforth (1979), who show that risk averse
workers choose a lower reservation wage if they hold little wealth. Similarly, Mortensen (1986) estab-
lishes that a liquidity constraint imposes an upper bound on the search time an individual is able to
incur so that the reservation wage is decreasing in the worker’s wealth. To isolate the impact of the
borrowing constraint, we consider an individual with CARA preferences and impose an interest rate
equal to the subjective discount rate.
The paper most closely related to our model is by Lentz and Tranæs (2005), who consider a discrete-
time sequential search model where a risk averse individual switches back and forth between employ-
ment and unemployment according to a two-state Markov process. In pioneering work, Lentz and
Tranæs (2005) demonstrate that the expected length of unemployment originates endogenously from
the optimal consumption behavior under risk aversion if individuals have access to liquidity. Over the
unemployment spell, unemployed individuals reduce their level of financial wealth and increase their
search efforts. Our research clarifies that bounded debt is a sufficient condition to obtain this pattern.
In related work, Rendon (2006) estimates a labor market search model with on-the-job search and
longitudinal survey data. He finds finds that larger initial wealth and free access to liquidity increase
the expected duration of unemployment as well as future wage incomes. He also confirms the earlier
assessment of tight borrowing constraints. According to Rendon’s (2006) estimates, borrowing is typ-
ically limited to 14% of an individual’s present value of risk-free income and thus far tighter than
assumed in this section (we impose a limit equal to 100% of the risk-free income).6 Rendon (2006)
derives his results from a discrete-time job search model with finite planning horizon in the spirit of
Danforth (1979). As usual in the literature, he obtains policy rules numerically by discretizing the state
variables, applying constant relative risk aversion preferences and a specified (truncated lognormal)
wage offer distribution among other functional forms.
In what follows, we employ a standard job search model in continuous time where the transition
between unemployment and employment is governed by a Poisson process. Abstracting from changing
6Most of the arguments in the analysis go through as long as any borrowing constraint exists, independently of its
level.
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risk aversion as wealth changes using CARA preferences and imposing an interest rate equal to the
subjective discount rate, our analysis provides further insights into how borrowing constraints, risk
aversion, and insurance affect the reservation wage as a function of wealth as well as equilibrium
consumption. Inter alia, we prove that a borrowing limit naturally generates a reservation wage that
increases monotonically in an individual’s wealth even under CARA preferences and assumptions most
conducive towards a constant reservation wage (the interest rate equals the subjective discount rate
and is the same for borrowing and for saving, the job arrival rate is exogenous, and the degree of
risk aversion is constant). We obtain our results using analytical expressions for optimal consumption
in the presence of idiosyncratic labor income risk and assess the impact of borrowing constraints on
optimal consumption and the reservation wage via phase diagrams. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no other studies who link nonnegativity constraints on consumption to wealth dependent
reservation wages under constant absolute risk aversion in a similar environment of sequential job
search with individual savings.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 8.2 briefly recapitulates the relevant parts
of the Shimer-Werning (2008) model. Section 8.3 demonstrates our claim in a “pure matching setup”,
i.e. there is no wage distribution and therefore no reservation wage. We show that a linear consumption
rule violates the IBC and characterize the optimal consumption path in the case with a borrowing
constraint/nonnegative consumption. A wage distribution and wealth dependent reservation wages are
introduced in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 concludes. The appendix contains numerical illustrations and
considers the liquidity effect under CARA.
8.2 The Model
Consider the sequential search model employed by Shimer and Werning (2008, cf. Chapter 7). At the
heart of the model is an individual with infinite planning horizon and preferences given by
U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)u (c(τ))dτ,
where ρ denotes the subjective discount rate and t is the time index. Instantaneous utility is of the
CARA type
u (c) = −e−γc. (8.1)
Like in Shimer and Werning (2008), we impose an interest rate r equal to the discount rate ρ, r = ρ, to
abstract from impatience effects. We concentrate on the case of constant unemployment benefits and
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employment taxes and set the employment tax to zero for simplicity (τ¯ = 0 in Shimer and Werning’s
notation).7 With a denoting an individual’s wealth, the dynamic budget constraint of an employed
worker obeys a˙e = ra + w − ce, where w is the wage rate and ce the optimal level of consumption
during the employment spell. Similarly, while unemployed, the flow budget constraint is given by
a˙u = rau + b¯− cu. (8.2)
If an unemployed individual accepts a job, her labor income jumps from constant unemployment
benefits b¯ to w (> b¯) and remains there indefinitely (i.e., employment is an absorbing state, the job
separation rate is zero). The Poisson arrival rate of job offers is given by α.8
8.3 The Case without a Wage Offer Distribution
We first look at the “pure matching case”, i.e. a setup without wage distribution, and derive a closed-
form solution. We show that the closed-form solution violates the IBC and demonstrate what the
optimal consumption path looks like under the IBC.
8.3.1 A Closed-Form Solution without a Borrowing Constraint
The Consumption Rule
We derive a closed-form solution by going through a verification theorem. This approach is in the
tradition of the “educated guess” (cf. Merton, 1969, 1971, among others).
Proposition 8.1 (Shimer and Werning, 2008, without a wage distribution/reservation
wage). Optimal consumption for an employed worker and her value function are given by
V e (a) =
u(ra+ w)
r
, (8.3)
ce (a) = ra+ w. (8.4)
Proof. The value function for an employed worker is
rV e(a) = max
c
{
u(c) + [ra+ w − c]V e′(a)} ,
7Since Ricardian equivalence holds, doing so comes without loss of generality.
8Under CARA and including a wage offer distribution, it is not optimal to get back to an earlier job offer so that
recall can safely be ignored.
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and the first order condition reads u′ (c) = V e′ (a) .Nowmake an “educated guess” and use as candidate
solutions (g for guess and γi are constants)
ceg = γ0a+ γ1, V
e
g (a) = γ2u(c
e
g).
Inserting them into the first order condition reveals γ0γ2 = 1. Inserting them into the Bellman equation
gives
r
γ0
= 1− ((r − γ0)a+ w − γ1)γ.
As we see, the wealth level drops out for γ0 = r. The constants are therefore γ0 = r, γ1 = w, γ2 =
1/r. Accordingly, the optimal consumption level and value function are
ce = ra+ w, V e =
u(ce)
r
.
Now we perform the same procedure for the unemployed worker. The optimal behavior of the unem-
ployed individual can be described by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. With r = ρ and
without a wage distribution to start with, the HJB equation obeys
rV u (a) = max
c(t)
{
u (c (τ)) + V u′ (a)
(
ra+ b¯− c)}+ α {V e(a)− V u(a)} . (8.5)
The first-order condition is
u′(c) = V u′ (a) . (8.6)
Proposition 8.2. Optimal behavior of an unemployed individual is described by
cu = ra+ δ1, V u (a) =
u(cu)
r
. (8.7)
where δ1 strictly lies between b¯ and w, being determined by
(
b¯− δ1
) γr
α = e
−γ(w−δ1) − 1.
Proof. Assume that optimal behavior is given by
cug = δ0a+ δ1, V
u
g (a) = δ2u(c
u
g ).
Analogously to the above, inserting cug and V
u
g (a) into the first order condition requires δ0δ2 = 1.
Inserting the guess into the Bellman equation (8.5) yields
−rδ2e−γ(δ0a+δ1) = −e−γ(δ0a+δ1) + γδ0δ2e−γ(δ0a+δ1)(ra+ b¯− δ0a− δ1) +
+α
[
−γ2e−γ(γ0a+γ1) + δ2e−γ(δ0a+δ1)
]
.
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After canceling e−γ(δ0a+δ1), inserting γ0 = r, γ1 = w, γ2 = 1/r, noting that δ2 = 1/δ1, and rearranging
terms, we get
r
δ0
= 1− ((r − δ0)a+ b¯− δ1)γ + α
[
e−γ((r−δ0)a+w−δ1)
r
− 1
δ0
]
.
The wealth level drops out for δ0 = r. Then,(
b¯− δ1
) γr
α
= e−γ(w−δ1) − 1. (8.8)
The left hand side is a linearly decreasing function in δ1, intersecting the horizontal axis at δ1 = b¯ from
above. The right hand side is monotonically increasing in δ1 and equals exp(−γw) at δ1. It intersects
the horizontal axis at δ1 = w from below. Hence, equation (8.8) determines a unique δ1 ∈
]
b¯, w
[
.
The optimal consumption path is thus linear in wealth.
The Dynamics of Savings
We now analyze how savings of the unemployed evolve. Given the budget constraint of the unemployed
worker and optimal consumption from (8.7),
a˙u = ra+ b¯− (ra+ δ1) = b¯− δ1. (8.9)
As δ1 > b¯, wealth falls. As both δ1 and b¯ are constant, it seems that wealth drops without bound. At
the wealth level
auneg = −δ1/r, (8.10)
however, consumption cu becomes negative, see (8.7). If we assume (in an ad hoc fashion) that con-
sumption is zero from there on, wealth continues to follow (8.9) with cu = 0, i.e. a˙u = rau + b¯. Using
(8.10), we find a˙u = −δ1 + b¯. Following the argument from before, as δ1 is strictly larger than b¯,
we conclude that assets continue to fall even if consumption remains constant at zero. Income of the
unemployed is not enough to pay back interest on debt. This cannot be a feasible optimal behavior if
the lender does not want to take risk from the unemployed (i.e., if the bond is risk-free).
8.3.2 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint
Given this conclusion, we now impose a more restrictive intertemporal constraint on the individual’s
maximization program, which also implies a no-Ponzi game condition.9
9The typical wording “dynamic budget constraint” for the law of motion of the state variable, i.e. the evolution of
wealth in our case, is generally misleading since it does not really constrain the individual by itself. If the evolution of
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What does such an intertemporal constraint look like? If we formulate a constraint for an unemployed
worker in realizations (i.e., suppose we knew the realization of the state variables at any instant), it
reads ∫ ∞
t
e−ρ[τ−t]c (τ) dτ = at +
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ[τ−t]z (τ) dτ, (8.11)
where z (τ) denotes the wage income in the case of employment and the unemployment benefit in
the case of unemployment, respectively. In a slight abuse of the word, we call z the “labor” income.
As we do not know this future “labor” income and therefore consumption levels, such a constraint is
relatively useless. We should rather think of an IBC in expected terms. As expectations need only be
formed about the point in time T when the individual accepts a job, this yields
ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ[τ−t]cu (τ) dτ+ET
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ[τ−t]cedτ = at+ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ[τ−t]bdτ+ET
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ[τ−t]wdτ. (8.12)
Clearly, we do not have sufficient information about cu (τ) to compute the first integral.10 We can
consider the IBC in the limit, however, where consumption of the unemployed is zero. In this case,
after some steps which are described in Appendix 8.A,
α
r
ce = amin(α+ r) + b+
α
r
w. (8.13)
where amin is the lowest possible wealth level, i.e. −(amin) is the highest debt level an unemployed
worker is ever able to borrow. Solving for amin,
amin =
α
r
ce − w
α+ r
− b
α+ r
, (8.14)
and inserting the optimal consumption of the employed worker, ce = ra+ w at a = amin, we get
amin = − b
r
. (8.15)
The present value of an infinite stream of unemployment benefits is the largest level of debt that can
be repaid with probability one. This implies that the maximum debt which is allowed under an IBC
at cu = 0, amin, is smaller than the debt level (8.10) under the linear consumption rule, −b/r > −δ1/r.
Hence, under a linear consumption rule, wealth of the unemployed with positive probability becomes
the state where the only “constraint” on the maximization problem, consumption (in our case) should simply be set
to infinity (the typical no-Ponzi game condition in fact limits the growth rate of debt to r). Imposing a transversality
condition to rule out Ponzi schemes and solving the dynamic budget constraint gives the intertemporal constraint.
10This is simple in setups where we have a closed form solution for consumption. See, e.g., Blanchard (1985).
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so small (debt grows so high) that the IBC is violated. The individual should never have been able to
get so much debt in the first place.
As a thought experiment, suppose the unemployed individual were able to write a binding contract
that limits her consumption to zero, even when she finds a job. Intuitively, she should be able to borrow
funds equal to the present value of unemployment benefits for the expected duration of unemployment
and wage income thereafter. Using ce = 0 in equation (8.14), where ce is constant due to r = ρ and
s = 0, confirms
amin,0 = −
(
b
α+ r
+
α
α+ r
w
r
)
. (8.16)
As −δ1/r is not necessarily smaller than amin,0, the linear solution may not violate the IBC and the
unemployed could actually end up in a situation with zero consumption. As this occurs at a wealth
level lower than −b/r where a˙ < 0, the unemployed individual, however, will continue to run into
debt, and eventually hit amin,0. We therefore know that in either case, the IBC is eventually violated:
−a exceeds any real number with positive probability.
8.3.3 Optimal Consumption
We now analyze the evolution of consumption and wealth generally without imposing a linear solution.
We first compute the evolution of optimal consumption. The resulting consumption Euler equation,
which is sometimes called “Keynes-Ramsey-rule” (KRR), was derived in Section 6.3. Here, we apply
the result for the CARA case (cf. Section 6.3.2):
dcu =
{
r − ρ
γ
− α
γ
[
1− e−γ(ce−cu)
]}
dt+ (ce − cu)dqα, (8.17)
where dqα is the increment of the Poisson process that counts the switch from unemployment to
employment, i.e. from 0 where the individual is unemployed to 1 when she finds a job. Chapter 6
provided a detailed interpretation of this consumption Euler equation so that we restrict ourselves
to a short description here. As long as the unemployed individual does not change her employment
status, dqα = 0, consumption follows a deterministic rule (and we can write dcu/dt ≡ c˙u):
c˙u =
r − ρ− α [1− e−γ(ce−cu)]
γ
.
The unemployed individual spends more than she would in the absence of the chance of finding a job
so that consumption grows more slowly than in the standard deterministic setting (where α = 0). If
the individual accepts a job, her consumption jumps discretely to ce.
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Returning to the model, we note that the (stationary) consumption level of the employed remains
given by (8.4), i.e. ce(a) = rae + w (neither the first-order condition nor the value function of the
employed changed due to the lower bound on wealth, and we impose a ≥ −b/r to ensure repayment
with probability one so that cu > 0 as w > b). Hence, with r = ρ and while not receiving a job offer,
(8.17) can be written as
c˙u = −α
γ
[
1− e−γ(ra+w−cu)
]
,
As finding a job can occur at each instant, the wealth level in the employed’s consumption ce(a) =
ra+w used in the unemployed’s Euler equation above is the current wealth level as described in (8.2).
We therefore characterize the optimal behavior of an unemployed individual by a two-dimensional
differential equation system,
c˙u = −α
γ
[
1− e−γ(ra+w−cu)
]
,
a˙ = ra+ b¯− cu.
Identifying the equilibrium trajectory in a phase diagram requires two boundary values. The first
is given by the initial wealth level au0 . The second is initial consumption, c
u
0 , which remains to be
identified.
Properties of the System
This system can easily be analyzed by a phase diagram. The zero motion line for optimal consumption
during the unemployment spell is given by
ζc (a) ≡ ra+ w.
It has a constant positive slope ζ ′c = r = ρ, ζc (0) = w, and ζc (−w/r) = 0. Similarly, a is constant on
ζa (a) ≡ ra+ b¯,
which is parallel to ζc with ζa (0) = b¯ (< w). The dynamics of the system are illustrated in Figure 8.1.
Above ζc (a), consumption goes to infinity while wealth converges to minus infinity. Laterally reversed,
consumption goes to minus infinity while a approaches infinity below ζa (a). Evidently, neither case
can be part of a feasible optimal behavior so that the optimal path has to be included between both
zero motion lines. This verifies Corollary 6.1 (which also holds under CARA preferences and without
job separation), viz. that the consumption good is normal.
8.3. THE CASE WITHOUT A WAGE OFFER DISTRIBUTION 237
Figure 8.1: Wealth and Consumption Dynamics during Unemployment
Figure 8.2: Linear and IBC Consistent Consumption Paths
Figure 8.2 adds the Shimer-Werning (2008) solution. The linear consumption rule hits the horizontal
axis at −δ1/r. If we impose nonnegative consumption, cu stays zero from then on and wealth falls
further. We know from (8.15) that the minimum wealth level an individual is allowed to have (if IBC
is to hold) is −b/r. We thus conclude that the optimal consumption path consistent with the IBC
must be as drawn. Consumption starts on this path from whatever wealth level the unemployed has,
approaches a zero-consumption level (in finite time if she does not leave unemployment) and stays at
(c, a) = (0,−b/r) until the unemployed finds a job. The optimal path can easily be solved numerically.
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8.4 Wage Distribution and Reservation Wage
With this background, we now include a wage distribution. This section analyzes the model as pre-
sented by Shimer and Werning (2008, cf. Chapter 7) and provides the benchmark for the solution with
a borrowing constraint.11
8.4.1 The Closed-Form Solution without a Borrowing Constraint
The Consumption Rule
Allowing for wage offers from [0,∞), the optimal program involves a reservation wage w¯, which
is defined by the unemployed individual being indifferent between accepting a job that pays the
reservation wage w¯ or remaining unemployed:12
V e(a, w¯) = V u(a). (8.18)
Hence, w¯ is potentially a function of the assets if V e and V u have different slopes. The value function
for the unemployed reads
rV u(a) = max
c
{
u(c) + V u′(a)
[
ra+ b¯− c]+ α ∫ ∞
0
max [V e(a,w)− V u(a), 0] dF (w)
}
. (8.19)
As usual, dF (w) = f (w) dw. A new job arrives with Poisson arrival rate α, and only jobs with
wages that yield higher discounted utility, V e(a,w) > V u(a), are accepted. We now provide a similar
proposition to the ones above without wage distribution, namely the solution obtained in Shimer and
Werning (2008).
Proposition 8.3 (Shimer and Werning, 2008). Optimal consumption levels and value functions
for employed and unemployed workers with CARA preferences are given by
ce (a,w) = ra+ w, V e (a) =
u(ra+ w)
r
. (8.20)
cu(a) = ra+ w¯, V u(a) =
u(ra+ w¯)
r
. (8.21)
The reservation wage is determined by
[w¯ − b] γ = α
r
∫ ∞
w¯
[1 + u(w − w¯)]dF (w). (8.22)
11This section proves the statements on the optimal consumption rule and the value function of the unemployed in
Chapter 7.
12We verify from the resulting solution for the value functions that V e (a, w¯) and V u (a) define a unique reservation
wage.
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Proof. The Bellman equation and first order condition of an employed individual do not change when
we include a wage distribution. This proves the first part of the proposition. We adopt the Shimer-
Werning guess for the unemployed:
cug (a) = κ0a+ κ1, V
u
g (a) = κ2u(c
u
g (a)),
where the κi’s are constants. The first order condition of the unemployed is not affected by her
reservation wage choice either: u′(c) = V u′(a), from (8.19). We have three equations to determine
the three constants κi. The first order condition requires again κ0κ2 = 1. From the definition of the
reservation wage and the maximized HJB we get, directly using κ0κ2 = 1,
−e
−γ(ra+w¯)
r
= −κ2e−γ(κ0a+κ1), (8.23)
and
−rκ2e−γ(κ0a+κ1) = −e−γ(κ0a+κ1) + γe−γ(κ0a+κ1) [ra+ b− κ0a− κ1] +
+α
∫ ∞
0
max
[
−e
−γ(ra+w)
r
+ κ2e−γ(κ0a+κ1), 0
]
dF (w). (8.24)
Following Shimer and Werning (2008), suppose κ2 = 1/r. Thus, κ0 = r and from (8.23) κ1 = w¯. Using
these expressions in (8.24), we find
[w¯ − b] γe−γ(ra+w¯) = α
r
∫ ∞
0
max
[
e−γ(ra+w¯) − e−γ(ra+w), 0
]
dF (w).
Note that integrating from 0 to ∞ using the max operator and an arrival rate α is identical to
integrating from w¯ to ∞, dropping the max operator and integrating over the truncated (conditional
on w ≥ w¯) distribution F (w)/[1−F (w¯)] while using the effective job arrival rate α[1−F (w¯)]. Dividing
by u(cug ) = −e−γ(ra+w¯) we arrive at (7.4) (equation (9) in Shimer and Werning, 2008):
[w¯ − b] γ = α
r
∫ ∞
w¯
[1 + u(w − w¯)]dF (w). (8.25)
Equation (8.25) shows the beauty of the Shimer-Werning result. What seemed to be a more or less
technical condition in (8.8) which determined δ1, i.e. the part out of labor income which is used for
consumption, is here an equation that determines the reservation wage. In fact, multiplying (8.25) by
−1 and inserting the utility function shows that δ1 in (8.8) corresponds to the reservation wage w¯ in
(8.25). Note that the reservation wage is determined independently of the level of financial wealth.
This is the standard result obtained for CARA preferences (cf. Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
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The Dynamics of Savings
We now analyze again how savings of the unemployed evolve. The budget constraint of the unemployed
worker does not change compared to a situation without wage distribution. Current income is b in
both cases. Optimal consumption, however, is now given by (8.21) and inserting this into the budget
constraint (8.2) yields
a˙u = rau + b¯− cu = b¯− w¯. (8.26)
With a wage distribution, the reservation wage is higher than unemployment benefits, w¯ > b¯, and since
both are constant, wealth decreases linearly. In finite time, consumption of the unemployed becomes
negative as well, as soon as the individual’s wealth hits
au, distrineg = −w¯/r. (8.27)
Wealth continues to fall according to (8.26). Repayment cannot occur with probability one.
Let us see whether an ad hoc restriction on consumption solves the problem. That is, let us impose
nonnegativity of consumption. In this case, consumption is zero when the debt level hits au, distrineg as
defined in (8.27). Following the same steps as before, we find that wealth continues to fall according to
(8.26) (with consumption remaining constant at zero). Hence, the linear solution again implies credit
default with positive probability.
8.4.2 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint
The present value of unemployment benefits is the highest debt level that an unemployed can repay
with probability one. We prove this statement following the same steps as in Section 8.3.2 and derive
the intertemporal budget constraint. We then check whether the linear solution violates the IBC.
Finally, we analyze the general dynamics again and show what the optimal consumption path looks
like.
The intertemporal budget constraint in realizations with a wage distribution is identical to (8.11).
Forming expectations, however, now requires forming expectations about w as well, i.e. in contrast to
(8.12) we have an additional expectations operator ET,w:
ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ[τ−t]cu (τ) dτ + ET,w
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ[τ−t]cedτ = at + ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ[τ−t]bdτ + ET,w
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ[τ−t]wdτ.
Note that we assume that the draw from the wage distribution is independent of the draw of the length
of unemployment in the derivation above. Put differently, independently of when the worker accepts
8.4. WAGE DISTRIBUTION AND RESERVATION WAGE 241
a job, she always faces the same wage distribution. This allows us to rewrite ET,w
∫∞
T e
−ρ[τ−t]wdτ
as ET
∫∞
T e
−ρ[τ−t]Ewwdτ . We also need to do the same for consumption of the employed worker, i.e.
ET,w
∫∞
T e
−ρ[τ−t]cedτ = ET
∫∞
T e
−ρ[τ−t]Ewcedτ . With these expressions at hand, we proceed just like
in the previous paragraph, compare (8.13) and Appendix 8.A, and find
α
r
ce = amin [α+ r] + b+
α
r
Eww. (8.28)
Inserting the consumption level of the employed worker from (8.4), ce (a) = ramin + Eww, yields
amin = − b
r
.
8.4.3 Optimal Consumption
We now analyze the evolution of consumption and wealth generally without imposing a linear solution.
We already know that accounting for the borrowing constraint rules out a linear solution. Also, we
know from the flow budget constraint for the unemployed that amin with a˙ = 0 corresponds to zero
consumption. To characterize the optimal path, we begin by computing the evolution of optimal
consumption including a distribution of wage offers.
Properties of the Reservation Wage
Consider again the HJB equation for the unemployed individual when she faces wage draws from a
distribution:
ρV u (a) = max
cu
{
u (cu) + [ra+ b− cu]V u′ (a) + α
∫ ∞
0
max {0, V e (a,w)− V u (a)} dF (w)
}
.
In this program, wealth has no direct effect on the expected value of V e−V u via the reservation wage.
To see this, note that for a given level of wealth, the third summand in this HJB equation can be
rewritten as13
α
∫ ∞
0
max {0, V e (a,w)− V u (a)} dFw = α
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[V e (a,w)− V u (a)] dF (w) . (8.29)
Intuitively, reservation wages on the one hand prolong the expected duration of unemployment
by lowering the arrival rate of an acceptable job from α (without a binding reservation wage) to
13α
R∞
0
max {0, V e (a,w)− V u (a)} dF (w) =
α
hR w¯(a)
0
max {0, V e (a,w)− V u (a)} dF (w) + R∞
w¯(a)
max {0, V e (a,w)− V u (a)} dF (w)
i
and using the definition of w¯
yields the expression above.
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α [1− F (w¯ (a))]. On the other hand, the density of acceptable wages adjusts from f (w) (without
a binding reservation wage) to f (w) / [1− F (w¯ (a))], implying a higher expected wage. The change
in the distribution of wages above w¯ and the lower arrival rate cancel. Accordingly, at the margin,
a change in a has no direct effect via the reservation wage. Taking the derivative with respect to a
verifies that the direct impact via w¯ (a) drops out.14
As argued above, the optimal reservation wage is potentially a function of the level of wealth. We say
“potentially” since we already know that if the consumption function for the unemployed is linear in
wealth and no borrowing constraint is taken into account, both value functions are linear in wealth
and a cancels so that w¯ is in fact independent of a (cf. Chapter 7 or (8.22) above).
In the following, the situation of the employed remains unchanged so that her consumption is constant
but we look for a solution that satisfies the borrowing constraint in the case of unemployment (which
is non-linear). Returning to the reservation wage and using the closed-form solution for the maximized
value function of the employed, V e = u (ra+ w) /r, the optimal reservation wage is characterized by
rV u (a) ≡ u (ce (a, w¯ (a))) , (8.30)
where we made explicit the (potential) dependency of the reservation wage on wealth. Taking the
derivative with respect to a reveals
rV u′ (a) = u′ (ra+ w¯ (a))
[
r + w¯′ (a)
]
.
The terms in squared brackets on the right hand side reflect the direct impact of wealth on consumption
and the indirect effect via the change in the reservation wage, ∂c/∂a+ (∂c/∂w¯) (∂w¯/∂a) = r+w′ (a).
In the optimum, it holds that V u′ (a) = u′ (cu) from the first-order condition for optimal consumption
of the unemployed. Substituting for V u′ (a) and rearranging proves the following
Lemma 8.1 (“optimal reservation wage”). The optimal reservation wage satisifies
u′ (cu (a))
u′ (ce (a, w¯ (a)))
= 1 +
w¯′ (a)
r
, (8.31)
where ce (a) is the optimal consumption of the employed, ce = ra + w with w ≥ w¯ (a), and cu (a) is
the optimal consumption during the unemployment spell. Hence, cu (a) <,=, > ce (a, w¯ (a)) implies
w¯′ (a) >,=, < 0.
14 ∂
n
α
R∞
w¯(a)[V
e(a,w)−V u(a)]dF (w)
o
∂a
= −α [V e (a, w¯ (a))− V u (a)] ∂w¯(a)
∂a
+ α
R∞
w¯(a)
[V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w) =
α
R∞
w¯(a)
[V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w).
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We infer from Lemma 8.1 that imposing a linear consumption function (that abstracts from borrowing
constraints/nonnegativity restrictions on consumption) rules out the wealth dependency of the reser-
vation wage along the optimal path (cf. (8.25)). Imposing a linear solution implies that consumption of
the unemployed equates marginal utility during the unemployment spell and the marginal utility ob-
tained when working on a job that pays the (wealth-independent) reservation wage from (8.25). In what
follows, we use stars (?) to indicate variables obtained under the linear consumption rule. Equation
(8.31) shows again that a constant reservation wage is in fact optimal if cu? (a) = ra+ w¯? = ce (w¯?, a).
It follows that consumption smoothing is not perfect at the point in time where the individual accepts
a job that pays strictly more than her reservation wage. Under the solution obtained by Shimer and
Werning (2008), consumption jumps upward from cu (a)? = ra+ w¯? to ce (a) = ra+ w with w ≥ w¯?.
If the reservation wage is indeed a function of wealth, the change in w¯ (a) drives a wedge between the
relative marginal utilities as wealth changes.
Evolution of Optimal Consumption with Reservation Wage
Let us begin by deriving the evolution of optimal consumption. Using (8.29), the unemployed’s Bellman
equation can be written as
ρV u (a) = max
cu
{
u (cu) + [ra+ b− cu]V u′ (a) + α
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[V e (a,w)− V u (a)] dF (w)
}
.
Taking the derivative with respect to cu on the right hand side, the first-order condition for optimal
consumption is given by u′ (cu) = V u′ (a) so that again cu = cu (a). Plugging this solution into the
HJB, the maximized Bellman equation reads
ρV u (a) = u (cu (a)) + [ra+ b− cu (a)]V u′ (a) + α
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[V e (a,w)− V u (a)] dF (w) . (8.32)
Now, taking the derivative with respect to a, using the first-order condition (i.e., the envelope theorem)
and noting that −α [V e (a, w¯ (a))− V u (a)] w¯′ (a) = 0 (see (8.18)), we find
ρV u′ (a) = rV u′ (a) + [ra+ b− cu (a)]V u′′ (a) + α
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w) . (8.33)
We have to find an expression for the evolution of the costate variable to substitute for V u′′ (a). To get
there, we “calculate” dV u′ using the Change of Variable Formula (the CVF was introduced in Section
6.2.2; cf. Øksendahl, 2003, Sennewald, 2007a,b, and Wa¨lde, 2008):
dV u′ (a) = V u′′ (a) dau +
[∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w)] dqα,
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where dqα is the increment of the Poisson process and again the arrival rate of acceptable jobs and
the conditioning of f (w) on w ≥ w¯ (a) drop out.15 Therefore, inserting dau = [ra+ b− cu] dt and
rearranging, we have
[ra+ b− cu]V u′′ (a) dt = dV u′ (a)−
[∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w)] dqα.
This expression can be used to substitute for [ra+ b− cu]V u′′ (a) in (8.33):
dV u′ (a) =[
(ρ− r)V u′ (a)− α ∫∞w¯(a) [V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w)] dt+ [∫∞w¯(a) [V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w)] dqα.
If the individual does not change her employment state, and r = ρ like in Shimer and Werning (2008),
we find
dV u′ (a) = −α
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
V e′ (a,w)− V u′ (a)] dF (w) dt.
While the reservation wage depends on the individual’s wealth, relative to the case without a wage
distribution/reservation wage, only the expected wage as a worker needs to be taken into account. Ac-
cordingly, we can substitute for V e′ and V u′ from the first-order conditions in both employment states
to derive the evolution of marginal utility (where we omit all arguments for notational convenience):
du′ (cu) = −α
∫ ∞
w¯
[
u′ (ce)− u′ (cu)] dF (w) dt. (8.34)
To arrive at the evolution of optimal consumption, let υ ≡ (u′(cu))−1 such that dυ = dcu and υ′ (·) =
u′′ (cu (a))−1. Applying the CVF to υ gives
dυ((u′(c)) = υ′(u′(c))du′(cz(a))dt+
[
υ
(
u′(cu)
)− υ (u′(ce))] dqα.
After substituting for dυ = dcu, υ′ = u′′ (cu (a))−1, and du′ (cu) with (8.34), the change in consumption
during an ongoing unemployment spell (so that dqα = 0) obeys
c˙u = − α
u′′ (cu (a))
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
u′ (ce)− u′ (cu)] dF (w) .
15As noted above, if one feels more comfortable adjusting the arrival rate to the actual change in the new employment
state to α (1− F (w¯ (a))), the change in the distribution from f (w) to f (w) / (1− F (w¯ (a))) dw has to be taken into
account.
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Under CARA, u′′ (c) = −γu′ (c) so that along the optimal path, consumption evolves according to16
c˙u =
α
γ
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
u′ (ce)− u′ (cu)
u′ (cu)
]
dF (w) . (8.35)
Using u′ (ce) /u′ (cu) = −u (ce − cu) we have thus shown
Lemma 8.2 (“evolution of optimal consumption with reservation wage”). Under CARA,
r = ρ, and no job separation, the optimal consumption of the unemployed satisfies
c˙u = −α
γ
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[u (ce (a,w)− cu (a)) + 1] dF (w) , (8.36)
where w¯ is characterized in (8.31).
Note that allowing for a wage distribution and a reservation wage does not add another state variable.
We thus again derive a phase diagram in (cu, a)-space to characterize optimal consumption and assess
the reservation by via the optimality conditions.
Properties of the Dynamic System
According to Lemma 8.2, consumption is constant if and only if∫ ∞
w¯(a)
[
u′ (ce (a,w))
u′ (cu0 (a))
− 1
]
dF (w) = 0,
where cu0 (a) denotes the zero growth locus of c
u. Pulling the constant out of the integral and rear-
ranging yields
u′ (cu0 (a)) =
∫∞
w¯(a) u
′ (ce (a,w)) dF (w)
1− F (w¯ (a)) . (8.37)
We proceed in two steps. First, we allow for wage offers that are drawn from a (non-degenerated)
distribution, but impose an exogenous minimum wage that has to be accepted by the unemployed.
We set this threshold equal to the reservation wage w¯? under Shimer and Werning’s (2008) solution.
In the second step, we consider the optimal consumption path and sequence of reservation wages if
the individual is free to choose her reservation wage.
16Using CARA explicitly, i.e. applying u′ (c) = γe−γc and u′
′
(c) = γ2e−γc, this equals
c˙u = − α
γe−γcu
Z ∞
w¯(a)
h
e−γc
u − e−γce
i
dF (w) .
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Optimal Consumption Given a Minimum Wage w¯?
Replacing w¯ (a) with w¯?, consumption of the unemployed is constant along c0?u which is determined
by
u′ (cu?0 (a)− ra) =
∫∞
w¯? u
′ (w) dF (w)
1− F (w¯?) .
The right hand side is a constant, and we denote it by ω? (w¯?) . Accordingly, solving for cu?0 yields
cu?0 (a) = ra+ (u
′)−1 (ω?) .
This lies above cu? (w? < u′−1 (ω?)):
u′ (cu?0 (a)− ra) =
∫∞
w¯? u
′ (w) dF (w)
1− F (w¯?) <
∫∞
w¯? u
′ (w¯?) dF (w)
1− F (w¯?) = u
′ (w¯?) , (8.38)
and u′′ (·) < 0 implies cu?0 (a) > ra+w¯?. Consumption is falling below cu?0 and increasing above cu?0 .We
thus find the same global dynamics as in the case without a wage distribution, see Figure 8.3. We also
include again the linear Shimer-Werning solution (recall that a falls above ra+b and increases below).
As was shown earlier, the linear solution hits the wealth axis at a debt level w¯?/r to the left of amin,
thereby violating the IBC. In the presence of a borrowing constraint at amin and a fixed reservation
wage w¯?, the best the individual can do is to pick the consumption path that goes through cu = 0 at
a = amin, just like in the case without a wage distribution. The Shimer-Werning solution would satisfy
an optimal reservation wage choice (cf. (8.31)), but eventually violate the IBC.
Since optimal consumption satisfies cu (a) < ce (w¯ (a)) , Lemma 8.1 implies that it is optimal to choose
w¯′ (a) > 0. Keeping in mind that the unemployed would like to decrease the minimum wage along the
non-linear consumption path as wealth declines, we turn to the general solution where the individual
is free to chose her reservation wage.
The General Solution
Roughly speaking, earlier research (see e.g. the authoritative work of Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999) has
concluded that an individual’s wealth does not prolong an individual’s unemployment spell if under
CARA. In what follows, we show that this conclusion is incomplete.
Suppose that w¯′ (a) = 0 for all levels of wealth (by all levels of wealth, here and in what follows, we
refer to all admissible levels of wealth a ≥ amin). Then, (8.31) implies that consumption is linear,
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Figure 8.3: Global Dynamics with a Fixed Minimum Wage Equal to w¯?(a)
i.e. cu = ra + w¯ for some constant reservation wage w¯. With the IBC, from a ≥ amin = −b/r and
cu (−b/r) = 0, the constant reservation wage would have to satisfy w¯ = b. If cu = ra + b, however,
a˙ = 0 and c˙u = 0 as well. Then, (8.37) implies
u′ (b) <
∫∞
b u
′ (w) dF (w)
1− F (b) (8.39)
which, at a > amin, violates the differential equation for optimal consumption in Lemma 8.2 (which
requires equality in (8.39) if cu is to be constant). Hence, the only globally constant reservation wage
consistent with the IBC violates optimality.
Consider briefly a second thought experiment. Suppose w¯′ (a) < 0 for all levels of wealth. An immediate
implication is that, from (8.31), cu > ra + w¯ (a). This implies that at amin and zero consumption,
w¯ (amin) < b. Let alone optimality, by accepting a job with reservation wage w¯ < b the worker would
not even be able to repay her loan.
Intuitively, if unlimited debt is possible, consumption is set to the highest level that maintains c˙u < 0
if a˙ < 0 (so that consumption is normal), viz. the Shimer-Werning solution c? (u) = ra+ w¯?.
We proceed to show that if a borrowing constraint is taken into account, wealth has a positive impact
on the reservation wage even if preferences exhibit CARA. We achieve this in several steps. First, we
show that c (amin) = 0 and cu0 (amin) > 0 whereas ζa (amin) = 0. This gives, by continuity of c
u
0 and
from the instability of the a˙ = 0 and the c˙ = 0 loci, that c (a) > ra + b and c˙ < 0 for wealth levels
slightly above amin. We then infer from (8.39) that cu (a) 6= ra+b at any level of wealth a > amin, since
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this contradicts the law of motion for optimal consumption (8.36). Accordingly, cu0 (a) > ra+b = ζa (a)
for all levels of wealth (and cu0 > ra+ b for all a). Finally, we show that c
u (a) < ce (a, w¯ (a)) such that
Lemma 8.1 implies w¯′ (a) > 0 for all levels of wealth a > amin. In passing, we describe the evolution
of consumption during the unemployment spell.
Lemma 8.3. For wealth levels slightly above amin, cu (a) > ra + b, c˙u (a) < 0, and a˙ < 0 since
cu (amin) > ζa (amin) = 0.
Proof. cu (amin) = 0 since cu (a) ≥ 0 and cu (amin) > 0 implies a˙ < 0 (since cu(amin > 0 lies to the left
of ζa (amin) = 0), a violation of the IBC. Using cu (amin) = 0 and Lemma 8.1 yields
eγ(w¯(amin)−b) = 1 +
w¯′ (amin)
r
,
so that w¯ (amin) >,=, < b if and only if w¯′ (amin) >,=, < 0. w¯ (amin) < b can be sorted out since
it violates the IBC (if an individual accepts this low reservation wage, she cannot repay her debt).
Hence, w¯ (amin) ≥ b. By assumption, f (w) > 0 for at least one w > w¯ (amin), hence strict concavity
of u (c) and (8.37) imply∫∞
w¯(amin)
u′ (w¯ (amin)− b) dF (w)
1− F (w¯ (amin)) >
∫∞
w¯(amin)
u′ (w − b) dF (w)
1− F (w¯ (amin)) = u
′ (cu0 (amin)) .
Accordingly, u′ (w¯ (amin)− b) > u′ (cu0 (amin)) so that, from u′′ (c) < 0 and our earlier result w¯(amin ≥ b,
cu0 (amin) > w¯ (amin) − b ≥ 0. Hence, cu0 (amin) > ζa (amin). Continuity of cu0 (a) and the instability of
cu0 (a) and ζa (a) complete the proof.
We have shown in (8.39) that cu (a) 6= ra+ b for a > amin. Together with Lemma 8.3, it follows that
cu0 (a) > ζa (a) for all levels of wealth and hence c˙
u (a) < 0 for all a > amin together with a˙ < 0. We
summarize this finding in the following
Proposition 8.4. Under CARA with no job separation, r = ρ, Poisson job offers from a wage
distribution, and a borrowing constraint, optimal consumption and wealth decline strictly over the
unemployment spell. If the unemployed does not find a job, consumption and wealth continue to decline
until the stationary point (c, a) = (0, amin) is reached.
We proceed to show that cu (a) is less than what an individual would consume when she accepts
a job that pays exactly the reservation wage w¯(a) if consumption of the unemployed exceeds her
instantaneous income. Hence, consumption always jumps upward when an individual with wealth
a ≥ amin accepts a job.
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Lemma 8.4. If cu (a) > ra+ b, we have
ce (a, w¯ (a)) > cu (a) . (8.40)
Proof. Since the c˙u = 0 locus is unstable, and da < 0 is implied by cu (a) > ra+ b, we have cu (a) <
cu0 (a). Concavity of the utility function thus yields
u′ (cu (a)) > u′ (cu0 (a)) =
∫∞
w¯(a) u
′ (ce (a,w)) dF (w)
1− F (w¯ (a)) .
This implies
u′ (cu (a)) [1− F (w¯ (a))] >
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
u′ (ce (a,w)) dF (w) >
∫ ∞
w¯(a)
u′ (ce (w¯ (a) , a)) dF (w) ,
or, equivalently, u′ (cu (a)) > u′ (ce (w¯ (a) , a)). Hence, cu (a) < ce (a, w¯ (a)).
Taken together, Lemma 8.1 and Lemma 8.4 prove
Proposition 8.5. Under CARA with no job separation, r = ρ, Poisson job offers from a wage
distribution, and a borrowing constraint, the reservation wage is strictly increasing in wealth, w¯′ (a) > 0
for a > amin.
A direct implication of Proposition 8.5 is the following
Corollary 8.1. Including the borrowing constraint, the reservation wage remains strictly larger than
the unemployment benefits at a > amin.
Proof. The corollary follows from the proof of Lemma 8.3 (w¯ (amin ≥ b)) and Proposition 8.5.
In fact, Corollary 8.1 must apply to amin also. Intuitively, when the unemployed receives benefits b,
she cannot be indifferent to accepting a job that pays b and her current situation as long as there is
some chance of receiving a better offer than b.
Lemma 8.5. The reservation wage exceeds the unemployment benefits at all levels of wealth.
Proof. w¯′ (a) > 0 for a > amin is shown in Corollary 8.1. In the case of amin, we know that w¯ (amin) ≥ b
from the proof of Lemma 8.3. w¯ (amin) > b is shown by contradiction. Suppose w¯ (amin) = b. Then,
(8.30) implies rV u (amin) = u (0). Evaluating the maximized Bellman equation (8.32) at a = amin
using cu (amin) = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 8.3) and ρ = r, we obtain
0 =
∫ ∞
b
[V e (w, amin)− V u (amin)] dF (w) .
250 CHAPTER 8. JOB SEARCH WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINT UNDER CARA
Substituting for V u (amin) and V e (w, amin) using (8.20) yields
0 =
∫ ∞
b
[1 + u (w − b)] dF (w) ,
a contradiction if f (w) > 0 for any w > b since u (0) = −1.
We conclude that wealth prolongs the duration of unemployment if the borrowing limit is taken into
account (w¯′(a) > 0 for all a). As the unemployed runs down her assets over the unemployment spell,
however, optimal consumption behavior mitigates the moral hazard problem and raises the hazard
rate even if risk aversion remains constant. We have thus disentangled the (reinforcing) effects of risk
aversion and borrowing limits on the reservation wage.17
Let us briefly summarize our findings on the optimal consumption path of the unemployed. The Euler
equation implies that smooth changes in consumption are optimal so that the individual avoids jumps
within an employment state. From the dynamics of the system and the location of the zero growth
loci for consumption and wealth, we deduced that consumption of the unemployed is strictly larger
than her instantaneous income if a > amin. Thus, the optimal path involves decreasing wealth and,
as implied by the location and instability of the zero growth loci, decreasing consumption as well.
From the dynamics of the system, we conclude that the policy function cu (a) is strictly increasing
and concave. The borrowing constraint provides a stationary state at zero consumption and assets
−b/r. Along the linear consumption path obtained by Shimer and Werning (2008), w¯′ (a) is constant
(and equal to w¯?). Accordingly, cu? (a) gives the consumption choice that leaves the reservation wage
unaffected. If consumption is more than linearly decreasing over the unemployment spell, from (8.31)
and (8.40), cu (a) < cu? (a) equivalently states w′ (a) > 0. Along the optimal path, a˙ < 0 and (since
w¯′ (a) > 0) the reservation wage decreases. In contrast to free borrowing, if individuals face a borrowing
constraint, the moral hazard problem is mitigated even with CARA preferences.
These findings suggest that the optimality result of constant unemployment benefits and taxes in
Shimer and Werning (2008) crucially hinges on the assumption of linear consumption. We leave the
analysis of an optimal unemployment policy with nonnegative consumption for future research. Note,
however, that the solution in Shimer and Werning (2008) matches well the outcome with optimal
unemployment benefits and taxes under CRRA, where the reservation wage is almost constant due to
the counteracting effects of falling risk aversion and increasing optimal benefits.
17Evidently, this observation crucially depends on an exogenous and homogenous job arrival rate.
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8.5 Conclusion
We have studied the optimal consumption behavior of an unemployed individual with CARA prefer-
ences in a standard job search model where the only history dependence comes from an individual’s
level of financial wealth. We included a natural borrowing constraint in the optimal savings problem
considered by Shimer and Werning (2008) to maintain nonnegative consumption and repayment with
probability one. In doing so, we provided a general solution for the optimal evolution of consumption
in the form of a stochastic differential equation. In contrast to Shimer and Werning (2008), we pick
a specific solution to this differential equation by imposing a borrowing constraint instead of a linear
consumption rule. As a result, the value function no longer obeys a closed form solution. Using simple
phase diagrams, however, we establish that the policy function in the case with a borrowing constraint
approaches the Shimer-Werning solution from below in (a, cu)-space, with zero consumption at the
maximum debt level. The ensuing optimal path features a declining level of wealth, falling consump-
tion, and a sequence of declining reservation wages. The novel argument is that this occurs even under
CARA preferences if consumption is non-linear in wealth. The intuition is that the borrowing con-
straint forecloses levels of debt implied by a linear solution, but does not affect consumption at high
levels of wealth. Accordingly, consumption is non-linear and the reservation wage optimally declines
as wealth decreases so as to offset the increase in marginal utility. Our analysis thus disentangled the
effects of risk aversion and the borrowing constraint on the reservation wage. Dissecting the effects
allows us a better understanding of the main result in Shimer and Werning (2008), namely that the
CARA case without borrowing constraints provides a good benchmark for optimal unemployment
policy.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the derivation of the IBC, numerical solutions to the consumption and wealth
paths in the job search model without a reservation wage, and the derivation of the expected cost of
a constant benefits and taxes policy if an individual moves back and forth between employment and
unemployment.
Appendix 8.A Deriving an Intertemporal Budget Constraint
We can write the IBC in realizations as
∫ T
t
e−ρ(τ−t)cu (τ) dτ +
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(τ−t)cedτ = at +
∫ T
t
e−ρ(τ−t)bdτ +
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(τ−t)wdτ,
where T is the (unknown) point in time where the individual switches from unemployment to employ-
ment. If we assume that there is some constant cu before the switch (in the main text, we consider
the limiting case where cu = 0), forming expectations about T gives equation (8.12) in the main text,
ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ(τ−t)cu (τ) dτ + ET
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(τ−t)cedτ = at + ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ(τ−t)bdτ + ET
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(τ−t)wdτ.
Collecting terms, we equivalently have
ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ(τ−t) [cu (τ)− b] dτ + ET
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(τ−t) [ce − w] dτ = at.
As we know that T is exponentially distributed, the density is given by f (T ) = αe−α[T−t]. The
expected value is thus given by ET g (t, T ) =
∫∞
t g (t, T ) f (T ) dT . If c
u(τ) is constant, we obtain
ET
∫ T
t
e−ρ(τ−t)[cu − b]dτ =
∫ ∞
t
∫ T
t
e−ρ(τ−t)[cu − b]dτf(T )dT
= (cu − b)
∫ ∞
t
[∫ T
t
αe−ρ(τ−t)dτ
]
e−α[T−t]dT.
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Inserting the solution for the integral in squared brackets, α
[
−e−ρ(τ−t)
ρ
]τ=T
τ=t
= αρ
[−eρ(T−t) + 1], the
right hand side becomes
(cu − b)
∫ ∞
t
α
ρ
[
−eρ(T−t) + 1
]
e−α[T−t]dT =
α(cu − b)
ρ
∫ ∞
t
[
1− eρ(T−t)
]
e−α[T−t]dT =
α(cu − b)
ρ
[∫ ∞
t
e−α(T−t)dT −
∫ ∞
t
e−(α+ρ)(T−t)dT
]
=
α(cu − b)
ρ

[
−e−α(T−t)
α
]T=∞
T=t
−
[
−e−(α+ρ)(T−t)
α+ ρ
]T=∞
T=t
 =
α(cu − b)
ρ
{
1
α
− 1
α+ ρ
}
=
cu − b
α+ ρ
.
Similarly, as the wage rate and ce are constant (the employed’s world is stationary and we assume
r = ρ),
ET
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ[τ−t](ce − w)dτ =
(ce − w)
∫ ∞
t
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ[τ−t]dτf(T )dT =
(ce − w)
∫ ∞
t
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ[τ−t]dταe−α[T−t]dT =
(ce − w) α
ρ
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ[T−t]e−α[T−t]dT =
α
ρ
(
ce − w
α+ ρ
)
.
Taken together, the IBC in expectations in the limiting case where cu is constant, is given by
cu − b
α+ ρ
+
α
ρ
(
ce − w
α+ ρ
)
= at,
or, using r = ρ and rearranging terms,
cu +
α
r
ce = at(α+ r) + b+
α
r
w.
Appendix 8.B Numerical Solution
In this appendix, we compute numerically the solution to the pure job search model with savings
(the model with s = 0 and uncertainty only about the duration of the unemployment spell). The
254 CHAPTER 8. JOB SEARCH WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINT UNDER CARA
objective of this exercise is to illustrate and compare the consumption path obtained by Shimer and
Werning (2008) for the case of CARA on the one hand, and the consumption path under optimal IBC
consistent behavior on the other hand. Technically speaking, the optimality condition for consumption
is the general solution to the two-dimensional system of differential equations for consumption and
wealth. We change the boundary condition from what implies linear consumption as a specific solution
to the natural borrowing limit. For illustration purposes, we also solve the CRRA version of the model
under the simplifying assumption that r = ρ so that consumption of the employed remains stationary.
Finally, we briefly consider the case of simultaneously changing risk aversion and prudence (relative
prudence in the case of CRRA), i.e. calculate and compare the optimal consumption paths for different
values of γ (CARA) and σ (CRRA), respectively.
We use the computer algebra system Mathematica 6.0.1 and describe all calculations in detail, so
that they can easily be reproduced without prior computing knowledge.18
8.B.1 Consumption and Wealth Paths in the Job Search Model
Recall that an individual optimally runs down her assets during the course of unemployment and
consumes a constant amount when working on a job. In what follows, we focus on the optimal behavior
during the unemployment spell. We describe the situation of an unemployed who does not find a job
and keep in mind that consumption jumps upward when she finds a job (and subsequently earns w
forever).
CARA Preferences
As shown in the main text, if r = ρ and the individual has CARA preferences, optimal consumption
during the unemployment spell is completely described by the following two differential equations:
c˙u = −α
γ
[
1− e−γ(ra+w−cu)
]
a˙ = ra+ b− cu.
The linear policy function cu = ra + δ1 obtained by Shimer and Werning (2008) hits the a axis at
−δ1/r. Their solution thus implicitly imposes the boundary condition (a, c) = (−δ1/r, 0) at the point
18Mathematica is a registered trademark of Wolfram Research, Inc. It is protected by copyright law and international
treaties. c© 1988-2007 Wolfram Research, Inc.
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in time where consumption becomes negative.19 We use this boundary condition to explicitly calculate
the linear solution. The policy function to the IBC consistent solution is then found by replacing −δ1/r
with −b/r, i.e. using the borrowing limit as boundary condition.
In what follows, we solve the system of differential equations numerically and plot the policy functions
in (a,cu)-space. To do so, we firstly reverse the direction of time in the differential equations and
calculate the linear solution using c = 0 at a = −δ1/r as initial condition (Step 1). Upon reversing the
direction of time again, we draw the solution, which is given by numerical function objects for c (t)
and a (t), by combining consumption and wealth pairs in (a, cu)-space. Including the a˙ = 0 and the
c˙u = 0 loci, this gives a figure similar to a phase diagram.
Secondly, we solve the system again, using the same procedure, but this time imposing zero consump-
tion at a = −b/r to find the specific solution corresponding to the optimal IBC consistent behavior
(Step 2). The resulting policy function is then drawn in the same (a, cu)-diagram as the linear solution.
Note, however, that we cannot compare the time paths for consumption and wealth obtained in this
step since, in general, the underlying wealth level will be different.
To compare the optimal paths for consumption and wealth, we must use identical levels of initial
wealth. We therefore pick an arbitrary initial asset level and solve the time-reversed system again,
using as terminal conditions the amount of consumption obtained in Step 1 and 2 for the specified
level of initial wealth (Step 3).
Step 1 (Calculating the Linear Policy Function)
To begin with, define the parameters.
All parameter values are chosen arbitrarily. With this specification, the expected duration of unem-
ployment is 1/α = 11.1111 periods and unemployment benefits amount to 25% of the labor income
during employment. The implied valued for δ1 is 0.692924.20 The unemployed individual thus uses
about 2.8 times her unemployment benefits in addition to her capital income to finance instantaneous
19Recall that δ1 replaces the reservation wage in the original Shimer-Werning (2008) setting. It determines the consump-
tion component out of labor income before the employment shock and is defined by (b− δ1) γr/α = exp [−γ (w − δ1)]−1,
see Proposition 8.2.
20δ1 is readily calculated from (b− δ1) γr/α = exp [−γ (w − δ1)]− 1 using Mathematica’s equation solver Solve.
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consumption.
Next, define the system of differential equations for consumption and asset holdings.
Note that we multiplied the right hand sides by −1. This is because we solve the system backwards,
starting from the actual terminal condition. This is easily achieved by reversing the direction of time.
We obtain the solution, namely the time paths for consumption and wealth, using Mathematica’s
numerical solver NDSolve.21
The abbreviations cbSW and abSW stand for ”consumption backward” and ”assets backward” under
the linear solution obtained by Shimer and Werning (2008). Analogously, cfSW and afSW denote
“consumption forward” and “assets forward” under the linear solution, respectively. Upon extracting
cbSW and abSW, cfSW and afSW are obtained by reversing the direction of time again.
21NDSolve applies a variety of algorithms to obtain a solution. These include the forward Euler method, the midpoint
rule method, the smoothed midpoint rule method (sometimes called midpoint rule with Gragg smoothing), the linearly
implicit Euler method, the linearly implicit smoothed midpoint rule method (sometimes called linearly implicit midpoint
rule with Bader smoothing), and the numerical evaluation of parts of systems that are locally amenable to an analytical
solution. In principle, all but the last method take a sequence of steps in the dependent variable. NDSolve then estimates
the error in the solution and compares it to pre-specified tolerances. If not satisfied, NDSolve adapts the step size in
the numerical integration scheme or uses an alternative method to find a more accurate solution. In the problem above,
accuracy does not seems to be an issue. Cf. http://documents.wolfram.com/mathematica/functions/NDSolve for an
introduction to NDSolve.
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tend is the largest time value used in this calculation and corresponds to the point in time where an
unemployed individual arrives at the borrowing limit. Our choice of tend=50 (< 100, the upper limit
in the calculation) is arbitrary at this point. We verify below that it corresponds to an initial amount
of wealth of about 12.7. By choosing different time values for tend, we obtain the consumption and
wealth paths for all possible levels of initial wealth.
The policy function cu = cu (a) is simply the pairwise combination of the solutions for a (t) and c (t).
Using a sufficiently large value for tend, we obtain the policy function for all levels of wealth (the red
line).22
It runs between the a˙ = 0 (lower black line) and the c˙u = 0 (upper black line) locus. The green line
(identical to the c˙u = 0 locus) corresponds to the stationary consumption level after finding a job,
given the momentary level of wealth.
Step 2 (Calculating the Policy Function to the IBC Consistent Solution)
The policy function to the solution with borrowing constraint is obtained by imposing the boundary
condition (c, a) = (0,−b/r) when solving the system of differential equations:
22The figure above was generated using tend=100 (a[0]=34.7908) to include a broader range of asset levels. Note that
a = w/r = 20 corresponds to the present value of a workers’ “lifetime” income.
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Upon reversing the direction of time, we construct the policy function from the solutions for a (t) and
c (t) and add it to the figure obtained in Step 1 above.
Starting at the borrowing limit and moving to larger levels of wealth, the policy function to the IBC
consistent solution approaches the linear policy function from below. If individuals are sufficiently
rich, the presence of a borrowing constraint barely affects their consumption choice. At lower levels
of wealth, however, the borrowing constraint forces the unemployed to decrease consumption by more
than what is implied by the linear solution. In the figure, there is a visible reduction in consumption up
to about a = 6.7, which corresponds to about one third of the present value of a workers’ ”lifetime”
income (= w/r = 20). Using a careful calibration and/or estimation, future research may provide
important insights into the quantitative impact of borrowing limits and the observed heterogeneity in
consumption of the unemployed. In this assessment, the CARA case is an important assumption to
distinguish between the impact of borrowing constraints and changing risk aversion.
Given our exemplary choice of tend=50, a[0] is equal to 12.6681. If an unemployed individual starts
out with this level of wealth and does not find a job for 50 periods, she ends up with the maximum
attainable debt and zero consumption. Here are the time paths for wealth and consumption under the
IBC consistent solution for this unlucky individual:
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Step 3 (Comparing Consumption and Wealth Under the Two Solutions)
Since we are free to choose an arbitrary level of wealth, we simply use afSW[0]=8.28773 from the linear
solution and the same asset level under the IBC consistent solution (which turns out to correspond to
t=9.99128 in the initial run):
The next step is to solve the time-reversed system again, using as terminal conditions the identical
asset levels (a[100]=8.28773) and the corresponding consumption levels on the respective optimal
paths (c[100]=1.10731 and c[100]=1.09999, respectively):
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Upon extracting the solution and reversing time, we obtain the optimal time paths for consumption
and wealth under the two solutions. Looking first at the evolution of wealth, we find that starting
at a level of wealth equal to 8.28773 or about 41% of the present value of working on a job, there is
little impact of the borrowing constraint on the evolution of wealth. After some time, say, somewhat
longer than half of the average duration of an unemployment spell, the borrowing constraint starts
to affect the consumption behavior. The unemployed reduces her assets slower relative to the case of
unbounded borrowing. While the level of asset holdings under the linear solution continues to decline
until the individual finds a job, the IBC consistent solution reaches the maximum level of attainable
debt after 3.6 times the average duration of unemployment, and remains constant thereafter.
The time path of consumption reflects the evolution of wealth. Initially, the individual is sufficiently
rich so that consumption differs only slightly in the cases with or without borrowing constraint. While
consumption decreases linearly without the borrowing constraint, the IBC consistent consumption
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path declines faster, thereby slowing down the decline in wealth and, eventually, the increase in debt.
Including the borrowing constraint, consumption hits zero faster, and then remains constant until the
unemployed finds a job. In the linear case, consumption becomes zero at time 50, but continues to fall
to negative levels.
The thin lines depict the stationary consumption levels after finding a job, given the momentary level
of asset holdings. Note an important difference between the two solutions. In the case of linear con-
sumption, the increment in consumption when finding a job remains constant across time and, as can
be verified from the policy function above, also across asset levels. This feature causes the reserva-
tion wage in the original Shimer-Werning (2008) model to be independent of an individual’s financial
wealth, reflecting CARA. Under the IBC consistent behavior, the difference between consumption in
the two employment states increases steadily, starting (with a larger initial difference) at day one of
the unemployment spell. This is what generates declining reservation wages in the model with a wage
offer distribution in the main text – even under CARA.
Evidently, the quantitative effects crucially hinge on the exact parametrization and the initial level of
wealth. Consider, for example, an unemployed individual with zero financial wealth initially.
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She considerably retards the increase in debt, both by cutting initial consumption and by decreasing
consumption faster over time relative to the solution with unlimited borrowing. Measured by the
difference in consumption between the two employment states, the individual facing a borrowing
constraint should have a significantly stronger incentive to work.
In Shimer and Werning (2008), imperfect information on behalf of the unemployment agency gener-
ates the well-known Samaritan’s dilemma: the reservation wage (the probability of finding a job) is
increasing (decreasing) in the net subsidy (i.e. benefits net of employment taxes which we set to zero)
received by an individual. Yet, we have just seen that unlimited access to liquidity per se prevents
individuals from becoming less selective as wealth declines, and this finding is independent from the
current degree of risk aversion. With unlimited access to liquidity, the opportunity costs of consump-
tion under CARA are such that a constant reservation wage is optimal. Including the IBC, the costs
of consumption are higher, leading to larger levels of wealth so that lower expected wages are sufficient
to finance the target consumption level after finding a job.
Under CRRA preferences and the optimal insurance scheme, Shimer and Werning (2008) identify
two determinants of the reservation wage: first, as consumption falls, the unemployed’s risk aversion
increases, leading to a decline in her reservation wage. Second, the optimal unemployment policy
accompanies the increase in risk aversion and raises benefits over time, reinforcing the moral hazard
problem. In their calibration, the net impact of both effects is less, implying an almost constant
reservation wage.23
After shutting down both the decline in risk aversion and the increase in benefits, we have seen that a
constraint on borrowing induces optimal consumption to decline faster relative to the case where debt
is potentially unlimited. From the point of view of the unemployed, this implies that the expected
level of consumption after finding a job declines slower over the course of unemployment, because the
reduced levels of consumption during the unemployment spell retard the decline in wealth. Higher
levels of wealth c.p. enable higher levels of consumption when working on a job. This induces the
unemployed to accept lower wages (consumption of the unemployed does not change if the decline in
labor income is compensated by a higher capital income so that dw = −rda). Since imposing a no-Ponzi
game condition is equivalent to the natural borrowing constraint under CRRA, this mechanism plays
23An immediate implication is that imposing constant benefits comes at little additional cost.
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a role in the determination of the optimal level of constant unemployment benefits also. As argued
by Shimer and Werning (2008), the unemployment benefit under CRRA has the dual role of relaxing
the borrowing constraint and providing insurance. Interestingly, Shimer and Werning (2008) find that
providing extra liquidity by means of a welfare program that generates little incentive effects reduces
insurance costs. In particular, the solution to the optimal unemployment insurance implies notable
slowly adjusting job finding rates that in fact decline over time. Optimality in the sense of providing
the individual with a given level of utility at the lowest possible cost thus does not imply a policy
that puts the individual to work as fast as possible. It instead allows her to wait for a sufficiently well
paying job, thereby accepting lower capital income and potentially lower consumption in the future.
The interplay of risk aversion, liquidity, and optimal consumption in generating these findings provides
an interesting area for future research.
CRRA Preferences
Let us briefly consider the case of CRRA preferences in an economy with r = ρ explicitly. We proceed
just as in the previous section, but with the law of motion for c˙u given by
c˙u = −α
σ
[
1−
(
cu
ra+ w
)σ]
.
Following Shimer and Werning (2008), we set σ = 1.5. Performing analogous steps as in the CARA
case again gives a phase diagram-like figure of the policy rule:
The choice of tend=50 in this case implies an initial level of wealth equal to 14.1885. The time paths of
wealth and consumption of an individual with this initial level of wealth look similar to the respective
paths under CARA.
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Note, in particular, that the increment of consumption between the two employment states only
increases after quite a long duration of unemployment in this example.
If we relax the assumption of r = ρ, we must take the change in the optimal consumption of the
employed worker (ra + w in the case of r = ρ) into account. Since there is no job separation, the
employed individual lives in a deterministic world after finding a job. Her consumption Euler equation
is then given by the well-known expression c˙e = (r − ρ) /σ (see equation 6.14 in Section 6.3 with
s = dqµ = 0). After integrating, we get ce (t) = exp[(r − ρ) t/σ]ce (0), where ce (0) follows from the
IBC in the case of employment (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, pp. 93).24 Together with the
evolution of wealth, a˙ = ra+w−ce, we can construct a policy function ce (a) and then calculate cu (a)
just like before.
24If we denote by a¯ the level of wealth at the point in time where the unemployed finds a job, and further denote this
point in time by t = 0, the IBC is given by Z ∞
0
ce (t) dt = a¯+
w
r
.
Using c (t) = exp[(r − ρ) t/σ]ce (0) , this gives
ce (0) =
a¯+ w
rR∞
0
e
r(1−σ)−ρ
σ
tdt
.
If r (1− σ) < ρ, the exponent in the denominator is negative and
ce (0) =
`
a¯+ w
r
´
(ρ− r (1− σ))
σ
.
In the case where r = ρ, the consumption rule boils down to the linear solution in Shimer and Werning (2008) for the
case of employment,
ce (t) = c (0) = ra¯+ w
since a˙e = 0.
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8.B.2 Changing the Attitude Towards Risk
Finally, we consider the case of different degrees of risk aversion and prudence by varying γ and σ.
This section provides an introduction to the section to come, where we study the impact of changing
risk aversion and prudence on the optimal amount of savings in the standard two-period model of
savings under uncertainty.
CARA
Performing the by now familiar steps, we obtain the phase diagram for two different degrees of risk
aversion/prudence. We plot the policy function for γ = 1 (blue line) and γ = 5 (red line).
At any given level of wealth, the individual with higher degree of prudence/risk aversion chooses a
smaller amount of consumption than the less risk averse/prudent individual. To compare both policy
functions in terms of the optimal path for consumption and wealth over the course of unemployment,
we again evaluate the two solutions at identical initial levels of asset holdings. We pick a=2 and obtain
the following figure for the evolution of wealth:
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Corresponding to the lower level of consumption, the more risk averse individual runs down her
assets slower than the less risk averse individual.25 If the unemployment spells last for longer than
approximately 1.7 times the average duration of unemployment, the faster decline in the less risk averse
individual’s wealth implies that her consumption falls short of the consumption of the more risk averse
individual for the remainder of the unemployment spell. The conservative consumption behavior of
the more risk averse individual implies that her consumption level after finding a job always exceeds
the consumption level of the less risk averse individual, who has eaten up more assets and thus earns
less capital income.
CRRA
We calculate and plot the phase diagram for σ = 1 (blue line) and σ = 5 (red line).
To compare both paths, we evaluate the optimal wealth and consumption path for both individuals
25With CARA and CRRA preferences, a variation in the global degree of risk aversion (= −u′′(c)/u′(c)) implies a
variation of global prudence (= −u′′′(c)/u′′(c)) in the same direction as well. Cf. Chapter 9.
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at an initial level of financial wealth equal to a=5. The resulting patterns of wealth and consumption
are similar to the CARA case.
Appendix 8.C On the Agency’s Problem if Unemployment is Tem-
porary
To the best of our knowledge, no one has studied the path of an optimal unemployment policy in
a matching model with savings where individuals jump back and forth between employment and
unemployment, i.e. with stochastic durations of un-/employment spells. In this appendix, we take a
first step and derive the expected costs of a constant benefits and taxes policy to insure an individual
over the course of her lifetime. Given the lack of closed form solutions for consumption, we expect
that solving the unemployment agency’s dual problem is easier to do. In what follows, we assume that
the agency is committed to provide an actuarially fair insurance.
With positive job separation and matching rates, and constant benefits and taxes, the expected cost
of insuring an unemployed worker for T periods is
Z0,T = E0
∫ T
0
e−rtz(t)dt,
where z(t) ∈ {b,−τ} denotes the agency’s payment of benefit and revenue from the employment tax,
respectively. Expectations are formed about future employment states, given that the individual is
unemployed at t = 0. Given the Markovian evolution of employment, the conditional probability for a
currently unemployed worker to be employed at some future point in time t ≥ 0 only depends on the
elapsed time:
puu(t) =
s
α+ s
+
α
α+ s
e−(α+s)t.
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As t increases, puu converges to the fraction of time the individual will be unemployed over her lifetime,
i.e. the unemployment rate s/(α+ s).
From today’s point of view (t = 0), the insurance company pays out the unemployment benefit with
probability puu(t) and receives the employment tax with probability 1−puu(t) at time t. The expected
cost of running the insurance agency thus is
Z0,T =
∫ T
0
e−rt {puu(t)b− [1− puu(t)] τ} dt
=
∫ T
0
e−rt
{[
s
α+ s
+
α
α+ s
e−(α+s)t
]
b−
[
α
α+ s
− α
α+ s
e−(α+s)t
]
τ
}
dt
=
sb− ατ
α+ s
∫ T
0
e−rtdt+
α(b+ τ)
α+ s
∫ T
0
e−(r+α+s)tdt
=
sb− ατ
α+ s
(
1− e−rT
r
)
+
α(b+ τ)
α+ s
[
1− e−(r+α+s)T
r + α+ s
]
.
Taking the limit as T → ∞, the expected cost of insuring an individual throughout her life amounts
to
Z0,∞ =
sb− ατ
(α+ s)r
+
α(b+ τ)
(α+ s) (r + α+ s)
=
(
s
α+ s
)
b
r
−
(
α
α+ s
)
τ
r
+
(
α
α+ s
)
b+ τ
r + α+ s
. (A.1)
Suppose for the moment that once the unemployed finds a job, she can keep it forever so that s = 0.
The expected insurance cost for T periods then becomes
Zs=00,T = −τ
(
1− e−rT
r
)
+
α(b+ τ)
α
[
1− e−(r+α)T
r + α
]
,
and over an individuals lifetime (T →∞), this boils down to
Zs=00,∞ =
b+ τ
r + α
− τ
r
.
Without separation, the insurance agency simply pays out a continuous stream of unemployment
benefits (that ends stochastically with probability α) until the unemployed finds a job. The present
value of this cost is b/(r+α). When employed, the worker pays the employment tax forever, hence the
agency receives τ/r − τ/(r + α). In the case with separation, equation (A.1) is analogous, accounting
for the fact that the individual stochastically changes her employment status.
The insurance agency is limited to choose combinations of b and τ to provide an actuarially fair
insurance. Running the agency therefore comes at zero expected cost or gain, Z0,∞ = 0. The insurance
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agency is thus free to choose τ , but must pay the benefit b(τ) that is consistent with a fair insurance.
Solving Z0,∞ = 0 for b gives
bf (τ) =
α(α+ s)τ
αr + (r + α+ s)s
.
In the no-separation case, bs=0f (τ) = ατ/r. If we look at an individual with a positive reservation wage,
the arrival rate of a job is α[1− F (w¯)]. Hence, in the no-separation case, bs=0f (τ) = α[1− F (w¯)]/r.
270 CHAPTER 8. JOB SEARCH WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINT UNDER CARA
Chapter 9
How Changing Prudence and Risk
Aversion Affects Optimal Saving1
9.1 Abstract
In this chapter we show how optimal saving in a two-period model is affected when prudence and
risk aversion of the underlying utility function change. Increasing prudence alone will induce higher
savings only if, for certain combinations of the interest rate and the pure time discount rate, there is
distributional neutrality between the two periods. Otherwise, changes of risk aversion that affect the
distribution between the periods must also be taken into account.
9.2 Introduction
A famous result in expected utility theory states that a mean preserving spread of risky exogenous
future wealth leads to higher savings if the third derivative of the investor’s von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function is positive (see Leland, 1968, Sandmo, 1970, and Dre`ze and Modigliani, 1972). Utility
functions with this property thus reflect a specific precautionary savings motive and accordingly have
been coined as “prudent” (Kimball, 1990). Just like different utility functions may show different
degrees of risk aversion indicated by the Arrow-Pratt measure, they may in a quite analogous way
also show different degrees of absolute and relative prudence (see also Kimball, 1990, and the exposition
1This section is joint work with Wolfgang Buchholz. It presents a slightly modified version of Bauer and Buchholz
(2008).
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in Gollier, 2001). Whereas in some cases a globally higher degree of prudence will increase savings,
this assertion is not generally true (see, e.g., Menegatti, 2001, 2007, and Hau, 2002). In this chapter
we further explore, in the framework of the standard two period model with identical utility functions
in both periods, how a higher degree of prudence affects the optimal level of savings. The findings
of our analysis are ambiguous: If, through adequate combination of the exogenous interest rate and
the pure time discount rate, some equal treatment of the two periods is ensured, higher prudence will
induce higher savings. In other cases, the replacement of the utility functions typically has impacts
on the distribution of consumption over time such that, in addition, changes of risk aversion have to
be taken into account. If risk is low or the interest rate is high, the partial effect brought about by
a change of risk aversion will dominate, and the change of prudence becomes irrelevant. Moreover, it
can be shown that in the more general case with different utility functions in both periods, it cannot
a priori be expected that criteria based only on changes in prudence and risk aversion will generate
clear-cut effects on savings behavior.
9.3 The Model
Consider the standard optimal savings model under uncertainty when there are two periods, which
we synonymously interpret as two subsequent generations.2 We first assume that the utility function
is the same in the two periods 0 and 1 such that the objective function, i.e. the social welfare function
in the intergenerational case, is
u (w0 − s) + βEu (w˜1 + ρs) . (9.1)
Here, w0 denotes the given certain wealth in the first period, w˜1 is the uncertain wealth in the second
period and s is the endogenous amount of savings such that the (safe) consumption in the earlier
period is c0 = w0− s and (risky) consumption in the latter period is c1 = w˜1+ρs. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function u (ci) (with i = 1, 2) is assumed to be defined on R+ and to be three times
continuously differentiable with u′ (ci) > 0, u′′ (ci) < 0, and u′′′ (ci) > 0, i.e. it is strictly monotonically
increasing in consumption c, strictly concave, and prudent.
The marginal rate of transformation ρ between consumption in period 0 and 1 and the pure time
discount factor β are exogenously given by ρ = 1 + r and β = 1/ (1 + δ), where r is the interest rate
2With this interpretation, our results also have some relevance for the problem of intergenerational distribution which
is an important issue, e.g., in the current debate on global warming (see, e.g., Stern, 2006).
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and δ is the pure rate of time discount. We assume that maximizing (9.1) with respect to s yields an
interior solution s∗u, which is characterized by the first order condition
u′ (w0 − s∗u) = βρEu′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) . (9.2)
An important role in our analysis is played by the “precautionary equivalent wealth level” wˆ1 =
wˆ1 (ρs∗u, u, w˜1), which is defined as the certainty-equivalent of the wealth distribution under optimal
savings s∗u in period 1 when −u′ (c) is taken to be the utility function. Thus,
u′ (wˆ1) = Eu′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) . (9.3)
In general, the precautionary equivalent wealth level wˆ1 is related to the well-known precautionary
equivalent premium ϕ via wˆ1 = ρs∗u − ϕ (ρs∗u, u, w˜1) (see Kimball, 1990, and Gollier, 2001, esp. pp.
237–238).
The relation between wˆ1 and consumption w0 − s∗u in period 0 then crucially depends on the size of
βρ.
Lemma 9.1. If βρ < 1 (= 1, > 1) we have
wˆ1
w0 − s∗u
< 1 (= 1, > 1). (9.4)
Proof. The assertion follows as (9.2) and (9.3) imply
u′ (wˆ1) =
u′ (w0 − s∗u)
βρ
(9.5)
and u (c) is strictly concave.
We now analyze how optimal savings will change if the utility function u (c) is substituted by another
utility function v (c).
9.4 The Results
We assume that the new utility function v (c) has the same properties as the original utility function
u (c), i.e. that it is three times differentiable with v′ (c) > 0, v′′ (c) < 0, and v′′′ (c) > 0. Furthermore,
v (c) is supposed to be more prudent than u (c) according to the definition of Kimball (1990), i.e.
−v
′′′ (c)
v′′ (v)
> −u
′′′ (c)
u′′ (c)
(9.6)
holds for all consumption levels c > 0. Then, we get the following result:
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Lemma 9.2. If v (c) is more prudent than u (c) according to (9.6), then
v′ (wˆ1) < Ev′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) . (9.7)
Proof. Condition (9.6) implies that the utility function −v′ (c) is more risk averse than the utility
function −u′ (c). The assertion then follows from the identity (9.3) by applying a standard result
concerning changes of Arrow-Pratt risk aversion (see, e.g., Gollier, 2001, p. 21).
This result can now be used to show that in specific cases higher prudence will induce higher savings.
Proposition 9.1. If βρ is sufficiently close to 1, more prudence implies higher savings.
Proof. We first consider the case βρ = 1. Then, wˆ1 = w0 − s∗u from Lemma 9.1 such that Lemma 9.2
gives
v′ (w0 − s∗u) < Ev′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) . (9.8)
Starting from (9.8) with s = s∗u, it is a straightforward implication of the concavity of v (c) that s has
to be increased to restore equality, i.e. to get
v′ (w0 − s∗v) = Ev′ (w˜1 + ρs∗v) (9.9)
as the first order condition for optimal savings s∗v with the new utility function v (c). Therefore, s∗v > s∗u
holds in the case βρ = 1 and then, from continuity, also if βρ is sufficiently close to 1.
In general, however, higher prudence alone is not sufficient to provide unambiguous results on an
increase in optimal savings. Rather, additional assumptions on an accompanying change of risk aversion
are required. For the proof of these results, we need a lemma that is some kind of folk theorem in the
theory of risk aversion.
Lemma 9.3. The utility function v (c) is more (less) risk averse than the utility function u (c), if and
only if the ratio of marginal utilities v′ (c) /u′ (c) is decreasing (increasing) in c.
Proof. By means of a short calculation, it is shown that the following equivalence holds
d
(
v′(c)
u′(c)
)
dc
< 0 (> 0) ⇔ −v
′′ (c)
v′ (c)
> −u
′′ (c)
u′ (c)
(
<
u′′ (c)
u′ (c)
)
, (9.10)
which means that v (c) is more (less) risk averse than u (c) according to Arrow-Pratt’s standard
definition.
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We then have two results on the change of optimal savings depending on whether βρ < 1 or βρ > 1.
Proposition 9.2. If βρ < 1, higher prudence combined with higher risk aversion implies higher
savings.
Proof. Since, in the case βρ < 1, Lemma 9.1 gives wˆ1 < w0−s∗u, it follows from Lemma 9.3, i.e. higher
risk aversion of v (c), that
v′ (w0 − s∗u)
v′ (wˆ1)
<
u′ (w0 − s∗u)
u′ (wˆ1)
= βρ. (9.11)
From (9.11) and Lemma 9.2, i.e. higher prudence of v (c), we get
v′ (w0 − s∗u) < βρEv′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) . (9.12)
A similar reasoning as at the end of the proof of Proposition 9.1 then shows s∗v > s∗u.
Quite analogously, a result for the case βρ > 1 can be obtained.
Proposition 9.3. If βρ > 1, higher prudence combined with lower risk aversion implies higher savings.
Proof. Since, in the case βρ > 1, Lemma 9.1 gives wˆ1 > w0− s∗u, it follows from Lemma 9.3, i.e. lower
risk aversion of v (c), that condition (9.11) again holds. The proof then continues just like in the case
of Proposition 9.2.
We now want to provide some intuitive explanation for these results, which should make it more
transparent why savings behavior depends both on prudence and on risk aversion.
9.5 The Interaction of Changes in Prudence and Risk Aversion: An
Interpretation
For an interpretation of the results derived in the previous section, we start with the case βρ = 1 in
which β and ρ balance each other. Under the standard assumption that the economy is productive, i.e.
ρ > 1 holds, this advantage for the later generation is compensated by a positive pure time discount
rate δ > 0, i.e. β < 1, so as to avoid an unequal outcome and thus to ensure distributional neutrality.
This is a classical justification for pure time preference that dates back to Bo¨hm-Bawerk (1883)(see
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also e.g. Arrow, 1999, and – clearly expressed but quite unnoticed – Rawls, 1972, pp. 297-298). How
smoothing of consumption across the two generations is brought about by βρ = 1 is particularly
obvious in the special case when there is no wealth risk in the later period, i.e. if w˜1 is non random.
In this situation, βρ = 1 implies equal consumption levels for both generations. In the case where w˜1
is a random variable, the distributional balance between the two generations manifests itself in the
identity between consumption in period 0 and the size of the precautionary equivalent wealth level.
Then, as described by Proposition 9.1, the savings level is only affected by changes in prudence since
effects on intergenerational distribution are canceled out.
If, however, βρ 6= 1, things look quite different because in this case, a change of the utility function not
only exerts an influence on precautionary savings, but also on the distribution of consumption across
generations. First, consider the case βρ < 1 in which the future generation is disadvantaged through
a discount rate δ that is higher than the interest rate r, i.e. β is smaller than ρ. In the benchmark
case without wealth risk, the future generation then would have a lower level of consumption than the
present generation. With uncertainty in wealth w˜1 in period 1, the precautionary equivalent wealth
level is lower than consumption in period 1, i.e. wˆ1 < w0 − ρs∗u. Now, higher prudence still induces
higher saving via the precautionary motive (as in the case βρ = 1) but, in addition, the effects on the
intergenerational distribution that are implied by the replacement of the utility function have to be
taken into account, too. Since higher saving corresponds to a more equal intergenerational distribution
in the case βρ < 1, the new utility function v(c) must be more risk averse in order to ensure a higher
level of optimal saving (see Proposition 9.2).3 In the other case with βρ > 1, it is the future generation
that is privileged by the underlying combination of β and ρ which is reflected through wˆ1 > w0− ρs∗u.
To generate higher savings in this situation, the intergenerational distribution has to become less equal
such that higher prudence must be combined with less risk aversion (see Proposition 9.3).
Considering general risk averse utility functions, there is no systematic relationship between changes
of prudence and changes of risk aversion,4 which makes our results substantial. For specific classes of
utility functions, however, increased prudence goes along with increased risk aversion such that there
are opposing effects. Consider, as an example, the important case of iso-elastic utility functions for
which the constant elasticity of marginal utility is denoted by η. Further assume that the economy is
productive, i.e. ρ > 1, and that there is no pure time discount such that utility in both periods is given
3For some hints at the importance of risk aversion in this context see Ventura (2007).
4See Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (1994) for examples of the independence and an analysis of some existing relationship
between changes of prudence and risk aversion. Additional results on this are in Maggi, Magnani, and Menegatti (2006).
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equal weight, i.e. β = 1. An increase in risk aversion η now leads to an increase in the degree of relative
prudence which is η + 1. Therefore, the negative impact on savings that then results from higher risk
aversion via the consumption smoothing effect over time is counteracted by the precautionary effect
that stems from higher prudence. This ambiguity has clearly been noted by Dasgupta (2008) in his
comment on Stern (2006).
If future wealth is certain, i.e. w˜1 = w1, only changes of risk aversion matter. Therefore, by continuity,
for any given u (c), β, and ρ with βρ < 1 and any utility function v (c) that is more risk averse than
u (c), there always exists, irrespective of the prudence of v (c), a random wealth distribution w˜1 with
Ew˜1 = w1 such that s∗v > s∗u. If βρ > 1, the analogous result hold for utility functions v (c) that are
less risk averse than u (c). In this case, more saving is also compatible with lower prudence if future
wealth is uncertain.
Concerning changes of prudence, another irrelevance result is obtained when, for given u, β, and ρ,
the condition
w0 − s∗u ≤ w1 + ρs∗u (9.13)
holds for s∗u and w1 := min w˜1. Then, with optimal savings, wealth in period 1 in all states of the
world is at least as high as wealth in period 0. This clearly requires βρ > 1, and it is typically
possible to generate the situation described in (9.13) by only decreasing ρ strongly enough.5 Now,
assume that u (c) is replaced by any utility function v (c) that is less risk averse than u (c). Then,
h (c) := v′ (c) /u′ (c) is increasing in c by Lemma 9.3, such that we get
v′ (w0 − s∗u) = h (w0 − s∗u)u′ (w0 − s∗u) = Eh (w0 − s∗u)u′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u)
< Eh (w˜1 + ρs∗u)u
′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) = Ev
′ (w0 + ρs∗u) . (9.14)
By the standard argument already applied in the proofs of Propositions 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3 it then follows
that s∗v > s∗u, independently of any assumption on the change in prudence. As we have started with a
general utility function u (c), these considerations also show that the potential irrelevance of changes
in prudence for changes in savings is not a remote possibility, but rather a generic phenomenon.
5Let u′ (c) > 0 for all c > 0. Now assume that ρs∗u < M < ∞ for all ρ > 0. Then, from concavity Eu′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) >
Eu′ (w˜1 +M) > 0 for all ρ such that, for any β > 0, limρ→∞ βρEu′ (w˜1 + ρs∗u) =∞. The supposed boundedness of ρs∗u,
however, implies limρ→∞ s∗u = 0, such that limρ→∞ u
′ (w0 − s∗u) = u′ (w0) < ∞, which is not compatible with the first
order condition (9.2). Thus, limρ→∞ (w1 + ρs
∗
u) = limρ→∞ ρs
∗
u = ∞. This implies that there must exist a ρ˜ such that
w1 + ρs
∗
u > w0 > w0 − s∗u for all ρ > ρ˜.
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9.6 An Impossibility Result
We finally consider the general case where the utility functions in both periods are different. By u0 (c0)
we denote the utility function in the earlier, and by u1 (c1) that in the later period. Under otherwise
unchanged assumptions, the objective function then becomes
u0 (w0 − s) + βEu1 (w˜1 + ρs) . (9.15)
We now show that, given u0 (c0), β, and ρ, it is not possible to characterize the class of period 1 utility
functions v1 (c1) that induce higher savings than the original utility function u1 (c1) only by referring
to their (absolute) degrees of risk aversion and prudence. This impossibility result follows from the
following proposition.
Proposition 9.4. Let u1 (c1) be replaced by some other utility function v1 (c1). Then, there always
exists a utility function v˜1 (c1) which has the same degree of risk aversion and prudence as v1(c1)
everywhere, but induces a lower amount of savings than u1 (c1).
Proof. Define v˜1 (c1) as v˜1 (c1) := γv1 (c1) for some constant γ > 0. Thus, v˜1 (c1) clearly has the same
degrees of risk aversion and prudence as v1 (c1). Now, choose γ small enough such that
u′0
(
w1 − s∗u0,u1
)
> βEγv′1
(
w˜1 + ρs∗u0,u1
)
= βEv˜′1 (w˜1 + ρs
∗
u) , (9.16)
where s∗u0,u1 denotes optimal savings under the original combination (u0 (c0) , u1 (c1)) of utility func-
tions. Then, again by the standard argument described in the proof of Proposition 9.1, savings must
decrease when u1 (c1) is substituted by v˜1 (c1).
So we see that, because of a level effect, it cannot be expected in the general case that changes of risk
aversion and/or prudence will provide sensible results on changes of savings behavior.
9.7 Conclusion
This chapter has confirmed that only in rather limited cases, changes in the degree of prudence of
utility functions have unambiguous effects on optimal savings in the standard two period model. Only
if there are identical utility functions in both periods and the underlying combination of the interest
rate and the pure discount rate approximately give rise to distributional neutrality across the two
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periods, is it ensured that higher prudence induces higher savings. Otherwise, additional properties
of the utility functions also play an important role. With identical utility functions in both periods,
changes of risk aversion are also relevant when the intergenerational distribution is not balanced.
Then, distributional effects that are not grasped by changing prudence but instead by changing risk
aversion as a separate determinant become relevant for the savings decision. In general it is, depending
on the given interest and pure time discount rate, well possible that the precautionary effect and the
consumption smoothing effect over time resulting from a change of the utility function either support
or work against each other.
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